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ABSTRACT
This work examines some of the effects that developments in economic 
theory might have had on concepts of economic justice that are 
associated with it. For instance, concepts like desert which seemed 
to have dominated human thought on economic justice since Aristotle 
had disappeared almost entirely from present-day discussions of the 
subject. One possible explanation to it is the emergence of general 
equilibrium as a dominant feature of economic theory. In it, the idea 
of simultaneity erases all traces of causality between agents' 
activities and outcome. Thus the elusiveness of responsibility 
becomes detrimental to any theory of desert. But whether or not the 
demise of desert theories should follow from such developments in 
economic analysis also depends on what is meant by general 
equilibrium as well as on what is meant by desert. It matters a 
great deal whether the idea of general equilibrium is a perception 
of the real world or, a rationalistic tool of analysis. While the 
Walrasian notion of general equilibrium seems close to the latter, 
the 'empiricist' tradition of liberal classical economics implies 
a tendency to the former. However, in view of such a difference in 
the epistemological foundations, the whole idea of general 
equilibrium is open to different interpretations altogether. 
Classical economics, as represented by Adam Smith and J.S. Mill is 
a good example of models of general equilibrium where moral 
responsibility cannot be evaded. Indeed, in the ethical analysis of 
these models—  conducted by the same people who suggested them—  the 
role of desert was prominent. Contrary to the general belief that 
classical economists advocated natural liberty for its moral 
goodness as much as for its economic efficiency, analysis by desert 
reveals a serious moral inadequacy of natural liberty. This, in 
turn, may explain the discrepancy between the received view and the 
fact that the works of classical economists are sometimes full with 
moral apprehensions about natural liberty. : \
To reach such conclusions there is a need bo re-lnterpret ^ the works "
of Smith and Mill at both levels of economics and ethics. The bulk \ 
of this work is devoted to that purpose. A new interpretation of 
Smith's ethics is being offered. It is based on the consistency of 
human character and on the existence of some 'rationalistic' 
considerations in his work. Such an interpretation offers an 
alternative (and more comprehensive) solution to what became to be 
known as the Adam Smith's problem (old and new). Also, the 
application of his moral theory to the analysis of actions implies 
that a correlation must exist between intention and consequences.
Thus the moral significance of the proposed spill-over of 
beneficence derived from the 'invisible hand' mechanism, is 
questioned. A new interpretation of Smith's economic follows where 
'pre-market demand' relates the capitalists' decisions on saving to 
equilibrium prices. A distinction that has a moral significance is
then being drawn between 'market-price' and 'natural price' .
The study of Mill's methodology serves as a foundation to interpret 
some apparent contradictions in his moral theory (the relationship 
between Utilitarianism and Liberty). Ethology, which is the theory 
of character formation plays a major role in it. Coupled with Mill's 
theories of Free-will and Individuality, it is possible to establish 
a solution to the problems of Utilitarianism and Liberty without 
expanding the concept of utility. Similar principles are then 
introduced to Mill's discussion of economic justice. The principle 
of individuality is being presented in the form of Mill's principle 
of 'proportional remuneration'. A discussion of his theories of 
property follows and then, the question of the meaning of 
'proportional remuneration' is being put forward. Before, however, 
an exposition of Mill's economic model in the framework of 'cost of 
production' general equilibrium is being offered. Then, the 
principle of proportional remuneration is being investigated. It is 
also related to a much wider question of the role and meaning of the 
labour theory of value in classical economics.
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PART I
ETHICS-ECONOMICS RELATIONSHIP: AN INTRODUCTION
1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
This work is part of a wider research programme which is aimed at 
examining how concepts of economic justice are affected by 
developments in economic theory. More broadly defined, the context 
of this work is an investigation into the question of the 
relationship between ethics and economics. It is, however, confined 
to the study of these relationships in the context of classical 
economics alone.
What motivated this study is an observation whereby a concept of 
economic justice that seemed to have dominated human thought since 
Aristotle (and probably even earlier than that) had disappeared 
almost entirely from present discussions of the subject. I refer here 
to the concept of desert.^
Presumably there are many reasons for that and some of which may 
appear to rest entirely in the domain of internal developments within 
ethics and philosophy in general. Some however, by nature of the 
subject, must be associated with changes in economic theory and the
^The lost status of desert is discussed in more details in 
section (a) below. It should also be made clear that what I mean by 
desert is not a theory of entitlement derived from some natural 
qualities. Rather, I mean a concept of remuneration that is 
associated with efforts or deeds or, to generalise, with choice.
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subsequent change in the role and meanings of various economic 
concepts. One such reason, for instance, may be the emergence of 
Walrasian general equilibrium as a dominant framework of economic 
theory. In it the idea of simultaneity erases all traces of causality 
and thus makes it difficult, if not impossible, to associate any 
outcome with a particular activity (or choice) of any economic agent. 
Any theory of desert, therefore, will become intractable in such an 
economic setting.
There are, of course, other reasons and I will discuss what motivated 
this work in more details in the next section of this general 
introduction. What is however clear is that the task in front of us 
involves examining the correlation between developments in economic 
theory and the applicability to economics of various ethical 
concepts. Associating changes in economic theory to changes in the 
corresponding ethical discourse may, in principle, depend on two 
major features of such a change. One is a change in the subject 
matter of economics and the other, a fundamental change in 
methodology (and in particular, epistemology).
A change in the subject matter of economics may be a result of real 
changes in the world that surrounds us. These changes may be social, 
technological or both. They could, for instance, be changes in the 
economic significance of class distinctions. A change from an 
exchange economy with a very low division of labour where class 
distinction has no economic meaning, say, by way of its relation to 
modes of production, to an economy with a relatively high degree of 
division of labour were class distinctions and economic roles are
11
closely related^. Naturally what might have been considered as 
morally good, or just, in an exchange economy where class distinction 
has social meaning other than economical, cannot be the same as what 
might be thought of as morally acceptable in an environment where 
class distinction is marked by its economic significance.
At the level of methodological fundamentals the problem is perhaps 
easier to define. What we want to look at is whether or not there are 
some intrinsic relationships between the nature of economic theory 
and the nature of ethics. In particular, we would like to examine the 
epistemic content of economic propositions before we can apply to 
them ethical concepts which might have different epistemic 
significance.
For instance, if an economic model has been constructed on the 
foundation of 'classical empiricism'^ then obviously the 
epistemological content of the assumptions must be empirical. In 
other words, the assumptions are a description of the world. In such 
a case, would it be reasonable to apply concepts of justice that are 
derived in a 'rationalistic'* manner?.
When one associates economics with 'classical empiricism' one is not
 ^ I will show later in this chapter that such a change can be 
observed as we move from the partial equilibrium analysis of 
Aristotle through a similar, but nevertheless distinct, analysis of 
St. Thomas of Aquinas to the emergence of classical economics where 
the class distinction and its affect on production became the focus 
of interest.
 ^ By 'classical empiricism' I mean the empirical tradition of 
Locke and Hume.
*Here I refer mainly to the Cartesian-Kantian tradition.
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just saying something about the nature of economics, one is also 
saying something about the human mind. About how we perceive the 
world, how we form concepts, ideas etc.. This, I believe, cannot be 
entirely unrelated to how we form moral concepts, or ideas.
If we look at the Walrasian model and the subsequent treatment of it 
by Pareto, many serious questions of the methodological type arise.
I believe that I can show that Walras was first and foremost a 
'rationalist'; almost of a Cartesian kind.^ What then, one may ask, 
is the meaning of Pareto-Optimality in the context of his model. 
Clearly it is a concept of efficiency in terms of utilities. However, 
if utility is a 'rational' construction or, as Friedman (1956) puts 
it, an 'as if' statement, it is not a description of the world. Thus 
to argue that an allocation is Pareto-optimal does not tell us much 
about the real circumstances of the individuals involved. It only 
says that 'rational beings' --who do not really exist-- cannot get (4^  
a better deal without someone becoming worse off. But as people 
themselves are not necessarily 'rational' Pareto-Optimality is 
meaningful only if we argue that people tend to be 'rational' or that 
they 'should' be 'rational'. As neither of these is self-evident 
Pareto-Optimality is not the firmest foundation for a theory like 
Welfare Economics whose main concern are the circumstances of 
individuals within the economic system.
^Namely with little belief in any kind of direct relationship 
between the creation of the mind and their extension in the real 
world. So much so that he had to resort to a different model 
altogether in order to examine the relationship between his 'ideal' 
model and its possible extension in the world of matter. I refer here | n 
to the Tâtonnement which, by the way, failed to fulfil its purpose.
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This, of course, is not an argument against the use of 'rational' 
methods or against the 'as-if' argument. The usefulness of such 
constructions for the purpose of predictions cannot be denied. But 
whether 'prediction' implies 'explanation' is yet another serious 
hurdle to overcome. Ethical arguments in any case, when applied to 
economics, must be based on an understanding of the economic world 
rather than on the powers of its prediction mechanism.
All these are tremendously difficult and important issues, in 
particular, as we advance towards the 20th century where the problems 
of epistemology became much more complex. They are, however, beyond 
the scope of this particular study but they must be borne in mind 
throughout the reading of this work.
The reason why this work cannot cover the above issues is that much 
work was involved in the very first step of this ambitious programme. 
To analyze the association of changes in economic theory with changes 
in the conception of economic Justice one must be able to establish 
first that a particular economic system corresponds to particular 
ethical ideas. Then, one must be able to establish that a change in 
economic theory has indeed come about and what is the nature of this 
change. Then, one must examine whether this change imposes a change 
in the ethics that is applicable to the new economic system. An 
imposition that may be a result of a change in either the role of 
economic variables due to changes in the subject matter or, due to 
a change in the meaning of these variables (a change in their 
epistemic content). Alternatively, one must examine whether the 
concepts of ethics used in the past are still applicable to the new
14
system.
Perhaps the most significant and comprehensive change in the 
structure and nature of economic theory took place in the transition 
from the classical to the neo-classical paradigms. The first step, 
therefore, is to establish the application of ethics to economics in 
the context of classical economics. It is to this end -- the moral 
significance of classical economics-- that this dissertation is 
dedicated.
The two immediate questions that arise are (a) what does one mean by 
'classical economics' and, (b) which moral system should be 
associated with it. In the case of the classical school -under any 
reasonable definition- the answer to the second question seems to be 
almost straightforward. Most of the great scholars who wrote on 
economics also wrote on ethics, and usually they did so as part of 
a more comprehensive view of the social sciences. Thus, it will be 
sufficient to investigate the relationship between and across their 
own ethics and economics to see whether there are some intrinsic 
relationships between ethics in general and their classical models 
of economics.
As for the first question I will follow the convention. When I write 
about the 'classical school' I will refer here to what might be 
generally define as the 'liberal' tradition of 'classical economics'. 
By this I mean that I shall concentrate on the two major scholars 
whose writings are directly associated with the advocacy of 
free-trade (or natural liberty); Adam Smith and J.S. Mill. I also
15
imply by this that I shall exclude from my analysis a comprehensive 
discussion of other traditions, like the Marxian one, that are 
associated with classical economics. I will not, however, ignore this 
branch of classical economics altogether. In the analysis of how the 
theory has developed from Smith to Mill, I will also spend some time 
discussing and questioning whether the road to Mill is, as is 
usually implied, diametrically opposed to the one that leads to Marx, 
at least from the moral point of view.
Adam Smith and J.S. Mill were great scholars about whom a lot has 
already been said. While reading through their works I occasionally 
found myself at odds with the received view about their 
interpretations. Therefore, I had to devote some time to establish 
my own interpretation of some aspects of their works. Consequently, 
the reader will feel that there are a few digressions from the line 
of argument that was portrayed above. As I said before, this work is 
only a very first step, even a preliminary one, in my research 
programme. It should therefore be seen only as a novel exploration 
of Smith and Mill from the particular point of view of the 
relationship between their ethics and economics.
On the whole I believe that I have succeeded in establishing three 
major general propositions. One, that within the classical paradigm 
of which Smith and Mill are representatives, the framework of 
analysis is that of general equilibrium.® However, unlike the
®This may not be a novelty in as much as Smith is concerned but 
it is, by way of interpretation, in Mill's case. There is also a 
difference between the model applied to Mill and the one that is 
applied to Smith. In the case of the former, the novelty of my 
interpretation is that it is not based on a kind of input-output
16
accepted view, this general equilibrium is different in meaning and 
structure from the modern notion of its counterpart. Second, that 
Smith and Mill cannot be seen as utilitarians in the accepted sense 
of the word. And that each of them, in a different manner, thought 
of desert the key principle of economic justice. This, I believe, \ 
is a natural conclusion from the way they perceive and formalise the 
economic model. Also, in that context, both scholars who were 
fundamentally (but not entirely) empiricists drew obvious and strong 
relationships between morals and economics through their analysis of 
human nature. Namely, what it is that dominates people's moral 
opinion is not unrelated to what dominates their pursuit of their own 
interest. But whether their actual actions, or the state of nature, 
affect their natural features and consequently, their moral opinions 
etc. , is not very clear. In the case of Smith such a full cycle of 
the human character is not considered but is not logically 
inconsistent with his general theory of human nature. In Mill the 
dynamic perception of the human character is explicitly acknowledged 
through his references to a theory of Ethology. Unfortunately, he 
failed to develop this theory. However, through some logical 
extrapolation ethology can play a significant role in explaining some 
of the difficulties in his ethics though the features of the emerging 
character can only be speculated. The third conclusion, following 
the second one, is that it is false to believe that these scholars 
thought of natural liberty in the sense we understand it today as 
morally desirable.
Naturally these are only the general conclusions. There are many more
model rather that demand plays an unexpectedly significant role.
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additional points to be made in the particular context of each 
scholar but I do not wish to give a full account here. Each part of 
this work will open with an introduction that will be specific to the 
scholar who is being analyzed. I will explain their the reason why 
I chose each of them and what are the major problems with their 
interpretations from the ethics-economics relationship point of view. 
I will, nevertheless, offer now a very brief outline of the work's 
structure and then, in section (a) of this introduction, I will give 
a general account of what motivated and directed this work. I will 
discuss there the general problems of theories of desert in the 
context of the neo-classical paradigm as well as try to establish the 
dominance of desert theories in the past. This section can be skipped 
without seriously affecting the purpose of this particular 
dissertation.
The first part of this work deals with Adam Smith. At first, his 
methodology is being discussed and a point is being made about some 
'scholastic' ideas that still exist in Smith's perception of the 
world. This discussion leads to a new interpretation of Smith's moral 
theory which is based on his theory of human nature. Under this 
interpretation the 'Adam Smith Problem' (the TMS-WN relationship) is 
easily solved. Also, the application of his moral theory to the 
analysis of actions implies that a correlation must exist between 
intention and consequences. Thus the moral significance of the 
proposed spill-over of beneficence derived from the 'invisible hand' 
mechanism, is questioned. A new interpretation of Smith's economic 
model is then offered. According to this interpretation, where 
'pre-market demand' relates the capitalists' decisions on saving to
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equilibrium prices, a distinction that has a moral significance is 
being made between 'market-price' and 'natural price'.
A section is devoted to a general discussion of how the 
epistemological foundation can serve as a tool to study the 
evolvement of ethics-economics relationship between the times of Adam 
Smith and Leon Walras. In particular, some considerations are given 
to the question of framework. A distinction is being offered between 
the Walrasian notion of General equilibrium (a form of simultaneous 
equations) and a classical idea of it where causality is more easy 
to detect. The moral implications of these two different approaches 
is then only partially discussed.
The study of Mill's methodology serves as a foundation to interpret 
some apparent contradictions in his moral theory (the relationship 
between Utilitarianism and Liberty). It seems that the key to Mill's 
work is the neglected Ethology. Given Mill's theory of the Free-will, 
I suggest that Liberty, or Individuality, is not even a principle of 
justice as it is a pre-requisite for moral accountability. The fact 
that people's characters evolve (ethology) means that whether or not 
they have a free-will depend on the state of their individuality. 
Having no individuality means that people do not have a free will and 
thus are not morally responsible. Hence, even without expanding the 
principle of utility, one can offer an 'exogenous' (to morality) and 
consistent explanation to the theory of Liberty.
In the last two sections, I explore the implications of Mill's moral 
theory to his economics. First, the principle of individuality is
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being presented in the form of Mill's principle of 'proportional 
remuneration'. A discussion of his theories of property follows and 
then, the question of the meaning of 'proportional remuneration' is 
being put forward. Before, however, an exposition of Mill's economic 
model in the framework of 'cost of production' general equilibrium 
is being offered. Then, as an extrapolation, the principle of 
proportional remuneration is being investigated. It is also related 
to a much general question of the role and meaning of the labour 
theory of value in classical economics.
(a) The Lost Status of Desert: Motivation and Background
Before plunging into the depth of analyzing Smith and Mill I would 
like to share with the reader some of the general thoughts which 
motivated and directed this research programme. The following 
section, therefore, should not be seen as the final product of any 
research rather as the initial point; the point of questioning and 
reflection. Therefore it is not an integral part of the work and the 
reader may, if s/he so wishes, to skip it without affecting the 
integrity of this work.
As I said before it was the poor status of desert - - a remuneration 
principle that is associated with efforts and deeds-- against the 
background of its past dominance that has intrigued me first. There 
might indeed be many reasons why desert has almost disappeared from 
the agenda of economic justice debates but there are surely some
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which are strongly associated with the structure of economic theory.
(i) Economic Theory and Moral Principles.
Two such reasons for the decline of desert theories in economics 
might have been the emergence of Walrasian General Equilibrium as the 
dominant framework of economic theory and; the dominance of Utility 
theory in individuals' behaviour analysis as well as in the 
subsequent analysis of ethics-economics relationship. Walrasian 
General Equilibrium means, first of all, complete inter-dependence 
between all those variables which we consider to be 'economic^ 
variables'. This, in other words, also means that we cannot detect!
'A
clear causal relationships between those variables. If everything is 
being determined simultaneously then what one gets cannot be the 
direct result of what one does. Moreover, as one is at the same time-J 
a seller and a buyer, the possible advantages of his position in one 
market will be balanced by the disadvantages he might incur in the 
other market and vice versa. Hence there is nothing of great insight 
about effort-outcome relationship that we can learn in such an 
economic setting. Partial equilibrium analysis, which on the face of 
it seems the proper framework for any theory of desert, is a 
technical modification that can generate no ethical argument of any 
substance.
One may also wonder how, in principle, can anyone associate effort 
(provided that it can be measured) with remuneration in any neo­
classical paradigm. After all, what dominates modern economic
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analysis is the subjective attitudes of all economic agents. That is, 
if, say, labour is a measure of objective effort, equilibrium implies 
that the disutilities of labour were outweighed by the utilities 
derived from the remuneration (the bundle of goods).
To use a less Cardinal terminology, a bundle with so much 
remuneration and so much labour is preferred to any other possible 
combination. Desert, if meaningful at all, is therefore embodied in 
the concept of utility (or preferences). This, I believe, is the 
second reason for the elimination of desert from the ethics-economics 
agenda.?
Whether the mere use of the theory of utility (in its ordinal form) 
in economics has moral implications is yet again another serious 
question. What is, however, quite clear is that even without 
utilitarian moral considerations, desert and the theory of utility.
^Scepticism about how well does the concept of utility express 
the individual's welfare (or, as Hicks called it 'the ends of the 
economics life') has been pointed out by economists like Hicks(1959) 
and Sen(1987). Hicks wrote :"this characteristic feature [welfare 
economics] can be described as a belief that ends [of economic life] 
can be adequately expressed in terms of 'utility functions' or 
'indifference maps' that are 'revealed on the market', or could be
so revealed under suitable conditions. That we need some such
constructions as these I do not deny. Our basic concepts. Production 
and Distribution themselves, make no adequate sense without
them;...But...I have become more and more conscious of the
artificiality of these assumptions. They are simplifications, by 
which we beat reality into a form which makes it tractable to 
economic analysis; they are not more than that. In our role as 
economic technicians, we cannot do without them; but as soon as we 
aspire to be something more than technicians, we must see them for 
the shaky supports that they are."(Hicks, 1959, p. x ) .
My criticism, however, goes beyond this. Not only that it is possible^ 
that we do not capture with utility theory all what constitutes the! / \  
individual's perception of his or her welfare, but it might in itself 1 '—  
contradict some basic principles that we might have about the 1
internal composition of the bundle of economic variables which j
depicts our circumstances.
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as a behaviourial premise, do not coincide. A theory of desert is a 
theory whereby people have a view about the desired relationship 
between effort and remuneration. This, in other words, is a moral 
'principle' that relates to the internal composition of the vector 
of economic variables. As such, it is not a continuous idea in the 
space of those economic variables. Namely, either there is some 
proportion between remuneration and effort or there is none. The 
axioms of 'completeness' and 'continuity' of individual's ordering 
imply that any 'principle' concerning the internal order become^ 
vacuous to a great extent.
&
These axioms generate an important aspect in the theory of 
individuals behaviour; substitutability. If a particular vector of 
efforts and remuneration is preferred over the other there exists 
a set of vectors with, obviously, different proportions of effort to 
remuneration so that the Individual is indifferent between them. In 
other words, substitutability implies that every principle can be 
compromised or undermined. It will, in my view, be thoroughly 
inconsistent to represent an individual's preferences in a utility 
function if he has a principle that is concerned with the internal 
composition of the domain of his preferences.
t
Some would argue that the problem of 'principles' in the theory of 
individuals' behaviour is merely a problem of Lexicographic ordering. 
As such, it is a known problem in economic theory and though such 
orderings cannot be represented in a utility functional form there 
are ways to deal with it. However, this is not exactly the same as 
the point I was making. Let us look at a lexicographical ordering in
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the space of leisure [1,] (an inverse measure to labour efforts) and 
X which is a composite consumption bundle. Lexicographical ordering 
means that for two bundles a, and b:
a is preferred over b if either (i) 1,®> 1,^
or (ii) l.*-l,^ and x.>Xy
II
1.
Figure I depicts Lexicographic preferences and figure II depicts a 
'principle'. Clearly the problem of I is that the 'continuity' axiom 
is being violated but this is not necessarily so in II. The sloped 
line in II depicts the principle in the sense that everywhere above 
it the person feels as if his principle (his moral demand) is 
satisfied, everywhere below it is violated.® The line itself 
represents the acceptable substitutions between effort and 
consumption. It is difficult to say that these substitutions are part 
of the individual's preferences. They are more than that, they 
reflect a principle. Crossing that line will not bring about a less 
preferred bundle, it will bring about a furious and frustrated
® It should be noted that the position of that line is not 
independent of the general circumstances of society.
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individual. There is, according to standard theory, no way^ accept \
cardinality, to distinguish between the preferences of the indien 
when his claim for desert has been satisfied and when it has been 
violated®. If, then, being on the 'principle line' means that we are 
at a 'pre-rational' stage, then the set upon which preferences in the 
normal sense are defined is an open set. In that case, like in 
Lexicographic ordering we have a problem of 'continuity' on top of 
the problem that part of the set of choices is not subject to the 
normal preferences scheme. If, however, we include the principle line 
in the set which generates representable preferences then there is 
no problem of 'continuity'. The problem of 'completeness' however 
remains unresolved. Any solution resorting to a separable form of a 
general utility function will preserve substitutability and will 
therefore be no significant improvement. Therefore, the problem we 
have here is much more complex than the problem of lexicographic 
orderings.
At the level of social choice and general equilibrium this is a much 
more serious problem. Assume an economy with two individuals who have 
in their bundles commodity (say, x) and leisure (with homogeneous 
skills). The production function is homogenous of degree 1:
®Perhaps a somewhat similar case can be seen in the 'trade 
independence axiom' (TIA) in general equilibrium analysis. This axiom 
is relevant to the examination of whether general equilibrium - a 
situation in which everyone is believed to have at least not worsen 
his conditions- is consistent with famine (see Cole and Hammond 
(1986)). It means that in the initial state people have enough 
endowment so to ensure their survival. The intuition here is that if 
the TIA does not hold, then it is unlikely that individual will 
behave in a rational manner. A desperate person is not necessarily 
rational. Thus, the behaviourial assumptions will hold no more and 
the whole analysis might collapse. In the principle case one may say 
that people are not willing to consider rational behaviour (like, for 
instance, substitution) before something else is being satisfied.
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?
The diagonal is line along which output is being distributed 
according to each individual's effort (labour inputs)^®. Clearly 
there is a single point where the diagonal crosses the contract 
curve. Namely, there is a point where proportional remuneration is 
Pareto-efficient. Moreover, for a distribution which satisfies the 
principle of proportional remuneration, there exists an initial 
allocation such that the satisfaction of the principle is consistent 
with a competitive equilibrium.^^
So have I complained in vain? The answer is no. Let A be any point 
on the diagonal and B the point of Pareto-ef f iciency on that
^°When abilities are different then the problem becomes more 
complex as the size of the box changes continuously. I will give a 
more rigorous account in the Appendix to the last section in this 
work but the relevant conclusions don't change.
Recall however that in terms of individuals' choice the upper 
triangle is the domain of choice of individual 1 where his principle 
of remuneration is satisfied. Similarly, the lower triangle has the 
same meaning to individual 2. But the lower triangle is entirely in 
the domain where I's principle of desert is violated. Similarly the 
domain of I's choice is where 2's principle is violated.
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diagonal. To argue that B is Pareto-efficient we have to say that 
there is a utility level associated with it. The indifference curve 
at B must also be higher (for 1) than the one that goes through A. 
Hence, for B to be Pareto-efficient it must mean that we cannot move 
to A without someone being worse off. If, however, both individuals 
have a principle of proportional remuneration then in what way are 
they worse off at A? The principle is satisfied and as for anyone of 
them the preferences over the 'principle violating triangle' are far 
from being the smooth representable ones, there is no meaning to 
these indifferent curves in the first place. Their preferences may 
be normal when the principle is satisfied but these sub-sets are not 
at all in the domain of social choice.
Of course, this is so because I assumed Homogeneity of degree 1 in 
the production function. If, however, this was not the case 
principles of desert may not be so inconsistent (conceptually) with 
Pareto- efficiency. On the other hand, the problem of defining 
proportional remuneration will become more difficult. If now we have 
a production function of the type^^:
%=a(Z,i+I,2)+K
then using a method derived from the Euler equation to denote the 
share of labourers in output will not be as straightforward as it 
would have been in the previous case. In the previous case, where
The reader will appreciate that I have chosen a rather 
awkward kind of production function but this is simply to make the 
point in a straightforward manner. The discussion would not have 
changed had I chosen a kind of Cobb-Douglas production function where 
the sum of powers is greater or less than unity.
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constant returns to scale were present, the share of each individual 
in the total output was:
Now under the new production function this may still be the intuitive 
share of each individual but it certainly does not explain the whole 
output. Assuming that K is an exogenous feature which does not belong 
to anyone we can still argue that represent that shares of the 
individuals' contributions. Now, however, we shall have the case 
where each individual's proportional remuneration line lies apart as 
in the following diagram:
X
1 Le
Now, the shaded area is an area in which the 'normal preferences' of 
each individual prevail (their principles have been satisfied). Thus, 
any point on the contract curve within this domain has its normal
meaning 13
i^It is a situation where we can say that people have received 
what is considered to be their share in production and they compete 
for the share which is generally attributed to technology. If 
ownership of technology is also specified, then we are back at our 
original story.
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On the face of it, it seems that in such a case one can really 
accommodate desert and Pareto-efficiency^* by using some kind of 
lexicographic moral ordering. Namely, saying that social choice is 
such that proportional remuneration must be satisfied first and only 
then, can we apply the Pareto criterion^\ In the above diagram it 
means that we know, a-priori, that the socially desired outcome will 
be within the shaded area. Applying Pareto to it means that it will 
be on the contract curve within that area.
There is an example of another principle which seems to have been 
doing well in the context of traditional economic analysis. It is the 
Rawlsian 'difference principle' or the Maximin. It seems to me, 
however, that the acceptability of Rawls's 'difference principle' is 
founded on the assumption whereby the Maximin itself is a 'rational' 
choice. This choice, made by individuals behind the 'veil of 
ignorance' in the space of 'primary goods', makes the Maximin 
compatible with the most fundamental premise of contemporary economic 
theory. Namely, by assuming that individuals' preferences over the 
'primary goods' space are properly behaving preferences the 
rationality of individual in the full space of economic variable must 
inevitably be an extension of that rationality. The deduction of the 
'difference principle' therefore is based on the same logic of
^*By which I mean the whole theory of representable preferences.
^^By lexicographical moral ordering I mean an ex-post analysis. 
Namely, we may allow the final distribution to occur anywhere in the 
above diagram. Given the general assumptions about competition this 
is likely to be on the contract curve. Only then we ask ourselves 
whether the allocation is socially desirable. The answer to it 
reflects lexicographic moral ordering which is super-imposed ex-post 
on a normal ordering. Namely, we require from the desired allocation 
(to distinguish from the merely feasible one) to satisfy proportional 
remuneration first, and then Pareto-optimum.
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Pareto- efficiency.
In the case of desert principles this logical extension is far from
^eing obvious. Though there is a scope where traditional economic
j  ^ '
analysis can help in choosing the desired outcome (the shaded area 
in the above diagram) there is a serious question mark on why should 
we adhere to any principle of desert in the first place. If we are 
willing to accept substitution between effort and consumption in 
general why should we insist on some kind of proportional 
remuneration. If we observe people to have principles of the desert 
kind it must mean that they are not rational. If so, what is the 
meaning of the Pareto-criterion to non-rational beings?
So well does the Rawls ian principle fit into the framework of 
contemporary analysis that in order for it to co-exist with the ^
Pareto criterion we can mend social choice theory and think of a 1
social welfare functional which escapes the problem of social welfare ,/ 
functions and allows us to think of it as a lexicographic ordering ; 
in the space of moral theories. The 'Leximin' principle (Sen (1976)) 
is an example to such a case. We give the Maximin principle priority 
but once it is satisfied, we can go back to use the Pareto criterion.
As at both level of choice -the level of choosing the moral principle 
of the Maximin and the level of regular economic performance- we have 
smooth and well behaved preferences it is the rational construction 
which plays the important role.
But while it might make sense to establish the 'difference principle' 
on a rational construction (as it is a hypothetical situation in any
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case) the meaning of such a construction^® in the context of 
activity (and hence, Pareto) is much less obvious. If people are not, 
as a matter of fact, rational then Pareto efficiency is, at best, a 
prescription which tells people about the benefits of rationality.
In other words, 'rationality' as a construction for what ought to be
3 'makes sense. As a prescription that says that if people were
'rational' then the ought to have been would have anyway come about 
it does not form a very appealing method of constructing moral ideas. 
Thus, although both the 'Difference principle' and Pareto-efficiency 
are based on 'rationality' , they are not necessarily an extension of 
one another.
In the case of desert the problem is even more serious. If we expect 
that the behavioral foundation of economics and ethics to be the 
same, desert and Pareto cannot go together. If rationality^^ is 
required to establish the principle of desert, it cannot do so due 
to the lack of substitutability between effort and consumption.
A last note on this subject is concerned with the relationship 
between economics and desert theories of the kind mentioned by Nozick 
(1974). The difference between what I refer here to theories of 
desert and the Nozick configuration is quite big. In Nozick we
In the sense of epistemic content. Namely we have a social 
judgement that is based on rationality which might not exist in the 
real world.
^^ I mean rationality as a set of axioms which define preferences 
as being rational, not the school of 'rationality' which relates to 
a kind of epistemology. As a matter of fact it is within the 
'rational' school that principles of desert are likely to arise; like 
the right to the fruits of one's labour which is based on some kind 
of ownership of the self.
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ML/)
concentrate on the initial position. Given that any legitimate 
exchange is morally approved, rationality implies that if the initial 
endowment is at point A in the above Edgeworth Box then it is quite ^  
conceivable that the process will end somewhere where the  ^
proportional remuneration principle does not hold. In such a case I j 
can ask again why is the desert of any relevance in the initial state \ ^  y {tJp 
if people are willing to exchange it for something else. In other— ' /
words, rational people don't believe in desert theories. \,
A
All these questions that are raised in this sub section are questions 
of great importance to any current discussion of ethics-economics 
relationship. In this work, however, I will not deal with these 
issues beyond what I have just said. Here, as I said before I will 
concentrate on whether or not a particular system generates a 
particular kind of ethical discourse. In view of all that, the fact 
that classical economics with its form of general equilibrium 
generate a theory of economic justice which is based on desert is of I
great significance. In the work that follows this dissertation and j
which I have already begun, the issues of this section will come to f
the forefront. The major conclusion of the above is that the 
dominance of utility theory in individual's behaviour analysis 
excludes a part of what might have been considered as a concept of 
economic justice. As a matter of fact, together with the Walrasian 
concept of General Equilibrium it has excluded from the domain of 
ethical discussions of economics an idea that has been there [almost] 
ever since.
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('It) A Brief History
How dominant had been the principle of desert in the conception of 
justice throughout the history of Western thought can easily be 
established by looking at two major figures like Aristotle and St. 
Thomas of Aquinas. There can be little doubt about the prominence of 
St. Thomas of Aquinas within the Scholastic era which dominated the 
intellectual arena of the Middle Ages. Nor can there be any question 
about the influence that Aristotle exerted on St. Thomas of Aquinas.
Though looking at these two scholars alone is by no mean a pretention 
to capture the whole of the complexity of human thought throughout 
Antiquity and the Middle Ages, one cannot deny that they are sources 
of some authority to the general trends in the history of ideas. As 
this section is merely devoted to point out a general trend which 
constitutes part of what motivated this work, I will not try to 
defend this choice any further. For the same reason I not offer a 
comprehensive treatment of these scholars work. I will only 
concentrate on showing that justice in general, and when applied to 
economics in particular, is dominated by the idea of desert.
The Greek word for justice- dika- meant originally 'due share 
But for the ancient Greeks it meant 'the due share distributed by 
'moira''(fate) which, in other words, is strongly related to people's 
character within the framework of some kind of a godly design. Later 
on, this Homeric notion was transferred to the 'city-state'. Both 
Plato and Aristotle saw the concept of justice as rising from a
see a discussion in Spengler, p.79. ^
similar notion of 'due-share' even though it was now confined to the 
framework of the 'city-state' and its general governing laws.
Just, to Aristotle, means lawful and fair (Nic. Eth. Book V, 1129a21- 
b6) . Fairness here means not to take advantage of another, which, in 
other words, means not taking more than one's share. But what 
Aristotle means by one's share is a very difficult and peculiar idea. 
One's share is determined primarily by one's personal 
characteristics. Thus, things may be intrinsically good^® but they 
may not be good for this particular character. For instance, giving 
wealth beyond one's needs if one is prodigal is, in Aristotle eyes, 
giving him more than his share.
This is an interesting idea which associates some notion of 
efficiency with what is a 'due share' . Indeed, in his Politics, there 
is a whole section where Aristotle discusses the different roles 
people have in the household and the respective moral virtues that 
they will have or need (Politics, Book I xiii, 1259bl8-1260b24). 
Namely, moral virtues are associated with one's role in society. 
Consequently as there are many roles in society there are different 
merits and a distribution of wealth and other things should be 
according to a principle of 'proportionate equality'. A distribution 
whereby having a greater share is related to having greater merits 
(Politics, Book III xii, 1282bl4-1283a22).
Already we can see that the most fundamental perception of justice 
is associated with some kind of desert. It is, however, not the kind
^®and I refrain from discussing why and how.
34
of desert which I have in mind because it is not associated with any 
kind of actions or deed. Rather it depends on personal 
characteristics which may be entirely outside the domain of a 
person's free choice (like birth, for instance). Nevertheless it is 
a principle of justice which distinguishes between individuals. 
Perhaps instead of desert we should call such theory of justice a 
theory of 'merits' but in any case it is not a principle for which 
the difference between individuals is insignificant.
But Aristotle was not indifferent to the actual behaviour of 
individuals. The first step in that direction can be seen within the 
context of distributive justice but with reference to the 
distribution of political power and privileges. Here, argues 
Aristotle, political power should be distributed in proportion to 
'value received'. Namely, power should be distributed according to 
each individual's contribution to the general purpose for which the 
state exists (Politics, III ix, 1280a7-1281al0).
There is an even stronger argument why desert, in the sense of 
remuneration for deeds, plays a role in Aristotle's theory. It is the 
distinction he makes between 'distributive' and 'rectificatory' 
justice (Nic. Eth. V, 1131bl4-1132a2). Today when we talk about 
economic justice we immediately refer to 'distributive' justice. In 
the case of Aristotle this was far from being the case. 
'Distributive' justice deals with distribution of anything according 
to merits or, to be more specific, social status. It deals with the 
distribution of honours, privileges, political powers as much as it 
deals with wealth. But wealth here is not understood as an economic
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variable rather as a social variable which is necessary to support 
moral virtues and the advancement of the 'good' life.
Economics in Aristotle is mainly confined to the problem of exchange. 
Resources allocation and final distributions can hardly be seen as 
a mere economic problem. Under the domain of 'rectificatory' justice 
come all kind of voluntary transactions "e.g., selling, buying, 
lending at interest, pledging, lending without interest, depositing 
and letting. ."(Nic.Eth. V 1130b32-1131a22) . Thus the problem of 
economic justice is a problem of 'rectificatory' justice.
As the actions here are voluntary, economic justice in such a 
framework cannot be a procedural idea. Namely it cannot be the actual 
freedom to exchange which generates the notion of justice. Rather it 
is the outcome, or the price that emerges, which constitutes the 
subject of justice. Hence, the problem of economic justice is the 
problem of the 'just price'.
The literature on the interpretation of Aristotle's 'just price' is 
quite extensive. I do not wish to go through the various arguments 
but I do think that it is quite obvious that the 'just price' bears 
the mark of proportional remuneration^®. 'Proportional reciprocation 
is the basis of all fair exchange' writes Aristotle but it is unclear 
what is really meant by it. Any transaction, according to Aristotle,
Even Schumpeter who argues that Aristotle's, as well as St. 
Thomas's 'just price' is the simple competitive price, agrees that 
by implication it may be a cost related price. On the whole I 
disagree with Schumpeter's interpretation but I can see why he 
reached his conclusion. As will become clearer later, it is all a 
matter of interpreting 'demand'.
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may end with a 'gain' to someone and a 'loss' to another where ' g a i n ^  
('loss') is to have more (less) than one's s h a r e ^ i .  g^t by this more ] 
or less Aristotle is referring to whet one had at the beginning of 
the process. But what does it mean tc have more or less than one's
share in that sense? # Aç"*- '
Some would argue that this is a kind of a labour theory of value 
where the relative price reflects the relative difficulty in 
production. An idea which is usually based on the following 
statement: "There will be reciprocity, then, when the products have 
been equated, so that the as the farmer is to the shoemaker, so is 
the product of the shoemaker to the product of the farmer."(Ibid, V 
1133a31) . But this is not so straightforward as it appears. According 
to Aristotle the thing which brings about the execution of a proposed
exchange is the coincidence of demands (Ibid, V 1133a31-bl9) . To some 'j 
extent there is a hint of Walras' Law in all that because A r i s t o t l e ' 
demands that for exchange to take place the seller who has a demand
for other goods must expect his demand to be met before he will part 
from his merchandise^^. But what matters for us in this story is the 
definition of demand.
Demand is not explicitly spelled out but what one can understand from
^^One should be careful not to confuse the word 'gain' with a 
'utility gain' in standard economic theory. Here 'gain' is measured 
in real terms.
According to B.J. Gordon 'Aristotle And the Development of 
Value Theory' Q u a r t e ly  J o u r n a l  o f  E c o n o m ic s Vol.LXXVIII February 1964 
pp. 115-128, both relative cost and relative utility determine the 
exchange rate. I must admit, however, that I find the interpretation 
of Aristotle's 'demand' as 'utility' wholly unconvincing.
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Aristotle's writings is that demand, actually, is 'n e e d s T h e s e  
needs can be interpreted narrowly to mean ' the needs for 
reproduction' and hence a labour theory of value will follow. But in 
general, for Aristotle needs are not only those directly associated 
with the process of production but also those which arise due to 
one's social position. In such a case, the relation between the 
farmer and the shoemaker is not the ratio of their labour (effort) 
but it is this plus a whole range of other needs completely 
independent of the production circumstances of any commodity.
But which ever definition of demand we choose to accept we will 
always end up with a theory of the 'just price' where the key issue 
is proportional remuneration. As the needs arising from production 
are in the demand in any case, it cannot be said that the 
proportional remuneration is independent of effort. An abolition of 
the systems where merits were intrinsic to social classes will strip 
the theory to become such that will suggest the labour value as the 
'just price'.
By the acknowledgement that it is possible that in a voluntary 
exchange prices will emerge such that someone will get 'more than his 
due share' while someone else will get 'less than his due share' 
Aristotle suggests that the just price does not always prevail. To 
the extent that his 'model' is a general equilibrium one (in the
Commentators like J.T. Noonan(1957) and J.J. Spengler(1955) 
see in Aristotle's use of 'demand' as an indication that prices have 
nothing to do with 'cost of production'. I believe this view to be 
false but this is obviously not the place to develop such an 
argument. It will become evident from my exposition why, in my view, 
demand can be interpreted as related to 'cost of production'.
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sense that coincidence of all needs precede actual exchange) prices 
will always be at their 'just' level. Obviously, though his 'model' 
may suggests some general equilibrium property, Aristotle saw it as 
a partial equilibrium analysis. In such a framework it is not 
inconceivable to end up with an 'unjust' price. But whatever system 
we choose, the 'just price' is the key concept of 'economic justice' 
in Aristotle and, it is a concept based on desert.
The Aristotelian notion of the 'just price' was carried into the 
Middle Ages by one of its most clear representative; St. Thomas of 
Aquinas. There are two major sources for St. Thomas of Aquinas' views 
of the 'just price' . One is in his Commentary on the Nicomachean 
Ethics (CNE)^*. The other is in his Summa Theological (ST)^^.
It is a question of considerable interest to examine how the sphere 
of economic activities had developed since Aristotle times to St. 
Thomas days. It could have shed some light on the differences that 
exists between the two scholars perception of economic justice. It 
seems to me, however, that the changes were not as great, in essence, 
as one could have expected. There were obviously changes in the form 
of ownership and the organisation of society but in terms of modes 
of production it seems to me that the changes were not of great 
significance. Consequently the focus of economic activity remained 
exchange at a moderate level of division of labour with no reference 
at all to relationships in production.
^Vhich can be found in Volume I of the Library of Living 
Catholic Thought series, Henry Regnery Company, Chicago,1964.
^^a translation by J.E. Welldon in: A.E. Monroe Early Economic 
Thought, Harvard University Press, 1951.
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Indeed, from the study of St. Thomas's comments on Aristotle's ethics 
it appears that he accepted, in principle, Aristotle's definition of 
the 'just price'. In his Commentary he makes the vague parts of 
Aristotle more explicit. "In order to have just exchange, as many 
sandals must be exchanges for one house...as the builder... exceeds 
the shoemaker in his labour and cost... "(ONE V ix p. 426). And as 
Hollander(1977) points out, according to St. Thomas demand is merely 
used as a general statement about what generates exchange^®. So that 
what comes out of this interpretation is that there are now no 
qualification to the statement that the 'just price' is a 'cost of 
production' (or labour theory of value under some interpretations). 
From that I conclude that the principle of desert, as a principle of 
economic justice was upheld by St. Thomas of Aquinas.
However, some may argue that the fact that St. Thomas has interpreted 
Aristotle correctly does not mean that he also agreed with these 
views. In the Summa Theological St. Thomas refers very clearly to the 
fact that market forces may move demand and supply in such a way that 
the price may not reflect cost of production. But then he gives a 
long moral defence to such fluctuations on the ground of the same 
principle as before; the principle of desert. "Gains, however, which 
is the end of trading, though it does not logically involve anything 
honourable or necessary, does not logically involve anything sinful 
or contrary to virtue ; hence there is no reason why gain may not be 
directed to some necessary or even honourable end; and so trading
^®I, personally, as shown above prefer to think of 'demand' as \ 
'needs' in a general sense such that generate a clearing of the \ 
markets rather than just as a general statement about the nature of \ 
exchange.
40
will be rendered lawful; as when a man uses moderate gains acquired 
in trade for the support of his household, or even to help the needy; 
or even when a man devotes himself to trade for the public welfare, 
lest there be a lack of things necessary for the life of the country; 
and seeks gain, not as an end, but as a REWARD FOR HIS EFFORTS(ST 
p.63, my italic).
There is, of course, the problem of relationship between market price 
and cost of production price. Whether or not there is an explicit 
connection between them in the works of St. Thomas is an unresolved 
debate. I tend to accept Hollander(1977)'s view on that matter to the 
extent that there is no evidence to show how market price relate to { Y 
cost of production. I do, however, believe that a logical 
construction can be made if we interpret demand as the extended 
notion of 'needs' as I did in the case of Aristotle^^.
But all this does not affect my major conclusion that the principle 
of economic justice that dominated a significant period of time in 
the development of human thought had been that of the 'just price'.
This, in turn, had almost invariably been associated with the concept 
of desert.
The emergence of the 'classical school' in economics has brought
^^A possible explanation to the move from the Aristotelian cost 
of production price to a market price can be the change in the 
meaning of demand. In Aristotle demand included 'needs' that were 
generated by social status. In the middle ages some of those 'needs' 
disappeared. Consequently, that part of 'needs' beyond those required 
for reproduction became wants as we understand them today. Hence, a 
coincidence of these wants did not, immediately, generate the 
Aristotelian conclusion about the just price reflecting the relative 
efforts.
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about a change in both the subject matter of the discipline as well 
as in methodology. The change in the subject matter is reflected by 
the shift to a problem of reproduction; the production and 
distribution of surplus. Consequently the theory of value is now 
dominated by relationships in production. The decisions made by the 
owners of the surplus (the capitalists) affect the wages (and 
sometimes the numbers) of labourers in the next period. Consequently 
the rate of profit and relative prices are determined by these 
relationships^®. This, of course, does not mean that the 'classical' 
economists were unaware of the market mechanism. On the contrary, 
quite vivid descriptions of it appear in most classical writings 
including Smith, Marx and Mill. But it was the circumstances of 
production which dominated the natural value, the value around which 
market prices oscillate. And thus, in their capacity as magnetic 
field, these circumstances became the focus of economic investigation 
and therefore, the focus of attention to any kind of ethical 
discussions of economic issues.
But it was not only the subject matter of economics that seemed to 
have changed with the emergence of the classical school, 
methodological fundamentals too have undergone significant changes. 
The rise of sciences and in particular, of experimental sciences, had 
changed the focus of philosophy. Two major schools now dominated the 
scene, the 'rationalists' and the 'empiricists', and the focal issue 
became to be that of the meaning and accumulation of knowledge. But 
in spite of all these sweeping changes it will be incorrect to assume
^®This is, of course, a grossly simplified interpretation of 
classical economics which nevertheless captures the aspects of it 
with which we are interested.
42
that no traces at all were left of Scholastic or Aristotelian 
thinking. In particular this is true at the early stages of classical 
economics^®.
But the Scholastic left-overs are by no mean a necessary condition 
for principles of desert to be carried on into the ethics of 
classical economics. There is, as a matter of fact, nothing inherent 
in the changes I have mentioned above to suggest that concepts of 
desert are not applicable to the 'new' framework of economic 
analysis. Indeed, I will show in this work that in principle, the 
concepts of economic justice that are associated with classical 
economics are fundamentally concepts of desert.
will show later on how the scholastic interpretation of 
Universals plays a role in Smith's methodology. I will also show that 
to some extent the ' labour theory of value ' can be seen as scholastic 
relic. Namely that labour values are the Universals of relative 
prices. Though it is not inconceivable in the case of Smith, it will 
be difficult to accept in the case of Mill. Nevertheless, I will 
point out to several lapses in Mill's adherence to the 'empiricist' 
tradition which he so vigorously advocated.
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PART II
THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ECONOMICS OF 
ADAM SMITH
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1. INTRODUCTION
Adam Smith seems to be the right place to begin an investigation into 
the relationship between morals and economics. Not only is he
prominent as one of the founders of economics as an independent 
discipline (and in particular as a founder of the classical school), 
but also he was first, and foremost, a moral philosopher.
Besides being the natural starting point there are two other reasons 
why the construction of ethics-economics relationship in Adam Smith 
is of considerable importance. Firstly , being part of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, Adam Smith conceived philosophy in general, and moral 
philosophy in particular, as science. Thus, at least from the 
methodological point of view, a common ground has been formed for the 
examination of economics and ethics. Which means that a considerable 
obstacle in the investigation of their inter-relationships has now 
been removed. The second reason is a matter of substance. Adam Smith 
has not been acknowledged only for his contributions to economic 
analysis. He has also been considered as the prime promoter of the 
idea that 'natural liberty' , based on self-interest, is morally good. 
A proposition that is widely accepted by economists but that is still 
debated among some of Adam Smith scholars.
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One of the reasons that this last proposition is of relevance today, 
the era of neo-classicism, is that its application to economics has 
been extended to the present conception of economics with little 
qualifications. Obviously it is related to how Smith's economics is 
being perceived today. In spite of him being a classical economist, 
many contemporary scholars start their papers -- about thoroughly 
neo- classical matters --by quoting Smith. There is, on the whole, 
a feeling that Adam Smith's model is larger than the classical 
paradigm. That it contains all the seeds of contemporary analysis. 
More importantly, this idea is also extended to his framework of 
analysis and by implication. Smith's methodology and the Lodern one , 
are thought to be virtually the same^. Consequently, his moral 
decrees in what concerns economics are as applicable to the modern 
paradigm as they were to his own model.
Adam Smith published two major works; the Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(TMS) in 1759 and the Wealth of Nations (WN) in 1776. His other 
writings (unpublished) are collected in three volumes; Lectures on 
Jurisprudence (U), Essays on Philosophical Subjects (EPS) and 
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (LRBL)^. On the face of it
^Robbins, for instance, goes as far as to suggest that Smith's system 
stands "in harmony, with the most refined apparatus of the modern School of 
\Lausanne" (Robbins,1935. pp. 68-9). As for the importance of the framework of 
analysis and methodology to the applicability to economics of ethical concepts 
see the general introduction and chapter 2 in part 3 below. It is nevertheless 
quite clear that no matter what reservations one may have about the 
'empiricist' nature of Smith's methodology, it is fundamentally different from 
the Walrasian 'rationalist' approach. It is this awkward imposition of a 
'rationalistic' framework on an 'empirical' model that generates the 
unacceptability of the extension of Smith's proposed defence of natural 
liberty into the neo-classical paradigm.
 ^I do not mention here the collection of his correspondence as I am less 
interested in the twists and turns of his mind as I am in trying to construct 
(logically) a coherent theory out of his works.
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there seems to be a clear division of labour here. The TMS is Smith's 
moral theory^ and the WN is his economic analysis. The question of 
ethics-economics relationship, therefore, is the question of relating 
the TMS to the WN. Apparently, this has not been a very easy task 
even though one would not expect to find serious problems of 
consistency as Smith himself edited the sixth edition of the TMS to 
appear in 1790; fourteen years after the WN.
As I said before, there is a widely believed view that Adam Smith 
advocated natural liberty that is based on self-interest for its 
moral goodness as much as for its efficiency. Indeed, for anyone who 
reads his Wealth of Nations (WN) this seems to be almost 
self-evident*. However, when one reads Smith's moral theory in the 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS), it becomes less so. If natural 
liberty based on self-interest is to be morally good, so must be 
self-interest itself. But when one finds in the TMS statements of the
^And its social consequences.
*0n the occasion of the bicentennial of the Wealth of Nations J.M. 
Buchanan wrote:"..Adam Smith's system of natural liberty, interpreted as his 
idealized paradigm for social order, embodies justice as well as economic 
efficiency."(Buchanan, 1978. p.77). On a similar occasion, G. Stigler, is 
quoted to have said: "I bring greetings from Adam Smith who is alive and well 
and is living in Chicago" (in Meek, 1977. p. 3). Which means both that Smith had 
morally praised the economic system of 'natural liberty' as well as that his 
moral assessment can be applied to the neo-classical paradigm without any 
reservation. R.Meek, who quotes Stigler, goes on to say that:"Smith's great 
message of good cheer-that competitive capitalism is,if not the best of all 
economic systems, at any rate the best of all possible systems. . ."(Ibid, p.4). 
M. Friedman whose views on natural liberty need no proof has taken Smith's 
ideas ad absurdum. With complete disregard to the quite relevant order of the 
two works, he sees the WN as a model that can easily be applied to Smith's 
moral analysis. He wrote "..on the moral level. Smith regarded sympathy as 
a pervasive human characteristic, but it was unlimited and thus had to be 
economized. He would have argued that the invisible hand of the market was far 
more effective than the visible hand of government in mobilizing, not only 
material resources for immediate self-seeking ends, but also sympathy for 
unselfish charitable ends."(Friedman, 1978. p.18).
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kind "that to feel much for others and little for 
ourselves....constitutes the perfection of human nature"[TMS p.25], 
one begins to wonder whether indeed this is the case. If it is 
benevolence, and not self-interest, that constitutes Smith's notion 
of the morally good character, the moral status of his system of 
natural liberty based on self-interest, becomes rather dubious.
But it is not only Smith's apprehensive approach towards 
self-interest that makes the reader of the TMS sceptical. It is also 
Smith's dismissive views of the meaning of 'wealth' as well as his 
approach to its natural distribution (i.e. the distribution that 
results from natural liberty). Wealth is trifle, he argues, but its 
apparent appeal serves as a mean by which nature deceives people to 
want it, pursue it and consequently advance the purpose of nature: 
the multiplication of the species. However, people's interest are not 
necessarily the same as those of nature:", .man is by Nature directed 
to correct, in some measure, the distribution of things which 
[nature] herself would otherwise have made."[TMS p.168]^. Which 
means two things. One, that the smooth functioning of nature (the 
distribution that results from natural liberty) is not necessarily 
consistent with what people might perceive as the desired 
distribution. Secondly, that what people think as desirable may be 
a result of the deception by nature. In that case, it is clear that 
Smith the observer does not agree with it. In other words. Smith's
y
 ^ It should be noted that Smith uses three concepts of nature: 'nature 
of things', 'nature of sentiments' and 'Nature'. The first two are the more 
frequently used and they refer to the physical world and the spiritual world 
of mankind respectively. The third form, Nature, is probably the uniting force 
which is God or, as some would interpret it, the 'Great Design' . This matter 
is discussed more carefully below.
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theory of morals may not be only a positive description of how people 
form moral opinions. It may as well be a prescription.
All these imply that the harmonious relationship between the TMS and 
the moral implications of the WN does not really exist. Indeed, the 
unease about whether Smith's ethics supports a moral advocacy of 
natural liberty is (or at least, was) widely shared. However, most 
dealings with the problem were confined to the moral vindication of 
self-interest. The analysis of the ethics of natural distributions 
appeared to have been entirely dominated by it. Little attention was 
paid to the very simple fact that the analysis of natural 
distributions follows the analysis of actions. Here, where two (or 
more) individuals are involved the vindication of self-interest will 
no be sufficient for the moral approval of the final distribution.
At first, the discrepancies between the TMS and the WN were explained 
as a problem of consistent premises. Some German scholars® thought 
that in the TMS Smith had believed people to be pre- dominantly 
benevolent. By the time he wrote the WN he must have changed his 
mind. Now he thought them to be self-interested. There is, therefore, 
an inherent contradiction between the two theories.
-   ■ V:.,. I
/The^Germans' position, which became to be known as 'Das Adam Smith 
 N
Problem', can be dismissed on the ground that had Smith really 
changed his mind he would not have edited the TMS in 1790 without
® Notably B. Hildebrand (1848), Carl A.G. Knies (1853) and Witold von 
Skarzinski (1878).
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changing its major premise. The generally accepted view? is that the 
TMS and the WN are perfectly consistent in their premises with regard 
to human nature because they are based on entirely different, and 
apparently unrelated, features of the human character. The TMS is an 
analysis based on 'sympathy', i.e. people's disposition to put 
themselves in other people's place (what today we might call
empathy); the WN on the other hand, is an analysis based on people's 
motivations to act. Motivations and dispositions are not the same 
thing and therefore, there cannot be any inherent contradiction 
between Smith's perception of the human character in these two 
theories.
Moral opinions, according to the received view, are generated by 
people's disposition to feel 'sympathy'. They experience a particular 
kind of pleasure (pain) if they feel harmony (dissonance) in their 
sentiments. Namely, they derive pleasure from feeling that they would
have felt the same had they been in place of the subject of
approbation. Upon this pleasure or pain, the harmony or dissonance 
of sentiments, people form their moral opinions.
The imaginary change of places with other individuals depends on how 
much can one really put himself in another person's position. By 
trying to do so, the process of 'sympathizing' generates a kind of 
an 'impartial spectator'. It is the agreement or disagreement of the 
'impartial spectator's' sentiments with those of the subject of
approbation which is the real source of moral judgement.
?Macfie (1967), Campbell (1971), Winch (1978), Skinner (1979) and Raphael 
(1985).
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It is then argued that any 'impartial spectator' could feel the same 
as another if he confronts moderate expressions of sentiments. Thus, 
by defining self-interest as prudence, i.e. a moderate expression of 
one's natural urge to care for one's self, self-interest is something 
any 'impartial spectator' would approve of. Hence, self-interest is 
morally good. If, then, self-interest is morally approved so should 
be the natural distribution which is associated with it. In 
particular, as such a distribution remunerates prudence (frugality 
and industry in other words) it means that the good is properly 
remunerated.
While all this may explain why the TMS and the WN are consistent from 
the moral point of view, it fails to explain the numerous occasions 
in the TMS (and even in the WN) where Smith expresses apprehension 
about self-interest and about the natural distribution of things. 
Indeed, there are now scholars who while accepting the received 
view's solution to the problem of inconsistent premises, are still 
uncomfortable with the conclusion with respect to moral propositions. 
Heilbroner (1982) for instance, argues that Smith's theory cannot be 
seen but as a reiteration of Mandeville's 'Private vice. Public 
benefits'. He explains the inconsistencies between the above theory 
and Smith's apprehensions by arguing that Smith speaks in two voices; 
the 'empirical observer' and the 'moral instructor'. Evensky (1987) 
argues that according to Smith people are inherently flawed. The 
moral goodness is in the system of natural liberty itself as it is 
a reflection of the 'Great Design'. Hence, as human character is 
flawed, natural liberty where everyone pursues his own ends is a kind ^  
of a 'second best' moral theory. ^
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There are, in principle, two possible explanations to the 
discrepancies between (a) the moral vindication of self-interest on 
the grounds of its moderation and, (b) the explicit apprehensions 
Smith has about it. One is to argue that Smith's moral theory is not 
a Q  'naturalistic/positivistic' (N/P) theory. The other is an
explanation within such a perception of his methodology.
A
(Jr-'
When one looks at the received view's interpretation of Smith's 
ethics one can see how strongly it is motivated by the belief that 
Smith's theory is N/P. By 'naturalistic' I mean a theory where morals 
is a matter of sentiments or instincts rather than reason. By 
'positivistic' I mean that it only describes how people, as a matter 
of fact, form their moral opinion. Naturally, if self-interest is 
morally good because it is a moderate expression of a natural urge. 
And because moderation is something which can generate a sense of 
harmony within any 'spectator'. Then moral approbation is entirely 
in the domain of how people actually form their moral opinion (which 
is based on some kind of a harmonious sensation). In other words, it 
is a N/P theory.
L
L
Some take this approach even further. They consider the TMS to be a 
kind of ethology. Namely, a theory of socialization which explains 
the emergence of the character in the WN. Ethics here is merely 
instrumental: Sympathy is a disposition that leads individuals to 
derive some kind of pleasure from an imaginary change of places where 
they feel that they would have felt (or behaved) the same as others. 
Coupled with a natural desire to be morally approved, the disposition 
to 'sympathize' also explains how we tend to adopt particular forms
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of behaviour. In particular, as we feel that we can always sympathize 
with a moderate expression of sentiments, we believe that others will 
also approve of our moderation. Hence, the want to be approved of 
will direct us to choose moderation as a principle of our behaviour. 
Prudence being a moderate expression of our natural drive to care for 
ourselves, is an obvious and natural pattern of behaviour. We are 
self-interested because self-interest is morally good. The WN then 
takes the character that emerged from the TMS and examines its social 
consequences. These consequences only prove that there is a complete 
harmony between our moral sense and the functioning of nature 
(natural liberty).
This positive/'naturalistic' view of Smith's ethics is not only 
appealing in its elegance but it also seems to fit our expectations 
from a scholar who was a pillar of what we call the Scottish 
Enlightenment. Nevertheless as such it still fails to explain some 
crucial problems in the TMS. In particular it fails to account for 
the places where Smith expresses his apprehensions about 
self-interest and where he appears to criticize people's judgements. 
For instance, when analyzing the deception of nature which leads 
people to see merit in wealth Smith argues that this is a false 
impression; that it is, as it were, a deception. How, however, can 
Smith judge such a thing? If his theory is descriptive in nature then 
the way people feel is the only criterion to what is morally good and 
bad. Smith's comments here and in many other places to the same 
effect are a clear indication that there is a hidden benchmark for 
moral analysis which is not necessarily embedded in what people 
actually think.
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But there is a way to try and defend this approach. It is the 
distinction Smith makes between what is morally good and what is 
merely proper. Many present-days scholars would agree that Smith was 
not really enthusiastic about self-interest. They would argue, 
nevertheless, that it still fits into the positive framework of his 
theory. The 'sympathy' that people may feel with any sentiment only 
tells us about propriety. Namely, that the particular sentiment that 
is experienced by the subject of approbation suits well his 
circumstances and therefore, is proper. But there is a distinction 
between something which is proper and that which is good. The latter 
will require some admiration as well as approval. Self-restraint and 
moderation are the keys to approval but the degree of it will either
invoke admiration or not. To eat when we feel an urge to do so,
argues Smith, is proper but by no means admirable.
Hence, self-interest is the proper way to deal with the natural urge 
to care for one's self, but it is not necessarily what constitutes 
the morally good character. The morally good way will involve
self-denial and sacrifice. If this is so there are two serious 
problems. One is that very few things may be morally good and the 
other, that given the different tastes people may have, what invokes 
admiration may be a matter of taste.
When Smith discusses theories of morals in general he states two 
major questions to be answered:"First, wherein does virtue
consist?. . .And, secondly, by what power or faculty in the mind is it, 
that this character, whatever it be, is recommended to us?" [TMS 
p.265]. The answer to the second question is 'sympathy' and the idea
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of the 'impartial spectator'. The answer to the first question is 
also clear; it is in propriety that virtue lies. Propriety has 
nothing to do with admiration. It is therefore difficult to accept 
the distinction between proper and admirable as the source of 
difference between the moral good and, say, what is merely just.
Moreover, the moderation of the natural urge to care for one's self 
cannot be thought of as mere propriety. Surely if the urge exist and 
prudence means to hold back it is not at all the same as 'to eat when 
one is hungry' . It should be compared to 'how much to eat when one 
is hungry'. Of course if one just follows his urge he would become 
a knave. The fact that he is prudent means that he exercises great 
restraint. Hence, as self-interest cannot be interpreted as mere 
propriety but rather as an admirable conquest of one's natural drive, 
the apprehensions Smith has about it cannot be explained by this 
distinction. Therefore, it must be a problem with the N/P approach 
to his ethics.
Beside all these difficulties there is still the problem of 
transition from the vindication of self-interest to the moral 
approval of natural liberty. A vindication of self-interest may be 
a necessary condition for the moral approbation of natural 
distributions (i.e. distributions that are associated with natural 
liberty) but it is by no mean a sufficient one. What is quite 
striking is that Smith's moral analysis is focused on the analysis 
of actions rather than merely on sentiments. It involves propriety 
of sentiments but it also deals with the question of merit. It is 
not sufficient to say that an action was motivated by a sentiment
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which was approved. The approval of the sentiments aroused in the 
person who, as it were, had been acted upon depends on the action 
that was chosen by the actor®. Thus some correlation is required 
between intentions (motivations that arise from approved sentiments) 
and the actual outcome. Consequently the moral significance of 
unintended good becomes a complicated issue. In particular, this is 
so when we come to consider questions of spill-overs.
In what follows I propose a re-examination of the whole of Smith's 
work. I would like to argue in favour of some 'rationalistic' 
considerations in Smith's methodology. These have two major ^
manifestation. One in the unity of human nature® and the other, in \
the rational considerations that are involved in the concept of the |
'impartial spectator'.
The unity of human nature, which could have been simply deduced from 
Smith's general belief in the unity of nature, implies that even 
though 'self-interest' may be a motive and 'sympathy' a disposition,
, ' - ' ■ " ' - i
there must be a consistent ; relationship between them. Thus, the '
solution to the Adam Smith problem whereby 'sympathy' is divorced
®It is perhaps interesting to note that the principle of moderation by 
which virtue is defined is a similar idea to the Aristotelean 'lying in the 
mean' principle (Nic. Eth. p.101). However, even there the analysis of 
morality does not end with moderation. It is immediately followed by a 
discussion of 'responsibility' (p.111). Similarly, in Hume where 'sympathy' 
in a similar sense is being used for the purpose of moral approbation, it is 
the proposed consequences which matter most. He wrote: "qualities acquire our 
approbation, because of their tendency to the good of mankind."(Hume, 
Treatise, p.627).
®This is a rational consideration because the unity is based on the 
assumption that there is a Universal to human characters. This Universal is 
'the interest they have in the others'. As such, a Universal is not 
contradicting 'empiricism' but if we treat it as substance, it becomes a 
Scholastic idea. In any case, I will discuss it more elaborately later on.
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from 'self-interest' on virtue of them being two distinct (unrelated) 
features of human character, is being questioned.
In the 'impartial spectator' the idea of 'rationality' comes through 
the 'impartiality' requirement. To be 'impartial' is not a simple 
thing. It requires some effort on the part of the observer which 
makes it difficult to accept that self-interested people will indeed 
put so much effort to see the other person's point of view. It also 
require some knowledge of the world in order to be able to establish 
whether a particular choice of action fits the intended approved 
sentiment. Therefore, the truly 'impartial spectator' is an exercise 
in reason rather than sentiments. Though it is a logical extension 
of the actual way people form their moral opinion (and thus not 
entirely un- empirical) , it is also a model by which Smith is capable 
to perform as a 'moral instructor'.
The part of the thesis on Adam Smith is organised in the following 
way. In chapter 2 I will discuss the reasons for introducing 
'rational' considerations into the analysis of Smith. It will also 
include some general notes on his methodology.
Chapter 3 will concentrate on Smith's theory of human character. I 
will discuss there whether the received view as if self-interest as 
prudence is being vindicated stands the 'unity of human nature' test. 
Namely, whether a character that is prudent in his pursuit of his own 
interest is also consistent with a morally desirable 
'other-regarding' behaviour. I will also investigate whether the 
character behind the WN is indeed the one we call prudent in the TMS. /C
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Then an extrapolation will be performed where I will investigate the 
methods people form their moral opinion as a function of what 
dominates their character. I will show there that the self-interested 
character may be inclined to judge by other available methods rather 
than through 'sympathy' (for instance, through utility). The 
judgement by these methods will morally vindicate natural liberty 
that is based on self-interest. Smith's opinion, however, would have 
been that this kind of moral judgement reflects a corrupt sense of 
morality.
Chapter 4 will be an exposition of Smith's moral analysis of actions. 
It will deal with the analysis of final distributions that are 
associated with natural liberty given that self-interest has been 
morally vindicated. I will argue there that Smith's theory of the 
morally desirable distribution is a theory of desert. People should 
be remunerated according to their intentions. Consequently, as 
proportionality means that one should be remunerated according to 
what one intended to achieve, spill-overs are no source for 
remuneration. The systems of natural liberty, it is then argued, 
cannot achieve a higher degree of moral approbation than mere 
'justice' in the Smithian sense of the word^°.
Chapter 5 is a new exposition of Smith's economic system. It is a 
general equilibrium system where demand plays a significant role. The 
model I will suggest have the following features. It is a sort of a
Injustice in Smith's deontological theory is all those things which are 
consistent with the viability conditions of society. It is therefore, the 
lowest level of moral approbation which is consistent with the existence of 
society.
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surplus approach theory, namely, that what determines values and 
distribution (of surplus), is the exchange of surplus. Now, as my 
model is a two sector model, surplus means the output that is above 
what is needed, from the particular commodity, for its reproduction.
It is a Sraffa-Leontief like model, in the sense that commodities 
are produced by means of other commodities. The model I will suggest 
is a general equilibrium model. I do so because I believe that it 
properly reflects Smith's intention. Though his analysis of price 
determination is carried out in the partial equilibrium framework of 
analysis, the majority of the book implies a general equilibrium 
approach. In particular. Smith's system is such that distribution and 
values are simultaneously determined, so that there seems to be no 
real reason why a general equilibrium approach should not be 
employed. As it is a system of 'surplus' distribution, there is part 
of the demand which is pre-market determined. Therefore, it is not 
a Walrasian general equilibrium and simultaneity is not part of it. 
Hence, causality is easy to detect and therefore, moral 
responsibilities.
In this two-sector, general equilibrium model, I will try to show 
that coincidence of wants (equilibrium) which generates a 
distribution of surplus, isn't always beneficent. Obviously, the 
accumulation of capital will be an important factor. I will suggest 
a way in which the expansion path of the 'net surplus' , which is also 
a condition for beneficence, can be introduced into the analysis of 
price determination, thus, distinguishing between equilibria that are 
beneficent, and those which are not.
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I will also show, that unlike the convention, at least the structure 
of demand plays an important role in determining equilibrium. Then 
I shall argue that the natural price, in Smith's analysis does not 
reflect a long run price, but, a beneficent equilibrium. In that 
sense, the natural price is a just price, but, not necessarily a good 
price.
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2. A NOTE ON SMITH'S METHODOLOGY.
Moral philosophy, for Smith, was not much different from any other 
natural philosophy (what we would now a days call science). 
"Philosophy", he said :" is the science of connecting principles of 
nature,...[It], by representing the invisible chains which bind 
together all disjointed objects, endeavour[s] to introduce order in 
this chaos ..."[EPS-HA, p.45]i.
In that respect he was following the tradition of the 18th century. 
There, science and philosophy were frequently interchanged when 
referring to an effort to understand nature in general, and human 
nature in particular. Therefore it would be useful to begin our 
analysis of his moral theory (or, maybe better called: system) with 
some notes on his methodology.
There are mainly two sources for that inquiry. First, his article on 
the different forms of discourse( Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles 
Lettres(LEIBL)) allows us to deduce his scientific method from his 
form of presentation. The other is a collection of three articles the 
title of each of them begins with :"The Principles which Lead and
 ^EPS stands for the Essays on Philosophical Subjects and HA stands for 
the History of Astronomy in it.
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Direct Philosophical Enquiries Illustrated By...”.
In these articles, as their titles indicate, Smith presents and 
illustrates some of his ideas on methodology. In spite of them being 
incomplete and unpublished papers they nonetheless constitute a good 
source to the understanding of Smith's scientific method. For various 
reasons most writers on Smith's methodology have taken into account 
only the most complete of these articles: the one in which the
principles of philosophical enquiries are illustrated by the History 
of Astronomy [EPS-HA pp.33-105]. I will maintain that some of the 
ideas presented in the other articles are as valid as those in the 
one on Astronomy. I will also argue that these ideas are particularly 
relevant to his social and economic theories.
Let us begin with the Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (LRBL) 
where methods of inquiry are reflected in the forms of discourse. The 
basic distinction Smith makes in this article is between what he 
calls 'historical narrative' and what he named 'rhetoric'.
The 'historical narrative' discourse proposes : "barely to relate some
facts..... to put before us the arguments on both sides of the
question in their true light, giving each its proper degree of 
influence, and has it in view to persuade no further than the 
arguments themselves appear convincing."[LRBL p.58]. On the other 
hand there is the 'rhetoric' discourse that proposes :"to prove some
proposition [and] endeavour by all means to persuade us.,"[LRBL
p.58].
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It is quite obvious that any sort of philosophical or scientific 
system will fall under the category of 'rhetoric' discourses. In fact 
it is the other way around. All discourses that are presented in that 
'rhetorical' fashion reflect an attempt to construct a philosophical 
(scientific) system, or theory. Indeed the relevant writings of Smith 
do fall under this category and thus we are able to look upon them 
as scientific theories.
The 'rhetorical' discourse itself is subdivided into two methods, 
producing a much clearer picture of his form of presentation. First, 
we have the 'Newtonian method' where : ”we lay down one or a very few 
principles by which we explain the several rules or phenomena, 
connecting one with the other in a natural order" [LRBL p.139].
Secondly, we have what Smith calls the 'Aristotelian method' where 
: "we begin with telling that we are to explain such and such things, 
and for each advance a principle either different or the same with 
those which went before"[LRBL p.139].
It seems to me that the 'Newtonian method' of discourse is the more 
prevalent one in Smith's works. The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) 
is a distinct example of it. First we have an exposition of the 
principle behind the whole system: the principle of 'sympathy'. Then 
it is being used to connect certain phenomena like, for instance, 
moral opinions, class structure, self-interested behaviour etc.. The 
Wealth of Nations (WN) too follows that line of presentation. Again 
the principle behind the system, the division of labour, is presented 
at the beginning and together with what motivates it (the propensity
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to barter and exchange) , the rules connecting different phenomena are 
being displayed. Even the three articles illustrating the principles 
of philosophical enquiries are constructed in the same manner. The 
system which is being investigated there, is the system of scientific 
inquiries.
We may conclude now that even from the mere form of discourse it 
seems that both his economic as well as moral systems are scientific 
systems and thus, there exist a common ground to investigate their 
interrelationship. The next step will be to explore the nature of 
scientific systems.
There are three illustration of philosophical enquiries; first in the 
"History of Astronomy"[EPS pp.33-105], second in the "History of 
Ancient Physics"[EPS pp.106-117] and thirdly in the "History of 
Logics and Metaphysics" [EPS pp.118-129]. In each one of them the 
first part is devoted to some general remarks that are made by Smith 
himself about the task of scientific inquiry. It is his conception 
of science that is portrayed at the outset of each article and only 
then he goes on to show how it reflects in the history of science. 
Indeed it is in the first illustration, the one on astronomy, where 
Smith gives the introduction to the general problem (or phenomenon) 
of scientific inquiry. But this does not mean that the points made 
in the other two illustrations are less significant. In both the 
History of Physics and the History of Metaphysics Smith advances the 
historical account with his own remarks on methodology. Some of them 
are elaboration of ideas presented in the History of Astronomy, and 
some 'new' ideas that arise due to different degrees of complexity,
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which emerge as the subject matter of our investigation 'descends' 
from the investigation of Heaven to the investigation of earth.
Thinking on the trio as a whole, one can very clearly draw the logic 
of their arrangement. Namely, the degree of the complexity of the 
subject under investigation. But this might have been just a 
coincidence. Even though the Heavens have just a few objects ( hence, 
in Smith's view, a lower degree of complexity), their influence over 
the faculties in human beings which promote philosophical 
investigation (admiration, wonder and surprise) are stronger (EPS-HA 
p.48] .
Nevertheless, though it is clear that in Smith's view the effects of
Heaven were stronger on motivation, human inquiry has descended to
Earth only to find that it is a much more complex task. "From
arranging and methodizing the System of the Heavens, philosophy 
descended to the consideration of the inferior parts of Nature, of
the Earth [But] [ i] f the imagination, therefore, when it
considered the appearances in the Heavens, was often perplexed, and 
driven out of its natural career; it would be much more exposed to 
the same embarrassment when it directed its attention to the objects 
which the Earth presented it..."[EPS-HAP p.106]%.
In the History of Astronomy Smith presents us with some basics of 
what he considered to be a scientific theory:
(a) it must have a principle which will unify all those 
apparently irregular phenomena.
^HAP stands for History of Ancient Physics.
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(b)it must be a simple system that would put our mind at ease.
(c) it must be based on familiar qualities^.
The need to deduce familiar qualities, operations and laws of 
succession, is already presented in the History of Astronomy. However 
the search for familiar qualities was a negligible part of 
'methodizing the Heavens' as there were only few objects involved. 
Consequently, finding the familiar qualities was not an issue of 
great importance that can be illustrated by the History of Astronomy. 
But it does have an important role in 'methodizing the Earth' as on 
the earth, according to Smith, the amount of objects exceeds 
significantly those which are in Heavens.
The principles and characteristics of such an inquiry where the 
subject matter is complex indeed are the more relevant ones to his 
TMS and WN. They are, however, more carefully analyzed in Smith's 
other two illustrations of methods of scientific inquiries; the 
History of Ancient Physics and the History of Logic and Metaphysics.
The reason that these articles were neglected has probably something 
to do with Smith's performance as a Historian. It is considered that 
even though his account on astronomy leaves something to be desired, 
it is still far better than those presented in his other articles*. 
But, from the point of view of studying Smith methodology it is 
completely irrelevant whether his historical accounts are correct or
 ^These characteristics are put forward in sections 1 & 2 in the History 
of Astronomy.[EPS pp.34-7].
*A discussion of this issue can be found in the general introduction, by 
Raphael and Skinner, to the EPS (p.2). They also refer to Schumpeter.
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not. What is important is what he called, the principles of enquiry. 
It does not matter whether they are demonstrated in a true or false 
story. What counts is what is being demonstrated. Therefore, one can 
not be satisfied with what is deduced on Smith's methodology from his 
article on Astronomy alone. One must also take into account, when 
analyzing 'earthy' phenomena, what Smith thought of scientific 
methods in this context.
There is indeed a significant addition to his methodology in the 
other two articles. This addition, that is derived from the
complexity of the system of earth, is worth quoting at some length.
"In every body, therefore, whether simple or mixed, there were
evidently two principles, whose combination constituted the whole 
nature of a particular body. The first was the Stuff, or subject 
matter, out of which it was made; the second was the Species, the 
Specific Essence, the Essential, or, as the schoolmen have called it,
the substantial form of the Body In every case therefore. Species
or Universels, and not individual, are the object of
Philosophy.....As it was the business of Physics, or Natural
Philosophy, to determine wherein consisted the Nature and Essence of 
every particular Species of things, in order to connect together all 
the different events that occur in the material world; so there were 
two other sciences, which, though they had originally arisen out of 
that system of Natural philosophy I have just been describing, were, 
however,apprehended to go before it, in the order in which knowledge 
of Nature OUGHT to be communicated. The first of these. Metaphysics, 
considered the general nature of Universels....The second of these.
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Logics..-[EPS-HALM pp.118-120]^.
This argument appears to be in complete accordance with what is 
suggested in the History of Astronomy®. Namely, that there is a 
need to classify matter according to familiar qualities. The only 
addition here is that we must analyze these qualities separately. 
Metaphysics, for Smith, the Theory of Universels,is a theory, the 
domain of which is not the matter itself but its classification. This 
does not mean that there is no connection between the different 
theories or that the universels are based on some a- priori notion. 
Even in Hume we can find assertions of the following type : ". . I must 
distinguish in the imagination betwixt the principles which are 
permanent, irresistible, and universal. . .And the principles that are 
changeable, weak and irregular. That is to say that we have, in
fact, two distinct levels of analysis. In both of them there are 
principles, the role of which is to connect the different phenomena. 
The rules that are derived from them may be permanent in character 
,or temporary.
From Smith's point of view, therefore, a scientific investigation of 
everything, and in particular, earthy matters, is conducted in two 
different levels. One, the level of the subject matter- the level of 
the nature of things - where the rules might be changing, and the 
other is the level of the Universels; namely, that familiar quality 
that is common to all the subject matter that is under investigation.
®HALM stands for History of Ancient Logic and Metaphysics. 
®EPS-HA pp.38-9.
^Hume, D. A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE p.274.
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In his economic system one may consider the notion of natural price 
as part of the Universels analysis (and I do not refer here to the 
natural price in its 'long-run equilibrium' interpretation), while 
market price may reflect the analysis of the subject matter.
In his moral analysis this distinction is even more clear. The level 
of the subject matter is the level of the observed behaviour of human 
being. Namely, people's moral opinion that is based on their actual 
disposition to 'sympathize' . The Universal, however, the familiar 
quality that is common to all mankind , in different degrees, is the 
emotional meaning of sympathy. Namely, what it is in human being that 
determines how much effort are they willing to put into trying and 
see the other from a true 'impartial spectator's' point of view.
The investigation of its permanent rules constitute what Smith called 
Metaphysics, or 'nature of sentiments'. In the account of Smith's 
life given by D. Steward, which was helped by one of Smith's students 
J. Millar, he describes the convention of moral philosophy at that 
time to be : "The science of Ethics has been divided by modern writers 
into two parts ; the one comprehending the theory of Morals, and the 
other its practical doctrines"[EPS p278]. It seems as if this 
distinction falls very well under the one just made; that is, the 
part of the moral system which is theory, is the one that is at the 
level of 'universals' : the level of permanent, while practice falls 
under the category of the changeable relations, the rules of matter.
What we learn from all that is that though Smith was, in principle, 
an 'empiricist' in the sense that the subject matter of any
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investigation was to be known to us through observation, he 
nevertheless adhered to some semi-rationalistic ideas®. Universals 
are not necessarily 'rational' even though one can always argue that 
at the level of analyzing human beings one cannot think of a 
universal which is observable. But what makes Smith's approach 
semi-rationalistic is the fact that he is willing to treat those 
universals as subject matter in themselves. This was precisely the 
essence (forgive the expression) of the Scholastic approach.
The main question is, however, whether or not we can observe these 
distinctions in Smith's work. The answer, in my view, is yes. Not { 
only that the distinctions exist, they are almost the only means by 
which one can explain the apparent contradictions in his writings.
The 'principles' in human nature upon which Smith bases his two 
theories are 'sympathy' and the 'propensity to exchange and 
barter'®, or, the 'principle of persuasion'^®. Both these 
'principles' are strongly dependent and correlated with a person's 
attitude towards the others. ' Sympathy ' is his disposition to put 
himself in another person's place and the propensity to exchange 
reflects a person's drive, or need, to trade with another. His 
ability to bargain depends on how well he can persuade the other.
®In an 'empiricist' sense I should use the word 'Classification' rather 
than universals. But this is only a semantic difference in what concerns my 
purpose.
®Why it is that I believe this to be the principle of the WN rather than 
'self-interest' will be explained below. In any case, either this propensity 
or 'self-interest' will serve the purpose of what I have to say here.
^®In the Lectures on Jurisprudence (U) Smith argues that the real 
foundation of this propensity is the 'principle of persuasion' in human nature 
[ U  pp.493-4] .
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I maintain that both these 'principles' are a reflection of the same 
fundamental in human nature. I call this fundamental, 'the Interest 
In Others' that people have regardless of the particular constitution 
of their characters. 'Sympathy' is clearly a reflection of people's 
interest in the others. It is, however, a reflection of it and not 
the interest in others itself. This can be seen by the existence of 
different degrees of 'sympathy' which, I believe, is a reflection of 
the different form that this fundamental takes in different people. 
I will show later on that Smith was aware of two important 
modifications. One, that people's particular character interferes in 
their 'sympathy'. Namely that when an individual is trying to be the 
'impartial spectator' his effort depends on his personality. It is 
not an effortless process to reach true 'impartiality' and therefore, 
a person with little interest in the others will be less inclined to 
put into the imaginary change of places the required effort for 
'impartiality'. It is the difference between asking the question 
'what would I have felt (and done) had I been the other person in his 
predicament' and asking one's self 'what would I have felt (and done) 
had I been in his predicament'.
The other modification is concerned with the role of utility in 
forming people's opinions. Sometimes, Smith argues, people tend to 
confuse aesthetics with morality. They are so impressed by the beauty 
of, say, a system, that they believe that it must be morally good 
[TMS p.185]. The same tension exists in Smith's Lectures on 
Jurisprudence (U) where he discusses people's social sense 
(acceptance of authority). There seems to be a substitution between 
'utility' and 'sympathy' (the origin of authority). The more one has
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from the one, the less he has from the other^^. When 'sympathy' is 
dominant the social organisation will tend to be authoritative, when 
'utility' dominates, a less authoritative organisation can subsist 
[ U  pp.401-2] .
Given that 'utility' is an effortless method of forming a moral 
opinion it is not inconceivable that people with low interest in the 
others will tend to form their moral opinion by utility. Hence,
' sympathy ' is not the interest in others itself but an expression of 
the particular form that this fundamental (universal) takes in each 
individual.
The propensity to exchange and barter and the 'principle of 
persuasion' which is behind it are too a reflection of the interest 
people have in others. The brewer and the baker do it from self-love. 
Namely, they have no interest in the other apart from being a source 
of commodities and services to them. But they succeed in their 
bargaining because the one persuades the other that the deal is such 
where you "give me what I want, and I shall give you what you want" 
[LJ p.493]. But if the two individuals had different characters they 
might not have reached agreement on similar terms of trade. If an 
individual has a positive interest in the others he might be 
persuaded to exchange for the 'cost of production'. For instance, in 
the Deer and Beaver case [WN p.65-6] where there is no capital 
accumulation Smith argues that the only acceptable rule of exchange 
is according to labour inputs (effort). But for that norm of
^^Again, all these points will be properly explored below. It is 
nevertheless important to present them here as they intend to give the sense 
of Smith's use of Universals.
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behaviour to prevail and to have persuasion power we must establish 
whether and why it became a social norm. The mere idea of persuasion 
depends on conventions and other side-products of social 
organisation. People's acceptance of these conventions is a crucial 
input to the process of bargaining and in itself, depends on people's 
disposition towards others (and the social organisation).
As I said before the mere analysis through universals is by no mean 
a reflection of 'rationalism'. It is the treatment of it as substance 
which takes us away from pure 'empiricism' . In the case of Smith this 
treatment appears in the form of the 'moral instructor' who deduces 
his prescriptions from an abstraction of the 'impartial spectator'. 
This abstraction is an analysis of an 'imaginary change of places' 
that is performed by an imaginary human being who has only the 
interest of the others at heart. 'Interest in the others' as an 
independent quality generates, through its impartiality, Smith's 
benchmark for moral analysis. It explains then what are the grounds 
for Smith's criticism of individual's actual judgement. It is simply 
that his moral theory is not a 'naturalistic-positive' one. Rather, 
it is a delicate combination of 'empiricism' and 'semi-rationalistic' 
ideas. It thus makes his theory much more rich and interesting.
It also helps to explain the meaning of the 'labour theory of value' 
in Adam Smith. It is by no means based on the assumption that labour 
is the universal of commodities and therefore, commodities relate to 
each other, as a matter of fact, according to labour ratios. Rather 
it is through the universal of 'interest in the others' that in a 
pre- capital-accumulation stage the social convention of the
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'impartial spectator' will be that it is right to exchange 
commodities according to their labour ratios. The labour theory of 
value, therefore, is not a positive theory of exchange values. It is, 
rather, a normative, or conventional, theory of exchange Of 
course one needs to explore what happens when capital accumulation 
begins. Whether labour values can still play the role of the 
normative benchmark without a metaphysical conception of commodities 
the intrinsic value of which is comprised of past and present labour.
The idea of a universal in Smith's perception of the human nature can 
also be supported for two other reasons. One is the influence of 
Newton on Smith's perception of the world. In particular, his 
influence on Smith's belief in unity in nature. The Universal in such 
a case helps to relate the various aspects of human nature that are 
being examined by his various theories. Also there is Smith's 
discussion of the problem of describing human characters. In the next 
two chapters I will explore the consequences of the 'rationalistic' 
aspects of Smith's theory on the moral values of self-interest and 
natural liberty. The Universal (the unity of human nature) and the 
manifestation of 'rationalism' in the idea of the 'impartial 
spectator' will play there a significant role.
different kind of argument in support of the ' labour theory of value' 
being approved by the 'impartial spectator' can be found in Young (1986). It 
is also interesting to note that the idea that exchange should reflect labour 
ratios is not unrelated to Smith's discussion of property right. In Smith's 
discussion of property rights in the Hunters' stage he says: "All agree that 
it is a breach of property to break in on the chase of a wild beast which 
another has started, tho' some are of opinion that if another should wound the 
beast in it's flight he is entitles to a share, as he rendered the taking it 
more easy on the whole."[U pp.459-60]. Which means that the 'labour theory 
of value' is also somewhat hidden behind a right which is strongly related to 
conventions about social organisation. These conventions are bound to be 
dependent on people's disposition towards the others.
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3. THE MORAL ANALYSIS OF SELF-INTEREST: A STUDY INTO SMITH'S ANALYSIS 
OF THE HUMAN CHARACTER.
The question of the inter-relations between Smith's analysis of 
morals and economics is basically the question of relationship 
between the Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) and the Wealth of Nation 
(WN) . The problem of relating the two books has two distinct 
dimensions. One is the question of whether or not the premises 
regarding human nature in these two theories are consistent with one 
another (and I will call it the level of suppositions) . The other is 
the problem of whether the moral propositions of the one theory are 
compatible with the moral implications of the other. In particular, 
whether or not Adam Smith offers a consistent proposition regarding 
the moral values of self- interest and natural liberty (and I will 
call it the level of propositions).
In the introduction to this part of my work I have given several 
reasons why worries were expressed about the consistency of the two 
theories. I will not repeat it here. I would like, however, to 
examine the development of the problem and its proposed solutions
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through the prisma of the universal, i.e., the unity of human 
nature^. I would like to point out to the reader that the 
vindication of self-interest, which this chapter is all about, does 
not constitute a sufficient condition for the moral advocacy of 
natural liberty. This latter problem will be dealt with in Chapter 
4.
(sl) The 'Adam Smith Problem' and the Theory of Human Nature.
As mentioned in the introduction the tension between the moral status 
of self-interest in the TMS and its moral implications in the WN -- 
which became to be known as the 'Adam Smith problem' -- was confined 
almost entirely to the level of suppositions about human nature. Some 
Germans had interpreted the apparent discrepancy between the role and 
value of self-interest in the two theories as a problem of Smith's 
consistent perception of the human character. In the TMS, they 
argued, he thought mankind to be pre-dominantly benevolent. By the 
time he wrote the WN, according to those scholars, he had changed his 
mind about it. Now he thought them to be pre-dominantly
^To that end, some of the points that were made in the introduction will 
be repeated in section (a) below. It is important to repeat these points for 
the completeness of the argument. In the Introduction I have presented the 
Adam Smith problem (and its accepted solution) at the level suppositions. Once 
this had been settled, we moved to discuss a possible reconciliation of the 
moral propositions that are generated by the two theories from the point of 
view of interpreting the nature of Smith's theory. Namely, we discussed the 
question whether interpreting his theory as 'Naturalistic' and 'Positivistic' 
can yield a moral vindication of self-interest that will be consistent with 
the apparent advocacy of natural liberty that is based upon it in the WN. Such 
an approach deals with the Adam Smith Problem in a segregated manner. Here I 
suggest to tie together the solution to the problem that was posed by the 
Germans (at the level of suppositions) with the solution of the problem at the 
level of propositions. The crucial point here is Smith's perception of the 
human nature. It is therefore necessary to repeat some of the points for the 
completeness of the argument and I beg the reader to bear with me.
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self-interested which, they argued, is precisely the selfish 
character that is so clearly deplored in the TMS. The difference in 
the role and meaning of self-interest in the TMS and the WN, 
therefore, is a reflection of this change of mind.
Modern commentators like Macfie (1957), Campbell (1971), Winch 
(1978), Skinner (1979) and Raphael (1985) rejected this explanation. 
In fact, they deny the existence of any problem at all in the TMS-WN 
relationship. The received view is that the German scholars thought 
that there was a problem because they had mis-interpreted 'sympathy' , 
the 'principle' behind the TMS. They understood that 'principle' to 
mean that the most dominant feature of human nature is that of 
benevolence. Thus, it was inconsistent with the character behind the 
WN who seemed to be dominated by self-interest.
However, argue modern commentators, the 'principles' of the TMS and 
the WN are not at all in competition with one another. Self-interest, 
the apparent principle behind the WN, is a description of people's 
motivations to act. 'Sympathy', the principle behind the TMS, is 
merely a description of another - distinct- feature of the human 
character. It is the disposition people have to put themselves in 
other people's place. They also derive a particular kind of pleasure 
from such an imaginary change of places if they experience harmony 
of sentiments. Namely, if they feel that they would have felt the 
same had they been in place of another. It is upon this pleasure, 
rooted in such an ability, or disposition (which we might call today 
empathy) that people form their moral opinions. Their motives to 
actions are an entirely different matter; they spring from a
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different aspect of human nature altogether. Self-interest, quite 
clearly, is a quality mainly ascribed to motives. It can only be 
understood as a description of that particular aspect of human nature 
and it has nothing to do with other dispositions that people may or 
may not have. Therefore, there is no inherent contradiction between 
the premises of his two theories^.
The solution to the problem posed by the Germans was in the method 
of character description. The Germans described a character by a 
single general tenor of behaviour which, presumably, captured all 
its various aspects. If named after its manifestation in motives a 
character can indeed be either benevolent, selfish or malevolent. 
Modern commentators, on the other hand, understand Smith's perception
 ^Macfie and Raphael, in their introduction to the Glasgow edition of the 
TMS, insist that these two faculties in human nature are entirely different. 
"Sympathy is the core of Smith's explanation of moral JUDGEMENT. The motive 
to action is an entirely different matter"(p.21). Raphael (1985), goes even 
further to draw a connection between the different (almost exclusive) spheres 
of human nature and their different (and again, almost exclusive) social 
meanings. "The social bond created by sympathy and imagination...is quite 
different from the social bonds of mutual dependence... The social bond of 
sympathy and imagination leads to our code of ethics and to a good part of our 
code of law. Economic behaviour has to be explained in terms of 
self-interest"( Raphael, 1985. p.94). Nevertheless, the distinction between 
the two aspects of human character to which 'sympathy' and 'self-interest' 
ascribe remain, to some extent, obscure. Even among modern commentators the 
interpretations of ' sympathy' seem to vary. At the one end ' sympathy' is being 
interpreted as a merely technical word; completely divorced from any emotion. 
(Thus, cannot contradict motives which necessarily involve emotions) . Campbell 
(1971), for instance, wrote that 'sympathy' is Smith's "word for agreement, 
coincidence or harmony of sentiments...It cannot be said that Smith's concept 
of sympathy accords with the normal meaning of the term" (Campbell, 1971. 
p.94). On the other hand there are those who found it more difficult to see 
'sympathy' as an idea which is unrelated to emotions. Macfie (1967), for 
instance, wrote that "for Smith sympathy was the effective cement of 
society. . . .Sympathy is then an emotion, and an unselfish emotion"(Macfie 1967. 
p. 57). And A. Skinner (1979) wrote that the process by which we morally 
judge, "involves a complex of abilities and propensities which include 
sympathy, imagination, reaéon, and reflection"( Skinner, 1979. p.49) where 
sympathy denotes an emotional disposition. All this implies that even in terms 
of their own solutions the divorce of 'self-interest' from 'sympathy' 
according to the received view is not intuitively clear.
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of the human character as more complex. How he is characterized in 
one particular aspect of his nature does not tell us anything about 
its other components. The TMS and the WN depict different features 
of the human character and they are therefore complementary social 
theories that are based on complementary aspects of the human 
character.
But solving the problem at the level of suppositions still leaves 
open the question of whether or not Adam Smith offers a consistent 
proposition regarding the moral value of self-interest and natural 
liberty. Obviously, this is wide ranging issue which is concerned 
with the moral analysis not only of self-interest but also of 
efficiency and the relationship between motives and outcomes. As I 
mentioned earlier I will deal with this problem in Chapter 4. Here 
I will confine myself to the analysis of Smith's moral vindication 
of self- interest. A vindication that is necessary (but by no means 
sufficient) to render the implied advocacy of natural liberty 
consistent from the moral point of view.
The apparent problem at the level of propositions seemed to have been 
that selfishness is clearly condemned in the TMS and that self- 
interest, distinct from ' sympathy' as it may be, can easily be 
regarded as a form of selfish behaviour. Hence the first and 
immediate task was to disassociate self-interest from selfishness. 
This too appeared to have been a problem of character description. 
Indeed the same technique of character description that was used to 
solve the problem that was posed by the Germans is now used to do 
just that: to divorce self-interest from selfishness and to open the
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way for its moral vindication.
According to the Germans, self-interest (or the character behind the 
WN) is a form of selfishness even if we think of self-interest as a 
description of motives alone. The reason is quite straightforward. 
When we describe a character by a single tenor of behaviour we expect 
it to manifest itself in all possible expressions of a person's 
character. In particular, we expect to find its appearance in what 
motivates human actions. As a description by a single tenor of 
behaviour does not leave many options besides benevolence, 
selfishness and malevolence, self-interest must be the expression of 
selfishness in motives.
To that extent, the complex method of character description as 
applied so far (i.e. to the problem of 'sympathy'-self-interest 
relationship) will not be very helpful. What we have done so far is 
to divorce self-interest (or the character behind the WN) from 
'sympathy' by saying that 'sympathy' is not a motive and thus has 
nothing to do with self-interest or, for that matter, with 
benevolence. However, if self- interest is a quality describing 
motives in general it means that people are motivated to act in 
whatever they do by their own interest alone. As moderate a sentiment 
as it may be it will be extremely difficult to argue that 
self-interest is not to conceive the others "upon account of our own 
private good or bad fortune"[TMS p.40] which is Smith's definition 
of selfishness. In such a case we cannot ignore its clear 
condemnation in the TMS.
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However, we can circumvent the problem by applying yet again our 
complex perception of human nature and distinguish between various 
kinds of motives. For one we can follow Smith's own advice and look 
at the motive-side of a character as comprised of 'own-regarding' and 
'other-regarding' behaviours [TMS p.212]. There are natural urges in 
both of them and self-interest here may be a quality of only one kind 
of motives. In particular it may describe the way one deals with 
one's natural urge to care for one's self. According to the accepted 
view self-interest is nothing else but the moderate expression of 
this particular natural urge. It is, then, what Smith called 
Prudence.
The appeal of this approach is quite clear. By virtue of this complex 
method of character description, self-interest in itself does not 
exclude the existence of other dispositions or even motives. It 
therefore allows 'sympathy' and self-interest to co-exist while at 
the same time it isolates self-interest as a separated object of 
moral approbation. Viewed in this way it is rather easy to establish 
that the self-restraint and moderation of the natural urge to care 
for one's self is morally approved^. Coupled with the beneficial 
outcome of the free expression of self-interest as portrayed in the 
WN the TMS and the WN are consistent not only in terms of their 
suppositions on human nature, they are also compatible in terms of 
their moral propositions.
^It is so because prudence is a moderate expression of the natural urge 
to care for one's self. According to the TMS, the 'impartial spectator' will 
tend to 'sympathize' and hence approve of all sentiments when moderately 
expressed. Whether such an Aristotelean concept of the moral good is 
applicable to Smith is discussed in the introduction.
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It Is quite clear that the moral vindication of self-interest is an 
essential part of the consistency argument that dominates the 
received view. But there is a growing dissatisfaction with the moral 
vindication of self-interest as is generally accepted. Heilbroner 
(1982) and Evensky (1987) are such examples. Their efforts to 
reconcile the two theories are based on the assumption that self- 
interest has not really been vindicated. In Heilbroner it is his 
insistence that we should read Smith's work as a reiteration of 
Mandeville's 'Private Vices, Public Benefits'. Evensky argues that 
for Smith self-interest must have been an inherent flaw in the human 
character. Advocating natural liberty is consistent with it because 
the minimization of interference from flawed human beings will bring 
us as close as possible to the 'ideal' of the Great Design which 
Evensky attributes to Smith.
The numerous occasions where Smith shows explicit and implicit 
apprehension about the self-interested character simply don't fit the 
generally accepted interpretation. Indeed, many of those who adhere 
to the received view will agree that though self-interest, as 
prudence, is unquestionably approved* it does not mean that the full 
character of those who act in such a way is also vindicated. After 
all, with the complex perception of human character the prudent care
*Some would argue that even prudence does not constitute Smith's idea of 
the morally good because of the distinction between mere propriety and virtue. 
Mere propriety is 'to eat when we feel the urge'. Virtue requires that there 
will be some admiration to the degree of self-restraint. However according to 
Smith nature deceives mankind to believe that wealth, the remuneration of the 
prudent (frugal and industrious), is a reward to true virtues. If Smith's 
theory is 'naturalistic' and 'positive' as is the received view then there is 
no way he could call this a deception. If people feel that self-interest is 
virtuous because it is associated with such great rewards then so it is. Smith 
the observer has no mean of claiming otherwise. See the Introduction and 
Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion of this.
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for one's self does not tell us anything about the 'other-regarding' 
aspect of a character. The knave's character is prudent but by no 
means morally desirable. It can thus be argued that as the WN 
explores only the harmonious interaction of people's 'own-regard' 
(self-interest) behaviour, the advocacy of natural liberty that is 
implied by it is perfectly consistent, from the moral point of view, 
with the TMS.
However, such a conclusion relies heavily on accepting a proposition 
about the human character which I find unpalatable from the point of 
view of Smith's theory as much as from a personal point of view. This 
proposition is that the method of a complex perception of the human 
character implies that the various features of it are not related to 
one another in a coherent way. At the level of suppositions about 
human nature it meant that 'sympathy' had nothing to do with motives 
and was therefore consistent with whatever kind of motives we 
attribute to the character behind the WN. At the level of moral 
propositions it means that the moderate expression of one's urge to 
care for one's self has no bearings whatsoever on his ' other- 
regarding' sentiments and behaviour. A knave as well as an indolent 
person have the same kind of morally approved prudence in their 
persuit of their own-interests.
While the distinction between 'sympathy' and self-interest may not, 
on the face of it, appear outrageous, the divorce of one's 
'own-regard' from one's 'other-regarding' behaviour seems to be 
wholly unacceptable. It is, therefore, the purpose of this chapter 
to establish a ^onsistent relationship between the various aspects
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of a person's character and to examine its consequences to the 
interpretation of the TMS-WN relationship. This examination will be 
carried out at two distinct levels. One is the internal consistency 
of the motive-side of a character. Namely, how do the 'own-regard' 
and the 'other-regard' relate to each other and what are the moral 
consequences of it for the vindication of self-interest or the 
character behind the WN. The other level is the question of the 
internal consistency of 'sympathy' and the self-interested character.
In the second section I will discuss the various methods of 
description that Smith accounts for in his Lectures on Rhetoric and 
Belles Lettres (LRBL) . I will show that the view according to which 
the TMS and the WN are based on conflicting perceptions of the human 
character (the Germans view), is as a legitimate a choice of method 
as that which is implied by the generally accepted view. I will also 
point to the fact that two out of the three methods which Smith 
advances in the LRBL have an explicit assumption about the unity of 
human character. A proposition that can be confirmed by a reference 
to Smith's writings on methodology.
Obviously the proper test to any choice of method is whether it 
produces a coherent relationship between the two theories. While the 
failure of the Germans' approach is evident, that of the modern 
interpretation has not seriously been discussed. In the third section 
I propose that the method that is implied by the received view still 
does not really vindicate self-interest and therefore leaves the 
problem of Adam Smith at the level of propositions unresolved. By 
relating the various aspects of a person's character in a consistent
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manner it will become meaningless to discuss the moral status of 
prudence alone. Any proposition we make about how people care for 
themselves will, in such a framework, inevitably imply something 
about their 'other regarding' behaviour. In any case, I will argue, 
the character behind the WN can by no means be considered as a 'one­
dimensional' character. The moral vindication of prudence is 
therefore, insufficient for its general vindication.
The fourth section of the chapter is something of an extrapolation. 
Unlike the argument about the relationship between 'own-regard' and 
'other regarding' behaviours, there is no explicit dealing in Smith 
with the question that is raised here. What I do in this section is 
to try and establish a consistent relationship between 'sympathy' and 
'self-interest'. I will show that 'sympathy' is not a fixed 
characteristic of human nature. That people use it differently 
according to the general nature of their character which, obviously, 
also affects their behaviour in their persuit of their own interest. 
The moral judgements that are produced under the different 
circumstances, therefore, vary considerably. I will argue that it is 
only the 'self-interested' characters that will see virtue in 'self- 
interested' characters. In as much as Smith's moral theory is a 
description of how people form their moral opinion it explains why 
people might advocate natural liberty when observing human nature to 
be self-interested. But from the point of view of Smith the 
'observer', this kind of judgement is corrupt and wrong. When 
properly judged, self-interest only merits the title of being a 
'just' in the sense that it does not endanger the ability of society 
to subsist.
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(b)Methods of Character Description.
As we saw earlier, one can learn a lot about Smith's methodology by 
looking at his methods of discourse. Similarly we can learn much 
about Smith's perception of human nature by examining his methods of 
character description. There are basically three methods of character 
description that were considered by Smith according to the lectures 
notes entitled Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (LRBL). These 
are the 'direct method', the 'general indirect method' and the 
'particular indirect method' . I will show now how the 'Adam Smith 
problem' (i.e. , the Germans perception of human nature as opposed to 
the modern one) corresponds to Smith's methods of character 
description. I will also show that two out of the three methods have 
an explicit assumption about the unity of human nature. The third 
does not have such an explicit assumption but deducing that human 
nature is thus fragmented does not really follow. I will show in the 
next section that this third method creates many consistency problems 
at the level of Smith's moral proposition. First, however, let us 
examine these methods.
To begin with. Smith gives a general account of the two main methods 
of describing a quality of any object : "That way of expressing any 
quality of an object which does it by describing the several parts
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that constitute the quality we want to express, may be called the 
direct method. When, again, we do it by -describing the effects this 
quality produces on those who behold it, may be called the indirect 
method” [LRBL p.67 my italics], (these are also distinguished as the 
'internal' and the 'external' methods). Notice that the 'direct' 
method differs from the 'indirect' one in two respects. First, in the 
'direct method' the quality is described by a set of properties (its 
several parts) while in the 'indirect method' we describe the 
quality by its cumulative effect. Secondly, in the 'direct method' 
we describe the different components themselves while in the 
'indirect method' we describe things by their external effects. In 
our case, the quality we are interested in is the quality of human 
character. When applied to it, the direct method is "when we relate 
the various parts of which it consists, what mixture of each 
particular passion or turn of mind there is in the person" [LRBL 
p.78]. That is, a character is a composition of a set of properties 
like, for instance, wisdom, courage, honesty etc. We distinguish 
between characters by the different mixture of these properties.
The indirect method, on the other hand, is where we "relate the 
effects it produces on the outward behaviour and conduct of the 
person" [p. SO] . For instance we may say that a person is harmful 
(malevolent), careless or bad tempered. The 'indirect method' is 
again subdivided: to the 'General' and 'particular' methods. We may 
describe a character in the 'indirect' method ( by its effects on the 
others) "either by relating the general tenor of conduct which the 
person follows, which we may call the general method, or by 
descending into particulars and pointing out how he would act in such
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and such instances: this we may call the particular method".[p.80]. 
So we may say that a person is benevolent, and thus describing him 
by the general tenor of conduct, or we may say specifically how his 
benevolence is being expressed in different circumstances. But in 
both the general and particular methods we refer to the effect that 
the different aspects of human character produce (the indirect 
method) . In the case of the former it is the cumulative effect while 
in the particular method it is the effect on the beholder of the 
various expressions of that character.
The 'particular indirect method' may, in some circumstances, be 
confused with the 'direct method'. In both cases we describe a
character by a set of properties. The difference, then, lies in that
the 'direct method' describes the intrinsic value of particular 
properties while in the 'particular method' we describe a set of 
behaviours that should stem from the same cumulative effect by which 
we distinguish between different characters.
To sum up, the three methods are as follows:
'Direct Method': when a character is presented as a set of features 
which are described by their intrinsic value rather than by their 
effects on others.
'General Indirect Method': when a character is described by the 
cumulative effect it creates on the observer.
'Particular Indirect Method': when the cumulative effect that the 
character creates on the observer is broken down to the effects on
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the observer that is created by the various aspect of the 
character^.
There are two instances in the reading of Smith where the character 
description plays an important role. First, in arguing that the TMS 
and the WN are not based on contradicting assumptions about the human 
nature. Namely that 'sympathy' and 'self-interest' are not 
competitive descriptions of the same thing. Second, in proposing that 
self- interest is morally good because it should not be read as 
selfishness but as prudence.
Clearly, for 'sympathy' not to compete with self-interest on the 
description of the basic emotional disposition of a character, we 
must stick to the 'direct method' of character description. To see 
that, let me now examine the opening statement of the TMS. There, in 
the spirit of the 'Newtonian Method' of discourse. Smith puts forward 
the 'principle' behind his moral theory. "How selfish soever man may 
be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which 
interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness 
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the 
pleasure of seeing it."[TMS p.9].
^On the face of it one may argue that the only difference between the 
'particular indirect method' and the 'direct method' is in the origin of 
description. Namely, that both these methods imply that the character is a set 
of properties only that in the former they are described by their external 
effect on the observer while in the latter they are described from the point 
of view of their intrinsic value (like, say, IQ as an intrinsic measure for 
wisdom). However, this is not the case. Smith is very clear that in the 
'indirect method' there is a general impression created by the character. Thus 
we can describe this general impression as such or to descend into the various 
expression of the same thing. It is through this descendance that I have 
concluded that in the 'particular indirect method' the unity assumption that 
is so clear in the 'general method' is preserved.
89
It can now be interpreted in two different ways:
a. no matter how busy people are with themselves, they always 
have a positive interest in the fortunes of others. Namely, 
their interest in themselves does not mean that they do not 
have an interest in the fortunes of others.
b. the selfish appearance of people is misleading. Actually, 
they are benevolently disposed. The happiness of others is
as important to them as their own.
The difference between these two interpretation is in the way the 
human character is being described. In the first case (interpretation
(a)) the character of man is perceived as composed of two independent 
aspects: the motive to action and the interest he has in the
happiness of (or feelings towards) others. Interpretation (b) , on the 
other hand, is based on the assumption that the human character is 
described by a single feature: its disposition towards the others. 
The way he feels about the others or the interest he has in their 
happiness, reflects the whole constitution of a person. In 
particular, his actions and the motive behind them must also be 
affected by the same thing: the degree of interest he has in others. 
Thus, to depict the essence of a character it would suffice to 
describe only his motives ; in such a case, he is either benevolent, 
or selfish or malevolent. Smith's opening statement is therefore 
interpreted as saying that sometimes we only appear to act out of 
selfishness (no interest in the others at all) but the truth is that 
we do have a positive interest in others' happiness. This positive 
interest, when manifested through actions, means benevolence.
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So the German interpretation of the 'principle' in the TMS is in the 
line of Smith's 'general indirect method' of character description. 
A character is described by its cumulative effects. And this effect, 
as perceived by those who behold, is his interest in the fortunes of 
others as reflected through his actions. 'Sympathy' therefore, is to 
be understood as a description of this emotional disposition. 
Obviously, it means a high interest in the fortunes of others. When 
manifested in actions, this degree of interest means benevolence and 
thus, is inconsistent with self-interest. Even without going into 
details regarding what self-interest really is, it obviously reflects 
much less interest in the fortunes of others than is implied by 
'sympathy'. Hence, as characters are perceived in the 'indirect 
method' , via the degree of interest they have in the fortunes of 
others, 'self-interest' and 'sympathy' correspond to different 
degrees of those 'fellow-feelings'.
But there are two other ways of interpreting Smith perception of the 
human character. The 'direct method' and the 'particular indirect 
method'. I have already mentioned that these two methods may be, 
sometimes, confused. For in both of them we describe a character by 
a set of properties. The difference between them, however, is 
significant. First, in the 'direct method' we describe the intrinsic 
value of the particular property (like, for instance, wisdom) while 
in the 'particular indirect method' we describe it by the effects it 
produces on those who behold. Secondly, and more importantly, in the 
'direct method' we do not find any inherent relationship between the 
different components of the human character. In the 'particular 
indirect method', on the other hand, we are actually describing the
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different expressions of the same thing.
Bearing in mind Smith's search for unity the 'particular indirect 
method' seems to me to be the more appropriated method. However, it 
seems as if the convention has chosen the 'direct method' as the 
solution to the problem posed by the Germans. That is to say,
'sympathy' and 'self-interest' are perceived as describing two 
distinct faculties of the human character. I will show now that if 
we choose to stick to this character description we shall run into 
difficulties in arguing that self-interest is morally good.
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(c) The Consistency of the Charitable Self-interested Character.
In the following section I will try to show that to use the 'direct 
method' of character description does not really solve the problem 
of the TMS-WN relationship. It does help in arguing that the fact 
that people employ 'sympathy' to judge morally does not, in itself, 
contradict their self-interested behaviour. However, when we come to 
the question whether self-interest is morally good, so that the moral 
propositions of the TMS will not contradict the moral implications 
of the WN, the same method itself creates an obstacle.
To begin with, however, it would be useful to discuss the question 
of what is really meant by self-interest.
The Definition of Self-interest: There are mainly two interpretation 
to the meaning of self-interest in the writings of Adam Smith.
(a) Self-interest means selfishness, or self-love.
(b) Self-interest means prudence.
(a) Selfishness or selfish behaviour, according to Smith is "when 
[sentiments of others are] conceived upon account of our own private 
good or bad fortune" [TMS p.40] . Or more generally, when our behaviour
93
is determined according to its proposed contribution to our own 
happiness.
(b) Prudence, according to Smith, is the 'virtue' of caring for one's 
self. "The care of the health, of the fortune, of the rank and 
reputation of the individual, the objects upon which his comfort and 
happiness in this life are supposed principally to depend, is 
considered as the proper business of that virtue which is commonly 
called Prudence"[TMS p.213]. Note that 'virtue' here does not 
represent a moral judgement. It denotes a certain feature of human 
character that may or may not be virtuous. (This can easily be proved 
for at some point Smith discusses the 'improper' and the 'proper' 
prudence. Obviously, if prudence can be 'improper' it cannot be at 
the same time virtuous by definition). So self-interest, according 
to this approach, is that part in our nature that directs us to the
care of those things which affect us.
The Difference between them: The most obvious distinction between 
these two perceptions of self-interest is that the one uses it as a 
description of the human character as a whole, while the other
perceives self-interest as a description of one single aspect of the
human character. In terms of Smith's discussion of the different ways 
to describe a character, clearly selfishness corresponds to the 
'general indirect method' while prudence, to the 'direct method'. 
That is, selfishness (the 'general indirect method') is a 
description of the general tenor of behaviour. Prudence, on the 
other hand (the 'direct method') is an account of a single aspect 
of human character.
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Indeed, when Smith discusses human character he decomposes the 
analysis into two main parts : When we consider the character of any
individual, we naturally view it under two different aspects; first, 
as it may affect his own happiness; and secondly, as it may affect 
that of the other people." [TMS p.212]. Prudence, quite clearly, 
belongs only to the category of the 'own-regarding' aspect of human 
character. Not surprising therefore, modern commentators who used 
Smith's 'direct method', perceive self-interest as prudence. The 
German scholars, who followed the 'general indirect method' perceived 
self-interest as selfishness.
There are now two questions that must immediately follow. One has to 
do with the moral accountability of the different forms of character 
description. That is, whether a single component of a character when 
'directly' described, is morally accountable. The other has to do 
with the nature of the 'self-interested' character that we observe 
in the WN. Namely, even if prudence corresponds to self-interest, 
is this the only feature of the human nature by which Smith 
describes the character of the WN?. Or in other words, is the WN an 
analysis of people's interaction only in as much as it concerns 
their persuit of their own good?.
The moral accountability of prudence and selfishness: There is hardly 
any problem in ascribing a moral value to selfishness. As it is a 
general description of the human character, it reflects the person's 
behaviour in any of his encounters with the world that surrounds him. 
It describes how he will feel and act in what concerns his own 
happiness as well as in what concerns the happiness of the others.
95
Everything will be determined according to its effect on this 
person's own happiness. Thus, Smith's moral judgement is very harsh 
and conclusive :"The heart of every impartial spectator rejects all 
fellow feeling with the selfishness of his motives, and he [the 
actor] is the proper object of the highest disapprobation."[TMS 
p.78] .
However,as far as prudence is concerned,we must bear in mind that it 
only depicts one aspect of the human character. Can we pass a 
judgement on a person according to that single aspect of his 
behaviour?. Indeed, when Smith comes to assess that quality his 
judgement seems to be quite reserved:"Prudence, in short, when 
directed merely to the care of the health, of the fortune, and of the 
rank and reputation of the individual, though it is regarded as a 
most respectable and even, in some degree, as an amiable and 
agreeable quality, yet it never is considered as one, either of the 
most endearing, or the most ennobling of the virtues. It commands 
a certain cold esteem, but seems not entitled to any ardent love or 
admiration."[TMS p.216]^.
Obviously, the moral judgement of a character, described in a 'direct 
method' , must take into account the other components of that 
character. In Smith's case, the character of man is now decomposed 
into the two specific forms of the 'own-regarding' and the 'other-
^It is true that Smith's reservations about prudence may result from its 
being merely proper. Namely, that it is not a great restraint or self-denial 
that should command admiration. I personally don't accept this interpretation 
for two reasons. One is that if the natural urge to care for one's self is so 
great then moderation of it should reflect great restraint. And the other, 
that as will be shown below. Smith's qualifications are entirely related to 
the other aspect of human nature with which prudence is associated.
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regarding' aspects. Thus, a moral judgement of any character must 
consider the 'own regarding' as well as the 'other regarding' aspects 
of it. Indeed, the description of the virtuous man follows precisely 
this qualification. "The man who acts according to the rules of 
perfect prudence, of strict justice, and of proper benevolence, may 
be said to be perfectly virtuous."[TMS p.237].
That is, perfect prudence describes the person's virtuous behaviour 
so far as it affects only his own happiness. Proper benevolence and 
strict justice, on the other hand, describe his virtuous behaviour 
as much as it affects the others' happiness. But can a person be 
perfectly prudent and improperly benevolent? If so, what will be the 
moral value of such a character?. Moreover, can a person, as a matter 
of fact, be perfectly prudent and perfectly benevolent?. Isn't there 
a hidden impossibility in Smith's description of the virtuous 
character? Or, perhaps, perfect prudence means to have a very 
moderate interest in one's own happiness. In that case, is it really 
self-interest?
The fact that prudence alone (i.e. a person's behaviour as far as his 
own happiness is concerned) cannot generate the virtuous character 
is only too obvious in Smith's own analysis of it. When he comes to 
pass a moral judgement on it, he is obliged to distinguish between 
three 'sorts' of prudence. Prudence that is 'directed merely to the 
care of one's self', prudence that is 'directed to greater and 
nobler purposes than the care for one's self' ( which he calls 
'superior prudence') and prudence which is 'the mere want to take 
care of one's self' (which he calls 'imprudence').
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By doing so, Smith had actually incorporated into the one aspect of 
human character, the circumstances of the other. Thus, he 
distinguishes between three sorts of characters who are prudent in 
their 'own regard' but who differ in their 'other regard' aspect of 
their character. The 'superior prudence' is when "Prudence 
is... combined with many greater and more splendid virtues, with 
valour, with extensive and strong benevolence..."[TMS p.216]. 
Prudence as such ( or mere prudence) prevails when the person's full 
intentions are "directed to the care of the health, of the fortune, 
and of the rank and reputation of the individual..". And 
'imprudence' is when a person's intentions are concentrated on "the 
mere want of the capacity to take care of one's self".
Obviously, superior prudence differs from the other two as it 
incorporates 'strong benevolence' which is clearly a feature of the 
'other-regarding' aspect of human character. Also mere prudence and 
imprudence differ in terms of their considerations to the others. 
Mere prudence means also that one cares about his reputation. 
Consequently he will do nothing to hurt the others or to cause them 
to dislike him. Imprudence, on the other hand means that the person 
only cares for himself and has no regard whatsoever to rank or 
reputation. Thus he may be inclined to hurt the others if they come 
between him and the successful implementation of his own happiness. 
Note however that in all three cases the person is considered as 
prudent in terms of his care for himself. Even 'imprudence' ( which 
is somewhat confusing) means that as far as his own happiness is 
concerned the person is prudent. "The artful knave" writes Smith 
"whose dexterity and address exempt him....from punishment or
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distinct detection, is too often received in the world with an 
indulgence which he by no means deserves” [TMS p. 216] . That is to say 
that the fact that someone is industrious and frugal ( in short, 
prudent) does not make him good, bad or mediocre. It is the 
'other-regarding' aspect of his character that determines his moral 
value.
In the following diagram I have tried to depict Smith's perception 
of the human character. It is composed, in the spirit of the 'direct 
method', of two aspects: the other regarding and the own regarding. 
Apparently, throughout the whole analysis of the 'own regarding' 
aspect of the human character (part 6 section 1 in the TMS) , Smith 
uses only one pattern of behaviour to characterize it: prudence. That 
is, although he distinguishes between characters according to the 
other features that are associated with the prudent ' own regard' , he 
does not distinguish between the possible difference in the 
expressions of prudent behaviour. Consequently, the 'own-regarding' 
aspect of the human character has no scope and is depicted by a 
single discrete point which represents a fixed degree of prudence^.
The 'other regarding' aspect of human character is defined in terms
^Namely, although Smith distinguishes between 'superior prudence' , 'mere 
prudence' and 'imprudence' he does so only through the association of prudence 
with other features of character. He does not, however, suggest in what way 
does the combination of say, prudence with benevolence, affect the meaning of 
the prudent care for one's self. In other words, the point I'm making here is 
that although Smith distinguishes between the various characters that pursuit 
their own needs prudently through their other characteristics, he does not 
explain whether the ' own regard' behaviour of the different types of character 
is the same or it varies too. The 'artful knave' and the 'Great legislator' 
are different in their attitude towards the other; how it affects their 
prudent care for themselves is not very clear.
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of what a person intends to the others : "The character of every 
individual, so far as it can affect the happiness of other people, 
must do so by its disposition either to hurt or to benefit them"[TMS 
p.218]. We may say that the want to benefit reflects a positive 
interest in the others as well as the want to harm reflects a 
negative interest in the others. In between, naturally, there are 
those who wish neither to harm nor to benefit anyone else. Those 
people have no- interest in the others whatsoever. So the 'other 
regarding' aspect of the human character is depicted as a continuous 
sequence from the highest direct positive interest in the others 
(benevolence) to the highest direct negative interest in the others 
(malevolence). Naturally, in the middle we find no-direct-interest 
in the others which actually means that if the person considers the 
others at all, it will only be in as much as they affect himself ( 
or his reputation). That is to say that the interest he might have 
in the others is entirely in the domain of his care for his 
reputation which is part of his ' own regard' . From the point of view 
of the 'other regard' it means that he has no direct interest in the 
others.
'own regarding'
prudence ^
'other regarding' 
Benevolence
Malevolence
Now we may depict the different complete characters which are 
accountable for moral assessment. Line A in the above diagram depicts 
the 'superior prudent' person whom Smith believes constitute the
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morally good character. Line B depicts the person who is prudent but 
has no-interest in the others. The only interest he has is to 
safeguard his own happiness by not causing harm to anyone else which 
may affect his reputation.
Line C depicts the morally bad character whose prudence is soured 
(imprudence). It is a person who may be prudent in his care for his 
own happiness and yet, he is malevolent and would not mind harming 
others in order to advance his own happiness. It is the artful knave 
which is depicted by line C.
In short, lines A, B and C distinguish between what Smith labelled 
as imprudence, mere prudence and superior (or perfect) prudence and 
we can thus clearly see that prudence in itself cannot be the 
subject of a moral debate. It is only the complete character that 
can be morally judged and what it is that determines that moral 
judgement is the interest a person has in the happiness of the 
others. If self-interest means no-direct-interest in the others, 
then it corresponds to line B. It certainly does not constitute the 
idea of the morally good character.
To summarize this point: in Smith's discussion of prudence he begins 
by defining prudence as the care for one's self. Then he continues 
to point out that every impartial spectator can go along with the 
effort to improve one's own conditions. However, he then continues 
to point out that the fact that we may approve of prudence, is of 
no real consequences when we come to assess, morally, a person's 
character. This, of course, is obvious because prudence constitutes
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only one section of the human character. He then distinguishes 
between prudence that prevails with different aspects of the other 
section of human character. On these complete characters he is able 
to pass a moral judgement: "As prudence combined with other virtues, 
constitutes the noblest; so imprudence combined with other vices, 
constitutes the vilest of all character" [TMS p.217]
Modern commentators rejected selfishness as a description of self- 
interest because it was evident that Smith had morally deplored it. 
It would have been inconsistent with the conventional interpretation 
of Smith's work if self-interest could be proved as morally foul. 
Prudence, on the other hand, seemed to have had more glorious 
prospects in providing the moral support for advocating natural 
liberty that is based upon it. However, as I have already shown, 
though prudence in itself can be thought of as morally approved, it 
does not mean that people who employ it are morally good. In fact, 
the moral value of prudence is meaningless if not specified with the 
'other regarding' aspect of the human character. But modern 
commentators might insist that the fact the we can morally approve 
of prudence as such is sufficient to establish the moral support for 
its advocacy. However, if we examine the nature of this moral 
approval we shall soon find out that this path too does not lead to 
the enshrining of prudence as Smith's idea of the moral good.
In Smith's moral system we approve of a sentiment because of the 
pleasure we feel when realizing that it coincides with what we feel. 
Also, we have a natural tendency to feel harmonious with moderate 
expressions of all sentiments. Thus, if prudence is perceived as a
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moderate expression of the natural dictate to care for ourselves, it 
should also become morally good. However, it would also mean that 
there is more than one way of caring for one's own. If so, one may 
now wonder about the relationship between the way a person conducts 
his affairs in as much as it affects his own happiness, and the 
interest he might have in the fortunes of others. In terms of 
Smith's analysis of the human character it would mean that a 
person's 'own regard' can no longer be considered as a fixed degree 
like what we have shown in the above diagram. It would have to be 
that the care for one's own is a sentiment, the intensity of which 
can vary from high to low.
'other regarding''own regarding
Benevolencehigh
prudence
Malevolencelow
Prudence, in this case, is only the middle point of that sequence. 
It is only the moderate expression of the 'own regard' aspect of the 
human character. Now, let us try and construct a plausible
relationship between the two aspects that comprise the human 
character. Surely if the intensity of one's care for one's self is
high, very little attention can be left in him for the 'other
regarding' aspect of his character. Thus, it will correspond to very
little interest in the fortunes of others. This, in turn, means that 
like the 'artful knave' the person will be ready to harm others in
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order to satisfy the strong urge to satisfy his own happiness. He 
cares so much for himself that he does not even regard reputation 
and rank as worthy ends.
So there is some sort of an inverse relationship between the 
intensity of the urge to care for one's own and the interest he has 
in the fortunes of others. Therefore, in terms of moral judgement, 
line A' (the combination of a high degree of interest in one's own 
together with a very low interest in the others (malevolence)) 
constitutes Smith's notion of the bad character ('imprudence'). Line 
B' (the combination of a moderate expression of the care for one's 
own together with indifference towards the others) constitutes the 
morally acceptable ('mere prudence'). Line C', accordingly, where 
low level of interest in one's own is combined with a high level of 
interest in the others constitutes Smith's notion of the morally 
good character ('superior prudence'-"to feel much for others and 
little for ourselves.... constitutes the perfection of human 
nature.[TMS p.25]).
The meaning of prudence as a moderate expression of one's natural 
urge to care for one's self gets now a new meaning. It is the 
Aristotelian mean; something that lies between two extreme. 
Moderation in the sense of self-restraint prevails here anywhere 
between the middle and the low intensity of one's own regard^. 
Coupled with its logically association with having little interest
^In any case, as line B' depicts Smith's idea of 'mere prudence', it 
means that the moderate interest that a person has in others is entirely due 
to his worries about his own reputation. This is not a very noble reason to 
have other people's interest at heart.
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in the others Invokes two major criticisms. One is that now we can 
say that the character as a whole does not fit the morally good 
character but it does fit propriety. The other, perhaps the more 
serious one, is that in fact, the character depicted by line B' is 
not really different from Smith's idea of the selfish character.
"There is", argues Smith "a considerable difference between virtue 
and mere propriety; between those qualities and actions which 
deserve to be admired and celebrated, and those which simply deserve
to be approved of to eat when we are hungry, is certainly, upon
ordinary occasions, perfectly right and proper, and cannot miss being 
approved of as such by everybody. Nothing, however, could be more 
absurd than to say it was virtuous." [TMS p. 25] . In a comment earlier 
I said that I do not believe that the 'cold esteem' that is 
associated with prudence reflects its being merely proper. Now I 
seem to argue that it does. The difference is important. Before, 
prudence was a single point. You could either yield to the natural 
drive or be prudent. Now, however, as the care for one's self is a 
sequence going from high to low (which also associates the care for 
one's self with the 'other regarding' aspect of his nature in a more 
distinctive manner), prudence is not a great self-restraint given 
the low care for one's self which is associated with high interest 
in the others. On that point it would seem rather odd to morally 
advocate something that is based on mere propriety.
The other major criticism relates to the complete character that 
emerges from this analysis. The self-interested character of the WN 
is probably the one depicted by line B' above. To judge according
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to Professor Stigler, the character behind the WN is the utility 
maximizer man. "Man is eternally a utility-maximizer, in his home, 
in his office- be it public or private- in his church, in his 
scientific work, in short everywhere" (Stigler, 1982. p.35).
In terms of Smith's analysis this corresponds nicely to Smith's 
definition of selfishness, "when [sentiments of others are] conceived 
upon account of our own private good or bad fortune" [TMS p.40]. And 
the moral judgement of that character is very clear indeed. Hence, 
if we think that the character behind the WN is Stigler's utility 
maximizer, we have a problem at our hands. Namely, Smith's advocacy 
of natural liberty means advocating selfishness which is, upon his 
own account, a moral vice.
Now, line B' correspond in Smith's complete analysis of character to 
what he named 'mere prudence'. As such 'mere prudence' would yield 
the same conclusions as in the case of the utility maximizer. This 
is so, because mere prudence means that the interest we might have 
in the others stems from the care for our reputation. Namely, we 
perceive the others only in as much as they affect our own 
happiness. Thus, mere prudence and selfishness are almost the same 
thing ( sort of a utility maximization where reputation is a 
parameter). However, we must admit that here Smith's analysis is not 
very consistent. Selfishness is most clearly deplored but mere 
prudence seems to gain some 'cold esteem' though not enough to 
become the moral good. At any rate, either way we are still far 
from the required result, i.e. that the self-interested character 
of the WN constitutes the moral good as implied by the received
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view.
The received view is that the moral proposition of the TMS is 
consistent with the WN because self-interest, as prudence, should be 
examined in isolation from the 'other regarding' aspects of his 
character. Prudence is a moderate sentiment with which we can 
identify and it tells us nothing about the person's other 
characteristics. We saw, I hope, the implausibility of this 
assertion in the context of his moral theory. There is another 
point, however, that is crucial to the received view. That is that 
the character behind the WN is also a 'one-dimensional' character. 
Namely, that the WN is an exposition of the interactions of only one 
aspect of human characters.
There are basically two principles in the WN. One is the 'propensity 
to truck barter and exchange' (which is founded on the principle of 
'persuasion'). The other is the drive to 'better one's conditions'.
The drive to 'better one's condition' is probably the best reflection 
of 'prudence' in the context of the WN. Frugality and industry (the 
characteristics of prudence) are essentials for that purpose. The 
question is whether this is a quality that can be seen as entirely 
in the domain of the ' own regard' and thus allowing the WN to focus 
on the 'one dimension' of people's character that is also considered 
as such as morally good. However , "An augmentation of fortune is the 
mean by which the greater part of men propose and wish to better 
their conditions" [WN p.341].
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Considering the fact that one cannot augment his fortune without 
proper division of labour, one's action to better his conditions must 
necessarily involve other people. Thus, even if all his actions in 
relations to other people are concentrated on his own fortune, he is 
necessarily expressing an attitude towards their happiness. This 
attitude comes forward in his dealings with other people in exchange 
and production.
As for the propensity to truck, barter and exchange Smith has a very 
clear view of it. "To perform any thing, or to give any thing, 
without a reward is always generous and noble, but to barter one 
thing for another is mean."[LJ p.527]. Obviously what brings about 
Smith intuitive judgement here is the fact that this propensity is 
inherently related to the 'other regarding' aspect of a person's 
character. By this two things are revealed. Not only that the 
character behind the WN is not the convenient 'one-dimensional' 
character who can be consistently related to the moral approval of 
prudence. Smith explicitly (though on intuitive grounds) denounces 
the fundamental in human nature that drives the system of natural 
liberty on moral grounds.
When, on the other hand, we extend the character in the WN to include 
both 'own regard' as well as 'other regarding' principles we end up 
with the 'mere prudent' character which is far from being the morally 
good character.
Whatever modification we make, it remains clear that the character 
that prevails in the WN is by no means of the 'superior prudence'
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kind. Thus, it is always less than what Smith considers as the 
morally good character. Consequently, Smith advocacy of natural 
liberty that is based on self-interest cannot be based on the idea 
that self- interest constitutes the notion of moral good.
109
(d)An Extrapolation: The Effects of Personal Characteristics on Moral 
Judgement.
So far we saw that the two methods (direct and general indirect) of 
character description leave many unsolved problems regarding the 
consistent relationship between the TMS and the WN. In the 'general 
indirect' method we confronted problems at both levels of 
suppositions and propositions. 'Sympathy' and 'self-interest' were 
considered as contradicting descriptions of human nature, and the 
self-interested person, hailed in the WN, was no other than the 
deplorable selfish character in the TMS.
In the 'direct method' we solved the problem at the level of 
suppositions but we are still confronted with problems at the level 
of propositions. The only way to establish 'self-interest' as 
morally good is by divorcing 'own-regarding' behaviour from 'other 
regarding' attitudes. There is indeed nothing in the 'direct method' 
to suggest that the various aspects of a person's character should 
relate to each other in a consistent manner. However two problems 
emerge. One, that treating 'own regard' in isolation is meaningful 
(for consistency purposes) only if the character behind the WN can 
also be seen in the same light. However, it is quite clear that the 
character behind the WN is by no means a ' one-dimensional' 
character.
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The other serious problem is that Smith himself seems to reject this 
approach quite explicitly. Distinguishing between different kinds (or 
degrees) of 'prudence' by their association with 'other regarding' 
aspects means that Smith considered the human character in a more 
coherent way. When, however, the different aspects of a person's 
character are brought together we are moving closer to the 
'particular indirect method'. The only difference between the two 
methods is that we still look at the various aspects from their 
intrinsic point of view (in the 'direct method') rather than from 
the cumulative effect that they produce on the beholder.
Indeed, I have already argued in favour of Smith's unified perception 
of nature in general and of human nature in particular. The result 
of it in terms of moral propositions is that 'self-interest' is a 
character which lies somewhere between being 'merely proper' and 
being morally denounced as a form of selfishness. The WN, in that 
case, is an 'empirical' examination of the interaction of such 
characters. It cannot, however, be advocated from a moral point of 
view. This dichotomy between the moral status of 'self-interest' and 
its efficiency in generating wealth can be an explanation to Smith's 
ambiguous approach to it. The confusing statements that he makes 
about self-interest can be a result of an honest confusion. But for 
that to be true there must be some moral merit in the efficiency of 
natural liberty that stands in conflict with the moral value of 
self-interest.
If we allow for that then we end-up arguing that Smith's system is
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logically incoherent. The merits of efficiency should have been 
present in the first assessment of 'self-interest'. However, I 
believe that we can overcome this problem by giving a different 
account of Smith's work. If we extend the 'particular indirect 
method' to deal with the relationship between ' sympathy' (the mean 
of forming a moral opinion) and 'self-interest' we will find an 
explanation which leaves Smith's theory logically intact.
The main issue here is to deal with the problem of discrepancies 
between what Smith considered to be morally good and what he believed 
to be the public perception of it. If we find a way to distinguish 
between the 'moral instructor' and the 'empirical observer' we can 
explain why self-interest (and wealth) may appear sometime as morally 
good and as almost a form of vice in other occasions. To do that we 
must move from the problem of 'own-regard' - 'other regard' 
relationship to a more fundamental level of the human character. The 
relationship that exists between people's character as depicted in 
the 'own-regard'-'other regard' space, and the way they form their 
moral opinions. In other words, it is the problem of 'sympathy' 
-'self- interest' relationship.
Smith himself did not deal with this problem explicitly and 
therefore, this section is an extrapolation^. However, as I said
^The purpose of such an extrapolation is to show that a consistent 
dealing with Smith's work can settle some apparent inconsistencies. While it 
is clear that Smith did not pursuit this analysis himself, he might have had 
it at the back of his mind but then again, he might not. For the purpose of 
this study I care more about the coherence of his theory than I do about 
whether or not he himself grasped all the meanings and consequences of his 
theory. The 'real test' of such an extrapolation would have been if I could 
have convinced Smith that it follows from his theory. Otherwise, its test is 
in its ability to shed light on some unexplained inconsistencies. Succeeding
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earlier there is plenty of evidence to suggest that Smith 
distinguished between the way people actually form their moral 
opinion, and how they should have done itf. The key player here
in so doing makes it a valid interpretation of Smith's theory as any other 
effort to settle the problems in his texts. The whole issue of 
" reconstructionalism' and its role in my analysis is dealt with in more 
details in Part III chapter 1 section 3.
 ^ But it is not only that there is a distinction between the 'moral 
instructor' and the 'empirical observer', Smith believes that people's actual 
Judgement is affected by their character and is sometimes, corrupt. For 
instance, let us take the tendency to identify with the rich, which is a 
result of the pleasantness of joy. Surely, he is describing here a natural 
tendency, something in the domain of practice; of the ' nature of things' . 
But, already in the same paragraph he makes it clear that he is not very happy 
about it. He insinuates there, that he cannot see any substance behind that 
tendency : "Do they imagine that their stomach is better, or their sleep 
sounder in a palace than in a cottage? The contrary has been so often 
observed, and, indeed , is so very obvious.." [TMS p. 50].
Obviously this does not make the tendency itself unnatural, it is in a 
different level that his perplexion occur.
Through the whole TMS, one cannot avoid the impression that a certain tension 
exists between what is natural (what is the practice) and what is also moral. 
It becomes even more clear when the natural consequences (the formation of 
ranks in society) of the natural tendency to sympathize with the pleasant, is 
being examined. : "That kings are the servants of the people, to be 
obeyed,resisted, disposed, or punished, as the public convenience may require 
is the DOCTRINE of REASON and PHILOSOPHY; but it is NOT the DOCTRINE of 
NATURE" [TMS p.53].(my italics). Therefore, it seems rather clear that the 
practical way we form our moral opinion, by the degree of accordance of 
sentiments, cannot be considered as the whole system of morals. There must be 
a different level of analysis, from which, Smith deduces his criticism of the 
prevailing morality.
The fact that actual 'sympathy', felt by people, will not be the source of 
proper moral judgement becomes evident from the existence of two expressions: 
corruption and perfection.
These words should be meaningless in a moral theory that is merely devoted to 
explain how moral approbation is actually formed. They can have meaning only 
if there is some system, or ideal, with which to compare the practice of 
morality. "This disposition to admire, and almost worship, the rich and the 
powerful, and to despise , or ,at least, to neglect persons of poor and mean 
condition, though necessary both to establish and maintain the distinction of 
ranks and the order of society, is, at the same time, the great and most 
universal cause of corruption of our moral sentiment."[TMS p.61].
The existence of that 'objective' system can be derived not only from the fact 
that a natural tendency can be corrupt, but also , that regardless of what 
is the prevailing nature of mankind, there is a perfection of it.: "and hence 
it is, that to feel much for others and little for
ourselves.......... constitutes the PERFECTION of human NATURE" [TMS p. 25].
Eventually , this tension between the natural and moral is spelled out.:"But 
though man is thus employed to alter that distribution of things which natural 
events would make, if left to themselves; The natural course of things
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is the idea of the 'impartial spectator' and in particular, the 
meaning of 'impartiality'. There can be little doubt that for Smith 
the proper moral judgement is when one sees the other from a truly 
'impartial' point of view. And there is no doubt that he forms his 
ideal on how he observed people to behave. However, the fact that 
people might think that they were judging through an 'impartial 
observer' does not mean that they are actually doing it in a proper 
way.
As I show below he was quite sceptical about people's ability to 
become more than just 'spectators'. This does not mean that they are 
not trying to be 'impartial', or that they feel that their judgement 
is not really impartial, but it is an effort to achieve 
'impartiality'. Some of them are incapable and some are not so 
inclined. The purpose of this section, therefore, is to investigate 
how a person's character may interfere in his ability to achieve true 
'impartiality'. And, to examine how it affects the subsequent moral 
judgement that will be generated by those individuals. Consequently, 
the same model of moral judgement can explain the actual moral 
opinion, its 'ideal' and the discrepancies between them. In the last 
part of this section I will take this idea even further. If a 
person's character may interfere in his tendency to become truly 
impartial, it might as well interfere in the method of forming a 
moral opinion. In other words, a person's character may affect his 
use of 'sympathy' to form his moral opinion. Sometimes, it is easier
can not be entirely controlled by the impotent endeavour of man: the current 
is too rapid and too strong for him to stop it ; and though the rules which 
direct it appear to have been established for the wisest and best purposes, 
they sometimes produce effects which shock all his natural sentiments[TMS 
p.168]. This last point is discussed also in chapter 4.
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to be taken by the 'beauty of the system' rather than engage one's 
self in a costly (in terms of time and effort) imaginary change of 
places.
The 'particular indirect method' of character description is first 
of all an 'indirect method' . Namely, a character is described by its 
cumulative effects as perceived by those who behold. However, unlike 
the 'general indirect method', it allows for several expressions of 
the same effect. That is, a character is not described by a single 
tenor of behaviour but, by a set of its expressions in different 
circumstances. If, for instance, we consider a person's attitude 
towards the others as the cumulative effect of the different 
components of his character (as perceived by those who behold) then 
we can see it in his dealings with his own affairs as much as in his 
direct dealings with the others. The 'own-regard' and the 'other 
regarding' aspects of human character, as I have tried to establish 
in the previous section, become the two sides of the same coin. In 
the same way, a persons approach to morals (the subject of the TMS) 
and his approach to actions (the subject of the WN) also become 
related in one way or another. In this section I will try to 
establish a relationship between moral judgement and a person's 
character. Consequently, we shall also discover the relationship 
between a person's morals and his motives to actions.
From the opening statement of the TMS, where Smith presents us with 
the 'principle' of his theory, it is quite clear that the part in 
human nature that dominates his moral theory is the interest people 
have in the fortunes of others:"...there are evidently some
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principles in [man's] nature, which interest him in the fortune of 
o t h e r s [ T M S  p. 9]. It also means that it is by this particular 
interest that Smith describes human nature. Namely that it is a 
quality that prevails in all human beings (otherwise it could not 
have served as a principle) and that people are distinguished by the 
different degrees of this quality. Some characters may reflect a 
high positive interest in the fortune of others and some, a highly 
negative one. Some, indeed, may reflect a very little interest 
altogether.
The quality of Interest in Others (IIO) may have two different 
expressions. It may manifest itself through sentiments as such 
(sympathy),or, in actions (motives). The interest in others as 
manifested through action, is reflected by the intention, or motive 
to action ("by [the] disposition either to hurt or to benefit "[TMS 
p. 218]). Thus a high positive interest means the want to benefit 
(benevolence) while the high negative interest means the want to hurt 
(malevolence). In between, there exists a point where Interest in 
Others is at zero, which means, no-interest-in-the others whatsoever. 
Neither the want to benefit nor the wish to harm. In other words, the 
only interest that such a character reflects is self-interest.
Let me now explore in more details the other aspect of interest in 
the others: the side of sentiments and sympathy. The IIO as
expressed through sentiments, in Smith's analysis, is the tendency 
to identify with the sentiments of the other. "That we often derive 
sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious 
to require any instances to prove it" [TMS p.9]. But "As we have no
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immediate experience of what other men feel", we do so by an 
imaginary change of places with the person we observe. We consider 
ourselves in his position and we try to experience through our own 
senses what he might be feeling. We realize harmony if our 
sentiments coincides with his (and this is what Smith called 
'sympathy' and I will call 'technical harmony') and dissonance if 
they don't.
However, the effects of harmony (or dissonance) that are being felt 
by the person who observes depend, to some extent, on his own 
natural constitution. "The imaginary change of situation.... is but 
momentary. The thought of their [,the observers',] own 
safety...continually intrudes itself upon them" [TMS p.21]. That is 
to say that a person's experience of the imaginary process is not 
at all independent of his own disposition. And in particular on his 
disposition towards (interest in-) the fortunes of the other. Hence 
whether or not the harmony we discover with the sentiment of the 
other is agreeable to us depends on the nature of that sentiment as 
well as on our disposition towards the fact that the other is 
experiencing it. For instance, whether or not we feel harmonious (in 
the sense that the harmony is agreeable to us) with the other's 
sorrow or joy depends on the existence, or absence, of envy. "If
there is any envy in the case our propensity to sympathize with
sorrow must be very strong, and our inclination to sympathize with 
joy very weak" [TMS p.44]. When we observe the sorrow of another 
person and we try to experience it through our own emotions (the 
imaginary change of places), it is painful to us. But if the 
observer has a negative interest in the fortunes of the other (where
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envy is more likely to prevail) , the realization that this pain has 
befallen his 'rival' gives rise to a great pleasure. Thus, though 
the observer feels that he would have felt the same as the person 
who is being observed ('technical harmony'), his direct sentiments 
towards the other contradict the pain that he derives from the 
imaginary process. Because the former are much more real sentiments 
than those that are being experienced through imagination, they are 
also the more dominant ones. Consequently, the envious person (or 
the one that has a negative IIO) will find the sorrow of another, 
when rightly felt (in the sense that the observer would have felt 
the same had he been in his place), more pleasant than painful. 
Thus, he will find it easier to 'sympathize' with sorrow.
If, on the other hand, the observer has a positive interest in the 
fortunes of others (the case of no-envy), the realization that the 
pain he experiences has befallen his fellow-man gives rise to a 
terrible distress. Thus, his direct feelings are in complete harmony 
with those that he derives from the imaginary process. Consequently, 
the non-envious person will find sorrow, when rightly felt, most 
unpleasant. He will therefore find it more difficult to 'sympathize' 
with it. But there is another case of non-envy which is significantly 
different. The case of no-interest-in-the-fortunes of others (or, 
self-interest). When the observer has a positive IIO, his direct 
emotions enhances the pain he experiences through the imaginary 
change of places. When he has no such positive interest (but also 
no negative interest) , the fact that the other is experiencing this 
pain will be of no significance. From the observer's point of view 
he is quite indifferent to the sorrow (or joy) of another. Thus, the
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pain that is being transferred in the imaginary process does not 
seem to get hold on any of the direct sentiments of the observer. 
It will hence dissolve rather quickly and will hardly be felt by the 
observer. Of course, one may also ask whether such a person will 
bother at all to exert himself to an imaginary change of places in 
the first place. At present, however, we assumed that he does but 
I shall deal with this point later on.
On this tendency to identify with the sentiments of the other Smith 
constructed his moral theory. We morally approve, or disapprove, of 
anything according to whether it invokes harmony of sentiments, or 
dissonance. But it is not upon the mere harmony (or dissonance) that 
we morally approve or disapprove. It is upon the pleasure we have in 
finding such a coincidence of sentiments with someone else. However, 
this pleasant, or unpleasant, feelings, as I have shown above, do not 
reflect the simple sense of pleasure like the one derived from 
utility. It is a much more complex notion of pleasure. In fact, it 
is comprised of two different sorts of pleasures. First, the 
pleasure we derive from realizing that we would have felt the same 
as another, had we been in his place: "nothing pleases us more than 
to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of 
our own breast; nor are we ever so much shocked as by the appearance 
of the contrary." [TMS p. 13]. And the important feature of this sort 
of pleasure is that it is independent of the nature of sentiment in 
question. Namely, that the pleasure we gain from realizing that we 
would have felt the same as the subject of approbation in case of a 
pleasant sentiment, is the same as the one we would have experienced 
in the case of an unpleasant sentiment.
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The second sort of pleasure, on the other hand,depends on the nature 
of sentiment in question as well as on the observer's disposition 
towards the other. Thus the other's sorrow, or joy, gives rise to 
pleasure or pain according to whether or not we have a positive or 
negative interest in their fortune.
Therefore, if we find 't . harmony' in sentiments that are a natural 
cause of pleasure to us ( the other's happiness, or joy, in the case 
of 'no-envy' and his sorrow in the case of 'envy'), we shall 
obviously approve of the actions and circumstances that have brought 
them about. We are experiencing what I shall call 'pleasant 
harmony'; a harmony within ourselves. That is, a consistent 
composition of the pleasures that are being derived from the 
imaginary process.
If, however, we find ' t. harmony ' in sentiments that are a natural 
cause of unhappiness, we are, in fact experiencing within ourselves 
an ' unpleasant harmony'. The pleasure derived from ' t . harmony' is 
being contrasted by the pain derived from the sentiment in question. 
This, in turn, means that within ourselves we experience 
'dissonance'. We cannot approve of the actions and circumstances 
that have brought those justified (in the sense that we would have 
felt the same) unpleasant feelings.
In the same way, if we find 't . dissonance' with sentiments that are 
a natural cause of unpleasantness we approve of the circumstances 
that brought them about. (If, for instance, there is no envy, we 
would approve of the circumstances that have brought about sorrow 
with which we experience 't . dissonance'. Namely, sorrow that we
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would not have felt had we been in place of the subject of 
approbation). So 'unpleasant dissonance', which means 'harmony' 
within ourselves (between the two components of pleasure that are 
involved in the process), gives rise to moral approval.
If, on the other hand, we felt 't . dissonance' with the pleasant 
sentiments, we would disapprove of the circumstances that have 
brought them about. (If, again, there is no envy, we would 
disapprove of the circumstances that have brought about happiness 
that we would not have felt had we been in place of the subject of 
approbation). The 'pleasant dissonance' means a 'dissonance' within 
ourselves and thus, moral disapproval.
So moral approval, in Smith's system, depends on the consistency 
between the pleasure gained from observing the other experiencing the 
particular sentiment and the pleasure gained from experiencing 
'technical harmony':
The result of 
the imaginary 
change of places
The effects of the other's experience as 
perceived from the point of view of the 
observer
Pleasant Unpleasant
t. har­ Moral Appr. Moral Dissap.
mony (harmony) (dissonance)
t. dis­ Moral Dissap. Moral Appr.
sonance (dissoance) (harmony)
We have now seen that at least the pleasure that is derived from
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observing the other experience a particular sort of sentiment depends 
on the nature of the observer's character. Hence, we can already 
conclude that the actual moral judgement, in Smith's theory, also 
depends on it. But it is not only this aspect of moral judgement that 
depends on human nature. Also whether or not we realize 't . harmony' , 
and derive pleasure from it, depends on the nature of the characters 
involved.
Generally speaking any person will find it easier to feel ' t . 
harmony' with a person of a similar character. When a benevolent 
person comes to judge any other person's behaviour he would most 
likely have felt and acted the same if the other person was 
benevolent too. If, on the other hand, the observed person is 
malevolently disposed it is most unlikely that the benevolent
observer would have felt, or acted, the same. The further is the
observed person's character from that of the observer's character 
(on the malevolent-benevolent sequence) , the less likely it becomes 
for the observer to find 't . harmony' with the observed person.
Consider now a society which is comprised of self-interested people. 
Also, suppose that it is as beneficent as indicated by the WN.
Namely, that everyone in this society is constantly improving his
conditions. Consequently, everyone's happiness increases 
continuously.
The self-interested observer, and indeed each member of that society, 
will consider this situation as morally good. Simply because he would 
have felt and acted the same as any other member of society had he
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been in their position. However, this would have been his moral 
verdict even if the outcome of this state was harmful. For the self- 
interested observer, or member of society, this is also the highest 
level of moral approbation that he is capable of. As a 
self-interested person derives nothing from seeing others happy or 
sad, his complete moral judgement depends on the degree of 't. 
harmony' that he experiences. Regardless of the consequences, he 
will most likely experience the highest level of 't . harmony' when 
observing another self-interested person.
For a benevolent observer, on the other hand, this state of affairs 
will not invoke the highest level of moral approbation. His moral 
approbation is based on an accumulated sense of pleasure. The higher 
is that pleasure, the higher becomes the degree of moral 
approbation.
Obviously, he will feel some pleasure from seeing other people enjoy 
as a result of the cumulative activity of society. However, he will 
find no 't . harmony' (or 't. dissonance' for that matter) with the 
self-interested subjects of approbation. He will thus experience less 
pleasure than, say, if members of society were benevolent as well. 
In other words, in the scale of morals of a benevolent person, the 
self- interested person who unintendedly causes beneficence has a 
moral value which still falls short from what one may call the moral 
good.
The question that immediately arises is whether or not the moral 
judgement of the benevolent person is more valid than that of the
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self-interested person. The answer to this question is indeed a 
complicated one. It involves the question of whether or not there is 
any meaning, in Smith's system, to a 'proper' (or ideal) way of moral 
judgement. Or, that his system is entirely 'naturalistic' in the 
sense that moral judgement is determined by instincts (or 
sentiments) rather than by rational dictates. We saw already in the 
previous chapter that 'rational' consideration were not unrelated 
to Smith's work. We shall see in the next chapter how the 
'rationalistic' nature of his work is interpreted in his model of 
the 'impartial spectator'. At present I will only say that even 
without this question it is rather clear that as a matter of fact 
people's judgement will depend on their character.
It is also possible to show that in Smith's view it is the judgement 
of the benevolent person which is the proper one. To begin with, the 
moral judgement of the self-interested person suffers from a serious 
problem of consistency as far as an objective observer is concerned. 
If an objective observer looks at the actions of a self-interested 
person he can only see whether it produced harm or beneficence. 
Surely he would expect the moral judgement of actions that have 
produced pain and misery to be different from those which have 
produced beneficence. However, the self - interested person will judge 
only according to whether or not he finds ' t . harmony ' with the 
actor. The outcome is entirely insignificant. He will mark the self- 
interested person's action as morally good whether it produced harm 
or beneficence. This, very clearly, is against what Smith considered 
moral judgement to be based on. "The sentiment or affection of the 
heart from which any action proceeds, and upon which its whole virtue
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or vice must ultimately depend, may be considered...in two different 
relations; first, in relation to the cause which excites it...;and 
secondly, in relation to the end which it proposes, or the effects 
which it tends to produce” [TMS p.18/67 my italic]. But it does not 
seem reasonable to suppose that anyone, as selfish as may be, will 
be so indifferent to the actual outcome of actions when he comes to 
assess them morally.
One may argue, however, that this is only the result of applying to 
the self-interested person a practice of moral judgement which he 
does not actually use. Namely the self-interested person, who has 
no interest in the others, may not judge by an imaginary change of 
places (the process of 'sympathy') altogether. After all, for anyone 
to judge from the 'impartial spectator's' point of view he must have 
some interest in what happens to the other. For the 'impartial' 
imaginary change of places to take place, one must exert himself to 
see the subject of approbation's point of view. Why would someone 
with no interest in the others whatsoever bother at all and exert 
himself to an imaginary change of places?
So it seems as if the character of a person affects not only his 
moral judgement as such (as discussed above), but also the way he 
actually forms his moral opinion. Those who have some kind of 
interest in the fortunes of others will be more inclined to judge 
by the imaginary change of places ('sympathy'), those who don't will 
probably judge in a different fashion. This other fashion is 
'utility' or, the 'beauty of the system'.
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Whatever is the nature of Smith's ethics one thing seems to be quite 
clear- that practical moral judgement depends on some sense of 
pleasure. So far we have mentioned two sorts of pleasure. One, the 
pleasure from 't . harmony', and the other, the pleasure from seeing 
another person's happiness (or mis - fortune). But Smith devotes a 
whole section in his TMS to another sense of pleasure- utility.
It would be interesting to note that in another place, where Smith 
discusses the formation of societies, he writes: "There are two
principles which induce men to enter into civil society,...the 
principles of authority and utility.". Both these principles, in 
Smith's view, explain the social existence because they explain 
people's obedience to different sorts of authority. Obviously, they 
are complementary. The principle of 'authority' "arises from our 
sympathy with our superiors...we admire their happy situation, enter 
into it with pleasure, and endeavour to promote it." [ U  p.401]. 
Namely, people's readiness to accept authority is based on their 
disposition to 'sympathize' with it. The principle of utility, on the 
other hand, explains obedience because of the 'love of systems'. That 
is "we take pleasure in beholding the perfection of so beautiful and 
grand system, and we are uneasy till we remove any obstruction that 
can in the least disturb or encumber the regularity of its 
motions." [TMS p. 185] . In other words, it is the pleasure we gain from 
the beauty of the system that is the source of our loyalty and 
obedience. Precisely as is the pleasure we gain from 'sympathizing' 
with our 'superior'.
Now as these two faculties of pleasure are complementary, the greater
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becomes the one, the less we have from the other. If a person has a 
high interest in the others, he will (a) be more inclined to feel 
'sympathy' with other members of society; (b) be less inclined to be 
impressed by systems as a whole. The fortunes of individuals will 
have a greater effect on him than the 'contrivance and beauty of the 
system'. A person who has no interest in the others will reflect 
precisely the opposite. The following graph illustrates this 
relationship. The character of an individual --depicted in the 
benevolent-malevolent sequence-- determines the composition of his 
dispositions to derive pleasure from 'sympathy' and from 'utility'^.
utility
sympathy sympathy
utility
Benevolence 
(high interest 
in
Malevolence 
(low or negative 
interest in the others)  others)indifference
The extremely benevolent person will have a greater capacity to 
'sympathy' and will hardly be impressed by the mere 'beauty of the 
system'. The extremely malevolent person will have the same 
constitution though with reversed signs. The selfish person will have
assume here, quite crudely, that the composition of the two aspects 
in a person's character must add up to unity. Namely, a benevolent person 
employs 'sympathy' in 90% of his judgements (or observations) of the others 
while only 10% of such an activity is affected by utility. In 90% of the cases 
the benevolent person will judge people by trying to put himself in their 
position. In 10% he will judge them by the general impression that the system 
will have on him.
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little patients to contemplate other's points of view and he will 
therefore be more impressed by the 'beauty of the system'. Others 
will have bits of both. They will be able to 'sympathize' and they 
will judge through an imaginary change of places but their judgement 
might be affected (to some extent) by the 'contrivance of nature'.
The fact that utility may sometimes take the place of 'sympathy' in 
determining moral opinion is very clearly considered by Smith. "From 
a certain spirit of system. ... from a certain love of art and 
contrivance, we sometimes seem to value the means more than the end, 
and to be eager to promote the happiness of our fellow-creatures, 
rather from a view to perfect and improve a certain beautiful and 
orderly system, than from any immediate sense or feeling of what they 
either suffer or enjoy"[TMS p.185].
However, though he is aware of the existence of the two principles 
in human nature he is also very clear in arguing that utility ought 
not to be the source of our moral opinion. He writes "it seems 
impossible that the approbation of virtue should be a sentiment of 
the same kind with that by which we approve of a convenient and well 
contrived building; "[TMS. p.188].
Nevertheless, in our analysis it seems as if the self-interested 
person will indeed refer to this particular kind of pleasure as a 
moral guide. He will consider the system explored in the WN as the 
moral good because of its extremely appealing beauty. A benevolent 
observer, on the other hand, will determine its moral value far below 
from what he considers as the ultimate moral good.
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Thus, when a self-interested person hails the system of natural 
liberty that is based on self-interest, he does so from the wrong 
reasons. In Smith's view, his sense of moral is corrupt.
Conclusion of Chapter 3
When the German scholars had coined the term 'Das Adam Smith Problem' 
they were not entirely in the wrong. They had mis-interpreted Smith's 
concept of 'sympathy' but they were right in sensing that the moral 
value of self-interest, in the TMS, does not seem to accommodate its 
glorious position in the WN.
Modern commentators rejected the existence of any problem between the 
moral status of self-interest in the Smith's moral theory and the 
implied moral standards of it in his economic theory. Their argument 
is based on interpreting the self-interested character of the WN as 
the prudent character of the TMS. Prudence, according to those 
commentators, is the moderate expression of a natural drive to better 
one's own conditions (the care for one's self). Now, in Smith's moral 
theory, moral judgement is based on 'sympathy' - the feeling that one 
would have felt and acted the same as the subject of approbation had
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he been in his place. Moderate sentiments, argue those modern 
commentators, is something that it is easy to feel harmonious with. 
Thus prudence, the moderate expression of one's care for one's self, 
becomes morally good.
In this chapter I have tried to show that this is not the case. I 
have argued that in order for the principle of 'sympathy' not to 
contradict the prevalent self-interest motive in human nature, 
modern commentators have implicitly used Smith's 'direct method' of 
character description. Consequently, prudence (or self-interest) 
becomes only a partial description of the human character. As such, 
it is insufficient to crown self-interest as morally good. Smith's 
'artful knave' certainly complies with prudence as described in the 
WN (industry and frugality). However, no-one will argue that in 
Smith's moral system he becomes morally good.
Therefore, I suggested to look at Smith's other method of character 
description- the 'particular indirect method' . I have tried to 
construct a consistent relationship between people's interest in 
themselves and their interest in the others. From this relationship 
it became apparent that the moderate expression of the care for 
one's self corresponds, in Smith's view, to the selfish character. 
This, I maintain, does not mark it as a bad character but it is 
certainly far from Smith's ideal of the morally good character- the 
'superior prudence'.
Then, I have shown that if self-interest is related to people's 
interest in the fortunes of others, then moral judgement itself
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becomes dependent on what motivate human actions. I have then shown 
that a self-interested society, such as described by the WN, will be 
considered as morally good only by self-interested people. Benevolent 
people will not consider it as morally bad but again, it will fall 
short of what they would have considered as morally good.
Then, we took the effects of a person's character on his moral 
judgement one step further. We saw that Smith distinguished between 
two sorts of pleasure that may produce moral judgement- 'sympathy' 
and 'utility' . He also made it clear that in his view the latter is 
a corrupt sense of morality.
We then saw that it is the self-interested character that will be 
most inclined to judge by utility. He will consider natural liberty 
that is based on self-interest as morally good mainly because of the 
'beauty of the system'. Therefore, his moral praise to that system, 
according to Smith, is a corrupt one.
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4. The Moral Analysis of Natural Liberty.
In the previous chapter we have discussed the moral significance of 
'self-interest' which, I argued, is only a necessary condition for 
the moral vindication of natural liberty. This, however, is not the 
view which is widely shared. To most modern commentators the 
problems with the moral status of natural liberty (in Smith's work) 
are entirely due to the difficulties with the moral value of 
self-interest. The 'Public Benefits' of natural liberty, or the
efficiency of natural liberty in the production of wealth, is so 
evident that to resolve any possible paradox in Smith's moral 
approach to it we only need to prevent self- interest from being 
interpreted as the 'Private Vice'.
Some scholars would argue that even this is superfluous as efficiency 
as such is sufficient for the moral approval of natural liberty. 
"The Wealth of Nations" writes Stigler "is a stupendous palace 
erected upon the granite of self-interest". It explores how "The 
immensely powerful force of self-interest guides resources to their 
most efficient uses..and [that] it enriches the nation which gives 
it free rein."(Stigler,1982. p.136). This, however, is not merely 
a positive statement on Stigler's part. Efficiency as such, he 
argues, "has been the main prescription of normative economists"
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over the last two hundred years.(Stigler, 1982.p.7)^. The
distribution of income, according to Stigler, was in Smith's view 
a "matter for the market to decide” (p. 11). Namely, it was not in 
itself a subject of separate ethical considerations.
Most commentators, however, do not take such an extreme view. For 
them, the morality of natural liberty is closely (perhaps too much) 
associated with the moral value of self-interest. If self-interest 
is morally good there is no reason to believe that its free 
expression should yield any other kind of moral judgement. In 
particular it should be true if the most significant result of its 
free rein is beneficent.
But is it really true that the moral vindication of self-interest is 
sufficient to render natural liberty as morally good? Some scholars, 
mainly those who are not absolutely convinced that self-interest had 
really been vindicated, will find it difficult to accept. Young(1986) 
thinks that after solving the 'old' Adam Smith problem --that of 
consistent premises-- we have to address a 'new' problem. This 'new' 
problem is whether or not the moral advocacy of natural liberty can 
be supported by Smith's moral theory. Naturally if the vindication 
of self-interest was sufficient to pass judgement over natural
liberty there wouldn't have been a 'new' problem at all.
Young's approach, however, does not deal with the question of
 ^In my introduction to Smith I gave another example to this view. It was 
Friedman's argument about the role of efficiency (through the invisible hand) 
in directing people's 'sympathy'. It meant that even what we considered the 
mean by which moral opinions are being formed is dominated by the efficiency 
requirement.
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relationship between self-interest and natural liberty. In his case, 
he is simply trying to apply the mechanism of the 'impartial 
spectator' in order to establish whether exchange under natural 
liberty can be morally approved. He does not, however, tell us 
exactly how the 'impartial spectator' forms an opinion about any 
particular exchange. He simply bases his analysis on some general 
attributes to the presumed character of the 'impartial spectator' 
like, for instance, that he is a 'social conscience'. Namely, that 
the 'impartial spectator' will judge the exchange from the point of 
view of the good of society rather than the self-interest of the 
participating individuals.(Young, 1986. pp. 366-7). Obviously it all 
depends on what is the good of society which, in my view, will be 
considered differently if we think of Smith's moral theory as a 
'positive' or 'idealistic' theory. In any case, as will be shown 
below the 'impartial spectator' in my interpretation is a much more 
well defined measure than it is in Young's analysis.
Commentators like Heilbroner (1982) and Evensky (1987) are examples 
to the 'new' Adam Smith problem. They are struggling with the moral 
meaning of natural liberty given that self-interest is not accepted 
as morally good. According to Heilbroner there is no solution in 
such a case and we end-up with a Mandeville's problem of 'private 
vice, public benefits'. Obviously it means that natural liberty has 
moral merits of its own (public good) but as they cannot be 
reconciled with the vice of self-interest there is no way to 
determine whether natural liberty based on self-interest is morally 
good.
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Evensky(1987) offers a solution to this problem by shifting the focus 
of moral evaluation from self-interest to natural liberty. According 
to his interpretation natural liberty is a 'second best' moral good. 
Namely, given that the Great Design, which encompasses the idea of 
God and the morally good, is manifested in the smooth functioning 
of nature, natural liberty is part of that moral goodness^. 
However, human nature is inherently flawed. Hence, the best to be 
done under such circumstances is to reduce the evil influences of 
the flawed human character only to its most elementary and vital 
expressions (self- interest). Consequently, the smooth functioning 
of nature which is marred by the flawed characters that lives within 
it, becomes the closest to the 'ideal' but it still falls short of 
it. It is, therefore, a 'second best' morality.
To some extent, Stigler's view and that of Evensky are similar. The 
Great Design and the harmony of nature is considered in Evensky as 
the ideal. As such, the efficiency of natural liberty, reflected in 
this harmony, is the foundation of the morally good organization 
which is almost the same argument as that of Stigler. Nevertheless, 
unlike Stigler, Evensky does not ignore the problematic status of 
self- interest. Hence, the solution he offered was to reduce the 
moral value of natural liberty to a second best solution. For 
Stigler, as well as many others, natural liberty is a first best 
solution. Not so much because self-interest can be proved morally 
good as for the efficient consequences of natural liberty.
^But not in the sense that natural liberty itself is morally good. 
Rather, it is through the fact that natural liberty allows those things which 
are intrinsically good to emerge.
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That such a conclusion is completely unacceptable from Smith's point 
of view is fairly easy to establish. It can be drawn from his 
discussions of the meaning of Wealth (in the production of which 
natural liberty is efficient) and his disapproval of the distribution 
of income which is associated with natural liberty. The former is at 
the "highest degree contemptible and trifling"(TMS p.183). As for the 
latter, "man is by Nature directed to correct, in some measure, the 
distribution of things which [nature] herself would otherwise have 
made"(TMS p.168). If natural liberty is morally good either in its 
own right or because of the moral vindication of self-interest, why 
and according to which principles should one correct the natural 
distribution of things?
Fortunately Smith does not leave open the question of how should man 
correct the distribution of income that is associated with natural 
liberty. For instance, when he discusses the discrepancy between the 
actual and desired distribution he writes: "The industrious knave
cultivates the soil ; the indolent good man leaves it uncultivated. 
Who ought to reap the harvest? who starves and who lives in plenty? 
The natural course of things decides in favour of the knave; the 
natural sentiments of mankind in favour of the man of virtue"[TMS 
p.l68]3.
^Notice that there are three references to nature in the above passage, 
I have discussed it before but I will nevertheless remind the reader of them. 
One is the 'nature of things' which refers to the material world and in 
particular, the functioning of natural liberty. The other is the 'nature of 
sentiments' which is associated with the level of moral judgements. It entails 
within it two different aspects of moral evaluations ; the practised one and 
the ' ideal' one. The last concept of nature is with capital N. This is the 
unified ideal of the material world and the world of sentiments. It can be 
seen as capturing the idea of Deity or, the Great Design.
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Two conclusions are quite immediate. One, that the natural 
distribution, the one associated with the efficiency of natural 
liberty, is not consistent with what we would morally consider as 
appropriate. The other, that the desired distribution relates to 
personal qualities. In other words, it all means that the desired 
distribution reflects the idea of reward (in wealth) to morally good 
personal qualities. Namely, the moral value of natural liberty does 
not depend on the wealth it produces but on whether or not it is 
being distributed according to some principles of remuneration. 
These, it will be shown, may not always be consistent with the 
efficiency of natural liberty.
It is also evident from Smith's economic analysis that the personal 
quality that, as a matter of fact, is most rewarded by natural 
liberty is that of self-interest. Therefore, it seems that the only 
thing to do in order to vindicate the natural distribution of income 
is to show that self-interest is virtuous. As such, the 'natural 
sentiments of mankind would favour it and want to see it crowned 
with wealth' . And this is why most commentators have focused their 
attention on the morality of 'self-interest'.
To remind the reader, according to Smith we shall morally approve of 
anything according to whether we feel 'sympathy' with it. Namely, 
that we would have felt the same as the subject of approbation had 
we been in his place. In a very much Aristotelian tradition, it is 
then argued that Smith considered any moderate expression of 
sentiments as something with which we can always find 'sympathy'. 
Now, as nature's most fundamental drive is to care for one's self,
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a self-restraint (moderate) expression of it should command respect 
and thus, be crowned as virtuous. As self-interest is being 
interpreted as this moderate sentiment (prudence, or the rational 
utility maximizer) it is also morally good. Therefore, its being 
remunerated in the natural process of income distribution is 
consistent with good morals.
The whole of the previous chapter is devoted to contest this 
proposition. But even if self-interest was to be considered virtuous, 
it would still be insufficient for the argument that the natural 
distribution of income (and thus, efficiency) is morally good. 
Indeed, we saw that the desired distribution should associate reward 
with virtue. However, the implementation of such a principle in a 
system is not quite straightforward. A system, and in particular an 
economic system, is more likely to be characterized by what 
motivates people to act and their subsequent actions and 
inter-actions, rather than as a collection of people with particular 
personal qualities. The moral vindication of self-interest was based 
entirely on the analysis of it as a sentiment; as a personal 
quality. A moderate expression of a strong natural urge. However, 
there is a significant difference between analyzing sentiments as 
such and motives-to-action that spring from these sentiments. The 
fact, to use a literary example, that Pierre Bezukov, in Tolstoy's 
'War and Peace' , may have been a good character, or that he 
sympathized with his peasants, does not make the system of serfdom, 
or indeed his actions as a landlord, morally good.
To begin with, in case of an action one must measure his 'sympathy'
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with the actor against his 'sympathy' with the person who, as it 
were, is being acted upon. Consequently, a simple analysis of 
'sympathy' will not suffice. Moderation, in such a case, will 
certainly not be sufficient to show that an action, sprung from a 
self-interested motive, is morally good. It will tell us nothing at 
all on whether the sentiments of the person who was acted upon are 
justified in the sense that we, or the 'impartial spectator', would 
have felt as he does. To do that, one needs to know more about the 
process by which a person implements his intentions and thus 
affects the other's circumstances. In other words, one must add to 
the analysis the question of the actor's responsibility to the 
outcome of his actions*.
The analysis of the morality of actions in general, and its economic 
significance in particular, is the subject of this chapter. I will 
show that for a motive to be morally good, and thus, command reward, 
the intention of the actor must stand in some proportion to the 
actual outcome. An outcome, it must be stated, is measured here in 
terms of its beneficence to the person who has been acted upon.
In the next section I will present the theory of the single action. 
I will show there that we have in fact a much more complex notion 
of morality. That is, a notion of morals where we can rank moral 
goodness on a continuous scale from the very bad one to the most 
desirable one. In particular, it will highlight the fact that a 
morally just system is not a great virtue in Smith's ethics. This,
*To remind the reader this is also the case in Aristotle theory where 
moderation is the key to virtue. See chapter 1.
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of course, is not so surprising bearing in mind the deontological 
nature of it^.
In the section that follows I propose a closer look at 
self-interested actions. We shall see there that the moral value of 
such actions depends on the beneficence of the outcome. As wealth 
is the actual result of a self-interested economic action, I
investigate there Smith's view of its beneficence.
In Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality® he argued that the commercial 
society, where division of labour (efficiency) prevails, is bound 
to create inequalities. Smith, on the other hand, argued that the 
'invisible hand' will keep the distribution of subsistence intact. 
This, because the stomach of the rich is not greater from that of 
a poor. Thus, in order to analyze the true beneficence of
efficiency, we must examine the possibility of a spill-over of the
benefit from the direct participants in the action of production to 
other members of the economy. To this, the beneficence of
efficiency, is the last section devoted.
®In a deontological moral system, unlike a teleological one, the analysis 
of justice is independent of the analysis of the moral good.
®”but from the instance one man needed the help of another.... equality 
disappeared" (Rousseau, 1968. p.116).
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(a) The Theory of Actions and Four Categories of Moral Judgements.
Let me begin with some of the general remarks concerning Smith's 
moral system that we have discussed before. It is generally accepted 
that Smith's moral system, like Hume and Hutchenson's, is a 
'naturalistic' one. Namely, that moral judgement is based on 
instincts, or sentiments, rather than on reason. People judge others 
according to whether or not they feel 'sympathy' with them. That is, 
they approve of someone's feeling according to whether they would 
have felt the same, had they been in place of the subject of 
approbation. However, while exercising this imaginary change of 
places, the observer must exert and bring himself to the position 
of an 'impartial spectator'. So that his direct relation with 
anything related to the subject of approbation will not affect his 
moral judgement.
The idea of the 'impartial spectator', in my view, is one of the 
proofs that Smith's system is by no means 'naturalistic'. On the one 
hand it is indeed drawn as an abstraction of the way people actually 
judge (through sentiments). On the other hand, however, it is also 
an 'ideal'- a model- which obviously is rational.
That people will tend to judge by some sort of an imaginary change
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of places is only too clear to Smith for him to bother and prove it
(if at all possible) . But this will only put people in the position
of a spectator, but not necessarily an 'impartial' one. It is in
Smith's 'demand' for 'impartiality' that one can find the roots of
a semi- rational moral theory. A person ought to exert himself and 
to try and view the other's position from the other's point of view 
as best as possible. Now to do that it is certainly not sufficient 
to have the natural tendency for the imaginary change of places. The 
observer must apply considerable reason in order to properly
understand the circumstances of his subject of approbation. This, 
of course, does not mean that Smith thought people actually do that. 
However, the idea of the 'impartial spectator' creates a reference 
point for actual moral judgement. The difference between the actual 
moral judgement and what a real 'impartial spectator' would have 
said is precisely the difference between the praxis of morals and 
its ideal. It is also the reason why in many parts of Smith's Theory 
of Moral Sentiments he allows himself to comment on people's moral 
judgement. As we shall see later on, it is upon this 'ideal' that 
Smith can argue that people's sense of morality concerning wealth, 
is false. Had it really been a 'naturalistic' moral theory. Smith's 
own opinions would have had the same status as other people's 
opinion.
Generally speaking, the idea of 'impartiality' combines two major 
objectivity conditions. One, that no personal relation will affect 
moral judgement. And the other, complete information about the 
circumstances of the subject of approbation. Let us now examine the 
meaning of 'impartiality' when actions are concerned.
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In the analysis of actions, the observer is supposed to judge 
according to a combined sentiment. His 'sympathy' with the actor and, 
as he is not supposed to take any side, his ' sympathy' with the 
person who is being acted upon. But in order for the observer to 
know whether or not he would feel as do those who are involved in 
the action, he must consider their circumstances. The proper 
examination of the circumstances of the person who is being acted 
upon is where objectivity, or 'impartiality', is of particular 
importance. The reason for that is that the circumstances of the 
person who was acted upon are a result of the actor's choice of 
action. This, in turn, may be a rational choice where his action can 
be considered as a successful implementation of the actor's 
intentions (i.e. that the a- priori probability of achieving the 
intended outcome by the chosen action was very high). Or, it can be 
an irrational choice where the action had a very low a-priori 
probability of achieving the actor's intention. Or, as it were, it 
can be a mere accident (i.e. that the probability of achieving the 
intended outcome was high but the action failed to produce its 
expected effect). To know all that, however, one must have quite a 
good knowledge of nature at least in as much as the a-priori 
probabilities of the outcome of particular actions can be known.
Let me first present Smith's idea of the action by decomposing it. 
A certain person 1 , creates an action A. He does so because of 
various reasons. Let us denote those reasons by a . Action A is 
therefore the result of sentiments (or emotions) in 1 that were 
invoked by circumstances a.
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While performing A, a second person, 2, is affected by it. 2, as
well has sentiments, which are invoked by action- A, and by his
particular circumstances which we'll denote by These sentiments, 
in 2, are also an incentive to a sub-action that has a particular
quality: reward or punishment. It is the actor's desert, if you
wish, and I have marked it by D.
Now we may draw the complete cycle of action which, according to 
Smith,is the subject of our moral judgement.:
sHcr) > A  > S2(^,A)
< ......... D........... I
Read: sentiments S^(a), invoked by a, initiated action A, which 
inflicted 2 in such a manner that aroused S^(^, A) so that he would 
have liked to sub-act <  D  | .
The first stage of that cycle : S^(o)----> A is the subject of what
Smith calls propriety. Namely, the question of approval of the 
relation between circumstances, motive (sentiment) and subsequent 
action.
S^(/9,A) D  > 1 is the subject of the theory of desert (merit and
demerit). Namely, the propriety of the sentiments that are felt by 
the person who was acted upon. (Notice that an important part of the 
cycle, the successful implementation of the action
(A......>S^(^,A) ), is not directly analyzed. Nevertheless, it is
completely reflected in the theory of desert which, naturally, 
entails the final judgement on the complete cycle of action).
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In our analysis, as in Smith's, we are interested in motives in as 
much as they affect the others. Hence, motives are defined in terms 
of what they propose to do to others, i.e. from benevolence to 
malevolence. Self-interest, naturally, means that the actor intends 
nothing for the other, (note, however, that Smith' analysis is in a 
discrete form. At a later stage, I shall extrapolate his model to 
include continuous degrees of effect as well as intentions). Actions 
too are defined in term of their consequences to the others. That is 
to say, from the beneficent to the harmful.
The first part of the 'action cycle' is the circumstances that turn 
into sentiments and consequently, into actions. It is the subject of 
propriety.
( i")Propriety: : "In the suitableness or unsuitableness, in the 
proportion or disproportion which the affection seems to bear to the 
cause or object which excites it, consists the propriety or 
impropriety, the decency or ungratefulness of the consequent 
action"[TMS p.18].
The key word in propriety is 'suitability'. Namely, whether the 
sentiment, S, that was invoked by circumstances , stands in some 
relation to them. In other words, that it is not exaggerated. To tell 
us this, we must bring ourselves to the position of an 'impartial 
spectator' . Then we can see whether we would have felt the same had 
we been in place of the subject of approbation. If there is a 
coincidence of sentiments between the 'impartial spectator' and the
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subject of approbation, then there is 'suitability'. Notice that to 
some extent, Smith's idea of the 'impartial spectator' resembles the 
Kantian 'Universal test'^. A sentiment is suitable to the 
circumstances that invoked it only if everyone, in that position, 
would have felt the same. But this is not the only 'suitability' that 
is required by propriety.
Now that we know that a person's feelings are reasonable in relation 
to the circumstances that invoked them, we must ask whether the 
action that followed was suitable to the sentiments that invoked it. 
To see that, again, we must resort to the idea of the 'impartial 
spectator'. We ask ourselves whether or not, had we been in place 
of the subject of approbation, we would have acted in the same way. 
Now the idea of 'impartiality' does not mean only to have no direct 
relations to anything that is related to the action. It also means 
to have the knowledge of the proposed consequences of any action. 
Hence, occasionally we may feel that we could 'sympathize' with 
resentment, or anger, of another person. However, when transformed 
into action we might find that the proposed outcome of the action 
stands in no relation to the sentiment it expresses.
Here too, it seems, we may find some resemblance to the Kantian idea 
of the 'universal test'. It appears that in Smith's view the 
'impartial spectator' should examine the proposed action on a much 
wider scale than the immediate results of a single action.
For instance, in the case of resentment and hate, Smith believes that
^See Kant Ground Work of the Metaphysic of Morals, p.88
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an 'impartial spectator' may feel 'sympathy' with the subject of 
approbation, (i.e. everyone would have felt the same). Nevertheless, 
as far as implementing this hate, or resentment, into a harming 
action he is quite adamant. "There can be no proper motive for 
hurting our neighbour. . . .which mankind can go along with" [TMS p. 82] . 
Namely, though we may approve of someone's feelings in particular 
circumstances, we confront, all of a sudden, a sort of a 'categorical 
imperative'. Now it is a 'categorical imperative' because the reason 
Smith believes that an 'impartial spectator' will never consider a 
harmful action as suitable to the approved resentment, is its 
'universal test'. "Society" writes Smith "cannot subsist among those 
who are at all times ready to hurt and injure one another" [TMS p.86] .
So obviously the reason for rejecting the harmful action is its 
global significance. If everyone was acting in such a way all the 
time, society could not subsist. In other words, in Smith's system, 
the 'suitability' of an action to the sentiment that invoked it is 
examined at two levels. One, whether or not it has an 'a-priori' 
high probability of successfully implementing the sentiment in 
question. The other, the global significance of such an action.
The second part of the 'action cycle' is the desert analysis. It is 
the analysis of the 'suitability' of the sentiments felt by the 
person who is being acted upon. Naturally, the 'suitability' of his 
sentiments will give the action its final moral judgement. Obviously, 
it will also incorporate the analysis of the suitability of the 
choice of action to its intention. After all, the consequences of 
the action now become part of the circumstances of the person who
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is being acted upon.
(ii)Merit and Demerit::" and that upon the beneficial or hurtful 
effects which the affection proposes or tends to produce, depends the 
merit or demerit, the good or ill desert of the action to which it 
gives occasion"[IMS p.67]. Merit, therefore, is:" To be the proper 
and approved object either of gratitude or resentment, which 
naturally seems proper, and is approved of...when the heart of every 
impartial spectator entirely sympathizes with them"[TMS p.69].
In the analysis of desert, we examine the consequences of the action. 
It is the Sf(^,A)--D--- > part of the action cycle.
As I have already said. Smith defines actions in terms of their 
consequences, namely, from the beneficent to the harmful outcome. But 
unlike the person who acts, the sentiments of the person who is at 
the other end of the action cycle are categorized into two types : 
Gratitude and Resentment (see TMS pp.67-68). Now, these sentiments 
are the 'motives' for the sub-action of desert. And as the 
sentiments are so well defined, so are the actions that comprise 
desert. They are either reward, punishment, or null.
Gratitude is a feeling that will be felt by the person who is being 
acted upon when the outcome of the action was beneficial to him. 
Resentment when the outcome was hurtful. Obviously it is possible to 
consider situation where individuals behave differently. Namely that 
they might feel resentment in spite of the beneficent outcome. All 
this is basically taken care of by the argument of S^ . It will be
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up to the 'impartial spectator' to determine whether or not his 
particular circumstances allow a reversed respond from what an 
innocent observer might expect. Beside these, one must also consider 
the situation where neither gratitude nor resentment are felt but 
I shall leave it till later on.
Nevertheless, whether gratitude, or resentment, are duly felt depends 
on whether or not the action that has brought about those outcomes 
was 'proper'. Namely, whether the sentiments that invoked it were 
'suitable' to their circumstances (a). And, whether the choice of 
action was appropriate. "It is to be observed" writes Smith," that, 
how beneficial soever on the one hand, or how hurtful soever on the 
other, the actions or intentions of the person who acts may have been 
to the person who is, if I may say so, acted upon, yet if in the one 
case these appears to have been no propriety in the motives of the 
agent, if we cannot enter into the affections which influenced his 
conduct, we have little sympathy with the gratitude of the person who 
receives the benefit; or if, in the other case , there appears to 
have been no impropriety in the motives of the agent, if, on the 
contrary, the affections which influenced his conduct are such as 
we must necessarily enter into, we can have no sort of sympathy with 
the resentment of the person who suffers."[TMS pp.71-72].
Hence, to understand merit we have to consider the cycle of action 
as a whole. Let us therefore, recapitulate:
Si(a) > A ------- > S2()8,A)
<  ******************
Propriety is the moral analysis (or judgement) of the suitableness
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of the triangle: circumstances-sentiments/motives-action i.e.
S^(a)......> A. Merit and demerit is the analysis of the
circumstances- sentiments/motives-reaction of the person that was 
"acted upon" : S^(^,A)***********>.
, A) may have two values : Gratitude or Resentment. But the value of 
S^(^,A) is determined by the consequences of the action A. (denoted by 
— ” =>). Desert, (*****>) may have three values : Reward, Punishment 
or Nothing.
We are now confronted with four possibilities:
(a) S^(o)--- > approved & S^()9,A)-G ->G is approved.
(b) S^(a)--- > disapproved & S^(/9,A)-G ->G is disapproved.
(c) S^(a)--- > approved & S^(^,A)-R ->R is disapproved.
(d) S^(a)--- > disapproved & Sf(^,A)-R ->R is approved.
Where G and R represents Gratitude and Resentment respectively. The 
approval or disapproval of G and R are somewhat more complex. They 
represent the 'impartial spectator's' approval (or disapproval) of 
the second person's response in action. Namely, the 'impartial 
spectator' may feel that he would have felt the same as the person 
who was acted upon due to this person's own circumstances. However, 
given the nature of the action and the objective nature of the 
outcome he might not approve of the second person's acting on his 
sentiments.
Also, we know that:
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Reward if S^(^,A)-G and approved
Desert— Punishment if A)—R and approved
Nothing otherwise
Though desert can get three values, it is the four categories from 
above that produces the moral grading. Namely, there is a moral 
difference between two possibilities of the value : nothing, in desert. 
Let us look more closely at the four possible states.
(a) S^(a).....>A, approved & S^(;3,A)-G approved.
That is to say that the sentiment and choice of action were approved, 
and indeed were successful in implementing the actor's intentions. 
We may call this action- Good.
(c) S^(a).....>A, approved & S^(^,A)-R disapproved.
The sentiment and choice of action were approved but they appeared 
to be unsuccessful. Because the choice of action was approved, it 
means that the reason for failure must be accidental, thus, the 
action can be a right action, but not a good one. Another 
explanation is that a person may feel resentment even if the 
approved action was successful. The reason, then, for the resentment 
is due to p , the second person's circumstances. In such a case, the 
'impartial spectator' may approve of the actual resentment in the 
sense that he might have felt the same. However, he will not approve 
of person 2's acting on it. Thus, for the sake of brevity it is the 
same as if he hadn't approved of the sensation of resentment.
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(b) S^(a)..... >A, disapproved & S^(/9,A)-G disapproved.
There was impropriety in the motive, namely, either the sentiment 
with regard to the environment (a) itself, or the choice of action 
were not approved. Therefore, the beneficent outcome of the action 
is accidental, or undue. We can say that no harm was done but it was 
still wrong either just to feel the way the actor felt or to act the 
way he did. This action we may title as a wrong action.
(d) S^(a).....>A, disapproved & S^(^,A)-R approved.
The impropriety of the motive or an irrational choice of action ended 
in harming another person. This is a Bad action.
So we have a sequence from the good to the bad. Every good action is 
also right but not every right action implies good. In the same 
manner, every bad action is necessarily wrong but a wrong action is 
not necessarily bad.
Smith's system,therefore, is a deontological theory. A theory where 
the right is being determined independently of its contribution to 
the moral good. In a teleological moral theory, like, for instance. 
Utilitarianism, something is right only if it is also morally good. 
In Smith's case, however, an action can be defined as right even 
when its consequences were harmful. This, in turn, will give the 
concept of justice a different meaning from what might have been 
implied in a teleological framework. There, justice and moral good 
are strongly inter-related. In other words, it will be possible to
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argue that an economic system, perceived as a set of actions, is 
just and yet, not morally good.
Let me now extend the analysis to the continuous case which will be 
more helpful in analyzing self-interest. Motives (y) can be 
normalized according to their degree of benevolence and defined over 
the interval [-l,l];y-l means benevolence,y--l means malevolence, 
and y-0 means self-interest alone. In the same fashion we may define 
actions (x), in terms of their consequences to the others, as 
spanning from extreme beneficence (x-1), to extreme harm (x— -1).
Now, propriety means that two conditions are fulfilled. One, that the 
sentiments (or intentions) are 'suitable' to the circumstances that 
invoked them. The other, that the choice of action was rational in 
the sense that it had a high 'a-priori' probability of successfully 
implementing the actor's intentions. But from the 'impartial 
spectator's' point of view there was an additional condition for 
approving of a sentiment becoming an action (motive). The global 
considerations. Namely, that actions (and intentions) that are a 
threat to society if habitually pursued by its members, cannot be 
approved. Therefore, there is one 'a-priori' condition on the moral 
approval of a motive; that it does not aim at hurting anyone.
In the figure below, let the horizontal axis (x) denote the actual 
consequences of the action , and the vertical axis (y) the motive.
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figure 1
Benevolence
(b)(d)
 (X)
BeneficenceHarm
Malevolence
A point in the plain (like T) will then read; a motive that reflects 
degree Y q of intended beneficence produced an action that ended up 
with Xg degree of beneficence. Now, when we choose the action which 
reflects the motive Yg , it can account for the beneficial outcome 
only up to some degree. Any point to the right of that line, cannot 
be explained by the mere intention. This line represents the outcome 
that can be explained by the actor's design. It seems as if Smith's 
intentions, in the discrete treatment of the problem, was exactly the 
same, namely, that if the outcome does not reflect the intention, it 
cannot be subject either of reward or punishment.
The 'suitability line' in the first orthant draws the line of 
responsibility. To the left of it, the whole level of beneficence can 
be accounted for by the intended action. Thus, it can be considered 
as the intended outcome, and call for a reward, (which, in turn, 
makes it a good action) . Every point to the right of the 
'suitability line' indicates that the level of beneficence exceeds 
so much the intention, that the latter cannot be considered
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responsible for it, and hence, no reward is due. The action, 
therefore, despite its beneficence, cannot be considered as a good 
action.
There are basically two reasons for that occurrence; one, we chose 
an action that was not appropriated to our intentions, or, the 
outcome was a result of fortune (no design). In the first case, it 
means that there was no propriety (in its extended meaning) ; we 
chose an action which did not reflect our intentions so that our 
design was not proper. Thus, gratitude cannot be approved. In the 
other case, the gratitude belongs to nature, or fortune, which, 
according to Smith, cannot be an object of moral approbation. Note 
that when Smith discusses the influence of fortune, he is very clear 
that it is the role of the 'impartial spectator' to correct our 
natural tendencies to sympathize with the agreeable, when it results 
from fortune.(see TMS pp.92-108).
The precise position of the 'suitability line' is not necessarily at 
the 45° . It also depends on how much of an accidental outcome we 
accept so that the actor can still be held responsible. Namely, if 
the degree of benevolence in the intention was, say y-.5, then we 
may say that when the degree of beneficence of the outcome does not 
exceed say, x- .6, then the whole of its beneficence can still be 
attributed in its entirety to the actor's intention.
If we look at the fourth orthant, we shall find a similar story. When 
high beneficence was intended, and small harm resulted, it is within 
the range of reasonable chance. However, if harm substantially
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exceeds the level at which even if all the benevolent intentions 
were reversed to harmful intentions, and successfully implemented, 
it can no more be attributed to chance, something in the choice of 
action was improper. There is a limit to the degree of harm that can 
be explained by fortune. Once it exceeds that limit, the actor must 
become responsible, or better phrased, irresponsible through
negligence. Therefore, any point to the left of the 'suitability 
line', must call for a punishment.
As to orthants 2 & 3, there seems to be no interest in them as it was 
rather clear that while we might approve of sentiments of resentment, 
we can never approve of them as motives. The reason was, that society 
cannot subsist when we practice malevolence. Therefore, whatever the 
choice of action is going to be, we shall never approve of the 
motive. Thus, orthant 2, which represents improper malevolent
motive, and a beneficent outcome, will indicate that the choice of 
action was as improper as the intention (with regard to its 
suitability to the motive), thus, no reward is due. In the 3rd 
orthant, successful malevolence calls for punishment.
The main point to be deduced from this analysis is that the mere 
beneficent outcome, does not secure the moral good rating. If a 
system of economics is to be considered as a good one, it cannot 
rely only on the promised beneficent outcome. It must prove 
proportionality as well. Moreover, note that for the low level of 
benevolence (self- interest), when in conjunction with a low level 
of harm, it already becomes bad, and calls for punishment. Thus, it 
is crucial to prove that the outcome of the economic system is
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Indeed beneficial, with no slips whatsoever to the harmful zone.
Appendix: A Note on Jutice
We saw that the analysis of Smith produced four categories of morals. 
We termed them as Good, Right, Wrong and Bad. We also saw that good 
implies right and bad implies wrong, but, right and wrong do not 
imply good and bad respectively.
In a utilitarian, or any other consequentialist theory, a right 
action would be an action that implies good. Therefore, as justice 
is more concerned with right, it is naturally connected with the 
good of the system. In our case, however, this does not hold.
Smith's process of approbation included both sentiments and reason. 
When he grouped the relevant sentiments, those we can more easily 
enter to, he classified them not according to the degree of their 
pleasantness, but, according to their proposed impact on the 
existence and well being of society.
He called the benevolent intention as social, the malevolent as 
unsocial, and the selfish as neither social, nor unsocial. Within 
each group of these sentiments there are circumstances where an 
'impartial spectator' could find agreement of sentiments. Even 
resentment, which is an unsocial sentiment, can be something we agree 
with provided that it is moderately expressed. But as for actions,
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the possible agreement with the sentiments that are invoked by some 
circumstances does not imply the moral approval of any actions that 
is derived from it. This moral approbation, as I said before, is a 
matter of rational considerations. In particular, in Smith's case, 
these considerations are the proposed social consequences.
"It is thus that man, who can subsist only in society, was fitted by 
nature to that situation for which he was made. All the members of 
human society stand in need of each others assistance, and are 
likewise exposed to mutual injuries. Where the necessary assistance 
is reciprocally afforded from love, from gratitude, from friendship,
and esteem, the society flourishes and is happy........  But though
the necessary assistance should not be afforded from such generous 
and disinterested motives, though among the different members of the 
society there should be no mutual love and affection, the society, 
though LESS HAPPY and agreeable, will not necessarily be dissolved. 
Society may subsist among different men, as among different 
merchants, from a sense of its utility, without any mutual love or
affection;...... Society, however, can not subsist among those who are
at all times ready to hurt and injure one another."[TMS pp.85-86].
That is to say that as long as the proposed outcome of an action is 
beneficent, or at least not harmful, society can subsist. It cannot 
subsist when the habitual practice proposes a harmful result.
The theory of justice in Smith's analysis, is a theory of social 
preservation. It has nothing to do with questions of moral good. It 
only serves as a safeguard to society. The meaning of justice, in
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Smith's theory, is the compulsion of one sort of desert: punishment. 
Reward, on the other hand, is not compulsory. The reason for this 
difference is obvious. It is the level of danger to the existence of 
society. The social consequences of the habitual practice of 
malevolence are disastrous while if no due reward is distributed 
society will be less agreeable but will not dissolve. Therefore, all 
sets of motives that are malevolent, are unjust and call for 
punishment. All the other motives are just simply because they do not 
endanger the mere existence of the social fabric. Therefore, to say 
that a system, in Smith's terminology, is just, means very little 
from the moral point of view.
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(b) The Self-Interested Action,
O f all the sentiments and motives considered in Smith's analysis, 
self-interest is the most important one. It is so, because it seems 
that Smith assumed it to be the most dominant sentiment. It is also 
the most relevant to our analysis of the morals of his economic 
system. In what follows we shall be discussing the moral significance 
of the habitual practice of self-interest.
Following our previous analysis, the moral meaning of self-interest 
depends on its propriety as well as on its consequences. In figure 
2 (which reproduces our continuous model for moral analysis), we 
depict two definitions of self-interest. One, which I call 
'point-self- interest' (PSI), is where self-interest means to have 
no-interest in the others whatsoever. Namely that as a motive to 
action, it intends nothing to the others. We may call this one, 
selfishness. The other definition will perhaps be closer to the 
accepted view where self- interest is perceived as a moderate 
expression of one's care for one's self ( or, 'prudence'). That is, 
a self-interested person may as well wish to do some good to the 
others. Hence, in terms of our analysis, his motive now, will 
reflect a small degree of benevolence. It is obviously a much wider 
definition. We allow selfishness as well as some low degree of 
benevolence to represent the motive of self- interest. I call this
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wider definition 'segmental-self-interest' (SSI)^.
Let us begin with the first definition (PSI). Self-interest, in such 
a case, means that the actor intends nothing to the other. Hence, 
a successful implementation of this intention would mean that the 
action has produced nothing for the other (x-0) (which of course 
does not mean that it hasn't produced anything for the actor).
figure. 2
Benevolence
SSI
BeneficenceHarm
PSI
Malevolence
Therefore, point-self-interest (selfishness), when successful, will 
yield an action at the point (0,0). Paradoxically, this action is a 
morally good action. From propriety point of view one can easily 
imagine the circumstances where a person feels that he wants to do 
only for himself and nothing for the other. After all, according to 
Smith this is one of the most strongest natural urges. It is 
therefore quite plausible that an 'impartial spectator' would have 
felt the same in such circumstances. As for the other part of
I^ choose to look at a segment rather than simply a point where there is 
some positive interest in the others in order to generalize. Within the 
segment of SSI can come all views of self-interest.
161
propriety- the rational choice of action- it too, indicates 
propriety. When the outcome was neither beneficial nor harmful to 
the others, the action could not have better reflected the motive 
(intentions). Also from the global considerations, taken by the real 
impartial (well informed) 'impartial spectator', there is no problem 
at all. An habitual use of these sort of actions does not seem to 
menace the social existence.
There is, however, one difference between what we considered as 
morally good and this particular action. There is neither gratitude 
nor resentment here. Hence, to some extent, this action has no moral 
dimension at all, as it has not affected anyone else but the actor. 
Nevertheless, for consistency purposes we may say that this sort of 
actions and consequences is morally good. (We may always say that if 
the intention was successfully implemented then the actor has already 
received a reward to which no-one seems to object).
There is another reason why we cannot really assume that a situation 
where self-interested people aim and achieve exactly what they want 
as morally good. Apart from the lack of any sense of gratitude or 
resentment in the system there is the question whether the successful 
implementation of their self-interested motive depends on what others 
do. It is not inconceivable that a successful implementation of a 
self-interested motive depends on the others being self-interested 
as well. It is clear that the idea of natural liberty as a 
harmonious machine is precisely the general interdependence of
people's behaviours. In that case, we cannot really think of the 
successful implementation of one's intention in an isolated manner.
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If all individuals are self-interested in a similar manner^ then we 
might say that each of them acknowledges the others contribution to 
his success in implementing his own intentions. However, as they are 
all of similar nature, their gratitude are similar and they can 
simply waive their demand for remuneration and be content with their 
own achievements. If, on the other hand, they are of different 
nature, it is not quite clear that waiving one's demand for reward 
will be consistent with one's character. Thus, if the 
self-interested person succeeds because of the other's benevolence, 
the 'impartial spectator' would expect the benevolent person to be 
remunerated. Otherwise, there is a danger that benevolence, which 
Smith thought of as a key to a better social existence, will 
disappear.
In any case, it is unlikely that the self-interested person will feel 
obliged to reward the benevolent person. It is also reasonable to 
assume that the benevolent person will be in a worse off than the 
self-interested person. Such a configuration is a good enough reason 
for any 'impartial spectator' to disapprove of successful 
implementations of self-interested intentions.
If, now, the same self-interested motive is being implemented through 
an action that has a high probability to result beneficent, its 
proposed outcome stands in no proportion to the motive. As the 
beneficence of the outcome cannot be attributed to the intention.
^We saw before that what is meant by self-interest is not so 
straightforward. Also, as will be shown later, in Smith's economic analysis 
there is a clear distinction between the manifestation of self-interest among 
the capitalists and its manifestation among the labourers.
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there is no propriety in the action. Any gratitude that might be felt 
by the beneficiaries, should be bestowed upon the forces that have 
really brought about the beneficial outcome. But alas, nature is not 
a proper object of morals.
Thus, the final judgement of such an action will be that it is a 
'wrong' action. Not a moral vice, but certainly not a morally good 
action. (Note that a morally 'wrong' action is when no reward is 
justified, but neither is any punishment due).
Consider now the segmental-self-interest (or what others may call 
prudence- a moderated expression of self-interest). This means that 
in the motive of self-interest there might be some degree of 
benevolence. Hence, at some degrees of beneficent outcome a 
self-interested action may gain the title of a morally good action. 
Nevertheless, it will be good only if the outcome does not exceed 
the intention by too much (and falls in area b in fig. 2). The more 
efficient we consider the economic system that is based on 
self-interest to be in producing wealth, the less likely it becomes 
that we could consider it as morally good.
Though it does sound a little bit awkward one must bear in mind that 
moral has to do with people, not with nature. We would never think 
of the water cycle in nature, for instance, as a morally good system 
just because it benefits us. In the same manner, even though a self- 
interested system may yield beneficial outcome, it is still the work 
of nature, and not of human intentions. Thus as no reward is due, 
from the moral point of view the system cannot be considered as
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good.
In figure 2 we can see the conditions for self-interest to be morally 
good. These are mainly two: (a) the outcome should be beneficent; and
(b) the beneficence of the outcome (to others) should not exceed the 
intended benevolence by more than some agreed degree (the
'suitability line'). Nevertheless, because the degree of intended 
benevolence is so low in the self-interested case, a very low degree 
of harm is sufficient to turn this sort of motive into a moral 
vice!(area (d) in figure 2). Hence, the moral acceptability of 
self-interest is very delicate. It depends heavily on its being 
beneficent to at least some small degrees.
There are two implicit assumptions that we have made throughout our
analysis. First, that as a sentiment self-interest is something we 
may always approve of. Very much in line with the convention. 
Nevertheless it was not sufficient to morally vindicate it as a 
motive to action. It only means that we approve of the sentiments 
that were invoked by circumstances (a). But propriety does not 
only consist of the approval of S^(a). It also depends on its
implementation into action; i.e. S^(q )----->A. Indeed, the lack of
propriety that we suggested was entirely due to the lack of
proportionality ('suitability') between the intention and the 
outcome of the chosen action. The second assumption was that the 
outcome of self-interest is indeed beneficent.
We dealt with the first assumption in chapter 3. We shall, however, 
accept that as a mere sentiment, detached from the analysis of human
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character, it is something an 'impartial spectator' could have gone 
along with. However, if the sentiment is not analyzed in the context 
of human character, it must be analyzed in the context of actions 
that are derived from it (which is precisely what the WN is all 
about). Otherwise, it will become morally insignificant. For our 
purposes, the assumption that as a sentiment self-interest is 
morally approved is valid as it is only part of the analysis of 
propriety. But whether it makes self-interest a morally good motive 
depends on our second assumption; i.e. its beneficence.
So far we only stressed the importance of the outcome of actions to 
the moral analysis of motives. However, we have not really discussed 
the meaning of a 'beneficent outcome' , the key to the moral 
vindication of self-interest. In the economic context it is quite 
clear what people usually mean by the beneficence of self-interest 
in the framework of natural liberty. It is that such a system is the 
best, the most efficient one, in creating wealth. But surely, it is 
not the mere production of wealth that can give rise to beneficence 
or to people's sense of gratitude. It is its distribution.
An important feature of natural liberty is that together with the 
efficient production of wealth, there is always a distribution of it 
to go along with. This distribution which would come about if things 
were left for themselves, is what Smith called the 'natural 
distribution' of things. Let me now, very briefly, examine Smith's 
views on the beneficence of wealth as such and, the beneficence of 
the natural distribution of it. In my view, it is in his approach 
to these issues that his ambiguous approach to self-interest and
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natural liberty can best be seen.
Smith's argument goes as follows. Wealth as such, argues Smith, is 
at the "highest degree contemptible and trifling"[TMS p.183]. But 
nature creates a deception so that it will appear more favourable. 
Smith writes that "we rarely view [wealth] in this abstract and 
philosophical light. We naturally confound it in our imagination with 
the order, the regular and harmonious movement of the system, the 
machine or oeconomy by means of which it is produced. The pleasures 
of wealth and greatness, when considered in this complex view, 
strike the imagination as something grand and beautiful and noble, 
of which the attainment is well worth all the toil and anxiety which 
we are so apt to bestow upon it. And it is well that nature imposes 
upon us in this manner. It is this deception which rouses and keeps 
in continual motion the industry of mankind".[TMS p.183].
But why, one may wonder, would nature want to encourage the 
production of something which is so trifle and contemptible. 
Obviously, because it promotes its own ends- the preservation and 
multiplication of the species. Because of the deception, mankind 
strive for wealth :"...and thus without intending it, without 
knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means 
to the MULTIPLICATION OF THE SPECIES".[TMS p.185](my italics).
Naturally, for the 'deception' of nature to work; that is, for people 
to become industrious in order to gain the apparent benefits of 
wealth, a connection between industry and wealth must be constructed 
in the human mind. Thus, the natural distribution of wealth must be
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so that industry will be rewarded.
So we have a system where people, acting upon their self-interest, 
are engaged in producing wealth because it appears to them as 
beneficent. (And to some extent it is indeed so). In this system, 
reward goes to the industrious person rather than to anyone else. 
However, argues Smith, this distribution of wealth isn't consistent 
with the human moral sentiments.
Nevertheless, in order to understand Smith's argument we must come 
back to the idea that his moral system is comprised of an 'ideal' 
which is distinct from the praxis. The fact that Smith considered 
wealth as trifle does not mean that people actually share that view. 
Apparently, the deception of nature seems to be working fine. People 
do believe that wealth is not trifle and they also think that 
wherever there is wealth, there must be virtue. "Magnanimity, 
generosity, and justice command so high a degree of admiration, that 
we desire to see them crowned with wealth, and power, and honours 
of every kind". But, argues Smith, wealth and power are nature's 
rewards to different sorts of human qualities altogether. Wealth and 
power, according to Smith, are " the natural consequences of 
prudence, industry, and application; qualities with which 
[magnanimity and generosity] are not inseparably connected".[TMS 
p.167] .
Consequently, in practice people may consider the natural 
distribution as morally good. It is only the really impartial 
'impartial spectator', a person like Smith, who can see that this,
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perhaps, is not how things ought to have been.
The bottom line of all this is that Smith considered the natural 
distribution of things to be inconsistent with moral dictates. Those 
which are derived from the model of moral approbation (the fully 
informed 'impartial spectator'). Nevertheless, he suggests, it is 
quite possible that in practice, ordinary people will be deceived by 
nature to believe that it is morally good.
But it seems that Smith's analysis is quite vague. After all, the 
reason he believes that the natural distribution is not consistent 
with morals is because it seems as if reward is going to the wrong 
place. However, the place is wrong, according to Smith simply because 
he has an a-priori idea who should be rewarded; i.e. the morally good 
character. But in the analysis of actions this is all beside the 
point. Merit or demerit, in Smith's own system , depends on the moral 
value of actions not of characters. There, if a character is morally 
good (which probably means that the motive is approved) it is far
from being sufficient to grant him rewards of any kind. Propriety
is also about choosing the suitable action. Consequently, even if 
self- interest is a morally good character, it does not follow that 
the reward of wealth should go to these people.
In order to really see whether or not the production and natural
distribution of wealth are beneficent we must examine more carefully 
the actions of wealth production. This is the subject of the next 
section.
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(c)Spillovers and the Beneficence of Natural Distributions
Let us begin by specifying what we mean by an economic action (or 
actions) that is the subject of moral assessment. The first two 
things that come into mind are exchange and production. But while 
relationships between the different agents (or social classes) that 
are involved in the process of production seem to be a natural (or 
perhaps traditional) subject of moral debate, exchange as such seems 
to have been more difficult to analyze. Can we really say that in an 
action of exchange there is a person who acts and another who is 
being acted upon?
According to J. Viner(1972) there isn't much point in a moral 
analysis of exchange in the framework of Smith's analysis. The 
reason is that exchange is a very impersonal action. The 'social 
distance' between the participants is so great that none of them 
will feel 'sympathy' with the other. Namely, neither of the 
bargaining side will have the tendency to feel as the other had he 
been in his place. Hence, as moral judgement depends on 'sympathy', 
no moral opinion will be formed. Young (1985 &1986) , on the other 
hand, argues against Viner's assertion. In his view, even when the 
'social distance' is large, 'sympathy' may still be felt by 
strangers provided that they meet face to face. Consequently, a
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sense of moral approval or disapproval will emerge at both ends of 
the deal.
In my view, however, there is a stronger case for moral assessing 
exchange even though the 'social distance' may be great. As I argued 
before, the 'impartial spectator' is an ideal as much as it is a 
description of how people actually form a moral opinion. Namely, it 
is a model of how to form a 'proper' moral judgement about anything 
at all. As such it may very well be applied into situations where 
people do not have an immediate sense of 'sympathy' or, morality. 
Viner's argument is that there is no moral value in exchange because 
the actual participants don't employ 'sympathy' . This, however, does 
not mean that we cannot conceive an 'impartial spectator' who will 
pass a judgement on both sides of the bargain. When a burglar breaks 
into a house he probably has no idea of who lives there. Does this 
mean that because of his social distance from the people who, as 
it were, are being acted upon his action is now value-free?. 
Obviously not.
But there is another reason why, at least in Smith's case, exchange 
cannot be seen as so impersonal. It is because of the meaning of 
prices in his economic system. Surely we can agree that the action 
of production (the owner-employee relationship) cannot be thought 
of as entirely impersonal. Now, as in Smith's theory prices reflect 
the distribution of income between all participants in the 
production process, it is by definition that exchange, where actual 
prices are being set, is subject to moral investigation. Not so 
much, however, from the point of view of the direct participants in
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the process of exchange as from the point of view of the general 
distribution of income that is implied by it.
There are mainly two ways to investigate the morals of exchange. One, 
in the tradition of Walras (and Nozick), where the moral value of 
exchange depends on the institutional arrangements. That is, that any 
exchange (and price) reached under the morally approved arrangement 
are morally good. Walras, for instance, considered the market price 
that is determined under perfectly competitive conditions as morally 
just because no-one was making any real profits (in terms of the 
numeraire) on expense of others^. Here, every market price is just 
provided that the freedom and perfectibility of the market are 
preserved.
On the other hand, we can consider the morality of a market in its 
success in bringing about the price that we a-priori (to exchange) 
define as morally good. Like, for instance, cost of production 
theories, or labour theories of value.
The Aristotelian based scholastic concept of the 'just price' is an 
example to such a case. There is still a disagreement whether either 
Aristotle or St. Thomas Aquinas thought the 'just price' to be any 
market price^. However, there is enough evidence in the writings of 
both these scholars to suggest that the 'just price' is in fact the 
cost of production price. Naturally, in such a case, the moral
^See in Jaffe (1980) for the reference on Walras. It must be noted, 
however, that Walras' perception of economic justice was much more complex. 
I hope to publish soon a careful discussion of it.
^See discussion in the General Introduction section (a)- (ii).
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reference point (the 'just price') is now being determined by the 
mode of production. The moral merits of exchange are then reduced 
to the success or failure of its institution to produce the 'just 
price' as the market price.
A s Smith's value theory is believed to have been a 'cost of 
production' theory^, it is the action of production that becomes 
the heart of the moral investigation of his economic theory. In 
other words, it is the relationship between the capitalist and the 
labourer which constitutes the two sides of the actions. However, as 
both of them act and are being acted upon simultaneously, the problem 
becomes more complex.
From what has been said in the previous sections it should be clear 
now that the morality of self-interested actions depends primarily 
on the beneficence of the outcome. It cannot really become a moral 
good but the beneficence is essential to salvage self-interested 
actions from becoming vice. The questions that we shall have to deal 
with now are (a) when is a final distribution beneficent and (b), 
which determines (a), whether we can distinguish after all between 
those who act and those who are being acted upon.
Let me now, gradually, develop a picture of economic actions. I will 
also try to show that though we are in a situation where everyone 
acts and is being acted upon, the distribution of ownership gives 
some distinct insights into who really acts and who is really been
proposition that needs modification as I will endeavour to show in 
chapter 5.
173
acted upon,
(1) General Beneficence.
A person, the capitalists, from self-interest, advances materials to 
the action of production. Another person, the labourer, again, from 
self-interest, brings his labour to the process of production. Both 
of them act and are acted upon at the same time, and the outcome of 
their action is a certain level of wealth.
Suppose now, that they produced wheat, does the mere extraction of 
wheat from the land indicates a beneficial outcome to their action?. 
Obviously not, even not in terms of nature's plan for the 
preservation of the species. The first thing we should inquire is
whether this quantity is more or less than it takes to produce it.
Surely when we began the action, we must have had some quantity of
the product, otherwise we could not have produced it*.
If the quantity that came out of the act of production is less than 
what is needed for its reproduction, the action cannot be considered 
as beneficial. In this particular action the amount of seeds and 
subsistence of the next period can not remain the same. If we do not 
cut subsistence then we must reduce the seeds, hence, the next period
*In our case we needed the wheat to serve as seeds as well as the food 
for the capitalist and labourer, during the period of production. By food to 
the people involved in the process of production, I mean the level of physical 
subsistence.
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will yield even less output. At some stage we shall have to give up 
some of our food as well. In the long run, if the trend continues, 
neither the capitalist, nor the worker will be able to maintain the 
same level of consumption, thus, though wheat is still extracted from 
the land, the action of its production cannot be considered as 
beneficial in its outcome. From nature's point of view it is
disastrous as well. With less wealth than earlier, the species will
disappear.
When the quantity produced is exactly sufficient to what is needed 
for its reproduction (including the subsistence of the labourer and 
capitalist), we may say that the action has had no effect (X«0)^. 
From nature's point of view , this action will preserve the species 
but will not multiply it.
Only when surplus is produced, it is guaranteed that the species will 
advance in quantity. However, from the moral point of view the 
question of whether the action can be considered as beneficial is not 
yet settled. For that we need to explore more carefully the question
who acts and who is acted upon.
^Note that we are examining the beneficence of the action, which is a 
dynamic concept, rather than the beneficence of the situation. Someone may 
feel grateful for what he has in comparison to what he might have had. 
Nevertheless, the action itself hasn't brought about any change in his 
conditions. There is no reason to suppose that as a result of a stationary 
state a person will attribute his position to actions which merely preserve 
what he has already been enjoying before.
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(il) Ownership and the distinction between actin# and being acted 
upon.
If a surplus has been produced, the person who initiated the action, 
the capitalis^ ( who, for reasons that are not under consideration 
at present, owns the outcome) can decide to consume the whole 
surplus himself. He will, obviously, be able to increase his family 
and advance the race but the other person, the labourer, will remain 
in the same state as before, (he might even be worse of, according 
to the capitalist's whim, if he was already above subsistence). 
Hence, the action will certainly raise the feelings of gratitude in 
the capitalist and, at the same time, it might even raise the 
resentment of the labourer if his level of consumption was 
decreased. (I shall assume that when surplus prevails, no capitalist 
will reduce his labourer's wages below subsistence).
On the face of it, the situation seems undetermined, however, we must 
look again into the description of the action in order to solve this 
problem. If indeed we had two persons who are acting and acted upon 
at the same time, the question of who owns, or who ought to have 
received, nature's remuneration; i.e. the total produce, should have 
been left open or, at least discussed more carefully. However, we 
have an exogenous constraint that dictates that the produce of the 
action 'belongs' to the initiator of the action (the capitalist).
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The distribution of it becomes a separated action. An action where 
the person who acts is the capitalist, and the person who is acted 
upon is the labourer. In other words, the capitalist's benefits are 
mainly due to the work of nature which is not an object of morals. 
Those of the labourer depends on nature as well as on human 
decisions. Therefore, whether an action of production, of which the 
'action' of distribution is an integral part, is beneficent or not 
depends on the labourer's feelings. As he is the one who is 
ultimately acted upon, it is his sense of gratitude which indicate 
a beneficent outcome. As the complete produce goes through the 
capitalist, it is unlikely that he will bestow benefits on the 
labourer, while harming himself. Hence, the beneficence of the 
worker, necessarily implies the beneficence of the capitalist but, 
it does not hold the other way around.
We may return now to the question whether an action where the 
capitalist (the initiator of the action) , who was rewarded by nature 
for his dexterity and, who leaves the wages of his labourer at their 
previous (or even, subsistence) level, is beneficent or not. Well, 
the answer depends on the use that the capitalist will do of his 
surplus. He might not share it with his labourer, the one that 
participated in the production of his surplus, but, at the same 
time, as his stomach isn't larger than that of the poor person, he 
is bound to share the surplus with another labourer whose services 
he might require®. Does this mean that the outcome is beneficent?.
®"lt is to no purpose that the proud and unfeeling landlord views his 
extensive fields, and without a thought for the wants of his bretherns in 
imagination consumes himself the whole harvest that grows upon them....The 
capacity of his stomach bears no proportion to the immensity of his desires, 
and will receive no more than that of the meanest peasant. The rest he is
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To begin with, we must acknowledge that the analysis of the 
relationship between those who are involved directly in the action 
is insufficient to determine the real effect of the action. If the 
capitalist does not share his surplus with the person who was 
involved, in producing it, there must be another action involved. The 
action in which he exchanges the surplus for some sort of labour, 
which Smith named as unproductive labour, (namely, labour that does 
not produce any surplus) . Obviously, the outcomes of both actions 
(the production and exchange of surplus) are interdependent. 
Therefore, we shall have to extend the framework of analysis so that 
we can measure the complete effect of the actions of production and 
exchange. (By the action of production I also mean the productive 
labourer's remuneration. I refer to it as part of production because 
the subsistence of the productive labourer is part of the 
reproduction of the whole process. Obviously, the capitalist can 
share the surplus with his own labourer, and increase his wages 
above subsistence, but, as it might affect production (in terms of 
productivity) I shall not discuss it here. This sort of analysis 
must be carried out in a more complete model of Smith's economic 
system. For the moment, we may distinguish between the remuneration 
of the productive labour, as part of production, while, the 
unproductive labourer receives his remuneration in the process of
obliged to distribute among those, who prepare in the nicest manner, that
little which he himself makes use of The produce of the soil maintains at
all times nearly that number of inhabitants which it is capable of 
maintaining. The rich only select from the heap what is most precious and 
agreeable. They consume little more than the poor,....They are led by an 
invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of 
life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal 
portions among all its inhabitants".[TMS p.184-5].
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the exchange of surplus).
In short, as the beneficence of a single action may spill-over beyond 
the direct participants in the original process, we have to consider 
these effects as well. On the one hand we have the initiators of 
actions, those who owns the benefits that are bestowed by nature. 
And, on the other hand, we have the labourers ( of all kind) who are 
engaged in either mere exchange ( in the case of the unproductive 
labour) or, in a complex action of production and remuneration.
Now, as we consider the complete system, the question is whether or 
not the process of the invisible hand guarantees a beneficent outcome 
to the production of surplus?.
Consider now the following case. In an economy there are 20 
capitalists, and 80 labourers, and the product is wheat, a unit of 
which is produced by .1 units of labour, and .5 units of wheat. In 
order to subsist through one period, a person needs 1 unit of wheat. 
In the initial state, the economy was producing 200 units of wheat, 
(namely, 20 labourers are productive and 60 unproductive, if employed 
at all) . From the point of view of reproduction, to maintain the same 
level of output, the capitalists will have to put aside 100 units of 
wheat, as seeds, and 20 units of wheat as subsistence for the 
required labour input. Adding to it their own subsistence, (20) the 
surplus that remains is 60 units of wheat. If the capitalists will 
use their surplus for 'luxurious' consumption, they can employ 60 
unproductive labourers. Note however, that no one can subsist on 
'luxurious' consumption. Indeed, though wealth is unequally
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distributed (80 people in the economy have only the level of 
subsistence, and 20 have, in terms of wheat, their subsistence + 
other trivial convenience), necessities of life (subsistence) are 
equally distributed (everyone , at the end of the process of 
production and exchange, has only 1 unit of wheat). This economy 
will not be able to maintain more people in these circumstances.
At first sight, the only reason for gratitude on part of the 
labourers is that they are alive and have something to eat. As time 
elapses, in this stationary state, there is no room for any more 
gratitude. The first set of actions (the functioning of the system 
at the first period) raised gratitude because it changed the 
labourers' position from hunger to subsistence. But, once they have 
reached subsistence, there seems to be no reason for gratitude as 
they get nothing in addition though the actions are repeated. So, 
the set of actions that generate the stationary state, though 
produce surplus and distribute life's necessities in an equal way, 
don't seem to be the cause of any gratitude. In particular when 
comparing to a different distribution of wealth which would have 
been consistent with the above state.
If, for instance, every member of society had 2 units of wheat (equal 
distribution of wealth), he would be able to produce, as an 
independent producer, 2 units. Though he only works .2 of his time, 
he needs for subsistence 1 unit of wheat. Hence, he is being left 
with no surplus. From the point of view of those who were labourer 
in the previous situation this must be much better. Under equal 
distribution of wealth with no division of labour (autarky) they
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will receive the same net-income (subsistence) as before but with 
much less work on their part. Surely there is no cause for gratitude 
among the labourers if we compare there previous conditions with the 
present one.
From the point of view of the ex-capitalists, they are now worse off. 
Though they still have their subsistence as before (for their stomach 
isn't larger than that of the poor) they simply cannot have any extra 
convenience. Luxury consumption and unproductive labour cease to be 
an economic variable. (Maybe now, because most people have more 
spare time, they will want to entertain each other. However, as they 
don't have any surplus, it will all have to be on voluntary basis).
It is clear that the economy as a whole may lose much from autarky. 
The production of surplus when properly used, may give rise to growth 
that wouldn't be possible under autarky. Nevertheless, in the above 
example the only thing that the economy loses from autarky is the 
luxury and convenience of the rich. The labourers, however, whose 
gratitude is essential in making the system beneficent, are, at best, 
completely indifferent to both institutions in the above example. In 
fact they will prefer autarky over the commercial society.
Consequently, not only that they will not feel gratitude under the
above commercial arrangement, they might feel resentment.
There is another reason why the labourers will not consider the
stationary state of subsistence as a cause for gratitude. In the 
Wealth of Nations, Smith writes the following observation :"A man 
must always live by his work, and his wages must at least be
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sufficient to maintain him. They must even upon most occasion be 
somewhat more; otherwise it would be impossible for him to bring up 
a family, and the race of such workmen could not last beyond the 
first generation."[WN p.85]. Namely, that in the above described 
situation, which follows his line of argument in the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, if subsistence means the amount of wheat that is needed 
to maintain the worker himself, this economy will not last more than 
a generation. Obviously, in face of such grim prospects, no one will 
argue that the outcome raises gratitude, or indeed, is beneficent.
However, if we allow a more liberal interpretation of subsistence, 
namely that it is enough for the multiplication of the species, we 
shall still not find it as a cause for gratitude. In the next period 
there will be more people in the economy. Competition for work will 
cause a decline in the level of wages, perhaps even below 
subsistence. For this not to happen, output must increase too. 
Recall, however, that in our example the surplus of 60 units went 
as subsistence to the unproductive labourers. If, instead, the 
capitalists would have wanted to invest it in order to increase 
output for the next period, they would have needed some of the 
surplus as raw material (seeds). Consequently, there would not be 
enough subsistence for all the labourers in the economy. Hence, 
either way will leave the workers resentful. In the first case 
because their wages fell and their subsistence undermined (in the 
second, or third, period). In the other, because most of them do not 
experience any change in their wages from the previous period but 
some of them, do not have enough for subsistence.
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From all this we may conclude that the mere production of surplus 
(wealth) is by no mean in itself a beneficent outcome. The fact that 
it may distribute subsistence in an equal manner is completely 
insignificant to the question of beneficence. Thus, the self- 
interested economic action may become a moral vice even when it seems 
to be creating wealth.
There is no doubt that in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith is 
trying to make the case for the beneficence of the invisible-hand- 
mechanism. However, this case is being reviewed and modified in the 
Wealth of Nations where he very simply argues that the beneficence 
of the system is possible, but it does not lie in the mere creation 
of surplus (or by the mere division of labour). This is, in my view, 
the real meaning of Smith's distinction between the 'dull' 
(stationary) state and the 'cheerful' (progress) one.
We may conclude now that the beneficence of the complex action that 
constitutes the economic system has two main properties. First, it 
is measured by the gratitude one would expect from the labourers. 
Secondly, this gratitude, or resentment, is a result of an actual 
change or an expected change in the labourers' circumstances.
Hence, a distribution is beneficent only if at least one of the 
workers (hence, all capitalists) is better off and no one is worse 
off. (There are obviously no tools to compare gains and losses of 
different workers). To some extend it is a similar notion to Rawls' 
principle of justice. There, a distribution is morally better if, in 
comparison to the state of equality, every one is better off. (in the
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modified version, it is enough that the worst off will become better, 
to make the distribution morally better). In Smith's analysis, as we 
regard labourers as those who are worst off in society, an 
improvement in their conditions will yield beneficence. From 
whatever state we begin, a system of self-interest will not become 
unjust, if the workers, who are the least in society, have a reason 
to feel gratitude through an improvement in their conditions. 
However, unlike Rawls, the fact that the system is just is of much 
less moral significance than it is in Rawls' analysis.
Conclusion of Chapter 4
I have tried to establish in this chapter that the moral good, if 
exists, of self-interest is dubious. At best, it is good in as much 
as society may subsist, but there is nothing in the system itself 
that assures us that this fragile moral good can last. Indeed, if 
we look at Smith's 'dull' and 'cheerful' phases we may find that the 
former is correlated with moral bad whereas the latter, is merely 
a 'just' situation which, in Smith's theory, is not so conveniently 
related to the idea of moral good.
Samuelson's(1977) 'vindication' of Smith's economic model ensures 
that in the long run, at the stationary state, the economy will
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reach the state in which no beneficence will occur and the habitual
practice of self-interest will become 'suitable' to its outcome.
However, it will be at the least possible level of moral
approbation. Samuelson's analysis may be interpreted to suggest that 
the only thing a system of natural liberty may offer us, is
'justice' as distinct as it is, in Smith's model, from moral good. 
There is, however, the question of how good a description of Smith's 
model is Samuelson's 'vindication'(see, for instance, Reid (1987)). 
At any rate, this is a subject for a different investigation 
altogether.
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5. IMPLEMENTING SMITH'S MORAL ANALYSIS TO HIS ECONOMIC SYSTEM
(&) Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. To offer a somewhat novel 
interpretation of Smith's economic system and, to analyze the 
machinery by which the beneficence of the system --which is 
essential to prevent it from becoming a moral vice-- comes about. The 
two, obviously, are not entirely unrelated.
There are two general points which are important for both the 
modelling of Smith's economics as well as for the purpose of 
establishing its moral significance. One is the symmetry, or a- 
symmetry, in the positions of the various economic groups which 
constitute the economic system. The other is a more technical 
question which relates to the choice of framework for the economic 
analysis. This latter issue is subdivided into specific questions 
of the kind of whether to use the general or partial equilibrium 
framework of analysis; whether to use the framework of growth models 
with equilibrium or disequilibrium paths, or the more Sraffian 'cost
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of production' systems which focus on inter-sectoral relationship 
and the continuous preservation of equilibrium prices.
(i) The Moral Consequences of A-Symmetry in what Motivates the 
Different Economic Agents.
Let us begin with the less technical problem: the problem of the 
relative positions of the groups which comprise the economic 
environment. By 'relative position' I mean the difference (if exists) 
in what motivates the various groups and the subsequent effects of 
their actions on the whole system.
In the previous chapter (section (b) in particular) we have analyzed 
the moral significance of a self-interest motivated action. We saw 
that such actions pose a particular problem in their moral 
evaluation. If a self-interested action is successful it means that 
the actor has received what he wanted without affecting anyone else. 
If indeed the achievements of the actor's goal was carried out 
without anyone else being acted upon then we might indeed say that 
there is proportionality between motive and outcome and the action 
might be crowned as morally good^.
^This, of course, depend on our approval of self-interest as a sentiment 
as such. We saw in chapter 3 that this is far from being obvious. I 
nevertheless assumed it to be morally approved to show that even then, the
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However, such a statement had to be qualified immediately. For the 
morally good action to prevail, in distinction from the mere Smithian 
'just' action, 'merit' and 'demerit' are important too. Namely, the 
fact that the action does not raise any gratitude from someone else 
implies that it is less than morally good. As a matter of fact such 
an action does not involve more than the actor himself and thus 
there are really no grounds at all for any moral judgement.
Within a system (a set of actions), however, the story is somewhat 
different. Some would argue that a self-interest based system is a 
system where all participants act out of self-interest (namely, each 
intends nothing to another) and that they are all successful in 
achieving their own ends (which are, presumably, rational ends). 
Hence, as all motives are the same everybody is acting and being 
acted upon in the same manner.
However, it is clear that this idea of efficiency which is strongly 
associated with natural liberty, means that each individual was 
successful only because other people behaved in the way they did. But 
it is not any way which others might choose to behave that will 
render the self-interested actions successful, it is the fact that 
others behave in the same way which brings about this harmony of 
wants^. Consequently it is as if each individual's self-interest
morality of natural liberty in Smith is questionable.
^Unless, of course, we assume that rationality also implies that the 
individual takes into consideration the others' behaviours. This, of course, 
is not the standard analysis and it is certainly not what is implied by 
Smith's idea of prudence. Such an idea, however, does exist in contemporary 
analysis in the form of rational expectations.
188
generated the other's successful Implementation of it. From the 
moral point of view it means that each individual's action created 
benefit to the other. The proper distribution that should emerge is 
where everybody is rewarded for his contribution to the others' 
successful implementation of their wants. But as they are all 
motivated by the same thing and they are equally successful in its 
pursuit, they owe each other the same and thus, it is as if their 
mutual rewards are balanced out and the immediate outcome of natural 
liberty is the morally desirable distribution.
However for the same reason why some might think of a single self- 
interested action as morally good, the system of self-interested 
actions is being deprived of such an evaluation. The reason is that 
there is no proportionality between what the individuals intend to 
the others and what they achieve for them through their own 
behaviour. They intend nothing for the others but through their 
pursuit of their own interest they achieve, unintentionally, a lot 
for them. They affect each others' success in pursuing what they 
intend for themselves. Hence, at best, this system can still be only 
'just' in the Smithian sense of the word. Namely, it can be accepted 
because it does not menace the social existence but is far from 
being a morally desired system.
The question that will arise is whether or not there is beneficence 
in such a situation. If everybody acted and was acted upon in the 
same manner the final distribution can be justified on the grounds 
that either the mutual rewards were balanced or, that there is no 
room for reward to anybody as there was no beneficence.
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Whether we can see at all the beneficence of the system (of the 
others' activities) in the success of the self-interested person 
depends on the similarity of their motivation. If a benevolent 
person allows the self-interested one to achieve even more than he 
had hoped for while the former finds joy only in his success to 
benefit the others, the natural distribution of things is wholly 
unacceptable^. Both individuals acted and were acted upon. The 
self- interested person intended nothing for the other and indeed 
achieved nothing real for him; the benevolent character intended 
good and achieved it. The final distribution, however, depends on 
the second aspect of the action cycle: reward and punishment. The 
self-interested person received real benefit from the benevolent 
person's action and he should therefore reward him. A distribution 
that does not satisfy this condition is less than morally good.
But the reasons why the final distribution may not be morally 
acceptable does not depend only on having different motivations. Even 
the expressions of similar motivation, when their effects on the 
model are diverse, will render the final distribution as 
unacceptable. In such a case we will not be able to say that the 
successful implementation of the self-interest of one group depends 
on the other group's pursuit of self-interest in the same way that 
the letter's success depends on the former's behaviour.
^It is important to point out that by distribution of things Smith means 
real goods, not utilities. The fact that the benevolent person wanted the 
self-interested one to be happy and he himself is therefore happy is 
completely outside the domain of Smith's analysis of reward and punishment.
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To a great extent it is all part of the question of who acts and who 
is being acted upon. Before establishing this we cannot hope to be 
able to say anything about the beneficence of the system. In the 
previous chapter we have dealt with this problem by introducing a- 
symmetry between the two groups (capitalists and labourers)* that 
is entirely due to the legal arrangement by which the capitalists own 
the final product. The motivation, however, of both sides appeared 
to have been the same ; i.e. self-interest. This, in turn, may lead 
to some debates about who really acts and who is being acted upon 
which may entirely depend on the point of time where we start our 
analysis. Namely, do we start it by the labourer coming to the 
capitalist and offering him to exchange his labour for wages and 
then the capitalist is being acted upon or the other way around? 
There is no intrinsic reason to prefer one arrangement over the 
other as both labourers and capitalists act for the same reason. The 
meaning of beneficence will be completely different under these two 
perceptions of economic relationship.
Indeed it is the general belief that in Smith's system all 
participants behave in the same manner that will cause people to 
doubt the analysis of beneficence that is based on the capitalists 
acting on the labourers (as assumed in the last section of the 
previous chapter). One may even argue that the idea that economic 
actions are simply exchanges among equals can be traced to Smith's 
evolutionary approach to social development (the 'four stages' 
theory). In other words, when in the rude stage people start to
*For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality I shall leave 
landlords out of my discussion.
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specialize and create surpluses they are all both labourers and 
capitalists. They face each other in the exchange of these surpluses 
as equals. In such a case, the difference in classes emerges due to 
the imprudence of some of these people who will not accumulate but 
consume everything immediately. In the next stage, those who have 
accumulated will be in a different position than those who haven't. 
But the question is whether an assumption that class distinction has 
emerged from pure self-interest means that the next generation of 
the imprudent people are on equal terms with their prudent 
counterparts^. I doubt it.
As a matter of fact this is a too sterile description of the 
emergence of classes in Smith's theory anyway. It had not been only 
the accumulation of capital which brought about a class 
distinctions, the acquisition of land also played a significant 
role. Thus, even if we believed the story where it is imprudence (a 
form of self-interest) which generated some class distinctions the 
fact that there is a third, unrelated, reason means that we cannot 
directly relate the predicament of the new generations of labourers 
to their forefathers behaviour.
I therefore believe that there is an a-symmetry in Smith's perception 
of the expressions of self-interest among the different classes. If 
we say, for instance, that labourers don't save but procreate 
instead while the capitalists do save then we have somewhat different 
expressions of self-interest. The coincidence of wants, which is what
^In legal terms this will be the problem of inheritance which I'd rather 
leave out.
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natural liberty is all about, has different dimensions if the wants 
(or drives) are not the same.
There is, in my view, a profound a-symmetry between the labourers and 
the capitalists for both reasons of the status of motivations and 
effects on the model. The common denominator of what motivates the 
capitalists and the labourers is the desire to 'better their 
condition' . Some would argue that here it is where the definition of 
self-interest starts and ends. I thoroughly disagree. As we said 
earlier there is a significant moral difference between the different 
expressions of prudence. One can wish to better his condition within 
a general context of society and thus be 'perfectly prudent'®. One 
can care for himself so much that the only reason why he may 
consider the others' position is because he worries about his 
reputation. And, of course, one can desire to better one's condition 
at the expense of the others. Therefore, to say that all characters 
in the WN are motivated by the desire to better their condition is 
not very meaningful.
If we look at the capitalists we shall find that Smith's description 
of their behaviour is dominated by words like 'parsimony' and 
'frugality' [WN Ilii] which are the same words he used in the TMS to 
define prudence. He describes the two principles which dominate the 
capitalists in the following way: "the principle, which prompts to
expense, is the passion for present enjoyment; which is in
general only momentary and occasional. But the principle which
®The three categories of prudence are discussed in chapter 3 above. 
Perfect prudence is when one pursues his own affairs with greater attention 
to the position of others.
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prompts to save, is the desire of bettering our condition.[WN 
p. 341]. Though it seems as if the capitalist has two kinds of 
motivation, there is, as a matter of fact, only one. His decision 
to save is not independent from his decision to consume. Therefore, 
it is the strength of his rational behaviour in his effort to better 
his conditions which will eventually determine how much he saves and 
how much he consumes.
On the labourers' side the problem is much more complex. If we take 
Smith's assertion that it is savings which is the reflection of the 
desire to better one's condition then labourers have no such desire 
as they don't save. We may, of course, be more liberal in our 
interpretation and say that the decision to save, for the labourers, 
is the decision to use the wages above their own subsistence to 
increase their family [WN p.85]. It is as if the choice that 
labourers confront is the choice between consuming the difference 
between actual wages and their own subsistence by themselves, or to 
use it to feed an extended family.
On the face of it, it seems as if under this liberal interpretation 
of labourers motivations we have similar kind of motivations from 
the two social classes. The labourers want to better their condition 
by using any surplus to procreate (and thus increase the production 
potential of the system). The capitalists too want to improve their 
condition by using the surplus to enhance the potential of the 
economy. However no one can fail to see the immediate difference 
here. What ever the labourers do they do not alter their personal 
predicament. The capitalist can at the same time improve his own
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consumption together with savings. Indeed it is the expectation for 
a better future in terms of consumption which is what 'bettering 
one's condition' is all about. This is certainly not the case of the 
labourers.
An alternative view of motivation in Smith's model can focus on the 
division of labour. More than anything it is the division of labour 
which is the tool of improvement^. Now both capitalists and 
labourers affect the division of labour. When Smith describes it he 
writes about it in terms of the ingenuity of labourers. However, 
this ingenuity is fuelled by the accumulation of capital. Therefore, 
the division of labour depends on the behaviour of labourers and 
capitalists. Can we say now that the effect of each of these groups 
on the division of labour is a reflection of the same kind of 
motivation? The answer is not.
The capitalists decide to accumulate according to a rational desire 
to improve their conditions. They will affect the division of labour 
by that decision. The labourers, on the other hand, cannot be 
thought of as making rational decisions about the division of 
labour. The productivity of labour may be a result of having more 
capital (in which case it is independent of the labourers decision)
?Like in his TMS, the 'Newtonian Method' of discourse is present in his 
WN. The main principle of the theory, the principle "by which we explain the 
several rules or phenomena, connecting one with the other in a natural order" 
is laid down in the first chapter[LRBL p.139].(It is also discussed in EPS-HA 
p.45 as well as in Campbell (1971) p.31). The apparent principle behind the 
improvement,in the productive powers of labour,and the order, according 
to which its produce is naturally distributed among the different ranks and 
conditions of men in the society"[WN p.11], is the Division of Labour. Behind 
it lies the human propensity to truck barter and exchange. Thus we can always 
say that the effect of any group's position on the general situation depend 
on its relations to the division of labour.
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but it might too be a result of labourers' own dexterity. While the 
former is an improvement in productivity which entirely due to the 
capitalists rational decision making, the latter can hardly be 
described as a rational behaviour.
Smith himself was not quite sure about whether the division of labour 
was a result of calculated pursuit of self-interest or just an 
instinct of human nature. " The division of labour, from which so 
many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any 
human wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to 
which it gives occasion. It is the necessary, though very slow and 
gradual consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which 
has in view no such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, 
barter, and exchange one thing for another".[WN p.25].
All the above means one major thing; that what motivates the 
capitalists is a different thing from that which motivates the 
labourers. Therefore, the interactions between labourers and 
capitalists cannot be thought of as the exchange among equals. Though 
it is very difficult to characterize what it is that motivates 
labourers one can argue that it is a much less a calculated self- 
interested motive than that of the capitalists. One can argue one of 
two; either that the improvement in the labourers' own circumstances 
is perceived by them in terms of family size and therefore, though 
not directed to the capitalists, it is a benevolent sentiment. Or, 
that it is much less a rational drive ; almost an animal kind of 
survival instinct. Therefore words like prudence will not be very 
appropriate to describe their behaviour.
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Either way there can be little doubt that the key to the moral 
assessment of the system is the beneficence of labourers. If their 
behaviour reflects benevolence then the key issue will be how the 
self-interested actions of the capitalists are affected by the 
labourers' benevolence. The desired distribution will require that 
the capitalists reward the labourers for it.
If, on the other hand, labourers' actions are merely instincts, it
means that we cannot really think of the labourers as acting because 
the sentiment which motivates them is an instinct with which there 
is no question of finding 'sympathy'. Their behaviour therefore, is 
to a great extent part of the system itself. Thus the only kind of 
rational interaction takes place among the capitalists themselves. 
The labourers are at all times being acted upon and their
beneficence, therefore, is the only key to the moral evaluation of
the economic system.
fii) The Modelling Implications.
At the beginning of this chapter I said that the question of symmetry 
has two dimensions. One is the moral dimension where we examined 
whether we can determine who acts and who is being acted upon by 
analyzing the nature of what motives the different classes. The other 
dimension is whether there is symmetry in the role and effects of 
each class activities regardless of their nature.
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In any economic model we may find symmetry or a-symmetry in the role 
and effects of various agents' behaviour. This, of course, does not 
mean that the psychological foundations of these behaviours are 
symmetrical or a-symmetrical too. But there is a reason why I find 
it important to contrast the view about the a-symmetry in the 
psychological foundations with the symmetry in the role and effects 
of these behaviours that usually prevails in the modelling of 
classical economics. This is that the idea of natural liberty, which 
is partly what these models are trying to capture, does depend on 
the symmetry or a-symmetry of the psychological foundations®.
The efficiency of natural liberty also means the coincidence of 
wants. If there is a-symmetry in the psychological foundations we may 
find ourselves describing a system where the wants of one group are 
fulfilled because it can manipulate the needs of the other. This, of 
course, does not mean that the other groups may not have wants which 
are different from their needs. In such a case, the coincidence of 
wants will be deceptive. It will only be the wants of the one groups 
which are consistent with the needs of the other one but no more than 
that.
For the purpose of moral investigation this is indeed very crucial. 
If we have a system where some people act out of choice and some out 
of necessity we cannot say that those who act out of choice were in
®Apart from this there is also the moral aspect of an action. Recall that 
there is a significant difference between the morally desired distribution 
when wants and roles are symmetric and when they are not. If people with 
similar intentions create different benefits to others according to their 
position in the model, the distribution of rewards should be different than 
in the case where all affect each other in the same fashion.
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any way been acted upon. Similarly, we cannot say that those who act 
out of need have acted in a way which put their action on the same 
moral footing as those who have acted out of choice.
Now if we say that in Smith capitalists and labourers act for the 
same reasons then we are saying that both of them act and are being 
acted upon in a similar way. Natural liberty, in such a case, will 
be the coincidence of their wants and any model which captures the 
balance of these wants as the determinant of its equilibrium is 
loyal to the spirit of Smith's writings. To analyze the moral 
significance of such natural liberty we will have to resort to the 
kind of legal arrangements of the previous chapter; i.e. to 
determine who acts and who is being acted upon according to who owns 
the final product.
On the other hand, if we say that the capitalists act rationally and 
out of self-interest while the labourers act on their needs (through 
their instincts) we cannot say that both of them act and are being 
acted upon in the same way. Clearly it is the capitalists who act 
(according to our definition of action) and the labourers are being 
acted upon. The labourers desperate need to survive is part of nature 
upon which the capitalists act, it is part of the system. To capture, 
then, the coincidence of wants is to ask whether the wants of all 
capitalists among themselves coincide. And not to ask whether their 
collective wants coincide with the collective need of individuals, j
As I will show now the focus of most formal expositions of classical 
economics is on the coincidence of wants between the capitalists as
199
a collective and the labourers as a collective. To that extent, I 
believe that these models do not suit Smith's work. There are other 
reasons for that but I will come back to them later.
Let us now examine more carefully what is meant by a-symmetry and the 
imbalance of motivations and effects between labourers and 
capitalists. For that purpose we will consider two trivial examples 
which, I believe, capture the major attitudes towards modelling 
classical economics. Of course I do not wish to imply by this that 
one can attribute one, or two, kinds of a model to all classical 
economists. I do, however, believe that there is a workable 
distinction between the different approaches to classical economic 
analysis. One approach is more neo-classical in character and it 
usually takes the form of growth models with diminishing marginal 
productivity of land®. The focus of analysis of these types of 
models are the relative shares and their development over time. Once 
a multi sector analysis is being introduced, everything becomes so 
complex to a degree, sometimes, of indeterminacy^®.
®Not surprisingly this approach is much more prevalent with respect to 
Ricardo (and Maithus) than it is in connection with Smith or Mill. See, for 
instance, Kaldor(1956) Blaug (1958 & 1978), Pasinetti (1960 & 1981), Caravale 
and Tosato (1980), and Casarosa (1985). A more general use of this approach 
to classical economics can be found in Eltis (1984). There are, of course, 
those who believe that what is true to Ricardo is true to Adam Smith (for 
instance, Hollander (1979) and by implication Hicks and Hollander (1977) who 
deal with Ricardo's growth model should be relevant to Smith too. Samuelson 
(1977 & 1978) is another example of someone who believes that modelling 
classical economics can be generalized in terms of Ricardo's Corn Model. Reid 
(1987) explores the fallacy behind Samuelson's vindication of Smith through 
the use of a kind of Ricardian Corn model.
^®Also, the importance of the theory of value in such a context is not 
very clear. Kaldor (1956) and Pasinetti (1960) are quite explicit about the 
separation of the theory of value from that of distribution. Morishima 
(1989), on the other hand, is trying to combine the Sraffian approach 
(discussed below) with the theory of growth.
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The other kind of approach is a more Sraffian one in the sense that 
the focus of analysis are the price equilibrium conditions which need 
to be satisfied (^co^inuousl^ In other words, in the centre of
attention are the inter-sectoral relationship and their expression 
in the problem of value. A solution to this problem also means the 
determination of the rate of growth through the determination of the 
rate of profits^^.
The role of human nature in many interpretations of Smith's economic 
system has, to some extent, been degenerated. From the complex 
character which is comprised of a propensity to exchange, a drive to 
better its own condition and a blend of 'own-regard' - 'other regard' 
dispositions, the human character has been reduced by many to a 
simple 'utility/profit maximizer'. As such, its main role is in 
shifting capital from a less profitable to a more profitable 
employments and to drive prices to their natural rates.
In the context of a 'cost of production' theory which focuses on the 
inter-sectoral relationship the pursuit of self-interest on the part 
of the two groups is as follows: the capitalists affect the model by 
their decisions on how much of their surplus to consume immediately; 
the labourers, whose wages depend on that decision, affect the model 
by either keeping wages at their subsistence level (through 
procreation) or, through the division of labour in as much as it is 
subject to their rational (or conscious) choice.
i^See, for instance, Morishima (1989) Roncaglia (1978), Sraffa (1960), 
Steedman (1977) and, to a limited extent, Walsh and Gram (1980).
201
In a multi sector model the effects of such improvements in the 
productivity of labour may not be of great significance anyway. The 
determinants of the rate of profits are a complicated mixture between 
all the technological components. And though the rise in the number 
of workers might mean more profits, it depends on the relationship 
between the changes in total output and the changes in the rate of 
prof it^^.
If we look at the inverse relationship between wages and the rate of 
profits we can clarify this point.
R*
W* W
W* is the subsistence level of wages. The 'cost of production' model 
solves the relative prices and the profit rate for any level of W. 
Now as wages depend in Smith's analysis on demand and supply one can 
argue that what determines the level of wages (and thus the rest of 
the relevant variables^*) is the self-interest of the capitalists
^^Notice that I do not refer here to profits as a function of wages 
(which we assume at their subsistence level). Rather we are asking whether we 
can establish a clear effect of division of labour as such on profits.
i^Including growth which is closely associated with the rate of profit.
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(who form the demand) and that of the labourers. Hence, natural 
liberty is the coincidence of these symmetrical wants. But there is 
an additional aspect to the theory of wages and that is that 
labourers will tend to increase their numbers and thus drive wages 
to their subsistence level (or their natural rate as is commonly 
believed).
This makes the symmetry even more clear. The decisions of the 
capitalists do not affect wages but the number of labourers. Thus, 
if the rational want of labourers is to increase their numbers the 
capitalists bring about a successful implementation of the labourers 
own desires. Similarly, as the labourers increase in numbers and 
wages remain at subsistence levels, the rate of profit may be 
unchanged [r(W*)] but total profits will rise. Thus, the pursuit of 
the labourers' own interest brings about the successful 
implementation of the capitalists' own interests.
Even if the division of labour is a decision variable of the 
labourers then the symmetry remains. By the improvements in their 
productivity the wages-rate-of-profits frontier will move outwards. 
Hence, though the labourers still earn their subsistence wages the 
rate of profits as well as total profits will go up. This means the 
number of labourers will rise (which is the successful 
implementation of their desires) and the capitalists too will feel 
satisfaction.
But this cannot last forever. A kind of traditional explanation for
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the shift towards (W*,R*)^^ is the one that deals with the rise in 
subsistence wages as the price of food goes up and we move towards 
less fertile land. This, however, depends on whether W are nominal 
or real wages. If I assume them to be in real term^^ the frontier 
will not move in a specific direction as a result of a fall in 
productivity of land affects the productivity of labour. But labour 
inputs vary among the various commodities. What matters here is the 
relative changes rather than the absolute ones. If, however, we 
follow Morishima's (1989) argument then the effect of less fertile 
land means a total change in the system which can then generate the 
inward shift of the wages-rate-of-profit frontier. I am, 
nevertheless, sceptical about the applicability of such Ricardian 
arguments to Smith's economic analysis.
Therefore, the 'cost of production' approach assumes symmetry in the 
role and significance of both classes. This symmetry prevails in the 
labour market where what drives the demand for labour is the same 
thing which drives its supply. Everything depend on it and there is 
nothing in the pursuit of self-interest of the one group that 
dominates the other. What drives wages to their natural rate is the 
self-interest of the labourers and what drives the capitalists 
earning to their natural rate (if anything) are the exogenous 
conditions of land productivity toghether with the capitalists' own 
self-interest.
i**denotes subsistence levels. There is, of course, no such necessity in 
Smith as there is in Ricardo. I will discuss it below.
i^If wages are not taken in their real term the inverse relationship 
between profit and wages is not always secured. See my discussion in part 3 
chapter 2.
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In view of what I said before about the lack of symmetry, in Smith, 
between what drives the capitalists and the labourers I find this 
kind of exposition as deceptive. It does not capture the specific 
nature of class relationships and therefore, the idea of what natural 
liberty means is misleading. If we do believe that class 
relationships are important to the understanding of both the 
normative and positive side of classical economics, then such 
expositions are not very helpful. When the two classes (capitalists 
and labourers) have symmetrical positions in the sense that they are 
driven by the same psychological principles and that their actions 
have similar weight in the model, the efficiency of natural liberty 
is in the balancing act between the two classes. In other words, it 
is all in the relationship between wages and profit.
If, however, the positions of the two classes are not symmetrical 
then the focus of analysis (positive and normative) should shift from 
the coincidence of wants across classes to the coincidence of wants 
within the decisive class. In such a case a non cost of prduction 
theory of value will become the focus of analysis. Apparently the 
other major approach to classical economics --the growth models 
approach-- suffers from a similar problem: it too entails a symmetry 
between labourers and capitalists.
Let us follow a simplified version of a one-sector type of a 
Ricardian Corn model^®. Y, say Corn, is produced according to the 
following production function:
®^I follow here Casarosa 1985.
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Y - f(L)
where L is the number of labourers. f'(L) >0, f'*(L)<0.
The maximium wages that capitalists are willing to pay are: 
w - f'(L)/ (1+r*) 
where r* is the subsistence rate of profit^\
It means that the 'marginal product of labour' "is not. . .equal to 
wages, but to the sum of wages and prof its ..." (Kaldor, 1956 .p. 84) . It 
is so, presumably, because of Ricardo's differential rent. Namely, 
as we employ more labour we have a fall in their productivity 
(because of less fertile lands). The difference between the output 
in both types of land is the rent. It is, nevertheless, not very 
accurate unless we believe that every increase in the number of 
labourers corresponds to a move to a less fertile land. I am not 
very convinced about it. Morishima (1989) rightly criticizes the 
association of differential rent with the marginal productivity of 
an aggregated production function.
Anyway, if indeed marginal product is the sum of wages and profits 
then the actual rate of profit will be: 
r-[f'(L)-w]/w 
where w are the actual wages.
The following graph depicts the relationship between wages and 
Labourers.
i^Obviously the subsistence rate of profit should itself be a function 
of output -a point that is ignored by many writers- but I feel that for the 
purpose of what I have to say it will not be of great significance.
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Notice that what appears as the Marginal Product curve is not really 
that but the marginal product multiplied by a constant [l/(l+r*)]. 
Therefore, its slope reflects the marginal product of labour but, 
and this is important, its position depends on what capitalists 
consider their minimum rate of profit to be (r*). In other words, 
unlike subsistence level of wages it is not very clear what it is 
that will drive profits to their subsistence level. If a standard 
of living emerges among the capitalists it is not inconceivable that 
they will stop accumulating at a level of profit which is above 
their subsistence^®.
Assume now that:
i®It is true that one can argue that what determines the subsistence 
level of wages is also a wider concept than physiological existence. In such 
a case the position of the labourers and the capitalists might become 
symmetrical as it implies that labourers choose and therefore, save in order 
to improve their conditions. However, this is not what appears to be implied 
by Smith. Sushis tence here should be read from an absolute-biological 
approach. And even if we consider subsistence as a socially defined principle 
it will still be different from what the capitalists will consider as their 
'subsistence' profit by virtue of the different segments of society against 
which the 'standards' are being determined.
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L/L - G[(w-w*)/w*] 
where w and w* are wages and subsistence wages respectively. Also: 
K/K - F(r-r*) where r-[f'(L) - w]/w 
where K is capital stock, r and r* are the actual and 'subsistence' 
rates of profit. By assuming that W-wL and K-W we get the following 
equation to describe the equilibrium path:
w/w“K/K - L/L^ F(r-r*) - G[(w-w*)/w*]
In area I in the above graph capital accumulation is positive and 
labourers numbers fall; hence there is a rise in wages. In area II 
both capital is being accumulated and labourers' number increases. 
However, whether this mean a rise, a fall or unchanged wage level 
depend on the levels of capital accumulation and of population growth 
(namely F(.)0- G(.)).
The level of w depends on the size of the propulation. The rate of
change depends on the rate of growth. For any size of population
there will be a wage level for which the situation will be stationary
(until the size of population and capital changes) . This is depictes
along the dashed line. In areas II and III both capital is being
# «
accumulated and population rises. However, in area II K/K > L/L
» • •
which means that w/w>0 while in area III K/K < L/L which means that
w/w<0.
To depict the equilibrium path in the space of w and L we simply need
to take a closer look at the equilibrium conditions. Clearly the
dynamic equilibrium condition is going to be:
• • •
w/w-K/K - L/L- F(r-r*) - G[ (w-w*)/w*]-0 
For any level of L it will give us the wage level for which capial
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We can denote this wage level as w®. By differentiating and solving 
the above condition we can get that: 
dw®/dL -0^®
which explains the slope of the dashed line^°.
Now, the symmetry between labourers and capitalists prevails in their 
respective ability to manipulate (as a group) the final stationary 
point S. The capitalists determine r* which positions the Marginal 
Product curve in the L,w space. The labourers affect the position of 
S by determining the level of w*. If r* and w* where both a matter 
of some kind of rational considerations then the model would have 
captured correctly the class relationships and its effect on the 
determination of economic (and social) variables.
However, it does not seem plausible that the reproduction 
considerations of a group which does not save and does not think much
^®The condition in full is :
F [ (£' (L)-w)/w-r*] -G [ (w-w*)/w*] =0 
D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g :
C l e a r l y ^ > 0  ; |£>0
A l s o :
^ ' 31 ---------
W here (l+r*)‘i<0 (f''<0)
o L
20-'It should be noticed, however, that this is not a stable path. Whenever 
we reach a point on the dashed line wage level is unchanged but the population 
increases in numbers (the rate of growth of population is positive and equals 
to the rate of capital accumulation). Hence, as the labourers number increase, 
wages will fall. The heavy line depicts these circumstances. I do not go 
further into the details of the stability problem as it is not my major 
concern. I am interested mainly in the point S to which we will converge 
anyway.
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in terms of 'improving their conditions' can be thought of as 
'rational considerations'. On the other hand, it is almost inevitable 
that the decision on r* (when to stop accumulating) which is made by 
individuals who are constantly thinking of how to ' improve their 
conditions' (and that is why theu save) will be a rational one.
Thus although the psychological foundations of the decisions made by 
the capitalists is significantly different from those of the 
labourers, each of the group exerts the same power in the 
determination of the model. As a result, natural liberty here means 
that the economy will move towards a point like S in the above 
duagram. But such a point is where coincidence of wants is being 
reduced to where nobody achieves more than mere existence. Although 
it does fit into one of Smith's descriptions (the famous 'dull' 
state) it fails to describe the others as well as it has serious 
moral implications. Because of the symmetry between the two groups, 
the responsibility for the 'dull' state lies equally with both 
groups. This is not a very logical result given what we have said 
already about the a-symmetry that is implied by Smith's analysis.
So we saw that in both the 'cost of production' and the 'growth 
models' approaches there is a fundamental symmetry in the role and 
effects of the behaviour of capitalists and labourers. This, 
naturally, does not mean that these models are wrong. As I said 
before we may have symmetry in role and effect in spite of an 
a-symmetry in the psychological foundations. What is however clear 
is that the idea of natural liberty as a harmonizing mechanism of 
wants has been trivialized. Instead of harmony of wants we only see
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how the rational wants of the capitalists can manipulate the system 
given the needs of the labourers^^.
Therefore, these two approaches do not capture, in my view, the real 
problem of coincidence of wants. Given the a-symmetry between 
capitalists and labourers, the coincidence of wants can only be 
tested if it prevails among the capitalists themselves rather than 
between them, collectively, and the labourers.
The question of coincidence of wants among the capitalists has a 
distinct economic significance. As the difference among capitalists 
reflects the difference among sectors, the coincidence of their wants 
means that the focus of analysis should be the inter-sectoral 
relationship.
Indeed, it is this problem which cause so much difficulties in the 
efforts to model Smith's work. We saw already that a Sraffian 'cost 
of production' approach does capture the inter-sectoral balance but 
it does so on the assumption of symmetry in wants. The collective 
treatment of capitalists and labourers meant that the coincidence of 
wants appeared in the labour market where wages were determined. 
These, in turn, determined a single rate of profit and thus, a single 
rate of growth. It is this assumption which does not suit Smith's
^^One may argue here that in the growth example it is the capitalists who 
are being manipulated to a subsistence level of profits at the stationary 
state. However, while this may be true to the Ricardian model it is less 
evident in Smith. As population grows and capital accumulate there is a rise 
in productivity which, in terms of the above model, means that the MP function 
will shift outward. Indeed this is one of the technical reason why I do not 
wish to use these kind of models.
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discussion of economics.
To capture the idea of the 'invisible hand' in Smith's analysis we 
have to focus on those actions which are matters of choice. Only the 
capitalists makes such choices; the activity of labourers is given. 
Therefore, we need to analyze what are the conditions under which the 
decisions about savings and consumption among the capitalists 
coincide. Obviously as there is division of labour for a capitalist, 
who owns the surplus of a particular commodity, to be able to employ 
the capital he intended to save, he will need to exchange some of it 
to get what is required for production from the other capitalists. 
Hence, the coincidence of wants among the capitalists already imposes 
a particular price system. Only when all these decisions are 
compatible will the capitalist proceed to buy the required labour. 
Hence what happens to labour is a simple result of the agreement of 
wants among the capitalists.
Allow me now to move forward and deal with the choice of model and 
its exposition in a more detailed way.
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(b)The Theory of Value and Distribution Revisited
So far I have put forward an argument about modelling Smith's work 
which is based on the idea that the model should capture the essence 
of natural liberty. Given the a-symmetry in what motivates the 
labourers and the capitalists, natural liberty is being trivialized 
if what it means is the coincidence of wants on the part of 
capitalists and labourers taken collectively. Therefore, if one of 
Smith's major contribution is to be his conception of the working 
of natural liberty we cannot accept such trivial exposition as being 
true to his work. Consequently, the focus of attention should be the 
non-trivial coincidence of wants which only makes sense if it deals 
with wants among those who have (or can afford to have) calculated 
ends.
Apart from that argument which is more concerned with the moral 
evaluation of Smith's economic systems there are two other major 
points which convinced me that the two types of approach mentioned 
in the previous section would not fit to describe Smith's economic 
system. It is division of labour and inter-sectoral relations which 
sometime take the form of different growth rates in different 
sectors.
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The Wealth of Nations is a vast book. It covers a huge range of 
subjects, some of which have completely dropped out from the agenda 
of economic theory. It se e m s , therefore, as if the general approach 
to Smith's analysis is more selective. Namely, different parts of 
his analysis are being presented, separately, while the 
interrelation between these parts is neglected.
Most, I believe, will argue that he offered mainly a theory of 
capital accumulation and growth. Inevitably they will concentrate 
on aggregated growth type model of the kind discussed above^. A 
few would maintain that Smith's major contribution to classical 
economics is his 'cost of production' (or adding-up as Sraffa calls 
it) theory of value. Others will insist that he had proved the 
superiority of the coincidence of wants over central planning, or, 
that he originated the labour theory of value, etc..
Each of the two types of models that I have mentioned above runs into 
difficulty if we consider Smith's division of labour and multi­
sectoral analysis. The growth type of models have both these 
difficulties. Allow me now to reproduce the diagram of the growth 
model I have used in the previous section but while assuming that 
this time the 'marginal productivity' curve is true to its name 
(i.e. with no particular reference to the subsistence rate of 
profit):
^See these models in connection with Smith in, Adelman (1961), Higgins
(1959), Barkai (1969), Eltis (1975 &1984), Samuelson (1977 &1978).
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Most of the growth models by the authors mentioned above apply to 
Smith a kind of a Ricardian Corn model. There are, obviously, two 
major difficulties. One, that it is an aggregated model which does 
not capture the idea of inter-sectoral relationship^. And secondly, 
the role of diminishing return is dominant and the division of 
labour is conspicuously absent.
Let me start with the second problem. Reid (1987) criticizes 
Samuelson (1977) which presented a similar kind of exposition of the 
Smithian model. Reid's general argument is that we should accept the 
exogenous limitations that land fertility imposes on us but that the 
marginal productivity of labour is also a function of its division. 
Hence, as we accumulate and consequently population grows, the 
position of the marginal product curve should move outwards. In the 
above diagram it means that the marginal product curve is a function 
of capital accumulation.
^See a discussion in Reid (1987) and in Walsh and Gram (1980).
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To defend the diminishing return caused by land Reid quotes Smith. 
"In a country which had acquired that full completeness of riches 
which the nature of its soil and climate, and its situation with 
respect to other countries allowed it to acquire....both the wages 
of labour and the profits of stock would probably be very low. ."[WN 
p. 111]. But this, in my view, is nowhere near to suggest the 
assumption of a continuously falling marginal product of labour 
which dominates the economic analysis. The reason why this country 
will not advance is because population will not rise and thus 
further division of labour will not be possible: "that country being 
already fully peopled, that number [of labourers] could never be 
augmented". Moreover, the first line after the paragraph that was 
quoted by Reid says: "But perhaps no country has ever yet arrived 
at this degree of opulence". Which means that as far as the relevant 
analysis is concerned we should not take any notice of a possible 
situation where the country is full.
But even if we agree to the idea that the economy works within 
effective boundaries of diminishing returns can the dynamic 
development of the model capture Smith's main conclusions?. According 
to Smith, whenever there is accumulation labour, wages will rise. 
Hence the equilibrium path depicted in the above diagram (AB)^ is 
inconsistent with Smith's analysis though it is, perhaps, consistent 
with the 'fixed wages' assumption that is attributed to Ricardo. Even
^The line AB is a movement along the equilibrium paths discussed in the 
previous section. For each Marginal Product curve there is a downward sloping 
curve which depicts the relationship between w and L when the rate of 
accumulation is equal to the rate of population growth. As the Marginal 
Product curves shift outward, so do the equilibrium paths. The arrowed dashed 
line ADEB is describing the movement from one such path to another.
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if we follow Reid and we push the marginal product line outwards as 
we go along, the 'cheerful' stage will indeed prevail (DE). But who 
said that the order of development is the following; a 'dull' phase, 
a 'cheerful' phase and again, a 'dull' phase?
Reid is also trying to deal with the problems of sectoral analysis, 
division of labour and growth theory in the context of Young (1928)- 
Kaldor (1972). As these models use utility for social choice I will 
not discuss them here. In spite of Reid's effort to justify his use 
of these models on the ground that Hollander (1973. ch.4) has 
convinced him that there are questions of choice in Smith's 
analysis, I believe that he has gone too far even in neo-classical 
terms. Of course there are questions cf choice in Smith's analysis 
and Hollander was right to point them out. However, it does not 
follow that individual choice can so easily be aggregated to a 
social choice. Not even in Smith.
On the whole, when the growth models try to deal with more than one 
sector they run into serious difficulties. In Pasinetti's analysis
(1960), for instance, the conclusions are that the shares of rent, 
wages and profits in the total income change as capital is being 
accumulated according to the relative share of employment in the two 
sectors. Obviously there is no particular reason to expect the 
relative share of employment in the two industries to develop in a 
particular way*.
*See discussions of these problems in the context of Ricardo's model in 
Pasinetti (1960) and in Caravale and Tosato (19)80. ch.6).
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Another reason why I find the above approach as un-suitable for the 
case of Adam Smith is that the relationship between the theory of 
value and the theory of growth and capital accumulation is not very 
clear. According to Pasinetti, "The Ricardian model.... contains a 
theory of value which is completely. . . independent of 
distribution."(Pasinetti, 1960. pp.84-5). How true a statement it is 
is difficult to assert and it certainly is not in the scope of this 
work. Nevertheless, it is sufficient that such a statement can be 
made in a somewhat convincing manner to make one wonder whether such 
a model can suit Smith's analysis.
This point brings us to the other approach where the theory of value 
is the focus of analysis and where growth and accumulation are 
derived from the equilibrium circumstances. However, the technical 
solvability of such models depends on the existence of a uniform 
rate of profit. This implies a single rate of growth which, as it 
were, contradicts an almost convention with regard to Adam Smith. 
Namely, that the rate of growth in the different sectors may be 
different. Indeed, Walsh and Gram (1980) who, in general, follow 
this line of Sraffian interpretation, have abandoned the analysis 
of Smith for precisely this reason.
Although Smith discussed the tendency of rates of profit to 
uniformity it is (a) not very clear what precisely he meant by this 
and, (b) it rules out general equilibrium in market prices when the 
rate of profit is not uniform. (I will discuss the issue in more 
detail below).
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What I mean by that is that if equilibrium prevails only when the 
rates of profits conform to uniformity, most of the time the economy 
cannot be at general equilibrium. In other words, general equilibrium 
prevails only at the level of 'natural rates' while at market prices 
this is not the case. Adding to it the embedded symmetry between the 
classes and the whole idea of natural liberty in the sense of a 
continuous coincidence of wants becomes obscured.
For all these reasons I do not find the above approaches to the 
analysis of Smith very convincing. Mainly, I must admit, because of 
the implications of the symmetry in the nature and role of what 
motivates the different groups which is embedded in them.
On the more economic side it is the segregated approach to Smith's 
theory of value and capital accumulation which is hidden in the above 
types of models which makes them not suitable to the analysis of 
Smith. In my analysis I will try to bring together his theory of 
value and distribution, and his theory of capital accumulation. The 
decisions that are made by the capitalists about the usages of the 
surplus they own will obviously affect capital accumulation. But 
given the interdependence between the sectors, whether they are 
successful in implementing their plans depend on the coincidence of 
their wants. This, in turn, must be determined through the market. 
But while the use of Sraffian models demands a uniform rate of 
profit, in my approach this will not be necessary. Market clearing 
will be consistent with different rates of growth. As growth and the 
beneficence of labourers are closely related a clear relationship 
between the decisions of the capitalists and the circumstances of the
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labourers can be established.
Obviously I mean by this that I adhere to a form of a general 
equilibrium interpretation of classical economics. The use of a two 
sectors approach will be helpful as it will lend meaning to the idea 
of balanced growth (which is an important issue in Smith's analysis). 
At the same time it will reduce the complexity of the model without 
ignoring its important features. What I mean by that is that in a 
multi sector analysis one can acknowledge the existence of division 
of labour without really dealing with it. It is so when division of 
labour is a phenomenon across the board. The capital labour ratios 
do not have to be immediately affected. All this is true, of course, 
as long as we are not investigating volumes of productions or the 
likes.
It is my view that general equilibrium (in a particular form) is in 
the essence of Smith's analysis. Not the least because the nature of 
beneficence which is mainly associated with the idea of the invisible 
hand (discussed in the TMS) . The whole task of the invisible hand is 
to be the mechanism by which wants coincides. What determines one 
variable will flow through the system, affect other variables and 
consequently will affect the same variable that generated the 
process. Lord Robbins went even so far as to argue that Smith's 
system stands "in harmony, with the most refined apparatus of the 
modern School of Lausanne"(Robbins 1935. pp68-9)^.
^A similar approach can be found in Hollander (1973) p.20 and Walsh and 
Gram (1980) p.62.
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It is true that the first book, where he originally developed his 
theory of value and distribution, is mainly described in a partial 
equilibrium framework of analysis. However, even when analyzing 
prices in that partial equilibrium framework, the prices themselves 
seem to withhold a more general significance.:"..so that [the price] 
of all commodities which compose the whole annual produce of the 
labour of every country, taken complexly, must resolve itself into 
the same three parts, and be parcelled out among different 
inhabitants of the country, either as the wages of their labour,the 
profits of their stock, or the rent of their land"[WN p.69].
Moreover, it is mainly book 1 that really points at a partial 
equilibrium analysis, the others are less well defined in that 
respect. However, one should bear in mind that it is the first book 
that holds most of Smith's early writings (before his visit to 
France). It is hard to tell how much of an effort he had exerted to 
update this book but, even simple things like the distinction between 
'stock' in general and 'capital' in particular, seem to be confused 
there. Therefore, at least from the point of view of the framework 
of analysis, we must not be too influenced by the fact that his 
famous price mechanism of this book is described in partial 
equilibrium terms.
There are quite a few scholars who believe that classical economics 
should be analyzed in the framework of general equilibrium. Hollander 
(1973 and 1987), Walsh and Gram (1980) and Morishima (1989) are a few 
examples. However, one must be very careful with what one means by 
'general equilibrium'. 1 wish to point out now that my interpretation
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of the 'classical general equilibrium' differs significantly from 
modern notions of it. I believe that the other scholars' formulations 
imply too that they employ a different concept of general equilibrium 
though I am not quite sure whether they would accept my assertion. 
However, I do not want to digress right now. A full discussion of the 
meaning and moral implications of the different conceptions of 
general equilibrium appears below (part III chapter 2).
One last point before we carry on. Some might argue that the proper 
way of constructing a model for classical economists is by satisfying 
their major propositions. Namely, the test of the model is in how it 
supports the explicit propositions that were made by those scholars. 
I do not agree with this approach. A scholar might have contributed 
to the understanding of the subject matter through observations 
which might not be consistent with the conclusions that he draws 
from it. To argue, then, the a proper model for Smith is only the 
one that upholds his propositions is, in my view, too narrow minded 
and not very instructive. Though at one stage I criticized the 
growth models for a similar reason (their conclusions with respect 
to the 'dull' and 'cheerful' stages) this was by no mean my main 
reason to reject them. On the contrary, I rejected them because in 
my view they do not capture the essence of Smith's perception of 
natural liberty. Because they are too busy in trying to reconstruct 
his conclusions rather than to concentrate on his assumptions.
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(c) The Model
Let us turn now to my description of Smith's economic model. The 
model I intend to suggest is one that is based on Smith's 
observation that the heart of the economic system is the creation 
of surplus, and its exchange.
This assertion is very simply derived from the meaning of the 
division of labour, which is the consequence of the propensity to 
barter and exchange. "When the division of labour has been 
thoroughly established, it is but a very small part of man's wants 
which the produce of his own labour can supply. He supplies the far 
greater part of them by exchanging that surplus part of the produce 
of his own labour, which is over and above his own consumption, for 
such parts of the produce of other men's labour as he has occasion 
for [WN p.37].
So, the exchange is made in terms of surplus and not of the whole 
product of the country. Even though in the commercial state of 
society the self-consumption (that part of our own product that we 
consume) becomes very small, we still exchange only surplus, namely, 
the output that is above what we need from our own product, for 
reproduction. Some will argue that it is this observation that
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distinguishes classical economics from the resources allocation neo­
classical paradigm but I will refrain from this argument in this 
worki.
So, the main characteristics of my model are that it is a two sectors 
model where commodities are produced by means of other commodities^, 
that it is a general equilibrium framework, and, that it is a 
surplus approach. As I said before I will drop rents from my 
analysis and also, I will ignore that which Smith called fixed 
capital. This is a real model and therefore prices will be measured 
in terms of other commodities. "Every commodity besides, is more 
frequently exchanged for, and thereby compared with, other 
commodities than labour. It is more natural, therefore, to estimate 
the exchangeable value by the quantity of some other commodity than 
by that of the labour which it can purchase" [WN p.49].
Thus we are to construct an economy in which surpluses are exchanged 
and prices are measured in real terms. From the technological side 
we may follow the tradition of fixed proportions production process. 
It is, however, important to note that the degree of the division 
of labour, which actually gives us the technological coefficients, 
depends not only on the extend of the market but also, and more 
importantly, on the accumulation of capital. Hence, if we are to say
^an elaborated discussion of it can be found in Walsh & Gram (1980) 
p p .304-7.
^Some my find this Sraffian characteristic as not typical of classical 
economics. I agree that it might not have been characteristic to Ricardo but 
it certainly has been typical of Smith. I refer the reader to Smith's 
beautiful discussion of town and country relationship in Book 3 chapter 1. 
Although the key issue here is balanced growth the reasons for it are 
precisely the interdependence of the two sectors on one another.
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anything in the long run we must incorporate this feature of Smith's 
economy. However, the two sectors model will enable us to say 
something about the long run without incorporating an explicit 
relationship between capital accumulation and the technological 
coefficients. Quite a lot will depend on the relative dependence of 
each sector on the other, and this, in turn, does not have to change 
even when a greater division of labour affects the technological 
coefficients.
Let there be a two sector closed economy where C, corn, represents 
the agricultural sector and I, (iron) represents Industry. A is the 
technology matrix as follows;
c^c c^l
A=
^ Ic  ^11
A is productive, (that is, there is a vector X*, X*>0, so that
AX*<X*.).
Figure 5.C.1 depicts the technology in the plane of the different 
levels of input.
Fig. 5.C.1
I
I c
C
c
Where Y°c and are the total (gross) production of each of the
sector.
225
The C and I rays depicts the level of input required for each level
of gross production. Hence to produce Y°c of C we need
units of C and Y^^aic units of I. In Smith's terminology, Y^cScc 
and Y^c^ic may be considered as the circulating capital of C. a^c 
represents the amount of corn (or agricultural product as a whole) 
needed for the production of one unit of corn. This amount consists 
of the 'material' ; namely the amount of seeds needed for the 
production of one unit, as well as the amount of corn needed for the 
subsistence of the amount of labour required to turn the seeds into 
a unit output. In the same manner we can generalize with regard to 
all the coefficients. Iron here does not represent fixed capital but 
rather a kind of industrial output which is consumed in the process
of production of both Iron and Corn. This is indeed the way Smith
regarded circulating capital : "The circulating capital consist in this 
manner, of the provisions, materials, and finished work of all 
kinds"[WN(c) p.266].
The circulating capital is in fact part of the total stock from 
which the capitalist will provide material and subsistence for his 
workers during the period of production. Surely he will provide for 
himself as well as for his workers during the same period. We may 
regard that part of his consumption which is at the level of his own 
subsistence, as part of that circulating capital which is 
represented by a^ g.
Obviously every choice of inputs that is not depicted by the 'gross 
production' lines reflects inefficiency. The question, however, is 
what can we say about the choice of combinations between C and I. As
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the two sectors are interdependent, there must be some correlation 
between what is produced in one and what can be produced in the 
other.
We may describe this interdependence in the following inequalities: 
Which also means that:
y,ai,<(l-an)yi
The meaning of these inequalities is that the amount of one's sector 
product required by the other sector for reproduction cannot exceed 
what is left in that sector after what is needed for its own 
reproduction has been deducted.
The right hand expressions reflect what I shall call the ' own 
surplus' of the industries. They are depicted in figure 5.C.2 below.
figure 5.C.2
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C* and I* are the lines of the 'own surplus'. At point A the two 
sectors produce i-C,I. We shall raieasuire their relative position
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by the input of their own product (the coordinates of A are Y°gagg 
and Y^jajj) .
Point B depicts the 'own surplus' produced in that state. In order 
to continue and produce the same level of output sector I will need 
Y^iSci of C and sector C will need Y^c^ic of 1. From the point of view 
of the economy as a whole the 'real net' is only what is there above 
what is needed for the reproduction of both industries. We can denote 
this 'real net' as:
NS<==y,(l-aec)-Yiaci
WS'=ri(l-a„)-Vic
where NS is the 'net-surplus'.
The conditions for economic viability of the system are exactly that 
the above expressions will be positive. The C* and I* lines enable 
us to see that viability prevails when the shaded area exists. The 
level of each sector's requirement for reproduction from the other 
sector, must be smaller than its 'own surplus'.
The position of the 'own surplus' lines is determined by technology; 
namely, according to whether (1 - a^) is greater, equal or smaller 
than a^ i , i»C,I. For our purposes it is completely insignificant 
whether the 'own surplus' lines lie to the right, to the left, or 
even coincide, with the process lines. To a great extent we will 
ignore the process lines altogether and only concentrate of the ' own 
surplus' lines.
The subject of some sort of rational considerations in this model is
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the 'own-surplus' that the capitalists have. They will have to decide 
how much to consume and how much to save according to the balance 
they strike between the passions of today and the desire to better 
one's conditions. It is not because they legally own the surplus 
that they are different from labourers, it is because their reaction 
to the existence of surplus is different. Labourers too may find 
their wages above subsistence (hence surplus) but they cannot afford 
to deliberate about it and the use they put it to is quite 
automatic. Thus by concentrating on the coincidence of wants among 
capitalists alone I uphold the a-symmetry between capitalists and 
labourers and I give a less trivial meaning to the invisible hand.
In each sector the capitalists will leave for themselves that part 
of their own product which they need for reproduction, the rest, 
they will bring to the market for exchange. Therefore, point B in 
figure 5.C.3 sets the exchange box of the market.
figure 5.C.3
yC^IC
Yi(l-aii) - 
Yc^ic
Yi(l-aii)
> Y,(l-a,J-Yia,i Y,(l-a,J
In figure 5.C.3 the exchange box is presented in a manner of an 
Edgeworth box. The left bottom is the origin of sector C and at the
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top right side, the origin of the I industry. The 'real net surplus' ; 
namely, the surplus that is left in the economy once what was needed 
for reproduction is put aside, becomes the upper left rectangular 
(it is the same as the shaded area in fig. 5.C.2).
Basically, the size of the box depends on technology. However, we are 
to consider the 'self-consumption' that might occur. In other words, 
a capitalist can use his own product not only for his reproduction 
but also for a superfluous consumption. This consumption is not his 
subsistence as we included his subsistence in the technology 
parameters, but something that is above that level and that for which 
he does not have to exchange.
Nevertheless, Smith argued, as quoted above, that as the division of 
labour is the source of exchange, the more advanced it is the less 
likely will it be to any one to satisfy his wants from his own 
product. Thus, we may neglect that parameter and leave to technology 
alone to set the size of the exchange box^.
In the mere fact that the economy can reproduce itself, there is no 
source of beneficence, either from the moral point of view, or from 
nature's point of view*. In order for beneficence to occur there is 
a need for at least someone of those who were acted upon, to improve 
his situation. This can only happen if the real net surplus is being 
accumulated.
^Generally speaking the size of the box should be determined by 
(1- a^i - Ai), where is the luxurious consumption of one's own product 
However, we shall assume without any loss of generality that A^-O.
*See the last section of chapter 4.
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Accumulation can be manifested in two different ways. One is by an 
increase in productive labourers' wages which will lead to an 
increase in their productivity. The other by hiring more labourers 
to work with additional materials. Either way, the process' lines 
remains the same. We know that a g^ denotes the amount of corn 
needed for the production of one unit of corn. When the labourers' 
productivity is higher due to the increase in wages, there might be 
a need for less workers to produce one unit of corn, but their wages 
(in real terms) are such that we cannot tell what will happen to 
agg. We might as well assume that it, as well as other such 
coefficients, will remain unchanged.
If all the net surplus is spent on unproductive labour (or 'luxurious 
consumption') all labourers will receive their subsistence and the 
economy can survive in such a stationary state for a long while. Only 
through accumulation of surplus, the possibility of a rise in wages 
arises. Only then , the chance of beneficence prevails. However, 
accumulation, as such, is not always beneficent. Obviously, if one 
sector accumulates his whole net surplus, and the other one consumes 
it all, the sector that accumulated will not be able to fulfil his 
intentions and thus the economy will not progress.
To analyze the circumstances of a 'beneficial' accumulation let us 
first connect the distribution of the ne it surplus and the progress 
of the economy.
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figure 5.C.4 (a)
figure 5.C.4 (b)
I
l -
C
In figure 5.c.4(a) only the real net surplus box is depicted. The 
'net surpluses' in the economy are:
where the index t denotes the period.
Let gi , i- C,1 denote the rate of the net surplus that a producer 
decides to devote for accumulation. If g^ N^S^ , i=C,l, is what each 
sector decides to accumulate they will have to accommodate that
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accumulation with the necessary amount of the other sector's product. 
To see that, I have introduced the process lines of each sector at 
its origin. The amount of the other sector product that each sector 
will need to achieve its own plans to accumulate will be 
[giNSVaii]aji, i,j-C,I.
Clearly if a sector accumulates successfully the volume of his output 
in the next period will rise by:
giNS^t/a^i
At point A in figure 5.c.4(a) we can find a situation where the whole 
real net surplus was accumulated successfully. In the following 
period, therefore, the level of input of each sector will increase 
in exactly what they have accumulated, and the economy will progress 
from point T to point L in figure 5.c,4(b) (note that these are the 
process lines and not the 'own surplus' lines.).
The question now is whether this progress in the level of production 
is also an improvement in the levels of the real net surplus. After 
all, from the moral and nature's point of view it is the progress of 
the real net that gives rise to beneficent outcomes. Let us now 
examine the conditions for the real net surplus to improve.
First, recall that the level of production at the second period will 
be :
Thus, the net surplus of the second period will yield:
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NS^ NS^
( 1 ) Ns‘.i =■ ( - ^  ) ( 1 -ail ) - ( ^
i^i j^j
= Y i ( 1 - a i i ) j  ^
®ii j^j
as, Yi(l-aii) - Yja^j - , (1) is reduced to:
N S l i . S S t [ l * g ^ l l ^ i i l 1 - g , N S i ^
i^i 2jj
i,j-C,I.
In order for the real net surplus to increase , we should show when:
NS^ NSi
Substituting (1) into (2) will yield:
Dividing (3) and (4) with gg and gi respectively, and rearranging:
j an (l-acc)^giWSt
(3)'
*ci agg ggWS,c
age (^~ajj) gf.NS^
The right hand expression is exactly the slope of the expansion path 
in terms of inputs which is depicted in figure 5.c.4(b) (between 
point T and L) . a^/agi is the slope of I's process line. In our 
example (1 - agg) > agg, thus, meaning that the slope of the
expansion path should be smaller than that of I's process line. In 
the same manner, it appears as a requirement for that slope to be 
greater than that of the C process line. 1 shall therefore maintain 
that condition (3)' and (4)' are actually a limitation on the 
expansion path of the real net surplus.
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Figure 5.C.5 depicts the different expansion paths. Point A is the 
level of inputs employed in the first period. B is the correspondent 
exchange box, with the shaded area as the real net surplus box.
figure 5.C.5
—  —  D
When all the net surplus was devoted to accumulation (as in 
fig.5.0.4(a)), the input of the next period would become larger in 
the same amount accumulated. The economy progressed to point C, 
where D defines the relevant exchange box with the correspondent 
shaded box of real net surplus. The expansion path, in terms of 
inputs, is the line between A and C, the slope of which is exactly 
the right hand expression in (3)'and (4)' . The expansion path of the 
real net surplus can be described as the line connecting B and D.
If the expansion path of the real net surplus were to advance towards 
point F in the figure, it would mean that in one sector, at least.
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no net surplus exists. Hence, the economy will not be able to 
accumulate any more. This stagnation will obviously become harmful 
from both moral and nature's point of view and it will be entirely 
the result of the choices made by the capitalists. It will mean that 
there is nothing in natural liberty itself to prevent the system 
from collapsing into a stationary state without any need for 
exogenous limitations by the productivity of land.
We saw before the meaning of a simultaneous growth in terms of the 
process lines. Let me show now the conditions for the 'surplus 
expansion path' (the line between B and D in the above figure) to 
avoid reaching point F. Obviously the restrictions on the position 
of this expansion path with respect to the 'own surplus' lines are 
equivalent to those restricting the position of the total output 
expansion path.
The slope of the net surplus expansion line (between B and D for 
instance) is:
yh\l-a„)-y‘(l-aoc)
We already saw that:
and:
Substituting into (5):
c^c
g^NS^ (1-Sll) Sec 
g^NS^ (1-acc) 1^1
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The slope of the 'own surplus' lines are:
gic . (1-aii)
We are to show now that:
ge«S» Cl-Scc) «11
/y% «ce
«cl ~gcNS‘ (l-«cc) «II
rearranging:
(6)'f5a
«CC (l-«Il) gc^S'
«II (l-«cc)^ &I*5 '
c^l C^C gçNS®
Which are exactly (3)' and (4)'.
Accumulation, therefore, is not enough to guarantee a beneficial 
outcome of the process of exchange. Even though we might find at 
certain stages the economy progressing(as well as net surplus), the 
fact that it is aiming towards a point similar to F in the above 
figure, means that this progress is only temporary. Any rise in wages 
and population will inevitably be reversed once the economy reaches 
point F.
The important features of the model just presented, are the 
information, at any stage, of the direction of the economy. An 
economy can be progressing at a certain moment, but, if the 
direction of this progress is such that , at some stage, there will 
be no correspondence of wants with regard to accumulation, the 
outcome of this system could not be considered as beneficent.
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Now, if we consider the influence of the division of labour, which 
is also a function of the accumulation, then , because of the two 
sectors, the relative positions of the 'own surplus' lines might not 
be changed at all. Of course, an extended analysis will have to 
incorporate the influence of the division of labour, as a function 
of the accumulation, on the position of the 'own surplus' lines. At 
present, however, I do not think that if we consider the position of 
the lines as unaffected by the division of labour, that we are 
seriously distorting Smith's perception of it.
We may say now that the conditions for beneficence are spelled out. 
Indeed they reflect Smith's observation of the importance of balanced 
growth to the advancement of opulence, (see his discussion of it in 
chapter 1 of book 3 pp. 376-9). But, on the other hand, they 
differentiate between progress that entails an assured beneficence, 
and progress, that at best can count on changes in the circumstances, 
to ensure beneficence.
On a more general note the above kind of treatment of Smith allows 
us to deal with cheerful and dull state without having to commit 
ourselves to a Ricardian Corn model. In the Ricardian model it was 
not really the question of interaction between the social classes 
which brings about the Smithian dull state. It was almost entirely 
due to the exogenous limitations of lands. Here, as in Smith, the 
dull and cheerful states are seen as a result of particular 
interactions between the wants that prevail in society.
Obviously this is not all the story and we have to see what happens
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in the case of incompatible accumulation plans which might lead to 
the dull state. For this we will have to examine the role of prices 
in such a system.
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(d) Equilibrium, Demand structure and The Role of Prices
In the previous section, the long term significance of any possible 
result of the economic process was put forward. It was mainly 
stressed that it is not the viability of the economy (its ability to 
reproduce) that brings about the required beneficence.
Now 1 shall turn to analyze some of the mechanistic aspects of 
Smith's theory; namely, how a certain allocation of surplus is being 
brought about. In Smith's discussion of the invisible hand in the 
IMS [pp. 183-185 ] he is describing some kind of a trickle down theory. 
The capitalists have to decide what to do with their surplus which 
is above what is needed for reproduction. In Smith's words, they 
have to decide between employing productive and unproductive labour. 
In such a way, argues Smith, although an equal distribution of 
wealth (in his terminology; income) is not brought about, at least 
there is an equal distribution of needs.
Bearing in mind that the multiplication of the species may be a need 
of the labourers, then whether or not it is satisfied depends on the 
proportion of that surplus that goes to productive labour. If all 
goes to unproductive labourers then we are at a stationary state
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where there is no beneficence whatsoever ^. If, however, the 
capitalists decide to employ productive labour then wages will have 
to go up (to increase the circle of productive labourers) and 
beneficence already began.
But this is only a partial description of the functioning of natural 
liberty. Adding to this story Smith's distinction between the 
calculated want of the capitalist, the desperate need of the 
labourer and the interdependence between sectors, and the problem of 
the invisible hand changes significantly. Now it is not just the 
harmony between the capitalists and the labourers which should be 
considered. Also we have (a) to look at the mechanism that 
harmonizes wants among the capitalists and which are subject to some 
kind of rational decision; and (b) to ask whether in view of the 
sector interdependence it is sufficient to assume that capitalists 
want to save (and thus bring about a rise in wages) in order to 
establish beneficence.
Obviously, the most important instrument of this mechanism is the 
price. The price, in a neo-classical (if I may call it so) system, 
is the key to the allocation of resources. In Smith, and probably 
in the classical school in general, prices are the tool for the 
distribution of surplus.
While defending the general equilibrium approach in the beginning of 
this chapter 1 have already pointed out that the three components of
 ^ Recall that beneficence will be felt by the labourers if they can 
improve their position. As the need to multiply is dominant in their rank, 
beneficence and an increase in wages are synonyms.
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prices reflect that distribution of surplus. In other words, it 
contains three components of surplus; reproduction^, accumulation 
and consumption.
Smith's discussion of price theory is sometimes confusing and leaves 
many questions unresolved. It is, in my view, spread over three 
chapters in the WN: chapters 5-7. In chapter 5 --of the real and 
nominal price of commodities-- Smith puts forwards what he believes 
to be the 'meaning of price'. "The real price of every thing, what 
it really costs to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil and 
trouble of acquiring it. What every thing is really worth to the man 
who has acquired it, and who wants to dispose of it or exchange it 
for something else, is the toil and trouble which it can save to 
himself, and which it can impose upon other people."[WN.p.47].
Namely, once the division of labour has been established, people need 
to exchange their surpluses for what they want. They have obviously 
toiled and laboured to produce the surplus and it is worth to them 
its toil and labour equivalent. Naturally, some of Smith's readers 
thought that he was trying to develop a labour theory of value. A 
view that can be supported by many more quotes from the WN.^ 
However, it is also quite evident that a 'cost of production' 
approach is implied in chapters 6 and 7 where he discussed natural 
and market prices and their components.
^To remind the reader, the surplus of one sector contains what is 
required for the reproduction of the other sector.
^See a discussion of the issue in Meek (1956) pp.45-81.
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Although I agree that Smith did not have a labour theory of value as 
a theory of price determination, I do believe that labour (and labour 
values) constitute an important part of his theory. It is 
particularly true with respect to the moral analysis of it. Some 
scholars, like Blaug(1985) for instance, raised the point that labour 
in Smith is a measure for social welfare rather than a determinant 
of prices. Though a possible explanation it is not the only one. It 
is certainly not so appealing as to justify its generalization 
through Ricardo and Mill to the whole of the classical school. It 
reflects more, I believe, the justified annoyance of modern readers 
with the obscure meanings of labour theories that keep coming up in 
the writings of classical economists though in the end they do not 
seem to explain prices in general (or, as some might argue, anything 
at all). However, the fact remains that classical economists related 
to it, wrote about it, and some of them believed in it. We cannot 
explain it by inventing a role for it which will remove it from the 
centre of economic analysis. It is true that chapter 5 starts with 
a statement about what is wealth. This does not mean that the purpose 
of the entire chapter (entitled 'of the real and nominal price of 
commodities') was to explore an aggregate measure for wealth.
By saying that labour --the real toil and trouble of production-- is 
a measure of the well-being of society the focus of labour theories 
moves from the disaggregated form of values to an aggregated measure 
of welfare. According to Blaug, the meaning of it is that Smith used 
nominal wages as the deflator of national income to measure social 
well-being in the sense of how much effort was involved in the 
complete production process. But this aggregate measure too, like the
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labour theory of value, ceases to be a meaningful measure once 
accumulation and profits are being introduced. However, from the 
point of view of those who are tired of the obscurity of the labour 
theory of value the goal has been achieved. First, labour was removed 
from the discussion of prices and introduced at the aggregate level. 
Secondly, as an aggregated measure of welfare it was crowned as a 
mistake (when accumulation is introduced). But as it is far from the 
heart of Smith's economic analysis (the theory of value) it allows 
to ignore labour values in his analysis altogether.
There are, I admit, a lot of ambiguities in Chapter 5. However, one 
cannot ignore the kind of quotes I brought above where it is evident 
that Smith thought that labour ratios have something to do with 
prices*. He certainly thought it to be true in the 'rude stage'.
*As a matter of fact the use of labour as a welfare measure as Blaug
suggests is not very far from suggesting a labour theory of value but with
a different meaning than explaining price determination. Let A be the 
coefficients matrix and a the vector of labour inputs, w is the money wage 
rate and P is the price vector. If chapter 5 is all about using nominal wages 
as a deflator then what we get is that labour values are a disaggregated proxy 
to social welfare, or, to use Smith's words, the true toil and trouble. If 
P - PA + Qw and we divide everything by w we get: P/w - a(I-A)'^
= (^1,^2.... ,fn)' That these are the same labour values one will get by using
the idea of embodied labour when the rate of profit is zero is quite obvious.
Let Z be the vector of labour values. Z- ZA+ o and thus, Z-(I-A)” c^e which is
precisely the same vector (Tiifz Tn) before. Indeed, this is also a
measure of national income under modern definitions (i.e. the sum of value 
added - generated income) . If the gross output is the vector X and the net 
output is Y, (I-A)X-Y. X-(I-A)"^Y and as we have the constraint of aX-L (the
total number of labourers) then we get a(I-A)"^ Y- L. Substituting Z we get 
ZY-L. Multiplying by w and we get PY-wL. But this is only true if profits are 
not expressed in terms of 'technological cost' (the subsistence needed for the 
capitalists as part of the technological coefficients) but in terms of 
interest rates. If there is a positive interest rate then labour values will 
not be a good measure to national income. This, however, does not mean that 
they cannot be a good measure to what Smith called the real ' toil and 
trouble' . So Blaug's story does not really rescue us from the vacuous meaning 
of the labour theory of value. Rightly or wrongly if Smith considered nominal 
wages as the deflator of income to measure social welfare he must have 
considered labour values as the disaggregated form of it. The deviation of 
actual prices from their labour value should have implications with respect
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Now, to argue that the whole discussion of the 'rude stage' is aimed 
at finding a unit for measurement irrespective to the process of 
exchange is not serious. What Smith was clearly trying to do is to 
understand the essence of prices rather than anything else.
So why is it that Smith writes about labour theory of value 
(explicitly and implicitly -see the previous footnote) and then moves 
on to a 'cost of production' theory of prices. The answer, in my 
view, is similar to the one I gave when discussing the apparent 
inconsistency in his human nature analysis. Labour (or effort) is, 
to Smith, the universal of exchange. It is the thing which 
underlines and affect exchange but it does not have to be its 
determinant.
Though it is a universal in the scholastic tradition^ it is not a 
simple one. Labour, to Smith, is not an intrinsic feature of 
commodities. They are not comprised of labour. It is simply that 
people's disposition in any exchange is motivated by the relative 
labour inputs, or, which is the same, by the relative 'toil and 
labour'. Notice that in the quote above Smith describes what a 
commodity means to a seller and what it means to a buyer. Unlike 
Marx, Smith does not discuss the question of what is a commodity.
to social welfare. Thus, unintentionally, this kind of argument supports my 
assertion (which will be discussed later on) that labour values has a kind of 
moral significance. It should be noted, however, that the deviation from 
labour values is not in one direction; it depends on the actual rate of profit 
as well as on capital/labour compositions in the various sectors. Of course, 
Blaug acknowledges that Smith was wrong but this will not alter the fact that 
Smith thought that the labour theory of value had a meaning which is obviously 
other than determining prices. What then, is that meaning?
^See chapter 2 above.
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Therefore, if two people meet to exchange commodities they would have 
liked to exchange according to those rules. This is what the 'rude 
stage' example shows. To some extent it is a form of subjective price 
theory but the subjective feelings are not those of pleasure rather, 
they are those of expediency and 'fairness'®.
This is perfectly consistent with arguing that in the end, prices are 
determined by other things as well. So, one may argue, what do we 
need the labour theory of value anyway? Well, we may indeed not 
need it to explain prices but we might need it to explain the 
significance of the circumstances when prices are determined by 
labour values or, the deviation of prices from labour values. We can 
always say that Smith felt that labour ratios are in the essence of 
exchange but that for some reasons, they do not determine its 
values. We can then investigate those reasons. On the other hand, 
we shall see that the terminology of labour values is used again in 
connection with the natural price. If indeed at the natural price 
profits converge to a rate of profit which is very low indeed, we may 
find, under some circumstances, that at natural rates, prices can be 
explained by labour values. But then, of course, we will have to 
determine what natural rates are all about. This, I will do later on.
In our model, as will soon be seen, prices are not measured in terms 
of labour. They are measured in terms of a commodity numeraire. This,
®See Young(1986) for a discussion of why the labour theory of the rude 
stage is morally approved. Some would argue that this subjective feeling may 
be the disutility of labour but general idea does not mean that we can think 
about it in terms of a utility function as we understand it today.
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at least in the short run, is quite acceptable on Smith. "But though
labour be the real measure of the exchangeable value of all
commodities, it is not that, by which their value is commonly
estimated......Every commodity besides, is more frequently exchanged
for, and thereby compared with, other commodities than with labour.It 
is more natural, therefore, to estimate its exchangeable value by the 
quantity of some other commodity than by that of the labour which it 
can purchase"[WN pp.47-9].
As I said, it is accustomed to view Smith's price as a 'cost of
production' system/, or, as Sraffa called it, an adding up system*.
Schumpeter went even further to say that the whole episode of the 
labour theory of value is merely a detour from the tradition 
prevailing in Smith's theory*.
If we see Smith's work as a kind of a general equilibrium model then 
'cost of production' systems will not be good enough. The system will 
only be solvable if wages are pre-determined and profits conform to 
a single rate. This, however, does not seem to suit Smith's system 
where unequal rates of profits (and growth) are allowed.
In itself, this is not a reason to suppose that Smith did not mean 
to have a 'cost of production' system of pricing. What it does mean 
is that there must be a distinction between prices which comply with
^See, for instance, Blaug (1985)
®See his introduction to vol.l of WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID 
RICARDO (1951).
®Schumpeter, 1954. p.568.
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the technical requirements of uniform rates of profits and those 
which do not. One way of going about It Is to assume first that 
rates of profit tend to uniformity as they approach their 'natural 
rate'. Thus, the system Is solvable at Its natural rates which, In 
other words, means that general equilibrium prevails only In natural 
prices. In market prices the system Is In disequilibrium.
What It Is that drives profits to their natural rate Is the decline 
In prospects. This, as I mentioned before, Is true when the economy 
has reached a state of completeness which Smith himself admitted to 
be far from being a real occurrence. And as Smith argues that 
sometimes prices may stay at their market levels for centuries, the 
Idea of natural liberty In the sense of coincidence of wants becomes 
vacuous.
Therefore, I would like to offer a system where market general 
equilibrium prevails. Then, we will be able to make meaningful 
statements about the difference between market price equilibrium and 
natural price equilibrium.
Equilibrium: Coincidence of Wants and Uniqueness
Let us now examine more carefully the exchange box presented In the 
previous section.
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figure S.d.l
Yiâci
K
NS
The producers enjoy the 'own surplus' of Yj.(l - a^c) and Yi(l - aji) 
for C and I respectively. However, while they can simply put aside 
their own contribution for their reproduction (g^NS^, i-C,I), they 
still need the other sector's goods for reproduction (giNS^aji/ai^, 
i-C,I). This defines the upper left rectangular as the real net 
surplus. This net surplus will be used either for consumption or for 
accumulation, but unlike consumption, the decision on accumulation 
must be synchronized with the other sector's plans in order for it 
to succeed. The process lines in the real net surplus rectangular 
shows exactly how much of the other sector's good will be required 
for each decision of accumulation.
If sector's C capitalists decide to accumulate g^ NS^ ,^ they will 
bring to the market only: Y^Cl-a^c) - gcNS^ which is also:
ria.it(l-fc)NSC
Thus, the actual exchange box is reduced to the box at the right
249
bottom of G in figure 5.d.l. If the I sector's plan coincide with 
those of C; namely that they bring into the market exactly what is 
require by C for reproduction and accumulation, and so does C (point 
G in figure S.d.l), the price in terms of commodities will 
necessarily become:
riaei^-(l-&)WS'
Which is the price of C in terms of I , and is exactly the slope 6 
in figure S.d.l. That is to say that point G is equilibrium if the 
price which prevails is S .
The slope of the diagonal of the most upper left rectangular that 
is created by G, ^ - g^NSVgc^S®, is exactly the slope of the 
conditioned expansion path of the previous section. The conditions 
for a growth in the net-surplus of both sectors were:
( _fii_ )<^ü£!sfîî (J-fîî )
«CO l-aii S j> s ° a.! a«c
And they are depicted by the rays originating from 0 in figure S.d.l. 
The shaded area reflects an allocation of accumulation that not only 
will yield an increase in production for one period, but a continual 
increase in the real net of the economy. But G is not the only 
equilibrium that is consistent with the price 5.
Let us examine point H in figure S.d.2.
2S0
figure 5.d.2
c r c
I
The two sectors have decided, separately, to accumulate, g^^NS^, i-C, I . 
This is a smaller amount than that intended before. The exchange box, 
now, becomes the rectangular at the right hand bottom of point H. The 
amounts of each product that was brought into the market is now, 
substantially greater. Hence, it could obviously accommodate a 
decision for less accumulation.
Thus, after the exchange was completed, each of the sectors, found 
himself with the other sector's good that he did not need for 
accumulation. He will then consume it. (Mark that the difference in 
consumption or accumulation of the net surplus is described by Smith 
as the difference between the employment of productive and 
unproductive labourers).
7c^ denotes the level of consumption. Surely one will use one's 
own surplus for superfluous consumption. This will influence the size 
of the exchange box. For the sake of brevity I neglected that aspect 
which could become more interesting as the decision for one's own
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product consumption, the demand for 'luxurious' consumption from the 
other sector, and the prices become related. However, this is a task 
for a different work. At present, I shall keep ignoring that aspect
of the theory, that even though not argued by Smith, seems to be a
reasonable extension of it.
So, we see now that the price S supports many equilibria. We may 
observe that all the points along that line to the right of 
G(fig.5.d.2) represents dissonance of wants. Therefore they can not 
be considered as equilibria points, (they represents excess demand 
as what is needed by each sector to support its accumulation plans 
will always be greater than what is brought to the market) .
All the points along the price line that are to the left of G
represents equilibria points. However, even though point U (in 
fig.5.d.2) is equilibrium when price 6 prevails, it is differently 
assessed than points like H or G. At U, there is indeed a positive 
accumulation but the proportions are such that it will lead, soon 
enough, to a stand still. The conditions of continual growth are not 
satisfied.
Another distinction that can be made with regard to the different 
equilibria that a certain price supports, is the general rate of 
growth of the economy. Clearly, this rate increases as we descend 
towards point G where it is the highest possible as the total surplus 
is efficiently allocated to reproduction and accumulation alone.
Throughout the above discussion I assumed that the decisions were
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taken only with regard to reproduction and accumulation. The 
'luxurious' consumption (that consumption that is above subsistence) 
became a residual.
This, of course, is not the only way to look at it. In fact, we shall 
soon see that Smith had something to say on the demand structure. 
Obviously, any supposition, like that the pre-market decisions are 
taken only with regard to reproduction and accumulation, is an 
assertion on the demand , the structure of which seems to be crucial.
Any other plausible way to go about it might, altogether, yield 
different conclusions. Before devoting some space to the structure 
of demand, let us see the immediate difference in results. The other 
option, therefore, is that the pre-market decision are made with 
regard to luxurious consumption, it is only the accumulation that 
becomes residual. Obviously,if the accumulation is the residual, the 
question of efficiency will become crucial.
Figure 5.d.3 depicts the new circumstances:
figure 5.d.3
îfl Yi ^ c-i
y.‘ :c
I
7c
US'-
•NS'
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Once the levels of luxurious consumption (7 ®^ , 7i®) are set, there is, 
actually, a unique equilibrium at point G. At any other points the 
wants will not coincide. Every point on and above the process lines 
will yield excess supply, any point below, excess demand. So there 
is a single price , for any set demand for luxurious consumption, 
which yields equilibrium. What will, though determine its long term 
consequences, is the relative volume of the pre-fixed demand for 
luxurious consumption.
Constructing the Demand in Smith's Analysis
Let me now, devote some time to what can be understood as an 
assertion on demand. It is, to me, rather clear that Smith saw the 
importance of demand in setting the price, in particular in the 
general framework which is not very clear from his partial 
equilibrium approach, as portrayed in chapter 7 of book 1.
There are three usages, thus demand , of the surplus: reproduction, 
consumption and accumulation. If we look at the demand for C in our 
model it will take the form:
1^1
Where giNS^ad/au represents the amount of C needed to accommodate 
the decision to accumulate gjNS^ of I.
Throughout the whole Wealth of Nations, the aspect of reproduction 
is assumed to be crucial. Without loss of generality, I will assume 
that the demand for reproduction is fixed , that is, it is set
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before the exchange begins and will not alter with prices. It is
quite reasonable to suppose that the demand for subsistence to feed
the labour needed for reproduction will be inelastic. Either because 
it is the capitalist who is aware of his own predicament if he fails 
to reproduce or, because it is the labourers themselves who face an 
even grimmer prospect if they fail to secure their demand.
We should, then concentrate on the use of the real net surplus. This 
subject is extensively discussed in the chapter on the accumulation 
of capital (chapter 3 book 2). The distinction between consumption 
and accumulation is done there by the employment of productive or 
unproductive labourers. The main source for that consumption and 
accumulation is the profits (and rents which we ignore).
What motivates demand, in Smith theory, is, again, a certain quality 
of human nature; a certain passion. The principle which"prompts to 
expense, is the passion for present enjoyment” (expense is to be
understood as consumption; the employment of unproductive
labour)."But the principle which prompts to save [namely, to 
accumulate or to employ productive labour], is the desire of 
bettering our conditions"[WN p.341].
Smith does not offer us a very accurate account of what regulates the 
relationship between these two contradicting passions. He does 
maintain, though, that they do prevail together. No matter how 
pleased a person can be at a certain situation, he will always 
desire to better his conditions, thus, it seems as if a certain 
priority is given to the momentarily passion, though, the want to
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accumulate will be there. This inclination towards the momentarily 
pleasures, which is very consistent with the poor status human 
nature had in Smith eyes, is spelt out when discussing the use to 
be made of the surplus by those who have it. "They might. . maintain 
indifferently either productive or unproductive hands. They seem 
however, to have some predilection for the latter. The expense of 
a great lord feeds generally more idle than industrious people."[WN 
p.333].
There are, thus, two main features in Smith's view of demand. First 
it is at least in part, motivated by passions that can not be 
regulated by the system and that are ex-ante to the system. Namely, 
passions that are less susceptible to price changes; similar to the 
argument that the demand of labourers for subsistence is independent 
of the price. Both are needs which are less controlled by reason but 
it should be clear that unlike labourers, the capitalists can afford 
not to have these needs satisfied. Second, that if we are to set the 
different components of demand in a certain order regarding there 
dependence on the price system, we may argue that Smith saw the 
reproduction and superfluous consumption as the pre-fixed demand,and 
accumulation, as a residual. The desire to better our conditions, 
according to Smith can be satisfied with the mere existence of some 
accumulation, whereas the passion for consumption seems more likely 
to affect the volume of demand before even coming to the market.
It is therefore, the second presentation of the general equilibrium 
solution that is in the line of Smith's writings; namely, that the 
levels of consumption (Yc ,^ 7i®) are fixed before the exchange begins,
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and the actual levels of accumulation is set by the market. It is 
thus the task of the market and prices to set these residual, which 
depends on technology, in an efficient manner. In such a case the 
demand function for C as described before is a function of price in 
the following way:
C'(P)=y,a„*gi(P)NS'iü-7j
1^1
Let us,now, descend from the general equilibrium level to the partial 
equilibrium framework to look more closely on the process of exchange 
in the light of the above observations. The analysis will differ 
somewhat from the exact analysis of Smith in chapter 7 of book 1 
however, its spirit will prevail.
Figure 5.d.4 depicts the demand for C under the assertion that the 
fixed arguments of it are the reproduction and consumption, and that 
a certain level of accumulation is planned but will be determined 
by prices.
I
figure 5.d.4(a)
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figure 5.d.4 (b)
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While it is implied that accumulation is eventually, residual, this, 
in turn, does not mean that there is no a-priori notion of what is
expected to be accumulated. In some respect we may even say that in
Smith analysis, there must be a hidden assumption about expectations.
Before coming into the market, not only the levels of consumption and 
reproduction are fixed, also a certain idea of what we would have 
liked to accumulate which is reflected in the portion of our own 
product that we devote for accumulation. Hence, if the producers of 
I decided to accumulate gi®NS^ of their product, they expect to get 
(gi®NS^aci)/aii on top of what they want for reproduction (Yia^i) and 
consumption (7c^) .
This pre-market formation of the demand is, in some respect, a
similar idea to what Smith called the 'effectual demand'. It is a
demand that is determined outside of the market and which, in parts, 
depends on technology (the demand for reproduction goods). 
Equilibrium will certainly depend on how the quantity that is
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actually brought into the market relates to this pre-set demand.
The pre-market demand, in figure 5.d.4(a), is depicted by the segment 
AK. The actual demand will obviously depend on the price. Therefore, 
as we said before the demand is a composition of pre-market (or 
autonomous) components and those which depend on prices:
*11
where gj'<0.
If the price that prevails is P^ , they will get exactly what they 
expected. If the price of C, in terms of I, increases to ?c (>Pa) > 
then, for what they brought to exchange they can get a smaller 
amount than they expected to get (C*) . However, knowing that if they 
get less for accumulation, they can reduce the amount they have put 
aside for it, thus, increasing the level of their own product to be 
exchanged (supply of I) and moving to point C.
If the price is lower than what they have expected it to be they can 
always increase the level of accumulation (point B) by reducing the 
supply of their own product I. We can now draw that demand schedule 
in figure 5.d.4(b) where the position of the curve depends on the 
level of consumption, and of the expected level of accumulation
(gi") .
We can immediately derive the supply of I which corresponds to the 
producers' of I behaviour in the market for C. We saw that gi'<0 and 
the supply of I will be their total surplus minus what they need for
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accumulation:
As gi'<0, the supply of I is positively correlated with P.
In a similar way we can analyze the behaviour of the producers of C 
and get the following equations for their demand of I and supply of 
C.
I'» (P )-r.a i.-g , (P )N S '^ +7Î 
C*(P)-r„(l-a„)-&(P)KS'
given that gc'(P)>0.
Figure 5.d.5(a) depicts the partial equilibrium settings in markets 
C and I . Clearly we can see that there might be a problem of 
stability in this model. As long as the supply of C and I are
steeper than the respective demand curves, equilibrium will be 
stable. I'm afraid that there is nothing of great significance in 
the conditions for stability and I will save the reader the trouble 
of going through it. Let us assume that the conditions for stability 
prevail. The existence of a unique general equilibrium is shown in 
conjunction with figure 5.d.5(b).
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figure 5.d.5.(a)
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The demand and supply of each sector are depicted by the process 
lines. At any other point of G the sum of the adjusted wants does 
not coincide.
We can now write the equilibrium equation in the two markets;
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C'^ (P)=r,a,it-,ï-fgi(P)WSl^ -i'.(l-a„)-&(P)NS'.C«(P)
1^1
I< '(P )-r„ a i„ ^ -7 5 ^ -& (P )W S 'fiîx y j( l-a ii)-g i(P )W S '.I* (P )
®cc
Which can be rewritten as:
WS'-7Î=^cWS't^iWSif£i
1^1
^cc
Solving and assuming (for the Cramer method) that:
A=NS'^ NS'^ -(NS^ -Ll)(NS^ -2l)f^ 0
c^c 1^1
We get the equilibrium growth rates:
g^=[ (WS'-7j)lïS'-(ffSi-7Î)WS'f£i ] A-i
1^1
gl=[(«Sl-7j)NS°-(WS«-7^)NS«fiî]A-i
c^c
By simple comparative statics we can see that the equilibrium growth 
rate of each sector is inversely related to the other sectors' 
planned luxurious consumption and positively related to its own 
luxurious consumption. This means that what we have here are the 
seeds of the moral disapproval of natural liberty.
Given the above results it is clear that what we have here is a kind 
of a prisoner dilemma. Each sector who wants very much to consume 
luxurious goods but at the same time to better its conditions through 
growth. By increasing its demand for these luxurious consumption 
(unproductive labourers) of the other sector's goods each sector can 
expect to enjoy both worlds. A higher luxurious consumption and a 
higher rate of growth. Performed simultaneously, they can drive the
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economy to a very low rate of growth which, in the end, will harm all 
of them. The effect to labourers, obviously, are quite catastrophic.
To round up the argument, let us have a quick glance at the 
circumstances where luxurious consumption is not pre-determined. Only 
some plan for accumulation precedes the actual exchange. Figure 5.d.6 
presents these circumstances.
figure 5.d.6(a)
figure 5.d.6(b)
P
C
At point A in figure 5.d.6(a), if the price was the pre-intended 
demand would be fulfilled. The difference between this pre-intended
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demand and the previous one is that there is no set level of
consumption but there is a pre-set level of planned accumulation.
Thus, at A the whole of the own surplus of I's producers will be 
turned to productive labour, namely, reproduction and accumulation.
If the actual price will become Pg, there are three possibilities. 
Either they will consume the whole addition of C they gained from the 
same amount of I, which they, sort of, brought into the market (point 
B) , or, use it to increase accumulation (point C) , or any combination 
between them (along the segment EC) .
Therefore, for any price, there is a set of levels of actual demand 
as depicted in figure 5.d.6(b). Obviously, as we already saw, the 
equilibrium in such circumstances is not unique. As I have already 
stressed, it is the other configuration of demand that is more in the
spirit of Smith argument. Hence, a unique equilibrium is the result
of Smith analysis taken from the general equilibrium point of view. 
However, this result does not in itself guarantee the beneficial 
outcome of the system. Only under certain conditions (in our case set 
of consumption levels) the continual growth, which is the heart of 
the beneficial significance of his system, can be promised. The mere 
action of the 'invisible hand' will yield equilibrium, but not 
necessarily, beneficence. The uniqueness of the result calls for a 
better explanation of how the decisions on consumption and 
accumulation are made.
Two points are left to be shortly examined, the uniform rate of 
profit and the natural price.
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(e) The Uniform Rate Of Profit.
The assumption of a uniform rate of profit is a crucial supposition 
in many of the dealings with classical economics in general and 
Smith's economics in particular. In any Sraffian type of 'cost of 
production' analysis this assumption will appear to be necessary if 
we are to solve, somehow, the price system. In particular, when 
demand has no role.
There are two main issues here. One is whether the circumstances of 
'perfect liberty' really indicate that the uniform rate of profit 
will prevail. And the other is, how are prices determined without 
this assumption.
In the previous section I have tried to answer the second question. 
I argued there that though the role of demand is difficult to trace 
in his partial equilibrium analysis, it becomes more apparent in the 
general equilibrium framework of analysis. We saw there that 
equilibrium prices can be characterized even without the uniform rate 
of profit. Indeed, the general convention according to which there 
should be different growth rates in different sectors implies that 
rates of profit should not be the same. Before dealing with the 
meaning of all that let us concentrate on the first question, namely, 
on whether a uniform rate of profit is; a natural outcome of the
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system of 'perfect liberty'.
The most powerful source for the assertion of a uniform rate of 
profit is, no doubt, the following quotation. "The whole of the 
advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour 
and stock must, in the same neighbourhood, be either perfectly equal 
or continually tending to equality. If in the same
neighbourhood, there was any employment evidently either more or less 
advantageous than the rest, so many people would crowd into it in 
the one case , and so many would desert it in the other, that its 
advantages would soon return to the level of the other 
employment."[WN p.116].
But then he goes on to argue that the fact is that the profits on 
stock, or the wages of labour do differ substantially. But not only 
because of false policies that limit the realm of perfect liberty. 
"But this difference arises partly from certain circumstances in the 
employments themselves, which, either really, or at least in the 
imaginations of men,....;and partly from the policy.".[WN p.116].
So, it is not just bad policy that might create differences in rates 
of return, it may sometimes prevail where there is 'perfect 
liberty'. These circumstances are no less natural than the 
circumstances that give rise to the mechanism of the 'invisible 
hand'. Namely, they are characteristics of human nature precisely 
like self-interest.
Indeed, rate of profits are hard to telLl and they are much less
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influenced by the different circumstances than wages. However, they 
are affected by some important circumstances. "Of the five 
circumstances , therefore, which vary the wages of labour, two only 
affect the profits of stock; the agreeableness or disagreeableness 
of the business, and the risk or security with which it is 
attended."[WN p.128]. In particular, they vary with risk. The risk 
aversion, in the same person, according to Smith, varies itself in 
different stages of the life of the same person. He would obviously 
turn his stock not only according to where its rate of return is 
higher, but also in accordance with his age.
I therefore maintain that the assumption of a uniform rate of return 
does not prevail in Smith's theory. He did think that a tendency to 
a uniform rate of profits existed but he suggested nothing about the 
degree of equality it might reach. It is also significantly different 
from the argument about the differential wages.
The disutilities that are being caused in the different employments 
are the same to everybody. Anyone who works in an unpleasant job will 
experience similar degrees of inconvenience. However, the employments 
of capital do not depend on the particular circumstances of each 
venture alone. It also depends on the different dispositions that 
people might have towards, say, risk. A risk averse capitalist will 
not employ his capital in a risky project even if the earnings are 
high. It is possible to think of a situation where in spite the high 
return some capitalists will avoid moving into that employment of 
capital. Consequently they will earn a different rate of return as 
those who are engaged in more risky jobs.
267
Whatever one thinks I believe that it can be agreed that even if 
profits rates tend to uniformity they are, most of the time, 
different. In such a case, the use of a Sraffian 'cost of production' 
method of analysis means that general equilibrium prevails only when 
the rates of profit are equal. Namely, general equilibrium is a 
concept that is associated with 'natural rates' but not with 
deviations from it. Like in the growth models I have discussed 
before, the burden of Smith's perception of 'natural liberty' is not 
so much in the harmony of wants itself as it is in showing that the 
system will reach a state where harmony prevails. In the model 
presented in the previous section I have suggested to integrate the 
two. Namely, the harmony of wants at any one time (even without a 
uniform rate of profit) is present together with the powers that 
might drive the system to its 'natural rates'.
Let us examine now the significant of the uniform rate assumption to 
the model of the previous section. In terms of our model the rate of 
profit of the two sectors are the following ones:
^ c ^ p y  ( l - a ,  ) - Y , a , c  
c^cl
Figure 5.e. 1(a)-(b) is over in the next page and it depicts the 
instances where profit rates are different (a) and equal (b). It is 
easy to see that the rate of profits as written above has the 
following geometrical representation:
CD Oo
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Figure 5.e.l
(a)
(b)
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In figure (b) we can see the equivalent positions marked with (*) . 
There it is clear that profit rates are equal. It is easy to see that 
what it means in that the price will coincide with the diagonal of
the exchange box the two nodes of which are 0 and A*. The question
is, however, whether or not the price should go though point H too.
The answer is yes^.
In our case the equality of rates means that both the numerator and 
denominators are the same (which, by the way is the only way to reach 
such equality as the rates of profit are inversely related). Hence, 
equating the numerators will yield that the price should satisfy:
" NS^
This also means that the slope of the line between A* and K equals 
the price. This slope, we saw earlier, is precisely:
=p 
gcNS^
Hence, as could be expected, equal rates of profit means equal rates 
of growth. Notice that the fact that the price coincides with the 
diagonal of the exchange box means that whenever there is growth it 
is balanced and therefore, net surpluses will rise over time. 
However, there is nothing in the uniform rate of profit to tell us 
what rate it is going to be. We saw in the previous section that as 
far as equilibrium is concerned the same price can suit many demand
^The importance of this point will be discussed in the next section. The 
only comment I would like to make now is that in our exposition the idea of 
'cost of production' pricing presents itself when the price equals to the rate 
of exchange between what each sector requires from the other sector for 
reproduction.
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configuration. Namely, there exist a whole range of levels of the 
pre-determined demand for luxurious consumption which is consistent 
with this price. Equilibrium, then, will be somewhere along the Ka* 
line in figure 5.e.1(b). The closer we get to A* the lower will be 
the rate of accumulation that is associated with it. Hence, whenever 
there is a uniform rate of profit the beneficence of the system will 
prevail provided that we are not at A*. However, there are different 
degrees of beneficence according to how high the rate of 
accumulation really is. Recall that beneficence meant that when 
there is accumulation there is a rise in the wages of productive 
labourers. Their sense of gratitude is the sole measure of 
beneficence as they are those who are being acted upon.
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(f) The Concept of The Natural Price.
Most classical economists wrote about the natural price one way or 
another. So did Adam Smith. The meaning of this concept and its 
distinction from the market price are not as simple as many would 
like us to believe. Many would argue that the distinction between 
the natural and market price is a simple distinction between the 
short and the long run prices. I tend to disagree. In my view the
natural price differs from the market price in its moral
significance. I would like to argue now that the natural price, in 
the framework that we have presented above, is a composition of two 
things; the reflection of 'real cost' and the long run consequences 
of it to growth.
Let us first look at the definition of the natural price. "When the 
price of any commodity is neither more nor less than what is 
sufficient to pay the rent of the land, the wages of the labour, and 
the profits of the stock employed in raising, preparing, and bringing 
it to market, according to their natural rates, the commodity is then 
sold for what may be called its natural price....The commodity is 
then sold precisely for what it is worth, or for what it really
costs the person who brings it to market.."[WN p.72].
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There are two components to this definition; one, that the natural 
price is the price of a commodity when all its arguments are in their 
natural rate. Tlis other, that the natural price is ’’precisely what 
it is worth" or what it "really costs" the person to produce it and 
bring it to the market.
The first argument, naturally, leaves us baffled. There is no 
definition of what is to be called the natural rate of wages, profit 
or rent. The second argument sounds exactly like Smith's definition 
of prices in general (see section (c) above where the necessary 
references are being produced). Namely, that prices reflect the toil 
and trouble of producing and bringing a commodity to the market. If 
prices, in general, reflect the 'toil and trouble', and the natural 
price is what it 'really costs', then natural price is just another 
name for prices in general.
Some would argue that such a description of natural price may imply 
that Smith considered the labour values as the natural price. I 
personally don't agree with it but I do not think that the reasons 
for rejecting it are that labour values don't explain prices. The 
fact that he uses the same terminology to discuss the natural price 
as he did when he presented the concept of prices implies that 
natural prices are the essential prices. Even if we think of Smith's 
chapter 5 as a discussion of social welfare where labour is the 
measure of the true toil and trouble, then natural prices are those 
prices which reflect this true toil and trouble. Obviously, labour 
values when there is profit will not explain national income but 
Smith might still believe that they reflect the true price (though
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not the true wealth). The question is whether or not labour values 
are not explaining actual prices even when profits are at their 
natural rate.
In any case, I do not believe that the argument as if the fact that 
labour values do not determine relative prices makes them
meaningless. After all, natural prices, according to Smith are also 
not seen very frequently. "The natural price" writes Smith," is , 
as it were, the central price, to which the prices of all
commodities are continually gravitating. Different accidents may 
sometimes keep them suspended a good deal above it, and sometimes 
force them down even somewhat below it. But whatever may be the 
obstacles which hinder them from settling in this centre of repose 
and continuance, they are constantly tending towards it."[WN p.75].
Unlike gravitation, there is something in his description that can 
lead one to think that the natural price, though the centre of 
prices, may actually never prevail; it is like an unfrictioned 
pendulum that was once moved from its 'natural equilibrium' , and 
though will never return there, her position is always influenced
by it. In the same way, natural price can be a price which may never
prevail, but market prices will always stand in some relation to it.
There is, however, another approach which regards the natural price 
as the long run price. The price that will prevail in the long run 
process of adjustment of supply and demand, and which will be the 
cost of production price. Marshall thought that it may be considered 
as the long run price only when assuming a stationary state, thus,
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implying that for any structural circumstances, there is a price that 
would have prevailed, were we confronted with the same circumstances 
for a long period of time(Marshall,1952. p .347). M. Dobb interpreted 
these rates as the theoretical rates that would prevail if we lived 
in 'perfect liberty' (Dobb,1978. p.43).
It seems as if under this interpretation, the natural price is to be 
understood as the equilibrium price of perfect competition. But 
perfect competition can not be simply interpreted as 'perfect 
liberty'. I have already shown that although perfect liberty 
prevailed, there might be natural circumstances to prevent economic 
variables from converging to what is expected of them in a model of 
perfect competition. For instance, I do not think that there need 
to be any problem with the conditions of 'perfect liberty' when the 
rates of profits do not converge to unity. There might be a problem 
with diversity in human nature but surely no one (before Hotelling) 
will expect human characteristics to become the same as an indicator 
for 'perfect liberty'.
So there is something of both approaches in Smith's discussion of the 
natural price. It contains elements of being a true measure for the 
'toil and trouble' and at the same time, it has this long-run 
meaning. The latter, however, not in the sense of being the price 
to which market prices converge but rather in the sense of a
magnetic field.
The first thing to examine, therefore, is what it really costs to 
produce a commodity. From the point of view of the wage component of
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the price it seems rather simple. The subsistence of the workers , 
as well as the allocation of materials, is always what it 'really' 
costs to produce a certain commodity. What seems more difficult is 
the natural rate of profit. In the same line of argument, namely, 
that what it 'really' cost to use a labourer is his subsistence, the 
natural profit should be what it really costs to reproduce the 
capitalist. "His profit, besides, is his revenue, the proper fund 
of his subsistence. As, while he is preparing and bringing the goods 
to market, he advances to his workmen their wages, or their 
subsistence; so he advances to himself, in the same manner, his own 
subsistence.[WN p.73].
If the natural rate of wages and profits is the subsistence level of 
the individual involved, one may argue that labour values coincide 
with actual prices and they make labour the measure of national 
income. This is so because in such a case we can write the 
subsistence of the capitalist as part of the 'cost of production', 
say, part of the corn coefficient. In such a case the interest rate 
which represented the rate of profit before will become 0 and then 
it is clear that (a) labour values coincide with prices and (b) that 
national income can be measured by population.
Nevertheless I do not think that labour theory of value is what Smith 
had in mind when he discussed natural price. My view is that the 
natural price is determined according to its proposed consequences.
If the natural price is according to the natural rates of wages and 
profits in the above sense, where is the surplus (which follows from
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the division of labour) and how is it being distributed. When 
discussing prices Smith was very clear that the prices reflect the 
general distribution of the whole annual produce of a land. If so, 
prices that reflect no surplus can prevail only when the economy 
stagnates. This could not have been his intention.
Striping the natural price off its surplus components ,even though 
a logical mistake, can be interpreted that Smith argued that the 
natural price is the price that prevail when the surplus, is not 
used for consumption. Namely, that the capitalist consumes only what 
is needed for his reproduction while the rest is being accumulated. 
This approach will coincide with another reference that Smith made 
about the significance of the natural price. "What ever therefore 
keeps goods above their natural price for a permanency, diminishes 
nation's opulence... .As what raises the market price above the 
natural one diminishes public opulence, so what brings it down below 
it has the same effect."[U p.498].
Therefore, I believe that natural price is neither the labour value 
nor the long run equilibrium. Rather, it is the price which advances 
society the most. Let us discuss now its two major features; namely 
its relation to the 'real cost' of production and its affect on the 
advancement of society.
What does it really costs to produce, in our model, a unit of C and 
of I. Surely it is a^ c units of C and a g^ units of I that are 
required to produce a unit of C. In the s;ame way it is a^ units of 
I and ad units of C that are required to produce a unit of I .
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Not all of that is being purchased through the market. Each sector 
can ensure his own share in the process of reproduction. What 
becomes the role of the price is to ensure that each sector gets 
what it needs for reproduction from the other sector, without having 
to reduce his produce below the level of its own reproduction.
When Smith discusses the natural price as the price that pays what 
it 'really costs' to produce, he probably meant, what is needed for 
reproduction. If something was not needed for reproduction it could 
not have been a part of what it really costs.
In our framework of analysis the natural price that reflects the real 
costs must be such that under no circumstances will it be possible 
not to reproduce. Namely the price should be such that even if one 
sector decides to consume his whole net surplus, the other sector 
will still be able to buy what it needs for reproduction. In figure 
5.f.l this point is depicted at A.
While we can assume that each sector will endeavour to bring to the 
market at least the amount he needs to exchange in order to be able 
to reproduce, only point A guarantees that this motivation will 
yield both sectors with what it really cost them. Pn, is thus, the 
natural price.
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figure 5.f.l
Yia^i
Ycale
Obviously, Smith's assertion that the price will consist only of what 
Is necessary for reproduction (In terms of materials and subsistence) 
Is Inconsistent with his own definition of prices. However, In our 
model we can make some sense out of It. The price Pn Is a natural 
price In the sense that It reflects exactly the price ratio when only 
what Is needed to reproduction (the real price) Is exchanged. But the 
unavoidable surplus still exists and must be exchanged , thus, 
reflected In the components of the price. Any allocation of surplus, 
like point C In figure 5.f.l for Instance, will depict an allocation 
of surplus that Is supported by the natural price.
Note that In this model the natural price Is necessarily the same as 
the price that would prevail under a uniform rate of profit. However, 
unlike the 'cost of production' method of analysis where this Is the 
only equilibrium state. In our model we allow for general equilibrium 
even If the rates of profits are not the same and the price Is not 
at Its natural rate.
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Let us now, turn to the second feature of the natural price, the 
progress of opulence. Natural price is the price which advances the 
economy the most. While price in our model is a mechanism to allocate 
surplus, its expression as a natural price can be determined as the 
price where the whole surplus is being used for accumulation on a 
long term growth path.
In figure 5.f.2 we depict the relevant part of the model:
figure 5.f.2
In figure 5.f.2 we can see the process line, that serves as demand 
indicator, at different levels of consumption. It becomes a heavy 
line within the triangle ABC where the continual growth conditions 
are satisfied.
As the level of pre-fixed consumption increases, the equilibrium 
point (like N) shifts inward. If the rise in consumption is only on 
the part of one sector the economy will quickly reach an equilibrium 
which is outside the prolonged growth path and indeed, outside of 
the area where net-surpluses of both sectors rise continuously. The
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rise in labourers wages will be temporary and in the end the economy 
will stagnate and there will be no beneficence in the system.
If the rise in consumption is balanced then the equilibrium will move 
inward within the triangle ABC. As it approaches point C the level 
of accumulation has diminished so much that no rise in productive 
labourers wages will occur and beneficence will be absent. The 
maximum growth possible is when we reach equilibrium at N. There, 
there is no luxurious consumption and as the whole surplus is used 
to raise labourers wages it is the highest possible beneficence of 
the system.
However, although the description of the price that supports N seems 
becoming to Smith's idea of the natural price, it might be a price 
that does not satisfy the 'real cost' requirement in a different 
sense. The price which supports N is such that the return to 
labourers and capitalists is precisely what they need for 
reproduction. But if we think of a price that reflects 'real cost' 
as the price which will exchange precisely what each sector needs for 
reproduction (and not for investment) then it must go through point 
R. However a price that satisfies this condition (like 8 for 
instance), may support a distribution M which is as bad as K.
Thus, it seems that we have to choose. In the line of thinking that 
the natural price should be a source of distinction between different 
equilibria outcome, we may choose to extend the concept to include 
all those solutions that are consistent with continual growth (the 
beneficent outcomes). It does make the definition substantially
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broader but it seems to be more in the line of what Smith considered 
natural prices to show. We may now summarize that the notion of the 
natural price as the price that reflects the real costs, does not 
necessarily coincide with its being the indicator of advancement ( 
thus, a mark of a beneficent outcome). Even to a lesser degree it 
coincides with the maximum accumulation.
Only when the uniform rate of profit is present and the price that 
prevails is also the natural price (under very restricted 
conditions), we may say that the idea of 'real cost' coincides with 
the extended interpretation of the price as an indicator of 
progress.
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A Brief Conclusion to Part 2
The context within which I have investigated Smith's work was laid 
down in Part 1. The general purpose, to remind the reader, is to 
examine whether developments in the conception of economic justice 
are strongly related to development in economic theory. For that 
purpose it is important to establish first that different schools in 
economics do have particular (and different) concepts of economic 
justice.
I chose to begin with Adam Smith for two major reasons. One, that he 
is considered as the breaking point of economics from ethics. The 
other, that he is considered by contemporary economists as a great 
advocate of 'perfect liberty' for its moral significance as much as 
for its efficiency.
My major conclusions in as much as the general context is concerned 
are two. First, that natural liberty is not considered as a morally 
good system. It is considered to be a system which is consistent with 
social viability and is, therefore, a 'just' system in precisely this 
very sense. Second, that the principle of moral evaluation of what 
is relevant to economics (i.e. actions) is a principle of desert.
It is not, however, a principle of effort remuneration but rather 
a system where the merits of an action are in the proportionality 
between intention and outcome. The sense of gratitude and the (
rewards that are therefore due are the principles upon which the 
morally good distribution should be based.
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To be able to apply these ideas to economic analysis there was a need 
to establish who acts and who is being acted upon in an economic 
system. In that respect the question of framework of analysis becomes 
of great significance. What acting and being acted upon means in a 
partial equilibrium setting is distinctly different from what it 
means in a general equilibrium framework.
In that respect is it quite clear to me that Smith's analysis is a 
general equilibrium analysis. It is not, however, the same concept 
as the modern notion of general equilibrium. There is interdependence 
but there is no simultaneity. While some may argue that these are not, 
major differences, they are, and I will elaborate about it later on, 
as far as moral considerations are concerned.
Using my particular exposition of Smith's economics we have 
established that the idea of beneficence is strongly associated with 
the idea of balanced growth. But even then, given the nature of 
motivations on the part of those who bring about this beneficence 
(the self-interested capitalists) they will not render the system 
as morally good but merely as 'just' in the sense of social 
viability.
C
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PART III
I N T E R L U D E
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1. INTERLUDE
The aim of this part of my work is to discuss in more general terms 
some of the questions arising from the effort to establish the moral 
significance of classical economics. It also aims to serve as a 
general introduction to the part on Mill.
There are three such issues which I feel need some clarification. 
These are:
(a) the problem of framework and its moral significance;
(b) the role and meaning of the labour theory of value and;
(c) the method of investigation.
These are all quite serious questions and obviously strongly related 
though it may not seem so on the face of it. Each of these issues 
requires a separate dissertation but as they all are at the back of 
my, and I'm sure the reader's, mind. I have therefore decided to 
devote some time to discuss these things explicitly so that the 
reader can see my point of view although he might not agree with me. 
I do not, in any way, suggest that I, or anyone else for that 
matter, have exhausted these subjects. As for myself I don't even 
think that I have reached a full understanding of them. Consequently 
I have brought them under the umbrella of what I call an interlude.
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But it should not be seen as a break in the line of this work. These 
questions are of great importance and my view of them explains the 
structure of this work.
In the first chapter we will discuss in rather general terms what 
might be the implications of the difference in framework of analysis. 
We shall look at possible explanations to the use of labour theories 
of value and, I will say a few words with respect to the method of 
investigating past ideas. In particular as in my analysis of Mill 
which follows this part I will employ a bit of 'analytical 
reconstructionalism' which to some of you may not be so appealing.
( a )  On th e  Q u e s t io n  o f  F ra m e w o rk  1 :  F ra m e w o rk s  a n d  C o n c e p t s .
Between the times of Adam Smith and Leon Walras there seem to have 
been two major changes in economic analysis. One is the emergence of 
subjective theories of values and the other, which is more particular 
to the case of Walras, is the dominance of general equilibrium 
analysis.
By saying this, I am also implying that classical economics was 
dominated by two different features; one, an objective theory of 
value and the other, a partial equilibrium framework of analysis. 
While the proposition that classical theories of value were 
objective theories, namely, theories where prices are dominated by
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the production circumstances, will raise little objection, the one 
about the framework of analysis will encounter considerable 
opposition.
According to some scholars, and in particular Hollander (1985, 1987) 
Morishima (1989) and Walsh and Gram (1980), classical economics is 
a general equilibrium system. A system where everything is being 
determined simultaneously^. No less than it is in the neo-classical 
tradition. In fact, in the previous part of this work (the section 
on Smith) I too seem to have implied a similar proposition. I have 
argued there that Smith's system should be understood as a general 
equilibrium analysis rather than a partial equilibrium one.
However, my interpretation of Smith's 'general equilibrium' is 
distinctly different from the concept that is being employed by 
Walras and contemporary theories. It is by no means a system where 
all economic variables are being determined simultaneously. A causal 
relationship between the various decisions made by different economic 
agents, can easily be drawn. Subsequently, moral responsibilities 
will also be easier to assign.
would like to clarify what is meant here by simultaneity and I will 
come back to the subject in the next part. Obviously general equilibrium means 
any interdependence of economic variables. To present them in a form of 
simultaneous equation is always possible and indeed was one of Walras' major 
contributions. Nevertheless, when we do so we are giving up something which 
might be of importance to moral analysis: the chain of causes. This chain will 
be meaningless if the cycle is neatly closed and if each agent's position in 
the system is the same. In other words, the chain does not tell us anything 
if all participants have a symmetric position in terms of what motivates them 
and the degree of influence that they have on the model. If, however, there 
is a built in a-symmetry then the chain of causes may indeed be interesting 
even though in the end everything is inter-related.
288
But it is not only my interpretation that is distinct from 
contemporary notions of general equilibrium. I believe, and I will 
show it later on, that what scholars like Hollander or Morishima 
believe to be a 'general equilibrium' analysis of classical economics 
is closer to my interpretation of 'classical general equilibrium' 
than it is to the modern conception of it (the Walrasian one).
Thus, the mere claim that classical economic systems are systems of 
general equilibrium does not bring them closer to modern economic 
analysis. No more than the claim that 'cost of production' in 
classical theories (and in particular in Mill) is the Marshallian 
long-run equilibrium prices; given the question mark hanging on the 
neo-classical character of Marshall's economics (Mirowski, 1983)%.
The question is, from the point of view of this work, whether it is 
of any importance at all that a particular economic system is being 
presented in a one or another framework of analysis. And, which is 
almost the same thing, whether or not there is any correlation 
between the apparent directions that economic analysis had been 
taking. In other words, whether there is a connection between the 
move towards Walrasian general equilibrium and the shift towards 
more subjective theories of value.
Regardless of how we perceive classical economics, I think that we 
can agree that the direct dealing with value theory is usually done
^The doubts with respect to how neo-classical Marshall might have been 
have nothing to do with his obvious subjective theory of value. It has to do 
with the framework of analysis. Namely, with the relationship, in the 
long-run, between demand and prices.
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in an apparent partial equilibrium framework of analysis. Indeed, 
although I have argued for a particular general equilibrium 
interpretation of Smith I admitted that his dealing with value 
theory in Book 1 appears to be in a partial equilibrium setting. 
Obviously it does not mean that this should be the final word on 
which framework of analysis is suitable but it must have affected 
the classicists understanding of prices.
In a partial equilibrium analysis, where the focus of exchange is on 
produced goods^, the role of effort and cost is very great indeed. 
We will tend to interpret a price of commodity only with direct 
relations to what it means to bring its exchange about. Inevitably 
we will have to acknowledge the a-symmetry between the buyer of a 
produced commodity and its producer. The latter appears to have 
worked hard and the former simply enjoys himself*. Consequently, we 
might tend to see in the price (or wish to see in it) a reflection 
of that effort.
If, however, we know that the seller of a commodity in one market is 
the buyer of another commodity in another market we might be less 
inclined to see the price as a reflection only of the specific 
circumstances of this commodity production process. Our tendency to 
relate effort to price will then diminish.
To some extent this is precisely what I did in the part on Adam
^Notice that even in the Smith's rude stage the exchange is made between 
produced (sort to speak) goods.
*In the rude state both have worked and indeed it seems natural to 
compare their efforts.
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Smith. It is clear to me that Smith's discussion of labour values 
in chapter 5 of book 1 reflects his view of prices from a partial 
equilibrium perspective. However, once we have established the 
general interdependence of his economic variables (through books 
2-3), the determinants of prices become a different thing 
altogether. The equilibrium prices in the system developed in the 
previous part have nothing to do with effort. It is in Smith's view 
of the natural price where he is trying to bring together what 
determine prices with what he believes to be the nature of prices. 
In other words, the natural price can be seen as an effort to 
reconcile the view of prices from the partial equilibrium angle with 
its general equilibrium determinants.
In any case, whatever one may think about the distinction between 
partial and general equilibrium analysis 1 would like to insist that 
at least from the moral point of view such a distinction is of great 
importance. Two systems of general interdependence have different 
implications if the positions of the various agents in the one are 
similar and in the other, inherently different.
The long standing moral indicator of the 'just price', the study of 
which was dominated by the study of relationship between the buyer 
and the seller, will lose all its traditional significance if 
everybody plays all roles. A buyer in one market is a seller in 
another; his disadvantages in the one market can be compensated by 
the advantages he gains, for precisely the same reasons, in another 
market. In particular when what is at stake is only the extent of 
benefits people extract from their various exchange activities.
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We may indeed have new interpretations to the 'just price'. We may 
follow Nozick and determine the 'just price' as the one that follows 
a fair exchange (a voluntary one). However, while such an argument 
may appear with no qualifications in a partial equilibrium setting 
it might not be the case in general equilibrium. If everything is 
simultaneously interdependent then the 'just price' which supports 
the procedures of exchange cannot be seen in such an isolated 
manner.
What it will mean is that when a 'just' initial distribution exists 
then, any exchange that satisfies the required conditions will be 
just. In other words, it is like saying that for any initial 
distribution there exist a final distribution which is supported by 
the 'just price'. In other words, the procedural 'just price', in 
general equilibrium where unique solutions exist, can be expressed 
in terms of the relationship between the initial and the final 
distribution.
In a general equilibrium framework we may think of three subjects of 
moral investigation: the initial distribution, the process of
exchange and, the final distribution. What simultaneity in general 
equilibrium implies is that you can say very little on exchange as 
such. Unless one has an idea of what is the final distribution which 
is morally desirable one will need to form an opinion on two out of 
the three subjects I have mentioned above. The Nozick type of 
procedural justice, as I have said above, has the initial 
distribution as well as rules of exchange im the domain of its moral
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function. But a theory of the 'just price' which only looks at 
exchange will be meaningless.
For instance, we may wish to confine procedural justice only to 
actions (and not distributions) and thus confine ourselves to a 
discussion of effort (actions) remuneration. We may choose the only 
requirement of procedural justice to be that exchange will be based 
on voluntary actions. In such a case, as there is no anchor either 
in the initial distribution (actions should not be confused with 
abilities) or in the final one, the 'just' price in the general 
equilibrium setting will become vacuous. There is a multitude of 
prices which satisfy that condition and that we cannot begin to 
characterize as they are inevitably associated with particular 
distributions. Similarly, an Aristotelian idea of proportional 
remuneration, to take an example of what may be meant in the 
traditional conception of the 'just price', will be lost entirely 
in such a framework.
But general interdependence does not have to be a simultaneous one. 
If, like in the case of Adam Smith, there is some causal relationship 
between the decisions of the different economic agents, the story is 
quite different. Prices in Smith reflect the capitalists' choice of 
how much to save (or return as circulating capital) . Given the labour 
supply, that amount that will be saved will determine the wages of 
labourers in the next period. As in Smith some of those decisions are 
made by the capitalists before exchange takes place, prices 
therefore, do not determine wages but they reflect those decisions. 
Thus, we can judge prices according to what they imply will happen
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to wages (remuneration) .
But, one may wonder, is it at all a system of general equilibrium? 
Doesn't a sequential analysis imply a 'partial equilibrium' analysis 
at each point of time?. The answer is that it is a general 
equilibrium analysis because there is interdependence between all 
economic variables. The decisions on wages, conditioned by a theory 
of how wages affect the division of labour, will determine what I 
called the 'net-surplus' (or net profits). It is on these grounds 
that the capitalists make their decisions and from there, the cycle 
repeats itself. But unlike what is implied by simultaneity, the 
positions of the agent here are not symmetrical.
The decisions made by the capitalists reflect rational 
considerations. Those made by the labourers are quite mechanical. 
Hence, though there must be harmony between this mechanical 
behaviour and the rational behaviour of the capitalists, the harmony 
which matters from the moral point of view is only the one among the 
capitalists themselves. Given the condition that actions need to 
produce beneficence in order to be at least 'just' (in the Smithian 
sense of the word), and, the a- symmetry between labourers and 
capitalists (which makes the former the subject of all actions), 
then the decisions by the capitalists will determine whether or not 
there is beneficence. The price that emerges from such a situation 
may be called a 'just price'.
This 'just price' in the framework of interdependence where the roles 
and positions are not symmetric has escaped the problem of having an
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implicit judgement about the relationships between initial and final 
distributions. Instead, it constructs a relationship between actions 
and final distributions. It thus combines the traditional view of the 
'just price' as a reflection of the proper 'proportional 
remuneration' with that which follow from the general equilibrium 
analysis (i.e., the price which supports the desired final 
distribution). It simply relates actions (or intentions) rather than 
the initial distribution) to the final distribution. This would not 
have been possible had the complete interdependence of the system 
been captured by the idea simultaneous equations..
In view of the moral significance of the choice of framework I have 
therefore decided to extend my analysis of classical economics and 
to include a discussion of J.S. Mill as well. There are mainly two 
reasons for that. First, too many lines of continuity are being drawn 
between Smith and Walras (Schumpeter,1954, p.189, Jaffe 1977, Robbins 
1935 pp.68-9, Negishi, 1985, p.11 Hollander, 1977), thus, shedding 
some doubts on how representative of his own school has Adam Smith 
really been. Even when I consider the differences between the 
framework of general equilibrium that I have attributed to him and 
the Walrasian system, I can see why some may still argue that my 
interpretation of Smith excludes him from what is generally accepted 
as classical economics.
If we agree that 'cost of production' is the typical classical theory 
of value, then my model of Smith's economics certainly does not 
comply. The decisions of the capitalists, not cost of production, 
determines values in my model. And though one can argue that those
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decisions themselves are a kind of simultaneous determination of the 
wages of next period (the cost of production), it is nevertheless a 
linkage formed through the means of demand side analysis. In other 
words, it is through the means of demand (and implied subjectivity) 
that I tie the ends in the Smithian model.
In my view this has no effects on the 'classical' nature of his 
analysis but nevertheless, in order not to be accused of avoiding the 
true classical model, I have decided to turn to Mill. His 
'Principles' could easily be considered as the most updated 
representation of main stream classical economics. Some kind of a 
summary of the state of the art. It was certainly Mill's own purpose 
in writing the 'Principles'.
Nevertheless, many would argue that such characterization of his own 
work was mere modesty. His own contributions to classical economic 
analysis, it is argued, are no less significant than the immense task 
of tying all ends together.
What ever is the case, the importance of the 'Principles' in 
classical economics cannot be overstated. It was, as Schumpeter 
described it, "not only the most successful treatise of the 
period. .. .but also qualifies well for the role of the period's 
classic work in our sense of the word. "(Schumpeter 1954. p.527). Its 
success "was sweeping and much more general, also much more evenly 
distributed over all countries in which economics received 
attention, than was that of Ricardo's [work]."(ibid, p.533).
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The second reason why I have decided to extend my analysis to Mill 
is his prominence in moral theory as well as in methodology. Not 
only changes in the structure of economic theory can generate a 
difference in the moral nature of an economic system. Also a change 
in the theory of morals is likely to alter the moral values that one 
attaches to the circumstances and consequences of a given economic 
system. From the methodological point of view it might be 
interesting to see whether there is any relation between changes in 
moral theory and changes in economic analysis.
In that respect, Mill has produced important writings in logic and 
methodology as well as in ethics. In them there is a reflection of 
many of the major developments in the intellectual environment of the 
time. Which makes Mill the perfect candidate for an investigation 
into the changes in classical economics theory viewed from the wider 
context of changes in the general philosophical environment.
Mill is also interesting for us from two specific points of view. 
These are the general context of his framework of analysis (i.e. his 
perception of the social sciences) and his moral theory. From the 
point of view of ethics, Mill seems to be famous for two doctrines 
that to some, would appear contradicting; his Utilitarianism and his 
writings on Liberty. I will obviously deal with this problem but what 
matters from our point of view is that his theory is (a) distinct, 
according to my interpretation, from that of Smith. Thus, making the 
question of the moral significance of classical economics as a school 
more interesting. And (b) that through variants of it. Utilitarianism 
has been carried on to quite a lot of contemporary discussions in
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normative economics. Hence, Mill becomes an interesting intersection 
point between classical economic analysis and modern approach to 
questions of normative economics.
I have pointed out before that the choice of framework of analysis 
may have some moral implications. I would also like to argue that 
the difference in moral implications can also be explained by the 
fact that the different frameworks reflect a much more profound 
difference in the scholars 'Weltanschauung'.
General or partial equilibrium, therefore, should not be viewed as 
mere technical methods, rather as reflecting one's view on the nature 
of relationships between the various economic variables. And how one 
perceives the relationship between those variables and the other 
social, or natural, factors (and theories).
There can be little doubt that for Adam Smith the study of the social 
sciences was not different from the study of natural phenomena. J.S. 
Mill, however, saw a great difference between these two fields of 
investigation. Not only in terms of what are the appropriate method 
of investigation, but also because of the profound difference in the 
nature of social and natural phenomena. For Smith, social phenomena 
were not different from the complex world of matter to which the 
physicist had to apply himself. Thus, the great harmony of nature can 
easily be applied to society. But it must be noted that it is a 
harmony that prevails everywhere and not only at the aggregate level
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of nature, or society^.
For Mill, on the other hand, the complexity of society was a reason 
to be sceptical about human abilities to establish clear causal 
relations. And though he would have agreed with Smith that society 
as a whole, like a big organism, has its own harmony, he would not 
have agreed that each of society's organs has a self-contained 
harmony of its own. Simply because the different aspects of social 
life are so strongly interwoven.
Naturally, the perception of society will play an important role in 
the choice of framework for its study. And it was this that brought 
me to argue in part 2 of this work for a general equilibrium 
interpretation of Smith's work. It is for the same reason that the 
case of Mill is so different. His perception of economics as 
comprised of both natural (production) and social (distribution and 
exchange) sciences creates many confusions. In the framework of the 
natural sciences (or the experimental ones) causal relationship 
according to Mill, are easy to establish. It is thus the interaction
^Newtonians laws, for instance, were considered as applying to the 
Universe as a whole as much as to all its sub-divisions and indeed, smallest 
particulars. Notwithstanding Hume's problem of induction, the general harmony 
can, therefore, be seen as merely a summation of the harmonies at the 
particular level. In the same way, for Smith, the invisible hand mechanism is 
a manifestation of the idea of harmony in the 'sub-section of the universe' 
called economic activities (or the production of wealth). It means that as 
part of the general harmony, economic variables reach a certain harmony 
between them, with no significant reference to non-economic variables.
It is, perhaps, like the Stoic notion of the Pneuma. The harmony of the 
universe is perceived through its compliance to a particular law. Like the 
pneuma, when going through matter defines them, so does the law of nature, 
when applied to anything, will achieve harmony. This is an entirely different 
idea than a 'geological' concept of equilibrium. At the local area there might 
be dis-equilibrium though in the whole of the earth this will not be the case.
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of labour with matter that generates commodities. All produced 
commodities, therefore, can be measured, and compared with one 
another in terms of their cause- labour. And if we consider a system 
where commodities are used in the production of other commodities, 
we can establish a general interdependence of all commodities in 
terms of the labour (past and present) used in their production.
But this apparent idea of general equilibrium (with a cost of 
production flavour) runs into great difficulties once handed over to 
social institutions like, for instance, the institution of exchange. 
Society, as we said before, is perceived by Mill as extremely 
complex. In fact, there is no reason, according to Mill, to assume 
that economic variables are determined only by other economic 
variables®. The effects of other social factors (like, for 
instance, education which affects the theory of character formation 
(ethology), which, in turn could affect the concept of the 'economic 
man' and consequently the theory of demand) cannot be ignored. 
Therefore, the idea of an economically confined general equilibrium 
will be difficult to apply. What determines the price of one 
commodity is affected not only by what determines the price of 
another, but also on other social considerations.
®I am sure that the reader will now feel that I am ignoring completely 
the concept of 'ceteris paribus'. I do not. I will discuss this point later 
on at two levels, one, the simple interpretation of ceteris paribus and the 
other. Mill's interpretation of it. I would only say here that it is hardly 
conceivable of a theory to assume as ceteris paribus those variables which it 
believes to have strong affects on those variables which are being 
investigated. Thus there is an implicit assumption that we know the other 
variables to be less significant than those we actually analyze.
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One of the most important implications of the choice of framework is 
on the theory of value and on its relationship with the theory of 
distribution. It must be clear, however, that general equilibrium 
approach does not necessarily imply a complete inter-dependence of 
distribution and value theories. For instance, in the 'cost of 
production' approach, wages are usually assumed as pre-determined 
(usually at their subsistence level). Thus, even though a 'factor 
price frontier' type of relationship between wages and profits can 
be established through the theory of value, there is by no means an 
inter-dependence between them. On the other hand, 'partial 
equilibrium' does not mean lack of dependence. One can think of a set 
of markets where prices are being determined independently of one 
another and yet, the sum total of those markets will yield 
distributional values.
Indeed, one of the question that we shall have to deal with is what 
do we mean precisely by general or partial equilibrium. Whether 
inter- dependence alone is general equilibrium or some forms of a 
one-way causalities may also qualify. In any case, the effects of 
the choice of framework will be considerable. In the case of Smith, 
to give an example, the choice of general equilibrium has 
transformed the system from a 'partial equilibrium' cost of 
production theory of value, to a theory where consumption decisions 
of the capitalists (i.e. saving decisions) will have distributional 
consequences which will also affect prices. To some extent, I 
believe, it implies that Smith's theory of distribution was not so 
far from a form of a Keynesian theory, or, perhaps even more 
accurately, a Kalecki one (there too, distributional shares were
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dominated by the saving decisions of the capitalists alone (see in 
Kaldor (1960) and Kalecki (1942)).
Having said all that means that the task in front of us is still 
quite immense. I will obviously discuss in more details the question 
of the framework of analysis but as far as the general conclusions 
regarding classical economics, I will have to defer that until much 
later. In my work on Mill I will try to show how this distinction 
between the frameworks of analysis can make the whole difference.
( b )  On t h e  Q u e s t i o n  o f  F r a m e w o r k  2 :  F r a m e w o r k  a n d  E p i s t e m o l o g y  - A  
N o t e
In the section above I maintained that the framework of analysis 
might have some implications about the applicability of some ethical 
concepts to economic analysis and I will discuss them more carefully 
in part 3. I will also argue that the difference between classical 
economics and the Walrasian paradigm will not be that the former is 
a partial equilibrium analysis while the latter is a general 
equilibrium analysis. Rather, the difference will be in the 
conception of general equilibrium.
Some might argue that such distinctions are not very relevant as they 
simply reflect methods of dealing with a problem the structure of 
which may be agreed on all. For instance, one may argue that the 
simultaneity of general equilibrium is merely a technical thing. That 
it is virtually the same as a kind of sequential interdependence
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between economic variables (which is more what classical equilibrium 
is all about). They will argue that Walras ' contribution to 
equilibrium analysis is the idea to solve the interdependence problem 
of economics by the use of simultaneous equations. This, of course, 
does not mean that he thought the world to be like that. Similarly, 
it can be argued that we can always choose a small enough unit of 
time such that even what appears as simultaneous will have a causal 
relation over time.
However, this is not what it is all about though I agree that it 
could have been. The difference between the classicists' conception 
of general equilibrium and the Walrasian conception of it are deeply 
rooted in the difference in the epistemological foundations of the 
two schools. While the classical school can be said to be dominated 
by 'classical empiricism' the Walrasian approach is definitely 
'rationalistic' in nature.
In the case of Adam Smith, for instance, the sequential nature of his 
conception of general equilibrium is rooted in the a-symmetry between 
the capitalists and Labourers. No matter how close in time are the 
decisions made by the capitalists (with respect to the usage of their 
surplus) and those made by the labourers (to increase their number 
or affect the division of labour in as much as it a decision 
variable), the causality is enshrined in the fundamental difference 
in the nature of their decisions. This difference, however, is based 
entirely on what Smith observed to be the behaviour of the different 
classes.
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Paradoxically enough Adam Smith was not aware of the problem of 
induction that is associated with 'classical empiricism' and that was 
raised by his friend Hume. Walras, on the other hand, worked within 
a particular kind of solution to this problem: the 'rationalist' 
solution. He could have 'easily' reached the idea of simultaneous 
equations because he perceived knowledge in a different way. In his 
L' Economie Politique et La Justice he discussed the notion of 
causality in connection with exchange. In order for a meaningful 
causal relation to appear in Walras we would expect utility to be 
the cause of value. Only if it is so then we can say that the 
behaviour of one individual caused prices to change and thus, 
affected another individual. But Walras does not consider utility 
as the cause of value. Very much in line with Descartes (1988. 
pp.178-180) he calls utility the genus of exchange value. The 
differential of value is scarcity. Hence it is scarcity which mould 
and shapes the differences in exchange value but scarcity is not a 
decision parameter of individuals. Moreover, according to Walras 
causality is given by perpetual sequence and proportional 
relationship between the two facts?. Such conditions will be 
difficult to satisfy in a sequential general equilibrium where there 
is a-symmetry between the various agents.
Simultaneous equations were the right choice for Walras as he assumed 
(a) that all economic agents act similarly and with similar effect 
and (b) that all of them are dominated by a third cause, scarcity. 
Now scarcity as a cause, it should be noted, does not change and
?"Concomitance perpetuelle des deux faits, proportionnalité constante de 
l'un a l'autre, telles sont les conditions d'un rapport des causalité qu' on 
puisse admettre". (Walras, 1860. p.9).
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cannot be affected by the activity of the economy. Though some may 
argue that the production of capital goods and technological 
improvement mean that scarcity does change, it will not be true 
according to Walras' interpretation of it. When we describe an 
intertemporal optimization problem we do not (and we cannot 
technically) allow for the utility functions to change. But if 
scarcity is the cause and utility is its differential then it means 
that each period there should be a new set of utility functions 
reflecting the changes in scarcity.
In the classical case (in the context of the 'cost of production'), 
however, this is not so. Wages play the role of scarcity. Once wages 
are determined the prices and profits are set. But here, wages too 
are affected by the system. Hence, the 'cause' (or perhaps the 
'transitory cause') and effect are interrelated.
Similarly the meaning of choosing a small enough unit of time in 
order to obtain causality will suffer from the immense difficulty 
of the meaning of time in such framework. In particular it will be 
the case of Walras who, in my view, followed Descartes but was 
convincing himself that he is reconciling the various schools. All 
this, I'm afraid, is only the tip of the iceberg of a dangerous 
subject. I will not deal with it here. The only point I was trying 
to make is that there is a fundamental difference in the perception 
of the world on the part of 'empiricists' and 'rationalists' and 
therefore. I'm not convinced that Walras was simply successful in 
something that economists were trying to do for a century before 
him. In my view he understood the world differently.
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Whether or not different epistemologies imply significant differences 
in moral theories is yet again a vast topic to be left out. 
Nevertheless I do feel that by the mere difference in the conception 
of the economic world and the nature of relationship between its 
components we can learn a lot about the changes in what is considered 
to be the subject matter of economic justice analysis.
( c )  S u b - d i v i s i o n  o f  C l a s s i c a l  E c o n o m ic s  a n d  t h e  L a b o u r  T h e o r y  o f  
V a l u e .
From the point of view of the inter-relation between the developments 
of economic theory and concepts of economic justice, the question of 
the general framework (political and philosophical) is of 
considerable importance. In that sense between the times of Adam 
Smith and Leon Walras classical economics appears to have developed 
in two different directions. One direction was within the framework 
of what is considered in general as liberalism, the other, within 
the framework of what I shall now generally name as socialism. I 
believe that J.S. Mill and Karl Marx are good examples of these 
different trends®.
®Though Mill and Marx were contemporaries, they seem to have related very 
little to each other. As Duncan(1973) puts it "they were contemporaries who, 
despite their significance as the theorists and organizers of very different 
schools and movements, paid very little attention to each other"(p.1). This 
lack of attention provoked various explanations:. One of them accused Marx of 
having plagiarised Mill's political economy (Bialassa (1959) which is quite 
astonishing an accusation if we consider them to be of rival schools.
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To some, this would appear as an aberration. They would argue that 
there can be little doubt about the 'true' nature of classical 
economics. That most of what we call classical economics had been 
written within the tradition of liberalism. They will probably point 
out that in the most fundamental aspect of economic theory- the 
theory of value- Marxian economics differ significantly from 
classical economics. In the essence of Marxian theories stands the 
labour theory of value. Classical economics, it will be argued, was 
dominated by a distinctly different theory of value; a 'cost of 
production' theory of value. Thus, the whole episode of the labour 
theory of value as well as the theories that are founded on it, 
though they may have merits of their own, should, from the point 
of view of classical economics be considered as a mere detour from 
its natural development (see for instance Schumpeter, 1954 p.568). 
Nevertheless, in view of what I believe to be the unsettled question 
as to how much of classical economics is the labour theory of value, 
one cannot doubt that Marxian economic theory is at least a 
legitimate offspring of that tradition.
Indeed, the question of the theory of value is the key to the 
understanding of the different nature of economic theories. If we 
accept the generally shared view that the theory of value associated 
with classical economics is a 'cost of production' theory of value, 
then Marxian economics may seem as a mere aberration. However, if
Evans (1989) deals with these questions and 'absolve' Marx from this 
accusation. Nevertheless, in view of their competing doctrines, there still 
remains a puzzle why hadn't Marx attacked Mill's theory. The explanation as 
if Marx hadn't really finished the Capital and that he would have discussed 
Mill's Principles had he had the chance to do so, is, in my view quite flimsy. 
If indeed their doctrines were antagonistic then in view of Mill's prominence 
Marx would have opened his economic analysis by criticizing Mill.
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we extend the characterization of classical theory of value to be 
a theory of 'objective effort' or, an Index of the difficulty of 
attainment, as opposed to the 'subjective' neo-classical theory, then 
a labour theory of value cannot be considered as aberration.
Moreover, there Is also the question of what Is really meant by a 
labour theory of value. For Ricardo the labour theory of value was 
a proposition about what It Is that determines prices. Hence, the 
question Is really whether or not prices are proportional to labour 
values; or. In other words, whether relative prices reflect labour 
Inputs. Some would argue that this Is also the case In Marx's theory 
which Is the reason why the problem of transformation became so 
crucial. If then. It can be proved® that prices do not reflect the 
labour theory of value. It becomes an empty concept.
However, this Is not the only possible interpretation to the role and 
significance of the labour theory of value In classical economics. 
Instead of being the regulator of prices, labour can be seen as the 
origin, or meaning of values In a more abstract fashion. Indeed, even 
though It Is agreed that Smith's theory of value, for Instance, Is 
a 'cost of production' theory, there is enough evidence In his 
writing to support the argument that a labour theory of value had 
crossed his mind. In fact, there can be no doubt that In Smith's 
description of the 'rude stage of society' values were proportional 
to labour Inputs. Why, one may wonder, does he bother at all to
®There are many proofs based on the Rlcardlan-Marxlan qualification that 
the proposition only holds If the capital to labour ratio In each Industry Is 
the same. I will however deal with these proofs when I discuss the problem of 
labour theories In the last section of this part.
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discuss a theory which he then considered to be of no consequence? 
What, in other words, is the purpose of exploring the theory of 
value in the 'rude' state of society if not for the purpose of 
extracting its most essential arguments?
Even Ricardo, who quite clearly modifies the conditions for the 
proportionality of labour values to prices, does not seem to abandon 
it himself. The explanation in his case is rather simple; though 
labour inputs do not determine prices, the changes in them seem to 
be in accordance with the changes in relative prices (or what became 
to be known as the 93% labour theory of value). Nevertheless it 
remains unclear why it matters at all, that changes in relative 
prices correspond to changes in labour values if what determines 
prices is something completely different.
There are two other interpretations which, in my view, are not 
unrelated. One is the one I have discussed above. Namely, that while 
analyzing prices in a partial equilibrium analysis it seems 
intuitively appealing to characterize prices according to their 
attainment difficulties. When the two hunters meet it is still a 
partial equilibrium analysis and as we know nothing about their wants 
and needs or, for that matter, their activities in other markets, 
what can be a measure for exchange other than labour inputs?
The other is an explanation put forward by Blaug (1985) which I have 
already discussed earlier. This explanation is that Smith's view of 
labour was a measure of welfare. Not only was Smith interested in the 
national income but he wanted to see the true toil and trouble that
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were involved in producing it. Therefore, he suggested nominal wages 
as the deflator to the national income. Viewed in this way it is 
clear that Smith never thought of labour theories of value.
I thoroughly agree that Smith did not see in a labour theory a 
mechanism which explains prices. I also agree that he saw in labour 
in the true toil and trouble-- the real measure of welfare. But 
this does not mean that he hasn't considered the same measure at a 
disaggregated level. Namely, that he hasn't thought of the labour 
value of a commodity as reflecting the true 'toil and trouble' of 
producing this commodity. This does not mean that he thought actual 
prices to be determined by it but on the other hand it is not an 
empty concept. If we know what the true 'toil and trouble' of 
producing a commodity is we can, perhaps, understand what it means 
to deviate from it, as is bound to happen. It certainly is not a 
worse explanation than to argue that labour values are wrong 
measures of social welfare.
On the whole, however, it is clear that discussions of labour values 
dominate classical economics. However, once we understand that the 
purpose of it was not to explain prices (except Ricardo) , we must try 
and see what was the other meaning of it. A measure to social welfare 
is indeed a possible explanation and it is, in my view, an equivalent 
one to that where labour values are the measure of the 'true' cost 
of production.
It is, apparently, easier to explain the meaning of a labour theory 
of value that does not regulate prices, in a 'rationalistic'
310
framework rather than in an 'empirical' one. In the former, ideas, 
or concepts, may exist with a very complex relation, and sometimes 
none at all, to observed phenomena. Thus, as prices are the observed 
phenomenon, labour values may be the unobserved one (in particular 
if we refer to past labour). Eventually, the problem will be to 
determine the meaning of this dual system and to analyze the
conditions and significance of the divergence of one system from the 
other. In the 'empirical' tradition, however, there is no room for 
a labour theory of value if it is not closely correlated with an 
observed phenomenon, like prices.
Notwithstanding the difficulties and complexities of Marx's 
methodology, I believe that it is possible to generalize and 
categorize his work within the rationalistic tradition (or to be more 
precise, within its special branch of German Historicism)^®. Hence, 
in such a framework it is meaningful to consider labour (indeed, 
abstract labour) as the universal of produced commodities- as the 
intrinsic value of things- without being inconsistent with the lack 
of its observed influence. In the case of Smith, who is believed to 
be a 'classical empiricist', a labour theory of value that does not
regulate prices may prove irrelevant. However, in the previous part
of my work I have argued that Smith's methodology was by no means 
free from, at least, 'Scholastic rationalism'. Thus, a way is being 
made to explain the role of the labour theory of value in his system
even when it does not regulate prices.
°^I do not wish here to go into the details of the problem of Marx's 
methodology. I admit that it is an over simplification but as far as my 
particular purpose is concerned, it is served. I also do not think that I do 
Marx in-justice as this may be a possible interpretation of it.
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In a rationalistic framework, the role of labour as the universal of 
all produced commodities may have some important moral implications. 
Particularly when theories of right and entitlement are being 
discussed. If, for instance, a proposition is being made about one's 
right to one's fruits of labour (a proposition made by both Mill and 
Walras)ii a labour theory of value may prove very helpful. To begin 
with, it may offer an explanation as to why observed prices deviate 
from a labour theory of value. At the same time, and in view of 
that, it might itself become a measure for some concepts of a 'just 
price' . An economy, then, might be judged according to its deviation 
from it.
In an 'empirical' framework, however, this is much more difficult. 
First, there is no epistemic content to the proposition about the 
labour value of things. Thus, a labour theory of value would only 
have any significance if it could be proved that it regulates and 
dominates observed prices. Even then, from the moral point of view 
it will probably be of no great consequence in view of the Humean 
dictate that no 'ought' statement can be derived from the 'is'.
In Smith, however, labour values do play a moral role. If labour 
values are the social welfare measure of true 'toil and trouble' it 
means that whenever the system deviates from labour value (when there 
is accumulation and profit) the labour measure is greater than the 
one measured by the 'true labour values'. Hence, the dictate of
This is in itself an astonishing thing, A theory of right from which 
such a proposition is being derived can hardly qualify as utilitarian. Indeed, 
that was one of the reasons 1 began searching f(or the true meaning of Mill's 
moral and social philosophy.
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moral is to increase the number of people so that it will catch up 
with the number reached by deflating national income by nominal 
wages. Therefore, the 'natural price', interpreted as the price 
which is associated with the highest rate of balanced growth, is the 
'just' price as when it prevails there is a rise in population.
There is a reason why I have focused the reader's attention on the 
labour theory of value. It is because it seems to me that the 
confusions, and sometimes mis-understandings, of the role and meaning 
of the labour theory of value is also the reason for some of the 
confusion with respect to the moral significance of classical 
economics. I believe that understanding why those scholars who seem 
to have neglected the labour theory of value as explaining relative 
prices but kept writing as if they adhered to it, is the key to the 
understanding of the moral implications of their economic theories.
( d )  A  N o t e  On ' R e c o n s t r u e t i o n a l i s m '
Explaining the origin (methodologically as well as historically) of 
our present concepts of economic justice is, in my view, a task with 
great contemporary relevance.
From this point of view it was of great importance to establish the
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difference in framework between classical and neo-classical analysis. 
Namely, to discuss the different notions of general equilibrium and 
to investigate the moral consequences of this difference. (The 
problem of causality and moral responsibility) . It is also important 
to establish Mill's theory of economic justice even though he had 
not discussed it explicitly. For that purpose I had a choice. To 
bring together the Logician, the moral Philosopher and the Economist 
in J.S. Mill and thus be blamed for 'reconstructionalism'. 
Alternatively, I could have simply collect Mill's moral assertions 
with respect to economic issues and to establish on it his theory 
of economic justice.
There are, in my view, two different ways to look at the nature of 
any attempt to analyze past theories (as distinct from historical 
analysis of 'facts'). One way is through its aim, the other, through 
the means of that investigation. Suppose now that there are only two 
kinds of such investigations which some may title as 'historical' 
and 'analytical' reconstructions (which in my view is not a very 
meaningful distinction as any reconstruction bears the seeds of an 
analytical investigation) . To distinguish between them through their 
aims is to say that 'historical' reconstruction aims at explaining 
apparent 'factual' contradictions in the past. (In the case of the 
history of ideas 'facts' should be interpreted as statements or 
propositions.). An 'analytical' reconstruction, accordingly could be 
interpreted as a reconstruction of past ideas for the purpose of 
explaining present difficulties (either theoretical or factual). It 
is a kind revival theories (like Sraffa (1960), for instance).
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To distinguish between the two methods by their means is to say that 
'historical' reconstruction is based on evidence found in the past. 
Namely, in the case of ideas, that a contradiction in propositions 
can be settled only through further investigation into the author's 
other manuscripts. However, it must be noted, such a reconstruction 
can only be resolved if one finds an explicit explanation to the 
contradiction in question. Otherwise, one needs either to employ 
some analytical tools or, to decide between the opposing statements 
according to their appearance in time.
'Analytical' reconstruction, viewed from its means, is an 
investigation that resolves such problems by using the logic as 
employed by the original author. From this point of view these two 
methods answer two different question. One is, what did he really 
say?, the other, what could he have meant?. For anyone who is 
interested in the history of ideas as an expression of the 
development of human knowledge, the only interesting question is the 
second one.
Now, while the two interpretations of 'historical' reconstruction are 
quite consistent, it is not so with 'analytical' reconstruction. If 
'analytical' reconstruction is, according to its 'means' definition, 
based on past logic, what good is it for the purpose of explaining 
contemporary problems (its 'aims' definition)? Why not apply present 
logic to it? Well, the answer to this question depends on whether one 
believes in progress. Of course, this cannot be the case of theories 
which have a clear experimental side to them. The social sciences, 
however, are certainly not this case.
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There are quite a few problems with applying 'historical' 
reconstruction to analyze the theory of economic justice in Mill. 
First of all, some very important propositions which appear in Mill's 
Principles are not obvious extensions of his moral theory. So much 
so that one really begins to wonder which moral principles should 
be applied to Mill's economic analysis. The most obvious example is 
the principle of 'proportional remuneration'; the assertion that 
everyone has the right to the fruits of one's effort, labour or 
abstinence.
The immediate application of that principle appears to some to be 
Mill's objection to Rent. However, this idea is not so simple. 
Indeed, Mill argues that "this principle [of proportional 
remuneration] cannot apply to what is not the produce of labour, the 
raw material of the earth".(Principle, p.230). However, he offers 
an 'economic' justification for allowing rent as otherwise, no 
cultivation will take place. Like Ricardo, he objects to the 
taxation of rent (beyond what is the common practice) on the grounds 
that it is impossible to tell which part of the rent is due to 
improvements (and then it is virtually profit) and which isn't.
So what emerges from all that is that Mill sees a great difference 
between moral and economic justification. Indeed, in his Liberty he 
even argues that the justification of Free Trade cannot be grounded 
on the idea of individuality which is the most important fundamental 
in Mill's moral theory. So how does expediency relate to ethics? 
Well, in spite of his Utilitarianism, expediency is only a 
secondary consideration. In his discussion on property Mill argues
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that society may choose to organise itself in different ways. For 
each he contrives the principles which, one can show, follow from 
his theory of individuality. Then, he says, when comparing two 
perfectly ethical systems, they will be tested according to how well 
they perform.
This, in principle, is not a very meaningful distinction between 
ethics and economic expediency. For each system, according to Mill, 
reflects different kinds of human development so that it is not 
really that we choose from a set of possible worlds, rather, the 
state of the individual dictates a certain social organization. As 
far as these organizations are efficient he seems to have little 
doubt that they all are, if properly organized.
Mill's explicit support of free-trade is also accompanied by serious 
criticism of the effects of competition on the diversity (and thus, 
individuality) of society. Moreover, in Liberty, he is quite explicit 
about that fact that exchange is in the domain of social 
interference. The only reason why he objects to it is that its 
particular purpose (efficiency) is better achieved without such 
intervention.
In order to establish whether free-trade is also morally good, one 
must examine whether the principles which should dominate its 
'ideal', have an extension in the real world of economics as Mill 
described it. For that purpose, I needed again to resort to 
'analytical' reconstruction. By establishing a relationship between 
the principle of proportional remuneration and classical economics,
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I will be able in the future to see what happened to a similar 
principle when it comes from a different philosophical background 
and is applied to a completely novel idea of economic analysis: the 
Walrasian system.
As the principle of proportional remuneration dominated the history 
of economic justice, it is of great interest to see how and why it 
disappeared almost completely from present day analysis of economic 
justice. Some would argue that the whole problem of Mill's view of 
proportional remuneration and its application to economics can be 
analyzed through his treatment of Rent. However the only thing we may 
get out of it is that Mill did believe in the principle as he (as 
well as Smith and Ricardo) was apprehensive about the rights of 
rent. But this we know already. The question is how can the 
principle be generalized in a consistent manner to the other 
components of society.
For that purpose I will have to resort to some 'analytical 
reconstruction' and I can only hope that the reader can see its 
merits.
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2. A Walk in The Woods: Some Reflections on General and Partial 
Equilibrium in the General Context of Classical Economics.
In principle, the question of whether classical economics should be 
discussed in a 'partial' or, 'general' equilibrium frameworks depends 
on what we believe to be the distinction between the two frameworks. 
As such, it is a subject that is beyond the scope of my present work 
but nevertheless, I would like to say a few words about it in 
connection with our particular task^. Surely if not all economic 
variables are inter-related it must have some effects on the subject 
of economic justice. In particular, as the case of Mill appears to 
be, when the theory of value is consciously (may be wrongly) being 
disassociated from the theory of distribution.
( a )  T h e  P r o b l e m  o f  D e f i n i t i o n .
Basically, or perhaps only technically, equilibrium is the 
simultaneous determination of a set of variables. At one place.
^1 would like to remind the reader that this is all part of the 
interlude. I do not pretend to have even started dealing with the full 
complexities surrounding the concepts of 'general' and 'partial' equilibrium. 
What I do want to investigate is how do different conceptions of equilibrium 
affect the role and meaning of prices. In turn, this will have important 
implications to the moral analysis of economics. It is mainly to that end that 
this chapter is devoted.
319
?
Hicks(1983) wrote that "equilibrium is relative to the things that 
we are prepared to treat as exogenous."(p.39). Which basically means 
that the only way to distinguish between different types of 
equilibria is through the numbers of variables that we consider 
simultaneously. However, the ability to choose any number of 
variables means that at any one time there exists a set of variables 
we believe to be related and, out of which we choose those to be 
considered endogenously and those to be considered exogenously. 
Surely, there would be no point at all in mentioning exogenous 
variables had we not had any idea about the nature of their 
relations (or interactions) with the variables we chose to analyze. 
Thus, the existence of general equilibrium is pre-supposed. It comes 
to practice when we consider all variables simultaneously^.
Obviously, the question that immediately follows is what do we mean 
by 'all variables'. If we mean by that the set of all economic 
variables then the idea of general equilibrium means that we believe 
that all economic variables are inter-related. Partial equilibrium 
analysis in such a case, which really adheres to the true meaning 
of the word, is merely a technical concept. It is an analysis of the 
simultaneous determination of one, or some variables out of the set 
with the underlying assumption that all economic variables are 
completely inter-dependent. Partial equilibrium in such a setting
^We must be careful with what is meant by 'all' variables. We can think 
(and I'll discuss it below) of variables in a hierarchy form. That is, we may 
have several sets of variables which are distinguished by the number of 
variables in them. Those in the lower order will influence the other but not 
necessarily the other way around. Within each such set there is complete 
interdependence. When I refer to 'all' variables I mean, at this stage, all 
the variables in a self-contained set which is also the lowest order of these 
sets.
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is indeed just a technical term with no significant insight of its 
own regarding the fundamental nature of economic phenomena.
Hence if we believe 'all' economic variables to be all those things 
which have a price then a general equilibrium approach will mean to 
denote, say, the demand for each good as a function of all prices;
(1) Di- Di(Pi......... Pn).
In a 'partial' equilibrium analysis we will write the same demand 
function as:
(2) Di- Di(Pi, . . .Pi).
Clearly what we are saying here is that we think prices Pj..... Pi to
be of greater significance to the market of the commodity in question 
than the rest of the prices. We cannot, in principle, construct (2) 
before knowing anything about (1).
What does it mean, one may ask, to say that (1) is a true description 
of the demand for this commodity? The answer must be in some 
fundamental assumption about the system. Namely, that markets are 
inter-related through economic agents. Equation (1) is true because 
we assume that each individual has preferences over the whole set 
of goods (completeness assumption). Hence, each individual has an
active interest in all markets and if there is a change in one of
them it will affect his behaviour in all the others. Each
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individual, then, has an equal role in the system.
If, however, by the set of all variable we do not mean all economic 
variables then even a simultaneous analysis of all variables that we 
believe to be related, cannot be considered as general equilibrium. 
The word general will be mis-leading. Naturally, if we consider a 
'general' equilibrium of an economic system, we imply by it that all 
economic variables are inter-related. As by defining the set of 'all' 
variables to include less than all economic variables, our analysis 
is by nature-partial equilibrium. It tells us nothing about the 
determination of some economic variables which we have knowingly 
excluded from the set of 'all' variables. Economics, in such a case, 
will be a set of sets which are not necessarily related to one 
another. Within each set we may choose to analyze all or part of the 
variables simultaneously but this will not invoke a meaningful 
distinction (other than linguistic) between partial and general 
equilibrium.
So far, however, there was an underlying assumption that dominated 
our analysis; that of inter-relations. This, of course, is 
fundamental to modern interpretations of general equilibrium. From 
Walras via Debreu to Arrow and Hahn, the basic feature of general 
equilibrium is the complete interdependence of all economic 
variables. Thus, as all of them are being determined simultaneously, 
the problem of causality gets a new and untractable dimension (an 
interesting discussion of it can be found in Simon (1953))^.
 ^ The problem of whether simultaneous equations are good tools for the 
purpose of estimation reflects the debate about how we perceive the real 
world. T.C Liu (1960), for instance, attacked simultaneous equations on the
322
However, what would the case be if we supposed economics to be 
comprised of more than one set of variables. Namely, that not all 
economic variables are inter-dependent?
The nature of economic analysis in such a case will depend on the 
relationship between the sets. If, for instance, they are completely 
independent from one another, then economic analysis is conducted in 
a 'partial' equilibrium framework even if within each group of 
variables we may analyze the simultaneous determination of all of 
the variables. If, however, there is some causal relationship 
between them, say, the equilibrium values of one group affect the 
equilibrium values of another group but not the other way around we 
may run into some difficulties regarding our 'definitions'. Can we 
consider it as a general or partial equilibrium conception of the 
economic system?. On the one hand, there seems to be a sort of 
causality flowing in one direction; binding, as it were, all 
economic variables in a chain of causation but nevertheless, no 
inter-dependence exists. On the other hand, part of the economic 
variables are determined independently of other economic variables; 
can we really call it 'general equilibrium'?.
grounds that the world, as a matter of fact, is much more simultaneous 
(interdependent) then we can imagine. As a result, any set of simultaneous 
equations for the purpose of estimaton will be underidentified. But at the 
theoretical level simultaneous equations will be the right method of analysis. 
H. Wold (1957) on the other hand, argued against simultaneous equations on the 
grounds that in reality there are unilateral causations. Hence the rejection 
of simultaneous equations in this case will be at the theortical level as 
well. Of course this does not mean that all variables may not be 
interdependent in one way or another. In any case, this debate is beyond the 
scope of this work but what I would like to stress is that simultaneity is not 
just a technical matter. It reflects a much more serious problem; that of our 
perception of the world.
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To some extent, this latter case is the case of 'classical economics' 
and, in my view, one of the reasons for confusion regarding its 
nature. Those variables which on the whole, seem to be determined 
separately are the values of remuneration and in particular, the 
remuneration of labour. Once determined, they affect the theory of 
value but only in as much as 'cost of production' values are the 
gravitation point around which actual prices oscillate. However, 
changes in actual prices do not seem to have an affect on 
remuneration. The reason for that is that there is no way to relate 
actual deviation of prices from their 'cost of production' as these 
are caused by changes in demands which are not explicitly inter­
related.
The difference between a Walrasian system and a classical one can
also be seen through the parameters of the solution. In Walras, the
parameters of the solutions are the technological coefficient (of 
production and consumption). In the 'cost of production' system the 
parameters are also technological except one; wages. Now there is, 
from a normative analysis point of view, a big difference between 
parameters which are 'decision' dependent and those which are 
'given'. In Walras the parameters are given. In the 'classical'
analysis we can agree that at least one is a 'decision' parameter*.
Wages, if not taken at their subsistence level, are an equilibrium 
result (of the labour market) which appears to be independent of the 
price system to which determination it contributes.
*By decision I mean a parameter which depends on the cumulative behaviour 
of economic agents.
324
Thus, the 'classical' system (unlike the Walrasian one) is 
hierarchical in terms of its economic variables. And though this 
does not mean that we cannot present the price system as a set of 
simultaneous equation, it cannot be thought of as a description of 
the same kind of world.
Even if we thought of the behaviour of the labourers as being 
technological (and thus setting wages at their subsistence level at 
any time) it would still be different from the Walrasian system. If 
the division of labour (the technological coefficients) depend on the 
dynamic of wages then again we shall have a hierarchical system 
though the nature of parameters will not be different than that of 
the Walrasian system.
( b ) T h e  C o n c e p t  o f  G e n e r a l  E q u i l i b r i u m  i n  C l a s s i c a l  E c o n o m ic s
The problem of the one-way causal relationship between, say, 
remuneration of labour, and values of commodities can take two 
different forms. One, it can be supposed, as it is usually done, that 
the problem of classical economic was not so much in trying to 
construct such a line of causation, as it was a failure in the 
attempt to bind them together. Consider, for instance, how Walras 
interpreted this problem in classical economics. "[Ajccording to the 
English School, we must have the prices of the productive services 
in order to determine the prices of the final products"(Elements,
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p.421). But, argues Walras, this cannot be done as the prices of the 
productive services depend on the price of final goods. He describes 
Mill's system (by the way, completely false) as suggesting that the 
price of final goods, P, is the sum of its cost of production: P— 
S + I where S stands form wages and I for interest rates. S, argues 
Walras, is pre- determined, thus, at least consistent with its being 
independent of the price P. I however, is described as the residual 
between the price and advances for labour. Hence, I- P-S. "It is 
clear now that the English economists are completely baffled by the 
problem of price determination"(p.425).
The question remains whether their failure according to Walras is in 
not succeeding to construct profits independent of prices or, in 
succeeding in constructing wages in such a way. As I have just 
indicated, there is a great difference between the two 
interpretations. If their failure was in not succeeding to divorce 
profit determination from prices, then it is believed that the 
Classicists perceived economics as a system of 'partial equilibria'. 
If, however, it is believed that they failed, technically, to achieve 
complete interdependence,(namely, they failed to connect wages with 
prices) then a 'general equilibrium' approach is attributed to them.
I believe that Walras criticised the classical school because he 
thought that they failed to see the general equilibrium nature of 
economics. That they have tried to divorce the problem of 
distribution from that of value. Some modern economists, like 
Hollander (1985,1987) and Morishima (1989) seem to believe that this 
was not the case. That the only reason why the classical economy has
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not produced general equilibrium analysis is simply because of 
technical reasons. There is, however, a great difference between 
views like those of Hollander and those of Morishima. The former 
tends to argue not only that classical economics should be seen as 
a general equilibrium analysis, but that it should be seen as a 
'neo-classical' one in the nature of its propositions (like, for 
instance, the subjective theory of prices and the role of demand). 
Morishima, on the other hand, does not seem to insist that classical 
economics offered 'neo-classical' propositions, rather, that 
'general equilibrium' should be applied to it in order to extract 
from it, its own logically consistent propositions.
In any case, according to these views, the classical theory of value 
is a theory of 'cost of production' which, it is argued, is a general 
equilibrium theory. However, as I have argued above, this is not the 
same idea of general equilibrium as understood in the modern 
framework of analysis. Consider, for instance, an economy with n 
commodities which serve in the production of each other. Let A be 
the technology matrix where is the amount of commodity i used in 
the production of one unit of j . Let P be the vector (row) of prices 
while is the vector of labour inputs. W will be the wages (in 
money) and r the rate of profits. We shall assume that the value 
and stock of money are constant throughout.
The idea of general equilibrium in terms of 'cost of production' 
theory of value means that prices are determined according to the 
following set of equations :
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Pl = (l+r) [^ ’1311+^2^21“*-......... +fn3nl+wai]
? 2 =(l+r) [Piai2+P2322“*-...... ■‘■^n3n2+V«2]
(1)  
P„=(l+r) [?iain+F232^I“*-.......
Or in a matrix form:
P - (1+r)[PA + Wa].
If general equilibrium means complete inter-dependence, then the 
above system does not satisfy this condition. P is the price vector 
produced by this system of 'cost of production' , r and W are the 
distribution variables. Surely, for all of them to be 
inter-dependent (or, in other words, to be determined 
simultaneously) there are not enough equations. To use Simon's 
terminology, this set is not self-contained. Thus, the idea of 
inter-dependence must be abandoned at once.
The 'traditional' solution to the problem is to fix one commodity as 
a numeraire; and to fix wages at the level of subsistence (i.e. W- 
PS where S is the subsistence vector). Thus, we have two concepts 
of real wages. One in terms of the subsistence requirements of the 
labourers and the other, the purchasing power in terms of the 
numeraire. The former is pre-determined, the latter is being 
determined in the model.
The question is, does it mean that real wage is an endogenous 
variable? If subsistence is indeed a reflection of necessities, why 
does it matter at all what his wages are in terms of the numeraire. 
Suppose, for a moment, that the numeraire is taken from the bundle
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of subsistence. The idea of a subsistence bundle is that one needs 
those levels of consumption from all the goods that comprise it. 
Hence, substitution is not possible. Thus, though the labourer may 
be able to buy more of the commodity he does not need any more, he 
will not do so because his earnings are sufficient only to pay for 
his subsistence.
Of course, this would be even more difficult to accept had the 
numeraire been taken from outside of the subsistence bundle. There 
are additional complexities that are introduced by this solution and 
I will deal, with them soon. At the moment, however, it is a 
solution in as much that it reduces the number of unknowns to the 
number of equations.
The problem now takes a new form. Equation (1) is now:
(2) P«(l+r)[PA+?5a]
where S is a column vector and a is a row vector so that Sot is a 
matrix. A typical component of A+ Sa is a^ j + aj which is the 
amount of commodity i needed for the production of one unit of j 
plus the amount of i needed for the subsistence of the labour 
required for the production of j. We can now re-write (2) so that:
(3) ?(l+r)-i=P[A+Sa]
Thus we have a simple problem of finding the 'eigenvalue' and the 
'eigenvector' . Following Perron-Frobenius we know that when a matrix 
is productive (i.e. A>-0 and for any x>0, Ax<x) there is only one 
positive eigenvalue which corresponds to a positive eigenvector, and, 
that its value is always less than 1. Hence, as (1+r)'^ is the
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eigenvalue, then it means that r>0.
The implication of it is that r, a distribution parameter, is secured 
as positive because of the productivity of the system, not because 
of prices. In fact, it is easy to show that r depends only on the 
technological coefficients. The eigenvalue of (3) is determined by:
(4) det[(l+r)-^I-(i4+Sa)]=0
Of course, prices too are determined by the technological 
coefficients alone. The question is whether or not we can call this 
inter- dependence. In my view this is not a case of 
inter-dependence. It is a case of one-way causality. Causality from 
the technological circumstances (which contain one distributional 
parameter) to prices and profits. Hence subsistence determines 
profits but not the other way around.
It must however be noted that I am ignoring here something which 
dominated Smith's analysis and, I believe, makes it a different case. 
This is the dependent of technology on distributional parameters; 
namely, the dependence of the division of labour on what the 
capitalists do with their profits and how it affects wages. But 
unlike Smith, in Mill though technological changes are considered, 
they are being considered independently of the development of 
economics (social institution).(In Chapter 3 book 4 Mill discusses 
the influence of progress and he considers various possibilities of 
combination between the development in the division of labour and 
different trends of other economic factors. He does not, however, 
consider the reciprocal influences that these trends might have).
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Coming back to the problem of general equilibrium in a cost of 
production framework, some would argue that the only thing that 
matters is that we can establish an inverse relationship between 
wages and profits (from the theory of value). But this, I believe, 
can be quite misleading. It means that if we reduce profits we might 
raise wages, and this is not true. The only thing we may say here 
is that if we raise wages (subsistence level), profits will fall.
The inverse relationship between the rate of profits and wages 
appears to be an important proposition in terms of the moral 
implication of such an economic system. Presumably, this inverse 
relationship, given the uniqueness of the system's solution, 
provides us with some relationship between various prices and 
distributional parameters. Thus, by looking at a price we can learn 
from it something on the relationship between the rate of profits 
and the wages. A price, therefore, can be morally just according to 
what it proposes with respect to the values of the rate of profits 
and wages. However, as I will show immediately, even this inverse 
relationship is not at all a robust result as is usually assumed. 
In section 7 I will also show that even if it were, it would not be 
a meaningful relationship as what happens to actual shares of each 
social class in the total output is not determined.
If, however, we want to discuss wages not as a technological 
coefficient but rather as an endogenous variable, we shall have in 
spite of all the conceptual difficulties to refer to the concept of 
real wages in terms of the numeraire.
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Let us study now the simple case of 2 commodities. Let commodity 1 
be the numeraire so the problem we have is the following one:
l=(l+r) [ (aii+Siai)+P(a2i+S2Cïi) ]
(5)
P=(l+r) [ ( a 12+^102 ) ( ^ 2 2 ) ]
We can re-write it as:
] (1+r)-1=0
(6)
^2=[ (ai2+5ia2>+P(a22+52a2)] (l+r)-P=0
Where,
Pi(P , r , S ^ , S 2 ) ~F1 [P(Si,S2) ,r(Si,S2) ] =0 
The partial derivative matrix will be: 
a?i 3Fi
3(Fi,p2) (a2i+S2(%i) (1+r) aii+5i(Xi+P(a2i+S2«i)
5 (F » r) aF2 aF2 (^ 22^ 2^^ 2) (l+r)-l 1^2^ 1^^ 2^ F (a22+^ 2^ 2)
~Ï ÏF
Let a^ j denote the components of A+Sa.
Now we can establish the inverse relationship between profits (r) and 
subsistence (say, Si).
a2i(l+r) Oi(l+r) 
dr ^  _ 322(l+r)-l a 2 (l+r)
55i ^ii(l+r) aii+Pa2i 
322(l+r)-l âi2+Pa22
a2i(l+r)2a2-[a22(l+r)-l]oi(l+r) 
aii(l+r) [ai2+Pa22]-[a22(l+r)-lJ (an+Pa2i)
If a22(l+r)"^<0 then the denominator as well as the numerator are 
positive so that the relationship between r and Si is negative. But 
there are some conditions when this is not the case.
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It will be indeed difficult to argue that the denominator can be any 
thing but positive, but this is not the case with the numerator. If 
a22(l+t)-l>0 the denominator must satisfy the following condition 
to be negative :
âii[â22(l+:") (P-l)+âi2(l+r)+l] < S2iP[ (l+r)a22-l]
This is most unlikely as the right hand side is very small indeed. 
If P, which is a relative price, is around unity, the left hand side 
is clearly greater than the right hand side.
The numerator, on the other hand, must satisfy the following 
condition to remain positive (so that 6 r/ 5 <0 ) :
(l+r)(â2i(%2-'^220:i)+«i > 0
Which means
> i n t i - ■■ 1. ]
®1 ^21 (1+r) 022
But as l/(l+r) is always less than 1, l/(l+r)a22 is also less than 
1 by assumption ( a22(l+i^ ) > 1  ). Thus, the expression in
parentheses is close to 1. The question whether or not the numerator 
is positive depends on the relationship between the ratio of direct 
labour inputs and the ratio of circulating capital. There is nothing 
in the system to guarantee either results. The conclusion as if 
wages in terms of subsistence is inversely related to the rate of 
profits is conditional.
1 admit that the above conditions are indeed stringent, but the 
problem of relationship between profits and wages cannot really be 
considered as technological. Indeed, if we wish to allow some sort
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of endogeneity to wages, we shall have to treat it in terms of the 
numeraire. Wages are thus given as W - Si + PS2. A change in real 
wages will be:
Suppose that the r-Si relationship is indeed negative, we still have 
to see how a change in Si affects prices.
Oi(l+r) âii+Pâgi
dP ^ _ « 2 ( 1 + ^ )  â i z + P â g g
aii(l+r) aii+Pagi
âg2(l+r)-l âi2+Pâ22
ai(l+r) [âi2+Pâ22]-ot2(l+r) [âii+Pâ2i] 
aii(l+r) [ai2+Pa22]-[a22(l+r)-l] (an+Pa2i)
The denominator must be positive for the original r-Si relation to 
hold. The sign of the numerator depends on the sign of:
ai(âi2+Pâ22)-a2(âii+Pâ2i)
And this depend on whether :
“ 1 > (âii+Pâ2i)
02 < (ai2+Pa22>
Hence, the effect of a change in subsistence on the price depend on 
the ratio between direct labour inputs. Now let us see what will 
happen to Wages in terms of the numeraire. If 6 P / S S 1 is negative, 
the answer will depend on the size of Si, Again, we have no definite 
answer as to the relationship between wages and profits.
Hence, if subsistence requirements rise, profits will fall but wages 
in term of the numeraire may fall as well. What can we say in such 
a situation on the moral significance of the rise in wages and fall
334
in profits. Surely, what seems to be missing is the effects of 
prices (or technology, to be more precise) on the distributional 
shares.
The meaning of all that is that the concept of general equilibrium 
that is often assigned to classical economics, does not really offer 
an insight into the question of the relationship between the theory 
of value and distribution. Either because in any case one 
distribution parameter determines the other as well as prices so 
that there is no causal relationship between prices and 
distribution. Or, because the relationship between the two 
distributional parameters in such a system is not well established. 
The truth is that given distributional parameters (r and S^) may 
yield three different prices for three different types of 
technological circumstances (I will show it in section 7). But the 
system as presented above tells us very little about how distribution 
and prices are actually related.
One way of over-coming these problems is in the idea of the wage-fund 
doctrine. Given the time factor, wages are paid at the beginning of 
the period, profits are collected at the end of it. The wages for the 
next period are determined by the ratio between how much the 
capitalists decide to return to the system as circulating capital, 
and the number of labourers. Hence, it seems as if we have the 
following causal relations;
Profits— > Wages >Profits >
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There are, however, two problems here. First, it seems that the
theory of value is merely a by-product of this cycle. As wages are 
determined, they comprise part of the technological circumstances 
which, in turn, determine profits as well as prices. There is, 
however, no need on our part to look at prices at all as the
determination of profits and wages does not depend on them.
The other problem is that the arrow from profits to wages depend on
the decisions made by the capitalists how much to consume and how 
much to save. If anything, this is the place where the effects of 
a theory of value on distribution can present itself. However, in 
order to see how the decisions of the capitalists are being 
coordinated we must examine an aspect of the theory that seems to 
be missing entirely from the 'cost of production' approach. In the 
case of Mill as in the case of other classical economists there are 
surprisingly 'modern' descriptions of demand functions (see Forget 
1989), nevertheless, a general interdependence between them is not 
established. Thus to argue that the 'cost of production' are the 
general equilibrium long-run prices to which all markets, analyzed 
in a partial equilibrium framework, will eventually converge is 
unacceptable. In Mill's case, I believe, it is the result of the 
partial equilibrium nature of analyzing social phenomena. Thus, cost 
of production are not necessarily the prices that will prevail, but 
they are a good reference point.
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(c) The Moral Implications
Allow me now to say a few words on why the question of framework is 
relevant to the problem of moral significance.
To consider the difference between the general and partial 
equilibrium approaches, in terms of their proposed moral 
consequences, it would perhaps be useful to try and examine them in 
a wider context. Such, for instance, that may suggest something 
about possible methodological relationships between economic 
analysis and moral theory.
There are mainly two issues to be considered here. First, whether 
each framework of analysis is associated with a particular 
epistemology. And whether a particular epistemology implies 
particular moral considerations. Second, there is the question of 
whether or not the particular frameworks of analysis as such, with 
no reference to their epistemologlcal origins, restrict in any way 
the moral analysis.
To the reader who is familiar with modern philosophy, the first 
question may seem a little bit puzzling. How can we relate the 
problem of discerning 'true' from 'false' to the question of 
distinguishing 'right' from 'wrong'. After all it was Bertrand 
Russell himself, the champion of 'analytical empiricism', who found 
the combination of science with ethics Intellectually and morally 
objectionable. It is so, apparently, because 'analytical empiricism'
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has changed the focus of philosophy. It has turned philosophical 
questions into 'syntactical' ones. Admitting by the way that doing 
it narrows significantly the scope of philosophy. (Carnap, for 
instance, was so taken by the ' linguistical' approach that he
insisted that all problems of philosophy can be interpreted in the
same way. It was Russell who had to convince him that this is a 
little bit far fetched).
In the framework of 'analytical empiricism' epistemology is reduced 
to the question of the meanings of words rather than the perceptions 
of 'ideas', 'concepts' etc. Thus indeed, to inquire about the 
meaning of 'x is y ' is significantly different than investigating 
the meaning of 'x ought to be y' . The whole exercise where one tries 
to connect moral theory with economics (taken as a science in the 
sense of it being engaged in an inquiry into the 'is') through
epistemology becomes thus, dubious.
But this was not the case in philosophy until the 20th century.
Certainly by the time Smith, Mill and Walras wrote, philosophers used 
to deal with both questions from the same point of view. A rough 
retrospective view on the last couple of centuries will present us 
with mainly two competing schools in both of which ethical questions 
were no less a problem of knowledge than scientific investigation. 
Classical empiricism, founded by Lock, Hume and Berkeley on the one 
hand, and Rationalism, represented by Descartes, Liebnitz and Kant 
on the other.
According to 'Classical Empiricism' human knowledge was basically a
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question of sensual experience. Consequently, knowing what it is that 
is good or bad is also a result of some sensual experience. 
Utilitarianism, therefore, is entirely in the tradition of classical 
empiricism. Of course, it does not mean that it is the only possible 
moral theory but nevertheless it is a good example of the 
psychological foundation of ethics in this tradition. In terms of 
scientific inquiries the question of what people consider to be good 
or bad is in itself a subject of a 'true' or 'false' investigation. 
Hence, ethics and science are subjects of similar sorts of inquiries.
Another feature of this trend of thought was that as far as method 
is concerned, it was primarily inductive reasoning that seemed to 
be consistent with the premise that human knowledge is based on 
sensual experience. The fact that Hume presented the world with the 
'problem of induction' did not mean that a solution to the problem 
can be to resort to deductive reasoning.
The rationalistic school, on the other hand, adhered to the idea that 
human knowledge can only be a result of logical reasoning. Descartes 
went as far as suggesting that there is no real relationship between 
what is in the human mind and what it is that exists in the real 
world. Kant, on the other hand, made an effort to relate the two by 
searching for 'a-priori synthetic' statements. That is, statement 
about the real world that are derived from some pre-experience 
knowledge. In the same way as in classical empiricism the pursuit of 
the question what is was no different from the question how do we 
know our duties (which are the result of our perception of the right 
and the wrong). Thus, moral theory is on the one hand a study of
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people but as it is founded on a-priori analysis it is an imperative 
at the same time. Not surprisingly, it was deductive reasoning that 
is consistent with this trend of thought. The question that will now 
have to follow is whether or not a particular epistemology implies 
something with respect to the framework of analysis.
As far as general equilibrium is concerned we have made a distinction 
between variables that are related through complete inter-dependence 
and those which are related but through a distinct causal 
relationship. For the empiricist, who bases his analysis on 
observation, interdependence is almost impossible to observe. Causal 
relations, on the other hand, are more easily detected. However, in 
view of Hume's problem of induction (and I do not examine modern 
solutions here) these causal relations cannot be extended to become 
a general theory. Hence, in principle, general theory should not 
have been a tool of classical empiricists. Nevertheless, as some of 
them thought that Hume's problem was solved, or, like Mill, thought 
that they have solved it themselves, the notion of general 
equilibrium is bound to be an extension of the causal relations 
which are observed.
According to Mill, induction is possible because the world is 
operating on rules. Thus, this assumption of rules allows us to 
extrapolate safely. However, as was said before, this is either 
explaining induction by induction or, even worse, basing induction 
on an a-priori principle.(To some extent it is amazing how similar 
this idea becomes to those of the great opponent of empiricism-Kant. 
He too thought that human knowledge is a-priori because the human
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mind is itself part of nature. Therefore, as the mind is subject of 
nature, it is capable of understanding its laws.).
In the sense of general equilibrium being an extension of some 
observed causality, the lack of complete inter-dependence in the 
'cost of production' approach is quite consistent with the way I 
believe a 'classical empiricist' would have described his general 
equilibrium. Even in the case of Adam Smith where I have applied a 
general equilibrium approach, the causal nature of it dominates the 
scene.
The difference in nature between the 'empirical' and 'rationalist' 
concepts of general equilibrium also has some direct moral 
implication. The lack of causal relationship in the 'rationalistic' 
view together with the complete interdependence of all economic 
variables will make it difficult to detect moral responsibilities 
within the system. Unlike a system where causality exists and where 
the conflicting sides can be more easily identified. In a world where 
we look separately at the buyers-sellers relationship of goods and 
services, moral judgement is bound to be focused on the advantages 
and disadvantages of each side to the trade. If, on the other hand, 
the buyer of a good is at the same time the seller of his services, 
it is presumed that his disadvantages in the one deal will be 
compensated by his advantages in the other. In other words, there 
is an important substitution between the supply of services, like 
labour, and the purchase of commodities. Consumption, in a person's 
utility, is a substitute for effort. Thus, the question cannot be 
whether in his particular relationship with his capitalist he feels
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that he was properly treated. One must also consider the benefits 
he had as a buyer. Thus, the moral significance of prices in a 
system of complete interdependence will be different from the one 
where causal relations exist. The ides of, say, a just price is 
reduced in the former case as dependent on the final distribution 
that it supports rather than on the nature of the relationship 
between the buyer and the seller.
There is, obviously, much more that can be said on the subject. What 
we did say will serve to understand the complex system of classical 
economics as appeared in Mill. It will also help to discover the 
difference in the focus of normative analysis within the classical 
school and between it and, for instance, Walras.
342
PART IV
MORAL PERSPECTIVES IN J.S. MILL'S THEORY OF 
VALUE AND DISTRIBUTION
343
1. INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of this work I have pointed out that one of the 
things which triggered this work was the absence of desert theories 
from contemporary discussions of economic justice. I have also argued 
that it seems to me to be the result of methodological development 
in economics. Some of these developments may indeed be due to the 
change in the subject matter. Some, however, may be entirely due to 
methodological questions of a more technical nature.
When we said that what seems to dominate contemporary notions of 
general equilibrium is the symmetry in the positions of all economic 
agents, we have implied that there was a change in the subject matter 
which affected the already known idea of interdependence. However, 
there is still an unresolved question here. Is it that the one time 
realization that economic agents have symmetrical positions that 
generated the change in methodology or was the change in methodology 
unrelated to any change in the subject matter.
In general it cannot be denied that some change in the subject matter 
of economics must have affected the way people perceived the world. 
However, I'm not entirely convinced that in the case of Walras it was 
that which invoked his idea of simultaneous equations (of a non- 
hierarchical nature). Rather, it was his perception of the world (his
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'rationalist' foundations) that generated the change in method which, 
in turn, implied a different conception of the economic world.
I have tried to show (at the beginning) that such conception of the 
economic system may have important moral implication. One of them was 
the disappearance of desert theories although I am far from convinced 
that they have also disappeared from people's sense of justice. To 
show, therefore, that the disappearance of desert was not due merely 
to the discovery of interdependence but rather to a particular kind 
of interdependence I had to show that within the classical school 
interdependence coexisted with principles of desert.
This is by no mean an easy task as on the face of it there is some 
inherent contradiction between interdependence and principles of 
desert. If decisions and actions (and consequences) are inter-related 
then responsibilities which are essential for desert cannot be 
established. In the case of Adam Smith the principle of desert 
survived but in a very particular manner.
It survived because it was an essential part of his moral theory (the 
analysis of action) and not because he clearly observed its presence 
in economic analysis. His analysis of values in the partial 
equilibrium context reflected this idea very well. Whether labour was 
a general index for welfare or a particular index for effort does not 
really matters. What matters is Smith's belief that there should be 
proportionality between actions and outcome. If one labours so many 
hours it seemed and immediate conclusion that he should be able, in 
an action of exchange, to get something which stands in proportion
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to his effort.
The general interdependence obviously created problems but we saw how 
the same idea can be transferred into the system through the 
distinction between the natural and the market price. The natural 
price, as it were, represented the situation where remuneration was 
according to effort ('what it really cost'). However, in the general 
equilibrium context Smith's expectation of what the natural price 
should represent had to be re-interpreted as those prices where 
growth is maximized. Although desert is not explicitly present in 
my interpretation of Smith's economics, the moral evaluation of the 
economic system was certainly driven by it.
However, I also argued that Smith's model is not typical of classical 
economics. It was based on the idea of general equilibrium in market 
prices which is then compared to the natural price specifications. 
In general, within some interpretations of classical economics 
general equilibrium only prevail in the natural prices (interpreted 
as 'cost of production' systems). From the moral point of view it is 
an important difference.
In a 'cost of production' setting we can only observe a very general 
relationship between two distribution parameters; wages and the rate 
of profit. From the moral point of view they are not very meaningful. 
As I will show later on, what happens to the total share of wages and 
profit is not always directly correlated with what happens to their 
rates. So as reflections of desert theories the inverse relationship 
between wage rate and the rate of profit is not very telling. Though
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most classical economists where apprehensive about Rents because they 
did not reflect any effort, we cannot say how such principles of 
desert can be applied to the other classes which comprise the greater 
part of society.
To a great extent It Is Mill who on the face of It, presents the 
greatest challenge to desert theories within the classical 
traditions. There are three reasons for that:
(a) a utilitarian moral theory;
(b) a partial equilibrium analysis of market prices;
(c) a 'cost of production' theory of natural price.
Utilitarian moral theory Is a teleologlcal theory where the only 
principle Is that of happiness maximization. Evidently there Is no 
room In such a theory to any other principle and In particular, the 
principle of desert.
A partial equilibrium analysis means that there should have been some 
hope to desert principles because In a narrow setting the 
relationship between Individuals are clearer. However, It seems that 
Mill's distinction between three Instances of exchange (Inelastic 
supply, constant returns to scale and diminishing returns to scale) 
have changed the focus of analysis. In some cases It Is utility that 
matters. In others, only cost of production. We cannot hope to 
generalize from this a theory of desert. And as for (c) we already 
saw the problems of desert with 'cost of production' theories.
In spite of all that Mill seems to uphold the principle of desert. 
When one looks for Mill's writings on economic justice In the
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'Principles' one will find them dominated by the theories of right. 
In particular, there were the principles of proportional 
remuneration and those which restrict the 'freedom' of the market in 
favour of individuals' progress (like education)^. One may argue 
that the latter is not entirely inconsistent with Mill's idea of 
utilitarianism as there are inferior and superior kinds of pleasure. 
Advancing what Mill thought as superior pleasures is a dictate that 
follows from utility maximization and need not be ascribed to a 
theory of rights. The principle of proportional remuneration, on the 
other hand, is much more difficult to defend in this context. The 
task of this part, therefore, is to see whether we can reconcile 
these apparent contradictions and to examine what could be the 
meaning of proportional remuneration in Mill's system.
The solution to these problems is quite complicated and depends on 
a careful examination of Mill's methodology. According to it there 
is indeed no reason to believe that there is some particular kind 
of synchronization within economics as an organ of the social 
sciences. Moreover, the major role of ethology^ implies that the use 
of an 'economic man' as a rational construction in deducing the 
working of the system is not very meaningful. The circumstances of 
the system serve as a feed back and affect the human character. 
Individual behaviour therefore, cannot be assumed but must be part 
of the system itself.
^The freedom of market has nothing to do with the freedom that is 
advocated in On Liberty. See p.116.
^The study of character formation to which I will come back later on
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Given Mill's objection to deduction as a mean for knowledge 
accumulation one must follow his solutions to the problem in order 
to understand his position with respect to economic analysis. He 
offers solutions (like the 'train of reasons') according to which the 
premises of the economic system will have to be the conclusions of 
an inference system based on induction. But as there is no possible 
way to learn by induction about social phenomena we are left with 
some 'tendency rules', on the one hand, and some deductions the 
premises of which are based on induction on the other.
Induction, it appears in Mill, is easier in the natural sciences. 
Therefore, the possible source of inductive base for social deduction 
should be those aspect of natural sciences that are closely 
associated with economics. As a matter of fact there is a branch of 
economics which Mill considers to be entirely in the domain of the 
natural sciences: the theory of production. According to Mill
production is the application of human labour to matter. The rules 
which govern these relations can be learnt by induction and they will 
therefore have, a major role in our economic analysis.
The task in front of us is the following one: First, to establish the 
major aspects of Mill's methodology which are applicable to the 
social sciences. Secondly, we have to see how it is possible to 
reconcile his utilitarianism with ethical principles like the one 
about proportional remuneration. Thirdly, we will have to see what 
does his methodology imply with respect to his economic system. In 
particular we will have to investigate what is the relationship 
between market prices and cost of production prices. We shall also
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ask how the fact that production relations are determined by natural 
laws (as opposed to social institutions) relate to the 'cost of 
production theory' and the natural price. Lastly, we shall have to 
engage ourselves in a kind of extrapolation in order to establish the 
significance of a principle of proportional remuneration in a 'cost 
of production' setting of general equilibrium.
On the whole I will argue that Mill's demand for an anchor in the 
natural sciences means that the theory of production and relations 
in production are the key elements in his theory. On the other hand, 
it will be shown that Mill considered economics as a part of the 
social science in an active way. Namely that although the general 
system of society is behaving harmoniously, each component of it need 
not have to be so. Therefore, the partial equilibrium approach to 
market prices is consistent with Mill's general view of society and 
science.
But at the same time, the theory of production provides us with some 
kind of an independently harmonious system. As all products are 
basically the result of applying labour to matter, we can use labour 
as a mean to compare commodities from the point of view of the 
natural science. Namely, this is not a labour theory of value but 
rather an 'empirical labour theory' which denotes the technological 
truth (learnt inductively) about relationship in production.
The labour relationship will obviously not determine prices. These, 
as was said before, are determined in a partial equilibrium setting. 
But there is an inherent interdependence between the various markets
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as commodities are interdependent by nature (the theory of production 
or, the labour requirements relationship). This interdependence 
simply reflects the objective constraints of the system (there is a 
given number of labourers). Market prices, on the other hand, are 
being analyzed in a partial equilibrium framework because they 
reflect the general interdependence that captures the whole society. 
In other words, market prices are a result of social institutions, 
labour interdependence in production is a natural phenomenon. How do 
they relate to each other and what is the meaning of this 
relationship is what this whole exercise is all about.
In order to be able to relate the two we can use another idea of Mill 
and that is the idea of ' average ' prices. Acknowledging that there 
is no exclusive economic interdependence between the market we can 
still try and relate them to one another by looking at averages. 
These averages form a system of 'cost of production' which may be 
thought of as Mill's idea of the natural price system.^
Now, if the theory of desert and Mill's own insistence on 
proportional remuneration, is to have any meaning then we must see 
how the 'cost of production' system that is generated by the social
^Some, like Hollander (1985), Forget (1989) and Bradly (1989), will 
argue that in the case of Mill it is clear that 'cost of production' are the 
Marshalian long-run prices. That is to say that though in the short run 
prices are being determined by the traditional analysis of intersecting 
demand and supply curves, in the long run prices will all converge to their 
cost of production. Naturally, it will take horizontal long-run supply curves 
in all markets to determine that prices are unaffected by the positions of 
the demand curves. This, I believe, is not a straight forward conclusion as 
Hollander would have liked to see it but nevertheless, under some assumptions 
it is possible to interpret Mill's system in a similar way. In general, 
though, such a view means to ignore Mill's discussion of averages and the 
distinction in framework between the natural and the social sciences.
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circumstances relate to the one that is generated by nature and, 
obviously, reflects the true efforts.
The next section will deal with Mill's methodology. I will discuss 
there the epistemological foundations of Mill's work as well as their 
effects on method of investigation. I will look at the unique form 
of deduction that Mill uses and I will investigate its significance 
to the study of social phenomena, I will point out that it is 
because of this method of deduction (which is associated with the 
idea of a 'train of reasoning') that we shall not be able to 
consider the actual determination of prices in a general equilibrium 
form. Rather, we shall have to make do with a 'cost of production' 
framework which is an average that relates the actual state of 
prices to relationships in production. The role of ethology as the 
Baconian Axiomate-Media will also be discussed. I will then try to 
sum-up Mill's perception of the social sciences.
The third section deals with Mill's moral theory. I will argue there 
that Mill's moral theory was not Utilitarian in the 'classical' sense 
of the word. That some of his moral propositions, and in particular 
those relating to economics, cannot be explained within the framework 
of utilitarianism. In fact, they are surprisingly close to some of 
the moral propositions of the rationalist Walras. I will try to show 
that Mill's moral system can be explained as consistent when viewed 
from the point of view of his perception of the social sciences. I 
will also argue that the rules of justice, almost like in Smith and 
Hume, are the necessary conditions for moral responsibility and for 
achieving Happiness. Necessary though not sufficient.
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The fourth section implements the previous ones into Mill's 
perception of the economic problem. I will suggest that economics, 
for Mill, is a discipline which combines natural and social science. 
This, I believe, is reflected in Mill's distinction between 
production and distribution. As such, it is possible to extract 
information about relationships in production in a far more reliable 
way than it is in the social sciences. These relationships which are 
independent (in Mill) of human institutions, can serve as a 
benchmark for any moral discussion of desert and remuneration.
I will show here that 'cost of production' is thought by Mill as an 
average (over time) of the actual prices in different markets. The 
actual determination of those prices is within a 'partial 
equilibrium' framework, but the average, implies Mill, is determined 
by the technological conditions of the economy. But not only on 
them, it also depends on the determination of one distributional 
parameter; wages. This, I maintain, creates a causal relationship 
between the one distributional parameter and the other. Fixing on 
the way the relative prices.
To that extent. Mill's proposition that distribution is not affected 
by prices is correct*. It is affected by it. Obviously, had there 
been a discussion of how prices may affect capitalists' savings (or 
the amount of circulating capital that they return to the system), 
the story would have been entirely different. Probably closer to 
Smith's economic model. Therefore, we can now treat relative prices 
as reflecting distributional considerations. Bearing in mind Mill's
*See chapter 26 in the 'Principles' pp.688-694.
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moral proposition regarding proportional remuneration, we have a 
moral argument directed at prices rather than at distribution.
Section five deals with establishing the principle of proportional 
remuneration as Mill's concept of economic justice from the moral 
point of view. Section six is the major extrapolation and it applies 
the principle of proportional remuneration to Mill's theory of value. 
There I will show various interpretations of the idea of 
proportional remuneration. I will deal with it when we apply the 
principle to capitalists as well as workers, and when (and why) we 
apply it to workers alone.
I will also show that the 'cost of production' framework produces 
(under some circumstances) a robust factor price frontier. But this 
frontier is different from the neo-classical one as it does not 
reflect optimal conditions. Hence, under different technological 
conditions, the same wage-rate of profit ratio may be associated with 
different shares in output of labour and capitalists. Adding these 
considerations, we may find that when we consider proportional 
remuneration of capitalists, there is some sort of substitution, in 
terms of economic justice, between proportionality and distribution.
In the appendix to that section I introduce a simple form of a neo­
classical model. I examine there the condition for prices to be 
proportional to effort. The conclusion I reach is that under complete 
inter-dependence there is no proportionality of prices to effort 
though utilities are maximized. Only if we break the 
inter-dependence into some sort of causality (like decisions on work
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(production) precede exchange) we shall find that prices are 
proportional to effort. However, those equilibrium values will vary 
inversely to it as circumstances change.
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2. A Note on Mill's Methodology
( a )  E p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  f o u n d a t i o n s
Before dealing with the question of method it is important to 
understand that Mill's epistemology is completely within the 
tradition of classical empiricism. "Truths are known to us in two 
ways: some are known directly, and of themselves; some through the 
medium of other truth. The former are the subject of intuition or 
consciousness; the latter, of inference."(Logic p.6). Any inference, 
he then argues, must be based on a premise that is known to be true. 
Otherwise, human knowledge will not be increased. Thus, the focus 
of acquiring knowledge is on the direct way; i.e. intuition or 
consciousness. The most powerful acquisition of knowledge is through 
consciousness."Whatever is known to us by consciousness, is known 
beyond possibility of question"(p.7) . This knowledge, he argues, is 
acquired through our senses. Intuition, however, may become 
inference. Optical illusions, for instance, are such occasions. 
However, through experience we learn to understand that what it is 
that we believe we see is only an inference.
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Thus, it is clear that as far as the epistemological foundations are 
concerned Smith and Mill seemed to have worked within the same 
tradition (like Lock and Hume). In turn, it implies that for both of 
them moral analysis will be strongly based on moral psychology; i.e. 
what it is that people believe to be morally good or bad. The 
question that will now follow is what method is appropriated to 
learn anything by inference.
( b )  I n d u c t i o n  v s .  D e d u c t i o n .
Many believe that Mill completely rejected the method of deduction 
and considered induction as the only possible inference by which the 
human knowledge may be increased. Blaug(1980), for instance, argued 
that Mill's Logic embodies "a deliberate disparagement of deductive 
logic (called ratiocination) as an intellectual sausage machine and 
a eulogy to the logic of induction as the only path to new 
knowledge."(Blaug, 1980. p69). Thus, when he comes to the social 
science and suggests that the only possible method here is the 
deductive one, one is tempted to interpret it as either saying that 
social sciences are not a science or, that deductive methods are 
legitimate tools of enhancing knowledge.
That Mill did not consider social sciences as less scientific is 
quite obvious. First, if they were not sciences, they should have 
been Art. As such, according to Mill, deduction would not be
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applicable. "The error Is therefore apparent, of those who would 
deduce the line of conduct proper to particular cases, from supposed 
universal practical maxims;"(p.946). Hence to argue that the fact 
that he attributed deduction to social studies means that it was 
less a science is wrong.
Moreover, Mill definitely considered the social discipline as first 
and foremost, scientific. "All phenomena" he wrote " of society are 
phenomena of human nature, generated by the action of outward 
circumstances upon masses of human being: and if, therefore, the 
phenomena of human thought, feeling, and action, are subject to fixed 
laws, the phenomena of society cannot but conform to fixed laws, the 
consequences of the preceding"(Logic, p877) . So is it that he
deliberately disparaged deductive logic? I think not.
There is little doubt that Mill was doubtful of deductive logic that 
is based on a-priori statements. In line with Sextus Empiricus' work 
from the third century. Mill argued that a-priori deductive logic 
suffers from 'petitio principii' (assuming what is required). Namely 
that the premises of the process of deduction are already based on 
the conclusion. For instance:
Major Premise 1 - All human beings are mortal
Minor Premise 1 - Socrates is a Human being
Conclusion: Socrates is mortal
Now, according to Mill, in this exhausted example the major premise 
was constructed upon the knowledge of the conclusion. Namely the
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premise that 'all human are mortal' entails already the conclusion 
that Socrates is mortal. Thus, argues Mill, deductive knowledge is 
itself based on induction. Namely, only by observing many human 
beings, including Socrates we can reach the major premise. In other 
words, for the conclusion to be true in the above case, the premises 
must also be true. The only way to know that the major premise is 
true is by induction.
This, however, is not a simple matter. Any deductive process pre­
supposes that in order to attribute a 'true-false' value to the 
conclusion, the 'true-false' value of the premises must have been 
well established. For an a-priori statement it is quite straight 
forward- the premise will be true by definition- but is it also true 
to the conclusion of an inductive process?. The answer to this 
question will lead us inevitably to a discussion of Hume's problem 
of induction and Mill's proposed solution to it.
In order not to digress any further, let me just point out that 
Hume's problem was that an induction that is based on numerous 
observation cannot be logically generalized beyond those particular 
incidents for which it accounts. Thus, the conclusion of an 
induction cannot gain a universal 'true-false' value that is needed 
for the premises of a deductive system. Mill's solution to the 
problem is based on the uniformity of nature. This, in turn, may 
either be a result of an induction which means that the solution to 
the problem of induction is based on itself. Or, even worse from 
Mill's point of view, that the uniformity of nature is an a-priori 
statement.
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It is within this tension between the problem of induction and the 
rationalistic sense of its solution that one will have to consider 
the role of general equilibrium among the 'empiricist' economists. 
Even though 'analytical empiricism' seems to have found a solution 
which is somewhat similar (see, for instance, Whitehead) it is still 
within the framework of what is considered as 'analytical 
empiricism'. Mill's solution, on the other hand, is introducing some 
rationalistic features to his analysis.
So if deduction, according to Mill, suffers from the problem of 
'petitio principii', it seems to be worthless for the purpose of 
acquiring new knowledge. However, this is not really the case.
Let us look at Mill's own example:
Major Premise 1 -All arsenic is poisonous
1
Minor Premise 1 -This which is before us is Arsenic 
Conclusion -This which is before us is poisonous.
Major Premise 2 -All things which produce a precipitate
of a certain colour are Arsenic
11
Minor Premise 2 - This which is before us produces a 
precipitate of a certain colour
Conclusion -This which is before us is Arsenic
Now the conclusion of 1 consists part of the induction process that 
generated major premise 1. But the minor premise 1 is based on the
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conclusion of II. Namely, it is based on a different syllogism. Now, 
if we only had problem I then for all we know that thing which is in 
front of us precipitate a certain colour. Without conclusion II we 
could not have established conclusion I. Hence, argues Mill, it is 
clear that deduction, though in itself not a way to acquire 
knowledge, may become helpful when too many inductions are required. 
He called it a 'train of reasoning'(see Logic, Ch.4 pp-209-230). On 
the whole. Mill had not considered induction as the opposition to 
deduction, "The opposition" he wrote " is not between Deductive and 
Inductive, but between Deductive and Experimental"(Logic, p.219).
Clearly, therefore, one cannot argue that deduction as such was a 
logical anathema to Mill, He was, however, quite opposed to a-priori 
statements. This means that for any deduction to have any meaning at 
all it must be based on observation rather than on definitions. The 
premises of social sciences, consequently, must be the result of some 
observation. The question that will immediately follow is whether or 
not, induction is possible where no experiments are available. One 
thing, however, seems to be evident. That in Mill's methodology the 
realistic nature of the hypothesis plays a crucial role.
Deduction, thus, is a legitimate tool of acquiring knowledge when the 
circumstances are too complex to follow the rules of induction alone. 
It is, however, important to point out that not all deductions expand 
human knowledge. Abstract deductions, like for instance geometry, are 
not accepted by Mill as expanding the human knowledge. The fact that 
it is based on a-priori statements, i.e. statements that follows
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definitions, empties it of any real contents.
Abstract deduction and induction are two competing methods of 
acquiring human knowledge. Both of these are engaged in establishing 
a single causation. Thus, in Mill's view and in the tradition of 
Lock and Hume, induction is the only path to the truth. But 
deductions which are not based on truly a-priori statements are 
valid to the process of acquiring knowledge. These are the 
'concrete' and the 'inverse' deductions.
( c )  C o n c r e t e  D e d u c t i o n  a n d  t h e  i d e a  o f  I n t e r - d e p e n d e n c e .
The 'concrete' deduction is the method by which we may learn 
something about the more complex world. Namely, the world where an 
effect may be produced by a set of causes. "It infers the laws of 
each effect from the laws of causation on which the effect depends; 
not, however, from the laws merely of one cause, as in geometrical 
methods, but by considering all the causes which conjunctly 
influence the effect, and compounding their laws with one 
another"(Logic p.895).
So there seems to be two stages incorporated in the process of 
concrete deduction. First, one has to establish the causes of each 
effect. And secondly, to compound the causes of different effects
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that prevail at any given one time. As for the social sciences Mill 
argues that the first step seems rather straight forward:"The 
actions and feelings of human beings in the social state, are, no 
doubt, entirely governed by psychological and ethological laws; 
whatever influence any cause exercised upon the social phenomena, 
it exercises through those laws" (Logic, p.896). The problem, 
however, arises at the second phase. "But when the question is that 
of compounding the aggregate result of many coexistent causes;...we 
attempt a task to proceed far in which surpasses the compass of 
human faculties"(ibid).
There are two different problems attached to the social science. 
First, the impossibility of experiments and second, the scope of 
inter-relations. The solution to the first problem is given by 
allowing some general introspections to serve as premises. Though 
they cannot be reached by proper induction, they nevertheless are 
not completely independent of a person's experience. The 
consequences of this reduced level of 'truth' in the premises is the 
reduction of conclusions to what Mill called 'tendencies'. In other 
words, the lack of universality of the premises only allows us to 
speculate on the directions of the conclusion. A deviation from that 
tendency is not necessarily an indication to the fallacy of the 
proposition.
The idea of tendency is also part of the solution to the second 
problem. The complexity of the social science and the difficulty in 
compounding all causes does not allow us to propose more than 
tendencies. However, there are two major propositions that Mill
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States which may shed some more light on the investigation of such 
complex phenomena as the social one. First that the whole of the 
social body may be viewed as a single organism. That is, an organism 
that is comprised of many limbs (separated fields of inquiries) that 
live in 'consensus' with one another. Namely, society is 
fundamentally a harmonious collection of causes and effects. Like 
the physical nature even though such a conclusion about nature is 
the result of induction while here it is merely an a-priori 
assumption.
The second important idea is that the social phenomena is a simple 
sum of the individual phenomenon. Namely, if society is a harmonious 
organism which is comprised of simple sums of individual phenomenon 
then it should not be difficult to calculate the effects in one limb 
of that organism, on the others.
Now, the idea of the concrete deductive method implies that society 
should be investigated by separated branches. But at the same time, 
while each branch follows its own concrete deduction, on the whole 
the social investigation should be seen as a 'train of reasoning'. 
The conclusions of each concrete deduction serve as part of the 
premises' structure of another. Thus, creating that dependent and 
harmonic view of society.
All this leaves us with the following important conclusions. (A) Only 
natural sciences (the experimental) are open to induction. Thus, the 
Newtonian harmony of nature (or general equilibrium) is a valid 
logical generalization. In short, the natural world is a general
364
equilibrium system. (B) The social sciences are only open to 
deductions of particular sort; concrete deduction and the 'train of 
reasoning' . Each branch of the social science may be considered as 
a single or set of concrete deductions which are the collection of 
causes related to a well defined phenomenon. There is no inherent 
requirement for equilibrium within the system; there is however a 
general requirement for the general equilibrium between all fields 
of social investigation.
( d )  T h e  r o l e  a n d  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  E t h o l o g y .
According to Mill, the branch of the social study that dominates and 
balances the social organism is that of Ethology. "The actions and 
feelings of human beings in the social state, are, no doubt, entirely 
governed by psychological and ethological laws ; whatever influence 
any cause exercised upon the social phenomena, it exercises through 
those laws" (Logic, p.896).
Before getting into more details, allow me to explain some additional 
methodological points. At least as far as deductive methods are 
concerned one must distinguish between universels and empirical laws. 
Empirical laws, according to Mill, are those observed uniformities
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(either in succession or coexistence). However, they may not be 
generalized (as they have no experimental aspect) beyond the limits 
of our observation (see p.861). The reason for that is that they may 
be either part of a more complex rule of causation or, that they may 
be broken into simpler sequences of causation. At any rate ”[t]he 
really scientific truths..are not these empirical laws, but the 
causal laws which explain them”(p.862).
"All ratiocination" wrote Mill, "start from a general proposition, 
principle, or assumption: a proposition in which a predicate is
affirmed or denied of an entire class. . ."(pp.173-4). This thing which 
is attributed to an entire class is what Mill calls a universal. 
Note, however, that this does not mean that he adheres to a 
rationalistic approach. A universal can be the outcome of inductive
reasoning. Past rationalists seemed to believe that universals were
substances in themselves. Thus, once a property is attributed to 
this substance it must be attributed to all that belong to this
universal (the dictum de omni principle).
As human actions are at the heart of the social phenomena, one should 
begin the investigation by looking at people's psychology. 
Psychology, according to Mill is the science of the elementary laws 
of the mind (p.869). But these laws of the mind (which is some form 
of epistemology) do not explain why people behave in a particular 
manner. This, it seems, depends on the encounter between the 
person's psychology and the circumstances. "Mankind " he argues, 
"have not one universal character, but there exist universal laws 
of the formation of character"(p,864).
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Hence, ethology is the science of the formation of character. Its
subject are the laws of the mind and given circumstances, its object
are people's behaviour. "Ethology will serve for the ulterior 
sciences which determines the kind of character produced in 
conformity to those general laws [of the mind] , by any set of 
circumstances, physical and moral"(p.869). It is, argues Mill, a 
form of a Baconian Axiomate-Media; a transition mechanism from the 
universals to the empirical laws. However, unlike Bacon, Mill 
believes that we can use deduction to move from the universals to 
the axiomate-media and from it to empirical laws.
Now we may depict Mill's system as follows:
Universals.......... > Axiomate-Media- > Empirical laws
Laws of the Mind Ethology --■>>Human action--Circumstances
I I I
I I I
I________________ Circumstances<.......... -..........
Universals, in this particular case, are known by experience and 
induction. These laws of the mind should not be confused with 
psychology as we understand it or, indeed, as Smith or Hume saw it. 
"Psychology, according to Mill, studies the 'laws of the mind', that 
is, the laws according to which states of mind or consciousness 
follow, or are caused by one another."(Berger.p.10)
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There are two General Laws of the mind:
l.Once a state of consciousness has occurred, it can be 
reproduced in the mind without the presence of the original cause. 
(Hume's assertion that 'every mental impression has its idea'.(Coll 
pap. p.852).
2."These ideas..are excited by our impressions, or by other 
ideas, according to certain laws which are called Laws of 
Association"(Logic p. 852).
Given these laws of the mind, we can derive rules according to which 
we shall be able to assess how people will behave when confronted 
with any set of circumstances, "..the great problem of ethology is 
to deduce the requisite middle principles from the general laws of 
Psychology. The subject to be studied is, the origin and sources of 
all those qualities in human beings which are interesting to 
us....and the object is, to determine, from the general laws of the 
mind,combined with the general position of our species in the 
universe, what actual or possible combinations of circumstances are 
capable of producing or of preventing the production of those 
qualities"(pp.873-4)
This view of the social sciences has two major consequences. First, 
as the outcome of human actions affects circumstances it may cause 
a change in human behaviour. Thus, economic circumstances are not 
only susceptible to human nature, they also affect it. This, I 
believe, must have great implications on the way we perceive 
economics. We can no longer suppose that a one time economic man 
will remain unaffected by the social comsequences of the economic
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system. If so, the premises of our economic theory must change 
accordingly. It also means that a stationary economic state may not 
be so stationary In terms of Its social consequences. That Is, a 
system may be stationary In terms of the values of economic 
variables, but the apparatus that achieved them may change. For 
Instance, the same set of economic variables may be either the 
result of a competitive system comprised of utility and profit 
maximizers or, say, an output maximizer central authority that Is 
based on some co-operative arrangements. Indeed, In Mill's analysis 
of progress, he believes that the art of production will progress 
together with the co-operative nature of human being.
It Is Interesting to point here at some similarities to Smith. There, 
we saw that the efficiency of a competitive economic system may 
affect people's moral psychology. They will tend to confuse wealth 
with virtue as they wish to see wealth bestowed on virtuous people. 
Nevertheless, the significant difference Is that In Smith's case 
these effects only change the quality of moral judgement but they 
do not change the fundamental psychology that governs people's 
behaviour. It certainly does not affect people's behaviour as far 
as economics Is concerned. At best. It Is affected by the same 
circumstances; I.e. the degree of Interest a person has In the 
other's fortune.
The second consequences of Mill's ethology Is, that the economic man 
must be affected by moral circumstances. Now In Itself It Is not a 
deviation from Mill's theory. Remember that we pointed out to the 
fact that society Is a harmonised organism. The separated study of
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each of its components help to understand its complexity of 
causation. As we may think of the sum of those separated studies 
as a 'train of reasoning' we know that each branch of studies 
includes in its premises the conclusions of another. Thus, the 
economic man must also reflect the results of people's moral views, 
or circumstances.
There is, however, another aspect to this theory which must have an 
impact on Mill's moral theory. It is the 'necessity of human 
actions'. Given the circumstances and the character's disposition we 
can foretell what his action will be "as we can predict any physical 
event"(Logic p.837).
Now Mill insists that this does not empty the concept of freedom as 
we can influence the circumstances. The power of self-formation 
(education) as he called it, is also the power of free-will. But as 
the power of self-formation depends on social circumstances it turns 
out as if the degree of moral responsibly is a function of the social 
state. Thus, we should not look for the impact of the 'necessity' 
paradigm on the analysis of how moral ideas are being produced (the 
utilitarian theory). Rather, we should ask ourselves how much of a 
free-choice those ideas reflect. In other words, how much freedom was 
generated by the social circumstances when particular ideas of morals 
were conceived.
In turn, all this will help to explain why it is that Mill had 
morally objected to the system of free enterprise even though he 
appeared to be a utilitarian. It will also help in understanding why
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in such circumstances, it is remuneration that is based on objective 
measures that is the source of the real moral good.
Let me summarize this last section. We saw that it follows from 
Mill's view of methodology that deductive methods are only valid if 
their premises either directly result from experience, or that they 
are conclusions of another deductive process the premises of which 
were direct results of experience. We also saw that Mill's 
perception of the social science was that of a complete and 
harmonious organism. Nevertheless, too complex and not experimental 
to allow any inductive method to be applied. Thus, the harmony, or 
general equilibrium between all components of social life is not a 
generalized induction but merely a hypothesis.
The study of each branch of society is in itself a partial analysis 
of society. Thus, it has as inputs the conclusions of other 
sub-systems of social analysis. A change in any of them will change 
the circumstances of all of the others. Now, usually general 
equilibrium in economics only implies that for any given initial 
circumstances, a solution will be found. However, the circumstances 
that it is referred to are those of initial distributions as such 
with no reference at all to the behavioral parameters which also 
constitute part of the premises of the model. In Mill's concept of 
society those changeable circumstances will change not only the 
initial distribution but the rules of behaviour as well. Thus, 
changes throughout the system and sometimes with little direct 
relation to economics, will bring about a change in the whole 
mechanism of economic activity. Hence, general equilibrium may be
371
9
used as depicting a single point in time but not as a principle of 
economic systems.
In the following section I will examine the consequences of Mill's 
methodology on his moral and economic analysis. I will begin by 
investigating the applicability of utilitarianism, or any 
psychologically based moral theory, to economic analysis perceived 
in the above way. I will compare it with Smith's analysis. Then I
will investigate Mill's economic theory from precisely the same
point of view. I will deal with the question of framework, with
concepts of remuneration and with the consequences of Mill's 
perception of the social science to economic questions as such.
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3. The Problem with Mill's Moral Theory.
In view of the role of ethology in the social sciences and, in view 
of its inter-relation with the social circumstances, the question 
of what is morally good becomes rather complex. In particular, it 
becomes difficult to accept Mill as a classical utilitarian (as a 
consequentialist) when obviously some responsibility to the moral 
behaviour of human beings may lie in the social circumstances.
In terms of its implications to the normative discussion of his 
economic system, the question will be where precisely do the moral 
considerations of a utilitarian come in when we have a system of 
general equilibrium in terms of 'cost of production'.
In the case of Adam Smith a similar problem should have arisen. 
However, as I have interpreted differently his economic as well as 
moral theories, it appeared that when applied to economics. Smith's 
moral theory suggested a principle which was not very far from ideas
373
that were associated with the 'just price'; proportional 
remuneration. I will therefore advance my discussion of Mill with 
some comments on the interpretation of Smith's moral analysis of 
economics. In turn, it will also shed some light on whether or not 
there is some general moral proposition that one can associate with 
classical economics.
( a )  Some I m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  S m i t h ' s  M o r a l  T h e o r y
In analyzing Smith we emphasized the two aspects of his analysis. 
One, the practice of morality which is entirely psychological, the 
other, the theory, or ideal, of morality which is a logical 
extension of the actual way that people use to form a moral opinion. 
At both levels we observed that the key to moral approbation is in 
the proportionality of the intention to the outcome.
Suppose now (which is not entirely far fetched) that in order to 
accomplish a certain intent, some degree of proportionality will 
prevail between the intention and the effort. In other words, the 
more benevolent an outcome we intend, the more effort will have to 
go into it. Then proportionality of intention to the outcome also 
implies proportionality to effort. Hence, as Smith wished the 
distribution of wealth to follow the moral principles, we may say 
that he wished remuneration to be proportional to effort.
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Nevertheless, as far as his economic system is concerned, it is clear 
that all are working for their self-interest. Thus for the system to 
become morally good it needed to be beneficent. The question was 
first of all who should enjoy and who should convey this 
beneficence. The answer depended on the social structure. As the 
produce belongs to the capitalists who, as it were, were remunerated 
by nature, the action of distribution is very clear. The capitalists 
act, the labourers are acted upon. Thus, beneficence will prevail 
only when labourers feel it. Hence, the condition for beneficence 
were a progressive economy with a low (minimal) rate of profit. It 
is, I maintain, a form of 'remunerative' justice. It is true that 
we do not distinguish between different works, but we do distinguish 
between labourers and capitalists. Namely, the remuneration of 
effort as opposed to remuneration for abstinence (to use Senior and 
Mill's observation). Smith obviously prefers the former to the 
latter.
I have gone through some effort to argue that Smith's moral theory 
cannot be interpreted as utilitarian. The fact that it is a form of 
pleasure that determines moral approbation is not enough to make it 
utilitarian. It is, nevertheless, a special kind of pleasure and 
indeed, it involves a rational process which cannot be considered as 
consistent with utilitarianism.
The reason I found it important to stress that point should be viewed 
in the larger context of this work. In my general introduction I have 
pointed out how in the past, due to the partial equilibrium approach, 
the key concept for economic justice was a 'just price'. More than
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to reflect an opinion on the general distribution of wealth (which 
could not be contested due to acceptance of the social structure) 
it reflected the idea of fair play. This can be simply seen in the 
analysis of Thomas of Acquinas. In Aristotle, this fair play was 
associated with a hidden idea that a just price should reflect the 
effort in production. The fundamental thing, however, about just 
price theories was that the position of the competing sides were 
well known and well defined.
In Smith I have tried to show that general equilibrium does not 
necessarily take us away from the idea of proportional remuneration. 
It is, in Smith, rather simple as his price is defined in such a way 
that it incorporates the general distribution among the three classes 
of society. Moreover, even though the labourers do not participate 
in the actual trade for goods (or their demand is always balanced 
by their subsistence consisting part of the supply price), their 
wages depend on the coordination of wants of the capitalists. Thus, 
though not directly confronted, labourers and capitalists are the 
two sides of the equation.
Now as for Mill we shall have to consider whether his moral theory 
as such, given the methodological comments of the previous section, 
paves the way to a similar or different concept of economic justice.
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( b )  Q u e s t i o n i n g  t h e  N a t u r e  o f  M i l l ' s  U t i l i t a r i a n i s m
For a long while it was accepted that Mill's moral theory ( based 
mainly on Utilitarianism) is fundamentally a Benthamian version of 
utilitarianism. This, in turn, means the following propositions:
(a) The desire for pleasure is the only motive to people's actions.
(b) The pleasure from an action is expected to be derived from its 
result. (A complete consequentialistic approach).
(c) Pleasure is the only thing which has any moral value. (see a 
discussion of these points also in Berger pp.30-1).
As far as the morals of economics are concerned this view may have 
some serious implications. First, as it is inherently a teleological 
approach to ethics, justice and the moral good are dependent on one 
another. Namely, a just economic system Is also a morally good one. 
Secondly, as it is an entirely consequentialistic moral theory, the 
idea of remuneration cannot be of great significance. If a 
distribution is 'Pareto-Optimal' like, using utility in the present 
sense, then it does not really matter whether the remuneration was 
proportional to anyone's effort as long as the outcome has generated 
the highest possible sum of utilities^. In a more partial 
equilibrium sense it would mean that when a deal is struck the only
^The fact that a Pareto equilibrium does not produce proportional 
remuneration can be seen in the appendix to chapter 6. It is important to 
emphasize that the effort I have in mind is; the objective input (of labour) 
rather than the disutilities of it.
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thing which matters is whether the two participants feel that they 
are happier now then they were before. Thus, a person who only had 
his labour to offer and he ends up with goods at his hand, must be 
happier than he would have been had he not traded at all. Even 
though he could have been happier had he been properly, in his view, 
remunerated.
This last addition of happiness will have to be measured against the 
loss of happiness of the person who hired him and now owns the total 
output. Moreover, if all utility functions were symmetrical, 
equality would be the distribution that generates the highest sum 
of utilities. Surely it cannot mean at the same time that
remuneration followed a proportion-to-effort pattern.
However, there are many reasons to believe that this interpretation 
of Mill's moral theory is inadequate. To a large extent it is so 
admitted (see, for instance, Robson,1968 and Ryan 1970) but, as 
Berger has noticed, "the orthodox interpretation continues to be 
widely promulgated" (Berger 1984,p.31). Let me now point out some 
of the reasons why such an interpretation is unacceptable.
First let me start with the assertion that the pursuit of pleasure 
is the only motive to human actions. The objection to it can be made 
at two levels; one, on the grounds of Mill's own direct observation 
about human nature, another, on the grounds of its inconsistency 
with his methodology.
As far as Mill's direct observations are concerned I would like to
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mention two other motiyes which are related to one another. These are 
sympathy and social feelings. When Mill accounts for social 
advancement he argues that behind it is "the desire to be in unity 
with our fellow creatures"(Ut. CW. VollO p.231). He also wrote when 
discussing the Utility of Religion that "Through all departments of 
human affairs, regard for the sentiments of our fellow-creatures is 
in one shape or another, in nearly all characters, the pervading 
motive. And we ought to note that this motive is naturally strongest 
in the most sensitive nature, which are the most promising material 
for the formation of great virtues"(Utility of Religion, cw v.lO 
p.411).
Sympathy, acknowledged as part of human nature, may still be 
interpreted as consistent with the above formulation of 
utilitarianism. Namely, that people may be motivated to please others 
because it pleases them to see other happy. To some extent it seems 
similar to Smith and Hume's reading of sympathy. However, we must 
remember that in the case of Smith the pleasure of sympathy was a 
rather complex one. It could not be interpreted as merely enjoying 
the other's happiness (or misfortune for that matter), it also 
included as joy from realizing harmony of sentiments. Whether this 
latter joy is part of what is meant a person's own pleasure is 
doubtful. After all we do experience it also when we measure our 
'sympathy' with another person's misery.
Coming back to our case it is rather clear that Mill did not believe 
sympathy to be a motive that reflects the pursuit of one's own 
pleasure. Commenting on his father's 'Analysis of the Phenomenon of
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the Human Mind' he wrote "By the acts or other signs exhibited by 
another person, the idea of a pleasure. ... or the idea of a pain, .are 
recalled, sometimes with considerable intensity, but in association 
with the other person as feeling them, not with one's self as feeling 
them" (Analysis vol. 2 p. 218). Moreover, not only a person's action may 
be motivated by sympathy which, according to Mill, cannot be 
considered as his own pleasure, but the social way of life dominates 
a person's character. The requirement of social existence, which may 
be thought of as a form of fellow-feelings, conditions a person's 
character. "Any condition, therefore, which is essential to the state 
of society, becomes more and more an inseparable part of every 
person's conception of the state of things.."(Utilitarianism cw v.lO 
p.231).
The existence of sympathy and social feelings as motives which are 
independent of one's own pleasure is consistent with Mill's 
methodology. The affairs of mankind in their natural social setting 
are certainly the subject of the social sciences. We have already, 
in some details, explored Mill's view of the social sciences. From 
it, it became clear that though he found deductive method as the 
most appropriate, he rejected the use of what he called 
'geometrical' or 'abstract' deduction.
It is mainly for two reasons; one, the general objection to 
deductions that are based on a-priori (in the real sense of the 
word, i.e. definitions) statements; the other, because geometry is 
the analysis of one force, not of conflicting forces like in 
mechanics or the social science.(see logic,p.888). He then goes on
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to show that the 'Bentham school's' philosophy is an example of such 
a fallacy. Indeed, he refers there to the political theory that was 
constructed upon the single principle of human motive but, 
nevertheless, it is as valid to moral as it is to economic theory. 
The fundamental objection is that one cannot construct any aspect 
of social theory on the assumption that there is a single force 
which dominates the scene. Given Mill's own observations, the major 
premise of the Bentham school can only be justified on a-priori 
grounds. Namely, as Mill observes conflicting forces operating in the 
social arena, to argue that there is a single force behind it does 
not seem to be consistent with experience. That is, if we wish to set 
the pursuit of pleasure as the definition motives fine, but it will 
not lead us, according to Mill, to any increase in our knowledge. 
If, on the other hand, we wish to construct our premises on some 
observations than we cannot accept the Bentham's premise.
The key to the question of motivation should anyway be in the theory 
of ethology. A theory that is based on psychology or, the laws of the 
mind. There are two points to be made here. First, according to the 
laws of the mind ideas occur to us also via association. Secondly, 
according to ethology, human character (that generates human actions) 
is constantly reacting and adjusting to circumstances.
The fact the ideas can occur to us by association also means that the 
idea of pleasure may appear in our mind in connection with something 
that is only associated with pleasure but that does not have any such 
direct effect. When an action is associated with pleasure, argues 
Mill, we come to desire it on its own merit with no reference to the
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original pleasure that was associated with it. Allow me now to quote 
at some length: "As we proceed in the formation of habits, and become 
accustomed to will a particular act or a particular course of conduct 
because it is pleasurable, we at last continue to will it without any 
reference to its being pleasurable. Although, from some changes in 
us or in our circumstances, we have ceased to find any pleasure in 
the action, or perhaps to anticipate any pleasure as the consequence 
of it, we still continue to desire the action, and consequently to 
do it....A habit of willing is commonly called a purpose; and among 
the causes of our volition, and of the actions that flow from them, 
must be reckoned not only likings and aversions, but also purposes. 
It is only when our purposes have become completely independent of 
the feelings of pain or pleasure from which they originally took 
their rise, that we are said to have a confirmed
character."(Logic,pp.842- 3).
In other words, because it is the formation of character (ethology)
that takes us from the universal laws of the mind to the observed
empirical laws, human actions cannot be understood but as a
combination of direct feelings and 'purposes', or habits which are 
derived from the laws of character formation. However, one must be 
careful not to associate those habits with the particular experience 
of the individual character. Some habits are acquired via other means 
like education and social circumstances. Hence, for a particular 
character, those habits may indeed be as remote as it can be from the 
original sense of pleasure that might have been associated with them.
This last argument on the affects of associations is also the reason
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to reject Mill's adherence to the second proposition of 'classical 
utilitarianism'. To remind the reader this proposition read that it 
is the anticipation of pleasure as a result of an action that is its 
motive. Obviously, the association principle means that sometimes we 
shall continue to desire actions simply because they are associated 
with the idea of pleasure. Regardless of whether or not they keep 
producing this pleasure.
But there is another argument involved here, that of Mill's 
distinction between 'interest' and 'impulse'. To act because one 
expects pleasure as a result means to act out of 'interest'. 
Sometimes, however, we tend to act out of 'impulse'; meaning that the 
mere contemplation of our act prevents us from, or drives us to, 
doing it. Namely, sometimes, the idea of pleasure that is associated 
with a particular action may precede, rather than follow it. "The 
pain or pleasure which determines our conduct is as frequently one 
which precedes the moment of action as one which follows it"(Remarks 
On Bentham's Philosophy, cw.v.lO p.12). Of course, in terms of the 
'laws of the mind' this idea too is connected to the principle of 
association. Nevertheless, it means that we do not always act because 
we desire the consequences of our action; sometimes, its mere 
contemplation is sufficient in order to invoke in us the feelings.
The third proposition, which is actually the conclusion of the first 
two, is that only pleasure has any value. This, naturally, is one of 
the most important questions in the context of a utilitarian moral 
theory. It implies that the only moral measure for anything would be
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its pleasant or painful effects. Thus, in a social context, the 
concept of well-being (as happiness) becomes the sole measure for the 
moral evaluation of a social system. There is no other thing with an 
intrinsic moral value. Indeed, it is this idea that dominates 
contemporary normative discourse of economics as can be seen in 
'welfare economics'. Not surprisingly, therefore, it is this idea 
which attracts the strongest criticism from those (like, for 
instance, Sen(1987)) who are unhappy with ethics-economics 
relationship.
However, at present I shall only deal with this question in as much 
as it concerns my analysis of Mill. It is, perhaps, interesting to 
note that in the case of Adam Smith, well-being perceived through 
wealth was by no means the 'true' measure for moral goodness. 
Nevertheless, Smith admits that in practice people do tend to 
associate virtue with wealth. But this does not mean that virtues 
themselves are defined in terms of 'well-being' or wealth. Namely, 
it is not well-being which constitute the morally good state of 
affairs. In the case of Mill, on the other hand, it is more 
difficult to dispose of this proposition. His modification of 
Utilitarianism does not really rule out the possibility that 
well-being is the only thing with an intrinsic value. Therefore, we 
shall have to see whether it is possible to attach Mill's modified 
utilitarianism to an alternative proposition.
First, however, I must point out why I suspect that Mill's moral 
theory cannot be interpreted as a consequentialistic theory of 
pleasure and pain. The most obvious reason is that Mill made it clear
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that he believed that some actions are generated by the sense of 
pleasure that is associated with doing them rather than with their 
proposed consequences. In such a case it will become extremely 
difficult to judge actions where the pleasure of doing them is not 
well synchronized with their results. Another such reason is the idea 
of 'purpose' . If a person does an action because of habit and because 
sometime in the past it was associated with pleasure, what will be 
the moral judgement of it now, when it does not invoke the same 
sense of pleasure (or not at all) in the actor?
In the same line of argument one may wonder what is the meaning of 
virtue, or the pursuit of virtue, in Mill's moral theory. "[T]he true 
virtue of human beings" writes Mill in one place "is the fitness to 
live together as equal; claiming nothing for themselves but what they 
as freely concede to everyone else"(The Subjection of Women p.174). 
Does it mean that virtue is morally good because it promises pleasure 
to the person who acts by it? Moreover, virtue is an attribute of a 
character. A character, in Mill's theory, is only confirmed when he 
acquired some habits ('purpose'). Hence, as we saw before, the 
actions of that character are not related to any immediate sense of 
pleasure. So why is a virtue- virtuous?.
The answer to that, given by some (like Berger), is that virtue is 
morally good because it is part of the general conditions for the 
happiness of man. The key to this argument should be Mill's 
perception of happiness. I think that it will be agreed that by no 
means can one read Mill's theory as suggesting that mere sensual 
pleasure constitutes the idea of happiness. A good example for it
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is Mill's distinction between 'higher' and 'lower' pleasures. In 
Utilitarianism he attacks the view as if by utility, or happiness, 
he refers to sensual pleasure as such. "Human beings" he writes 
"have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when 
once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness 
which does not include their gratification"(Utilitarianism 
cw. V. 10 .p. 211) . He then goes on to argue that even the Epicureans 
attached higher values to 'intellectual' pleasure than to 'sensual' 
pleasures. Nevertheless, he adds, some utilitarians believed that 
the difference between spiritual and corporal pleasures were only 
in terms of their consequences. Namely, the former had less real 
effects and when they did they were less harmful, or expensive, as 
were corporal pleasures. Thus, their 'better' value is not an 
intrinsic difference but merely an incidental one. Mill, however, 
insists that the 'intellectual' pleasures are INTRINSICALLY better 
pleasures than the corporal ones. The rule to measure the quality 
of 'higher' pleasure against the quantity of the 'lower' one, 
according to Mill, is to look at experience. People who are 
self-conscious and self-observing in a sufficient degree have always 
maintained that after experiencing both sorts of pleasure, they 
preferred the 'higher' one.
Naturally with such a large definition of pleasure the idea of 
pleasure, as we tend to understand it, as the sole thing with 
intrinsic value erodes. The desires for virtue, for money or power, 
though might have originated, by association, from some sort of 
pleasure, may indeed become an end in themselves. As such, and as 
they generate actions by habit (i.e. no expectation to pleasure),
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it cannot be said that they are desired for the pleasure that they 
tend to produce. Such a desire, argues Mill "is not a different 
thing from the desire of happiness, any more than the love of music 
or the desire of health. They are included in happiness. They are 
some of the elements of which the desire of happiness is made up. 
Happiness is not an abstract idea, but a concrete whole; and these 
are some of its parts"(ibid. p.236).
From all that it appears as if Mill did not adhere to the idea that 
pleasure a such, in particular is its sensual significance, can be 
considered as the sole thing with intrinsic value. Under his
definition of happiness, quite a wide range of thing can be
considered as having an intrinsic moral value. Like, for instance, 
equality even when we do not assume symmetrical utility functions.
But I shall deal with it later on.
There is another reason why intrinsic value can be found in things 
other than pleasure. It is Mill's view of Freedom. Though I do not 
intend to go now into the extensive debate surrounding the problem 
of freedom, I would still like to use it as an example that may 
prove important to the understanding of Mill's concept of economic 
justice.
Following Mill's assertions in his Logic, between the laws of the 
mind and the actual expression of human nature in 'empirical laws', 
there is an intermediate phase- an axiomaite media- called ethology, 
or the science of character. The souirce, and eventually the
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responsibility, to human actions cannot thus be found only in the 
origins of human understanding (the 'laws of the mind'). They must 
also be referred to the circumstances that, conjunctly with those 
laws, affect human characters and their subsequent actions.
This perception of human nature, as I have already discussed, is 
consistent with Mill's view of 'free-will'. Human will is only free 
in as much as they choose to alter the circumstances that effect 
their character. Accordingly, a person may have impulses and desires 
that are entirely created in him by the circumstances cannot be 
considered as having those things of his own. He thus "has no 
character, no more than a steam-engine has a character."(On Liberty. 
pp74-5). For a character to emerge, it must be the result of an 
interaction (almost dialectical) between those laws of the mind and 
the changing circumstances. "A person whose desires and impulses are 
his own- are the expression of his own nature, as it has been 
developed and modified by his own culture- is said to have a 
character."(ibid).
Thus, "Individuality is the same thing with development, and that it 
is only the cultivation of individuality which produces, or can 
produce, well-developed human beings. . . .what more, or better, can be 
said of the condition of human affairs, [other] than that it brings 
human beings themselves nearer to the best thing they can be?"(ibid. 
p.79). Which means two things; one, that human nature needs freedom 
to become its best (even when its best means happiest), and 
secondly, that social circumstances are only measured in their 
effects on the development of human nature.
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For people to have free-will at all, some social circumstances are 
required. Unless people are provided with those circumstances one may 
argue that as they don't have a free-will they are (a) not 
responsible and (b) not a subject of moral investigation. Hence, 
though one can always argue that a person's free-will, which is 
equivalent to saying a person's self-fulfilment, means a pursuit of 
happiness, the creation of conditions for it cannot be thought of 
as deriving from the value of happiness in its conseqeuntialistic 
sense. Namely, the fact that society provides a person with the 
facilities to develop himself does not mean that he will indeed 
succeed in doing so. Thus, as we go along, and form habits 
interactively with social circumstances, those conditions earn a 
value of their own. "I regard utility" writes Mill, "as the ultimate 
appeal on all ethical questions, but it must be utility in the 
largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of man as a 
progressive being"(On Liberty,p.224).
What Mill considered as progress is in itself an interesting subject 
to which I shall refer later on in relations to economic 
organization. One thing, however, is worth noting here; that Mill's 
view of 'civilization' was that of great cooperation. The ability 
to subordinate immediate personal advantages to the common interest 
is a necessary condition of 'civilization' as people become more and 
more dependent on one another. (Civilization,cw.vlS.p.129). How it 
affects moral progress is a different matter. Of course, for Mill 
himself, the best of human nature is when they desire only those 
things which can be shared with others(Utilitarianism,cw.v.10 
p.232). But Mill is quite aware of the fact that the effects of
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actual social progress on human nature may vary. Extreme 
self-interest and uniformity are considered by him as quite 
possible, and sad, development.
Nevertheless, theoretically the progress of society, in conjunction 
with human nature, should according to Mill develop in a co-operative 
fashion. Namely, the 'tendency laws' are such that people will tend 
to see the common interest as an integral part of their happiness.
( c )  T h e  Q u e s t i o n  o f  R u l e s  a n d  A  N o t e  On J u s t i c e .
We saw thus that freedom has a value of its own which is independent 
of the immediate outcome in terms of pleasure. Moreover, as it is 
a condition for developing characters (and free-will), it is also 
a condition for human beings becoming moral creature. Obviously 
freedom is only one aspect of the whole set of conditions that 
determine the circumstances in conjunction with which the 
interaction of the ' laws of the mind' will create a morally 
accountable character. Education as well as economic conditions form 
a significant part of it.
But to create those conditions under which all persons will develop
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themselves, independent of any direct effect (as we do not know a- 
priori whether all will really benefit from it), means that we are 
looking for rules of social organization; moral rules. Those, it 
seems, are not entirely consistent with 'classical utilitarianism'. 
If moral values of actions depend entirely on their consequences 
there is no room to determine a-priori rules of behaviour. Certainly 
not rules that may or may not yield greater happiness in the end. 
Thus, a theory of justice becomes difficult as it is a theory of 
rules.
We have spent quite a long while arguing that Mill's Utilitarianism 
cannot be considered as 'classical' in two major senses. One, that 
not all actions are motivated by an anticipation for their pleasant 
consequences. And second, which is not un-related, that there are 
some other things besides direct pleasure that have an intrinsic 
moral value. Surely it should not be too difficult to defend a 
theory of justice in such a framework.
Nevertheless, many find in Mill's defence of rules of justice in a 
utilitarian setting as a proof to the existence of the problem in his 
own theory. However, I think that it will be agreed that one must 
distinguish between the question whether Mill considered himself a 
utilitarian in the classical sense, and the question whether his 
theory is indeed a form of 'classical utilitarianism'. I believe that 
we have seen enough evidence in Mill's work to suggest that his 
utilitarianism is far from being 'classical'. It is enough to 
consider the fact that Mill assumed that there are conditions
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preceding any moral argument - that people must have free-will, or 
character - in order to argue that some rules are needed. Whether 
these rules are 'moral rules' or 'ante-moral' rules does not alter 
the fact that unlike classical utilitarianism, some kinds of rules 
which either precedes, or direct, moral conduct are not inconsistent 
with his theory.
Despite all that. Mill tried to show that justice is consistent with 
consequentialistic utilitarianism. Probably because he was himself 
a utilitarian or, perhaps, out of respect to his father. His 
efforts, thus, would be concentrated on showing that rules of 
justice are consistent with the enhancement of utility. According 
to his definition, the concept of justice is comprised of two major 
aspects ; a rule of conduct and a sentiment that sanctions that rule.
The instincts that are behind the 'sense of justice' are those of 
'self-defence' and 'sympathy'. A person wishes to defend himself and 
those with whom he feels sympathy. As the sense of sympathy depends 
on the state of society and as it is assumed that as society 
progresses so does the circle of people with whom a person feels 
sympathy. The sense of 'self-defence' is then extended to society 
as a whole. These sentiments causes people to 'resent', 'repel' or 
'retaliate' against "any conduct which threatens the security of 
society generally"(Ut.cw.10 p.248).
Now, all these desires are by no means moral unless they are "in the 
directions conformable to the general good" (ibid. p.249). Hence, the 
gratification of these desires in rules of conduct is utilitarian
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only in Mill's extended form of happiness. Namely, that only if 
people are capable of internalizing the common interest that rules 
and justice become part of the moral theory. It also means that 
justice is something that depends on the development of human 
character. Namely, there are some conditions which allow (via 
ethology) the creation of a free-willed character who will be 
capable of understanding his role in society and the dependence of 
his own happiness on that of the others.
Consequently, as the emergence of such a character is the condition 
for moral responsibility, it is also not surprising that it is the 
condition for the emergence of justice and rules.
I do not wish to go into details regarding Mill's discussion of 
justice, I would only like to concentrate on two concepts which are 
of great significance to economic justice; the theory of rights and 
that of desert.
( D A  Note on the Theory of Rights
"When we call anything a person's right, we mean that he has a valid 
claim on society to protect him in the possession of it. .. .If he has 
what we consider a sufficient claim..to have something guaranteed to 
him by society, we say that he has a right to it."(Ibid, p.250). Why, 
he goes on, does society have to guarantee something to an
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individual?, the answer is -the general utility. Now, as the 
development of one's individuality is a condition for his happiness 
(given that 'higher 'pleasures are greater than 'lower' ones), it is 
in the interest of general utility to guarantee the conditions for 
one's self-fulfilment. Freedom, therefore, is such an example of a 
right. Of course, all other conditions (educational and economical) 
will also be considered as a person's right. The question that we 
shall have to deal with later on is whether it also guarantees the 
right for private property.
(ii>On Desert and Distribution
When Mill gives an account of what immediate associations people have 
with the concept of justice, or injustice he mentions five: (i) to 
deprive someone of what belongs to him by law. (ii) to give by law 
rights that should not have been given, (iii) to remunerate each 
person according to his deeds,(iv) a breach of promise and 
friendship, (v) anonymity (to this last one he also attaches the idea 
of equality).
From all these, he believes that (iii) is the strongest sense of 
justice. But not only in the common sense of punishment. Also in the 
sense of reward. When analyzing Smith we saw that the return of good
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was part of the idea of moral good. It was not, however, an idea of 
justice. This, of course, is the result of the observation that in 
Smith the rules of justice are rules of social viability. In Mill, 
however, the rules of justice are those which ensure a morally good 
society. Hence, rewards can no more be considered as optional, a 
failure to respond to a good deed has two consequences. One, it 
causes immediate disappointment. However, as Mill's theory cannot 
be considered as classical utilitarianism this may not be the main 
reason to reward a good deed. The second reason, the more important 
one, in my view, is that it might discourage a benevolent behaviour 
in the future. Thus, affecting the general circumstances that, 
eventually, affect the character formation. In that sense, it is 
entirely consistent with Mill's theory of justice to demand that 
reward will be a duty rather than an optional action.
"He who accepts benefits, and denies a return when needed, inflicts 
a real hurt, by disappointing one of the most natural and reasonable 
expectations, and one which must at least tacitly have encouraged, 
otherwise the benefits would seldom have been 
conferred."(Ibid,p.256). It also entails, argues Mill, a breach of 
promise and friendships.
Thus reward is a duty no less than the punishment is a duty. The 
reason for that, as I have said, is, in my view, the difference in 
the meaning of justice in the context of the whole moral theory. 
Namely, if just actions must also satisfy the moral good it is clear 
that there is no reason to prefer the satisfaction of revenge over 
that from fulfilled expectations.
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Let me summarize this section before we move on to analyze the 
effects of Mill's methodology and ethics on his conception of 
economic justice. There are two conclusions of Mill's methodology 
which affect his moral analysis. One is that any aspect of social 
sciences must be studies by the tools of 'concrete deductive method' 
(or 'inverse deductive method' when dealing with history). The 
other, that empirical laws of human behaviour (the observed pattern 
of it) are a result of a deduction process that transmits the 
universal laws of the mind by the means of an 'axiomate media' 
-ethology.
The particular nature of deduction which Mill finds useful in the 
acquiring of human knowledge (train of reasoning) is the main reason 
why he rejects the 'Bentham's-school' view of human nature. There, 
he argues, the method that is being used is that of 'abstract 
deduction'. The 'abstract method' suffers from two main problems. 
First, it is usually based on 'abstract' universals and thus it 
suffers from all problems related to 'a-priori' based theory. 
Mainly, the 'petitio principii' problem that we have discussed 
earlier. Secondly, it assumes that a single causation exists. 
"Mechanics" writes Mill "would be a science very similar to 
geometry, if every motion resulted from one force alone, and not 
from a conflict of forces. In the geometrical theory of society, it 
seems to be supposed that this is really the case with the social 
phenomena; that each of them results always from only one force, one 
single property of human nature"(Logic p.888). And as Mill strongly 
believes that social phenomena reflect a compound of causation, the
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geometrical method is out of the question. Even when instead of 'a 
-priori' premises we substitute for more or less 'observed' ones, 
like the motive of self-interest.
Consequently, Mill rejects the assumption that one can construct any 
social theory on a single property of human nature. It certainly 
rules out a proposition that the sole motive of human behaviour is 
the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain. Thus, Mill's moral 
theory can be anything but 'classical utilitarianism'.
The other aspect of his methodology which dominates his moral theory 
is the role of ethology. As I have shown in the previous section, 
ethology means the theory of character formation. Now, as characters 
are created by the interaction of psychology (the laws of the mind) 
with the social circumstances, they cannot be supposed as only 
affecting social phenomena but also as affected by them.
Given Mill's definition of the 'free-will' which corresponds to his 
idea of 'individuality', one can set some conditions for the 
development of characters who would be, first of all, morally 
responsible. These conditions which are the same as those which allow 
each character to develop its own course, can be considered as Mill's 
theory of justice. It is the framework for the developing of a 
morally responsible society that can carry on developing and by 
doing so, to increase the happiness, widely defined, of its members. 
This happiness, it must be said, is not merely pleasure as it is a 
sense of self-fulfilment. Hence, the role and importance of
education as a fundamental right in Mill's theory cannot be
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overstated.
It is possible to say that Mill's theory of justice is somewhere 
between Smith (and Hume) and 'classical utilitarianism'. In his 
Enquiries, Hume wrote: "The happiness and propensity of mankind,
arising from the social virtue of benevolence and its subdivisions, 
may be compared to a wall, built by many hands, which still rises by 
each stone that is heaped upon it, and receives increase proportional 
to the diligence and care of each workman. The same happiness, raised 
by the social virtue of justice and its sub-divisions, may be 
compared to the building of a vault, where each individual stone 
would of itself, fall to the ground; nor is the whole fabric 
supported but by the mutual assistance and combination of its 
corresponding parts"(p.305).
From the above we can only sense the difference between rules of 
justice and those of moral goodness. Smith and Mill, however, make 
a connection between them. The rules of justice are the conditions 
for constructing the wall. Without them moral good will not be 
achieved. In Smith it is because society will not subsist. In Mill 
it is because people will not be capable of pursuing the real 
happiness.
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4. The Structure of Economics in view of Mill's Methodology.
So far we have discussed in a somewhat separated fashion three main 
issues. One concerning the general problem of framework in classical 
economics and in particular, the problem of relationship between 
distribution and exchange in a 'cost of production' version of 
general equilibrium. Secondly, we have discussed Mill's methodology 
and his perception of the social sciences. Thirdly, we have 
investigated the nature of Mill's moral theory and examined his
modification of utilitarianism from the point of view of his
particular perception of the social sciences.
Now is the time to combine the three for the purpose of an 
investigation into the moral nature of Mill's economics. We shall 
proceed from here in the following manner. First, I would like to 
present Mill's distinction between production and distribution in the 
context of his general view of the social sciences. Secondly, I will 
explore the implication of this distinction on Mill's theory of 
value. I will discuss here the role and meaning of the 'economic 
man' and the partial equilibrium nature of Mill's theory of prices.
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I will then discuss Mill's notion of values, as distinct from 
prices, and examine the problem and meaning of attributing to him 
a 'cost of production' theory of value. Naturally, in this section 
a reference will be made to Mill's distinction between distribution 
and exchange.
Thirdly, I will discuss the moral implications of all that. I will 
examine Mill's moral propositions regarding distribution and in 
particular the principle of proportional remuneration. I will examine 
the circumstances where the principle is upheld. I will also examine 
its relationships with distributional parameters (shares in output) 
and wonder on whether it is possible to think of principles of 
justice which serve as substitutes to one another.
We shall also investigate whether any idea of a labour theory of 
value can serve as a moral benchmark decreeing thus the deviations 
from those values as deviations from the morally just system. In the 
appendix, I will examine whether binding together the demand side of 
the economy through a simplified model of subjective theory of value 
helps in anyway to bring the actual prices close to satisfying the 
principle of proportional remuneration.
( a )  P r o d u c t i o n  a n d  D i s t r i b u t i o n -  T h e  S c o p e  o f  E c o n o m i c s .
One of the major aspects of Mills' theory which has not, in my view, 
attracted any serious consideration is the particular structure of
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his 'Principles'. A structure which reflects most significant 
propositions with regard to the relationship between the different 
aspects of economic investigation.
Mill's 'Principles' starts with a long and detailed discussion of 
Production. "The production of wealth; the extraction of the 
instruments of human subsistence and enjoyment from the materials of 
the globe...has its necessary conditions. Of these, some are 
physical, depending on the properties of matter, and on the amount 
of knowledge of those properties at the particular place and time. 
These Political economy...assumes;referring for the grounds, to 
physical science(Principles, p.21).
Production, therefore, has in it an aspect which is entirely within 
the domain of the natural sciences. Hence, it can be studied through 
induction (as causal relationships are easy to detect) and 
subsequently, be generalized. That aspect of production then, is the 
only thing in political economy about which we need not have any 
reservations : "The laws and conditions of the Production of wealth 
partake of the character of physical truths. There is nothing 
optional or arbitrary in them."(p.199).
Production, according to Mill is, in principle, the application of 
human labour, past and present, onto matter. At a given technology 
we know that a production of a particular commodity requires so much 
direct labour and so much capital. We also know how much labour is 
required for the production of that capital. In other words, we know 
precisely how much labour and matter it takes to create a commodity.
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Therefore, at any one time we can relate all produced commodities 
(and Mill includes in it also those which need to be simply 
collected), by the amount of labour required for their production. 
In fact what we have is a dual system. On the one hand, we can take 
the coefficient matrix A (from section 2) as depicting the 
technological circumstances at any one time. It tells us how much 
of each commodity is required for the production of the others but 
we can not relate one commodity to another without reference to a 
concept which is in the sphere of social institutions; prices. On 
the other hand, we can translate it into labour inputs language. It 
will tell us how much labour, direct and indirect is embedded in 
each commodity. And this measure is entirely in the domain of 
physical sciences.
The point I am trying to make here is not that Mill adhered to a 
labour theory of value, rather that the scientific nature of the 
theory of production provides us with a system that relates all 
produced commodities through their technological requirements. As 
such, it is a system of general equilibrium the common denominator 
of which, (or the numeraire) is labour and, its most important 
feature is that it is independent of social institutions.
There are basically two approaches to this issue. One, which is 
popular with those who are searching for a labour theory of value, 
and which assumes that things have some sort of an intrinsic value. 
The other, which I shall use, is trying to be faithful to the 
empirical nature of Mill's views in general and in particular with
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respect to the natural sciences.
Let there be an economy with n commodities. Let A is the coefficient
matrix as in section 2, and a -(01,02....... ,cr„) is the vector of
required direct labour for the production of each commodity.
Let A- (Ai,À2, Ajj) be the vector of labour 'values' of
commodities. Following the approach as if things have an intrinsic 
value which we have to discover and which are, as a matter of fact, 
not observable, we shall have the following system:
And in a matrix form:
A=AA+a
Rearranging it we shall have :
a=A(I-A)
Notice that it is a rationalistic approach as we assume a-priori that 
there is something called A^ (labour value) and by using the 
proposition that commodities participate in the production of each 
other, we can discover those values. Namely, only when we consider 
the system as a whole can we discover those values; as if they are 
completely inter-dependent.
An alternative approach which I believe is more in line with Mill's 
general views and in particular in the way he perceives production,
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is where labour values are derived from our knowledge of technology. 
Namely, the labour value of things is the amount of direct labour 
required for their production plus a simple sum of the direct labour 
required for the production of their means of production. Hence, we 
shall have the following system:
^n=“ lSln+“ 2^2n+
In a matrix form:
+*n4i2+*2
+anann+*n
A=a(A-J)
Rearranged:
a=Â(I+4)-i
Notice that here we do not need the full system in order to discover 
the labour value of any commodity; it is by induction that we learn 
on the labour values of different commodities. All values here are 
caused by the technological requirement of labour^.
When we compare the two systems we shall find that the difference 
between them is precisely that in the latter values are explained in
^What is meant by this is that in the previous method we could not have 
told the labour value of any commodity because the determination of that value 
was dependent on the labour values of the other commodities. We could 
therefore, determine labour values only simultaneously, like prices. In this 
alternative approach the labour value of each commodity is determined 
independently of the other. It is a simple sum of the labour required, 
directly and indirectly, for the production of each good. There is, here, 
nothing abstract about the labour values. This is what distinguish this 
approach from the one presented earlier where labour values are constructed 
as an alternative to prices. And it is this technological interpretation of 
labour values which makes it consistent with Mill's methodology.
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the full by the direct labour requirements while In the former case 
there Is an unexplained residual. In the former case A-(I-A)"^a and 
In the latter A-a (I+A). We can write (I-A)'^- I+A+A^+A^+. . . . so that
the difference between the two Is A^+A^+A^+........ Though not a
significant difference In volume, It Is a difference In substance.
Thus, the theory of production offers a general equilibrium framework 
In the sense that we can now relate all commodities by their 
technological labour requirements.
Distribution and exchange, In Mill's theory, Is a completely 
different story. Distribution of wealth, writes Mill, "Is a matter 
of human Institution solely. The things once there, mankind 
Individually or collectively, can do with them as they like. They 
can place them at the disposal of whomever they please, and on 
whatever terms."(p.200).
There are two Important features to Mill's characterization of 
distribution. First, Its being entirely a social question and 
secondly, that It follows the act of production. The Importance of 
the latter characteristic Is In the nature of relationship between 
production and distribution. The former, however. Is significant In 
terms of Its Implied methodology. While In the sphere of production, 
the natural sciences provided us with tools of Induction through 
which we were able to construct a complete relationship between all 
commodities, the social sciences present us with difficulties In 
doing so. What It Is that determine the circumstances of exchange 
of the different commodities cannot be so easily related. Modern
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theory has dealt with the problem through some kind of an 'economic 
man's' behaviour. Mill too discusses the idea of the economic man 
however, in his case, I will show that it is not very meaningful to 
construct an isolated (from other social aspects) theory of economic 
interdependence. What will concern us in this complex structure is 
where precisely stands the theory of distribution between the 
completeness of the theory of production and the partial nature of 
the theory of exchange.
Economics, therefore, is quite unique in terms of Mill's perception 
of the social sciences. On the one hand, it is very much dependent 
on social institutions. But on the other hand it is a system which 
seems to have an objective and general anchor; the theory of 
production. Thus, Mill's picture of the social sciences must bow be 
extended:
Universels---------- > Axiomate-Media---------- > Empirical laws
Laws of the Mind Ethology  >Human action--Circumstances
Circumstances<-
Laws of Matter..........................    Technology
It now has some inputs coming in from the natural world. The question 
is, through which of the economic parameters does this input presents 
itself and, for what purpose. This is, I believe, quite a unique 
perception of economics. In the case of Adam Smith, for instance,
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technology would not have been exogenous. There would have been an 
additional arrow from circumstances to technology.
So far we saw the meaning of the 'technological' input to the system. 
It relates all commodities to one another independently of any social 
institution. Now, allow me to discuss some of the difficulties that 
Mill saw in the social system. Difficulties in the sense of 
establishing a complete relationship between all commodities (general 
equilibrium).
( b )  T h e  L i m i t s  o f  P o l i t i c a l  E c o n o m y  W i t h i n  t h e  S o c i a l  S c i e n c e s .
There are two fundamentals to be considered when we come to discuss 
anything related to the social sciences. Its non-experimental nature 
and its portrayal as a harmonised organism. The first fundamental, 
the non-experimental nature,is a direct result of the complexity of 
social phenomena. The immediate consequence of this fundamental is 
that it does not allow a proper use of induction. Hence, the social 
sciences must be examined using the tool of deduction. In view of 
Mill's criticism of deduction, it must be qualified to particular 
sorts of deduction; mainly the 'concrete method of deduction'.
There are two main features to this method which make it possible to 
use deduction while avoiding the pit-falls of general deduction. One, 
that we shall avoid the property of 'geometry' where a single 
causation exists. Thus, 'concrete deduction' means to explain a 
single phenomenon by analyzing its various causes. The other feature
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is that the 'a-priori' foundation of our deduction should, ideally, 
be part of a 'train of reasoning'; namely, it must be a conclusion 
of another deduction (when at least some of them have as premises 
conclusions of inductions which, it is presumed, are possible at 
some narrower aspect of the social investigation). Otherwise, 
deduction cannot be considered as a mean of increasing our knowledge 
about the world.
However, in view of the problems with which social sciences are 
confronted. Mill is willing to make some allowances. In particular, 
he seems willing to accept the 'a-priori' premise on a less strict 
platform than 'truth'. Namely, the 'a-priori' premise may indeed be 
a result of some introspection we make about human behaviour. This, 
however, should not be interpreted as accepting the idea that a 
premise can be a definition or, which is almost the same, that it 
does not matter how true (in a 'synthetic sense') it is. In other 
words, what it means is that Mill's 'a-priori' premises are not 
really 'a- priori' but merely a modified version of 'synthetic' like 
statements. Its 'true' value cannot be properly established (and 
therefore, probably, not falsifiable) but it matters a great deal 
whether or not we believe it to be a true description of the world.
The second fundamental of Mill's perception of social studies is the 
assumption that society as a whole is balanced and interrelated like 
an organism. "There is no social phenomenon which is not more or less 
influenced by every other part of the condition of the same society, 
and therefore, by every cause which is influencing any other of the 
contemporaneous social phenomena. There is, in short, what 
physiologists term a consensus. similar to that existing among the
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various organs and functions of the physical frame of man and the 
more perfect animals"(Logic p.899). He then goes on to argue that 
this harmony of organs is unique to different bodies. Thus, a 
particular cause in one society, may spread differently in another 
as it encounters different circumstances of the various organs.
There are two conclusions to be drawn from it. One, that society as 
a whole may be considered harmonious, or, inter-dependent. Which, 
of course, means that from the point of view of modern 
interpretation society form a system of general equilibrium. 
Nevertheless, it also means that the individual organ (like, say, 
economics) cannot be in a self-sustained harmony. It depends on (and 
affects) all other aspects of society; its equilibrium properties 
can only be considered in relation to them, not as a complete 
interdependence within itself.
However, one may argue, general equilibrium within economics itself 
is possible when one uses the 'ceteris paribus' assumption. Namely, 
allowing for all economic variables to be related to other aspects 
of social studies but keeping these relations constant. But there 
are two major problems with this assertion.
First, a more general and not necessarily related to Mill, is the 
problem of sensitivity. That is, by freezing 'external' 
interdependence of economic variables we seem to imply that the 
'internal' relations are the more stronger, or significant, ones. 
Indeed, if we appear to be able to decide what is exogenous and what 
is not we pretend to know something about the nature and strength
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('elasticities' if one wishes) of relationship between all variables 
involved. Suppose we have three variables, A, B, C that we know are 
interrelated. Suppose too that A and B as well as B and C are 
strongly related. Surely to construct a theory about the 
inter-dependence of A and C leaving B 'ceteris paribus' is not the 
most meaningful line to pursue. Nevertheless, as we know the nature 
of relationship between all variables, we can thus choose to look 
at those we believe are more significantly inter-related. (For 
instance, to construct apparently independent theories on A and B 
and on B and C leaving C and A to be the exogenous variables 
respectively). The second objection to the 'closed' look at 
economics is based directly on Mill and is not entirely unrelated 
to the previous, general, objection. It is his own interpretation 
to 'ceteris paribus'.
According to his view, 'ceteris paribus' is used to indicate that 
there are other forces whom we do not know, and that may affect the 
propositions of our theories. But as our knowledge expands, we have 
to incorporate them into the theory. In other words, 'ceteris 
paribus' is in Mill's terminology to say that there are probably 
some other causes that are likely to affect our propositions. But 
as we do not know much about them, we shall simply reduce the level 
of our propositions to become mere 'tendencies laws'. Naturally, 
when we discover new causes we shall have to incorporate them. Once 
we have done so, we may indeed decide to conduct a partial analysis 
and choose those variables we wish to be endogenous and those we 
wish to be exogenous. Thus, choosing exogenous variables will be 
based entirely on the knowledge of their relations with the
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endogenous ones. Hence, defining general equilibrium within the 
economic system will make sense if we believe all other social 
variables to have a less significant affect on economic variables 
than they appear to have on one another.
Another conclusion of the general interdependence of all aspects of 
social life is that one cannot hope to reach general conclusions but 
simply, rules of formation. "The deductive science of society" writes 
Mill "will not lay down a theorem, asserting in an universal manner 
the effect of any cause; but will rather teach us how to frame the
proper theorem for the circumstances of any given case All
general propositions [therefore]... are grounded on some 
supposititious set of circumstances supposing that no other were 
combined with them."(p.900).
On the face of it this last conclusion does not seem to be consistent 
with the 'concrete' method or, for that matter, with its association 
with the 'train of reasoning'. However, we must distinguish the 
deduction of 'laws of formation', to which the above conclusion 
applies, from the deduction of 'empirical laws' which must be 
concrete and adhere to the various circumstances of society. Bearing 
in mind Mill's general assertion that in the social science we 
deduce an 'axiomate media' in the form of ethology, which then 
transmits the universal 'laws of the mind' to 'empirical laws', we 
can see that there might be room for different methods of deductive 
reasoning.
Let me remind the reader of Mill's perception of the social sciences.
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Universels .> Axiomate-Media----------------- > Empirical laws
Laws of the Mind Ethology >Human action--Circumstances
I I I
I I I
I________________Circums tance s<......................
The universels, naturally, hold to any human being. The social 
circumstances and the 'empirical laws' of different societies varies 
according to the difference in people's character. Ethology, the 
axiomate media, does not offer us a proposition about the character 
of individuals, it only tells us how they will form a character 
under different circumstances. This is precisely that part of the 
analysis for which a deduction is required that is not 'concrete' 
but 'hypothetical' in the sense that it can be attributed to 
different circumstances. Here indeed, the premises of deduction 
cannot be part of any train of reasoning as ethology is not part of 
a greater system but in itself a complete system.
The next move, from ethology to 'empirical laws', involves much more 
the particular nature of the subject of investigation. As the social 
scene is a vast set of many phenomena and inter-relations, we cannot 
any more ignore the effects of one social aspect on the other. The 
'concrete' method, which takes each phenomenon separately but tries 
to investigate the whole set of its causes, is applied here. Its 
premises obviously, will be the conclusions of other branches of 
social investigation. For instance, if we analyze the 'economic 
phenomenon' and we take as its premise people's motive, we obviously 
derive it from ethology- the science of character formation.
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However, if the economic circumstances affect, say, educational 
circumstances, it will affect the characters of individuals through 
the 'laws of character formation' (ethology). Once this has 
happened, the economic motivations of those characters may change 
altogether. The premise of economic analysis, consequently, will 
have to change too.
In the same way, it was this line of argument that helped us through 
the complex of apparent contradictions in Mill's moral theory. The 
reasons why we cannot think of Mill as a utilitarian in the classical 
sense of the word is because he made allowances to the development 
of people's personality. In our terminology it means that he took 
into consideration the change of circumstances that changes a 
person's character and consequently, his disposition to pleasure and 
pain. Thus, the concept of happiness had to be extended and other 
things than direct pleasure could have had intrinsic moral values.
The meaning of all this is that in the social sciences it will be 
difficult to establish relationships between all variables (or 
markets) for two reasons. One, that it is not necessarily that what 
determines the circumstances of one market are related in the most 
significant way to economic variables. Some other aspects of social 
life may affect those circumstances much more. These influences may 
come from custom, moral views, social organizations etc.. The other 
reason is that even if we wished to construct those relations on the 
behaviour of individuals (all the rest 'ceteris paribus') then we 
shall have the problem that people's character are affected by the 
circumstances that their behaviour create. Thus, though something may
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be true at one moment of time, human behaviour may change 
endogenously. This last point is also the reason why the idea of the 
'economic man' is not very helpful and, indeed, it plays no role in 
Mill's discussion of economics.
( c )  E t h o l o g y  a n d  t h e  'E c o n o m ic  M a n '
Allow me to say a few words on Mill's direct reference to economics 
as appeared in his Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political 
Economy (1836) and were later referred to in his Logic. To begin 
with. Mill begins his justification for a separate analysis of 
economics by re-stating its actual dependence on the other aspects 
of the social sciences. Only then, when this is clear, he explains 
why it might be helpful to study economics separately. 
"Notwithstanding the universal consensus of the social phenomena, 
whereby nothing which takes place in any part of the operations of 
society is without its share of influence on every other part;....it 
is not less true that different species of social facts are in the 
main dependent, immediately and in the first resort, on different 
kind of causes"(Logic.p.900).
Political economy, argues Mill, is concerned with consequences of 
three features of human nature. The desire for wealth, the aversion 
to labour and the desire for present enjoyment.(Essays,p.137,cw,v.4
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p321). To that extent, Mill is completely loyal to his Logic. The 
three principles, or forces, behind economic analysis ensure that it 
will not suffer the shortcoming of 'geometry' -the abstract method 
of deduction. Namely, it is not based on a single force but on 
contradicting forces which is a better description of the social 
scene.
Nevertheless, economics seems to suffer some of the deficiencies of 
the 'abstract method'. The reason for that is that its premises are 
not 'true' forces in the proper sense of the word. It is not that 
people in general do not have a desire for wealth, aversion to labour 
and a desire for present enjoyments. They don't have only these 
motives. The 'economic man', according to Mill, is a creature that 
is comprised of only these particular qualities. Thus, enabling us 
to examine the net effects that are produced by these net causes. 
"Not that any political economist" wrote Mill "was ever so absurd 
as to suppose that mankind are really thus
constituted. ."(Essays,p.138). In other words, it means that the 
'economic man' is carved out from the output of ethology at a given 
point of time. That is to say, ethology- which is the rules of 
character formation- produced in conjunction with given 
circumstances a particular character. The 'economic man' then, is 
an abstraction of that particular character. Namely, the 'economic 
man' is not an a-priori premise in the proper sense of the word 
(i.e. it is not a definition). It is based on observation and on 
what circumstances have produced and to that extent, it is an 
approximation to a process of induction. Thus, the premises of 
economics must be embedded in reality. They therefore also depend on
415
the changing circumstances of mankind.
The assertion that the 'economic man' is not a 'real man' gave rise 
to arguments, such as in Blaug(1980), that the 'economic man' is a 
proper a-priori assertion. This, of course, seems as a contradiction 
to Mill's arguments in the Logic that one cannot increase human 
knowledge by a deduction that is based on a-priori premises. 
However, the fact that at the same time Mill argues that these 
premises of the economic man should be established through 
observation does not seem to be consistent with its a-priori nature. 
Indeed, the only way to settle this apparent contradiction is in the 
way I have suggested before. Namely, that the 'a-priori' nature of 
the economic man is entirely due to the fact that it is not the 
complete picture. Not because it is not true in itself.
Of course, if the process of analysis ends at deducing propositions 
from the abstraction of the 'economic man' one cannot really hope for 
a great scientific content to those propositions. Blaug (1980), for 
instance, interprets Mill's discussion in the Essay as saying that 
Mill's 'economic man' makes his Political economy essentially an 
'abstract science' which is based on the 'a-priori' method. The 
hypothesis regarding human nature does not have to be grounded in 
fact (though he agrees that it must be grounded on some form of 
experience like observations or, introspection). Consequently, 
argues Blaug while quoting Mill, the propositions of economics are 
like those of geometry, true only in the abstract(pp.62-4).
But this is not the whole story. The study of human behaviour when
416
pursuing wealth comprises only one aspect of the social study. One 
cannot stop there. "In order to judge how [man] will act under the 
variety of desires and aversions which are concurrently operating 
upon him, we must know how he would act under the exclusive 
influence of each one in particular."(Essays p.139). After achieving 
this, we must then find a way in which we can consider all of them 
simultaneously (the true general equilibrium idea in Mill). "The 
political economist inquires, what are the actions which would be 
produced by this desire [the acquisition of wealth], if within the 
department in question it were unimpeded by any other. In this way 
a nearer approximation is obtained....[which] has then to be 
corrected by making proper allowance for the effects of any impulse 
of a different description, which can be shown to interfere with the 
result in any particular case."(p.140).
Political economy, perceived as the analysis of the consequences of 
the 'economic man' depicts only a small part of the social analysis. 
It fits well into the general theory and though its method may not 
be the ideal forms of deduction, it is the most helpful ones. The 
following diagram places the analysis of the 'economic man' in the 
general scheme of the social science:
Universals....... > Axiomate-Media---------- > Empirical laws
Laws of the Mind - > Ethology -->Human
I character-->Actions->Circumstances
I (economic man]---
Circumstances<.......................
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So the 'economic man' is itself subject to changes as a result of 
changes in the economic circumstances. But not only as a result of 
changes in economic conditions, also as result of changes in 
educational and moral circumstances. For instance, Mill seems to 
predict how the economic man will change with the progress of 
society. He will, according to Mill, become much more co-operative.
To sum up this last point, if we wished to relate all markets through 
some analysis of the behaviour of an 'economic man' , we would have 
had to consider two other points. One, what are all the other inputs 
on his behaviour that we make exogenous; in particular, what degree 
of individuality the economic man reflects and what are the moral 
norms that influence him. Secondly, we shall have to analyze how do 
the circumstances of a particular economic state affect that 
character. Given all that, I believe that it would not be far from 
the truth to argue that Mill saw markets in a partial equilibrium 
light. Different markets may be related to different social 
parameters and the behaviour in them will not necessarily be 
affected by other markets (or prices) as by those social 
circumstances. To use the notion of the economic man for the purpose 
of analyzing the behaviour of individuals in one market is quite 
consistent with Mill's analysis (hence, perhaps. Mill's discussion 
of demand as a function of value (book 3 ch.2 sectionA pp446-7)). 
But to extend the analysis so that all market will be related 
through the behaviour of the 'economic man' does not seem to me to 
be consistent with Mill's methodology and perception of the social 
sciences.
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(d) The Implications of Mill's Methodology to his Theory of Value.
What Mill's conception of economics suggests is that there are two 
observable extremes. One, given by technology which relates all 
commodities to one another. The other, the actual prices that prevail 
in different markets and, which on the face of it, cannot be related 
to one another.
As I mentioned earlier there are different views concerning Mill's 
theory of value. His very 'modern' description of price determination 
using demand and supply has invoked two opposing views. One, that his 
theory of value is in the framework of partial equilibrium analysis 
(see Blaug 1985). The other, that what ever is his theory of value, 
we must interpret his work in terms of modern analysis (see 
Hollander 1985) . Not surprisingly, this latter approach goes along 
with the idea that Mill's theory of value, and indeed the whole 
classical school's theory of value, is in the general equilibrium 
framework of analysis.
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Obviously, those who interpret Mill's theory as a 'cost of 
production' theory of value in a general equilibrium setting would 
like to believe that they can use a 'cost of production' theory as 
all prices, in the long-run, converge to their 'cost of production'. 
Thus, they seem to end up with a somewhat Marshallian theory of 
value, (see Hollander 1985, Forget 1989). The line, therefore, 
between Ricardo and Marshall, seems to them as established.
However, how much of Ricardo there is in Mill is still an open 
question (see on this subject Schumpeter(1954), Stigler (1955),Viner 
(1958), Robbins (1970), Schwartz (1972), Blaug (1985), Hollander 
(1985),(1987), Forget (1989), Bradly (1989)). And even if it was, 
does the line between Ricardo and Marshall really imply that 
classical economics is a form of 'neo-classical' economics? How 
neo-classical is Marshall (see Mirowski 1973).
We saw already that a 'cost of production' theory does not really 
imply general equilibrium in the modern sense of the word (complete 
inter-dependence). We also saw that Mill's theory is basically open 
to many interpretations. However, the meaning of his distinction 
between what can be analyzed in a general equilibrium framework and 
what cannot is not a mere technical problem. It is a point of 
substance.
To begin with, it would be useful if we noted Mill's distinction 
between value and price. Value is the relative price while prices are 
in terms of money. All prices may rise but it is impossible for all 
values to go up. Namely, values are how commodities relate to one
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another while prices, as a matter of fact, dominate that relation.
Naturally, if values relate all commodities to one another, it seems 
to resemble the idea that production provides us with a mean to 
relate all commodities to one another. But before that, we have to 
see how prices are being determined.
Mill argues that what determine prices are the following three 
circumstances of demand-supply relationship:
?
(a) (b)
?
(c)
(a) depicts the market for commodities which are not produced and are 
given at a fixed level. Presumably, these are going to be luxury 
goods such as artistic works; the demand for them, probably, is the 
demand of the rich. Market (b) , according to Mill, is the most 
common one. A market where the production of the commodity can be 
increased in a constant returns to scale fashion. Market (c) is the 
market for natural goods (like agriculture and mining) where we have 
increasing marginal costs as the quality (and quantity) of one of 
the factor of production (land) is diminishing (or fixed).
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Naturally, Mill does not offer any theory whatsoever to related the 
different demand functions to one another. This is the 'partial 
equilibrium' aspect of his theory. Thus, to argue for a general 
equilibrium interpretation one will need two things; (i) to argue that 
all prices tend to their 'cost of production' and,(ii) that in spite 
of (c) we can relate the 'cost of production' of all commodities 
without any reference to demand.
As for the first, this seems to based on the 'classical' idea of 
'natural' price. "As a general rule" writes Mill, "things tend to 
exchange for one another at such values as will enable each producer 
to be repaid the cost of production with the ordinary rate of 
profit"(Principles, p.452). However, it is important to note that 
according to Mill, cost of production, or the natural price, are 
taken as an average. A point around which prices oscillate though 
very seldom will really coincide with (p.433).
This last thing deterred many from accepting the 'cost of production' 
theory of value. Indeed, as I argued in Smith, the interpretation of 
'cost of production' (or natural price) as the long-run equilibrium 
price is unacceptable. It is, in my view, a reference point through 
which we may establish some relation with the information supplied 
to us by technology about relationships in production. Thus, the 
meaning of the natural price, or the 'cost of production' is really 
more moral than practical in terms of the determination of prices.
In terms of the second problem, the rising marginal costs, there is
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a possible solution. If (c) above really depicts agricultural 
commodities then it will not be a continuing rising marginal cost. 
Instead it will be as follows:
(d)
Namely, only after significant output from the given amount of land 
we shall have to resort to a less productive one. Even then, the 
productivity of land will not change with every small increase in its 
output. In such a case, for a given amount of population, variation 
in demand in (a) and (b) will not cause any change in the 'cost of 
production' system. If, however, the rising marginal productivity 
prevails in other raw materials, like mining, we have a more complex 
situation. While population will determine the cost of production in 
(d), shifts in demand in (b) will cause a rise in the demand for raw 
materials and in their cost of production. The case of (b) will not 
hold any more.
In any case, suppose that at one point of time we have the case of 
(a), (b) and (d). Until a further significant rise in population we 
may talk of 'cost of production' that relate all commodities to one
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another. We have then the following system:
fi=(l+r)  +fnani+wai]
P2*(l+r) [P ia ^ 2 *P z ^ 22^ ........
P„=(l-*-r) [Piain+f2a2D+........
And in a matrix form:
P=(l+r) [PA+wa]
The principal component of cost of production, argues Mill, is 
labour. (Principles, p.457). "What the production of a thing costs 
to its producer, or its series of producers, is the labour expended 
in producing it."(ibid). The key in this statement is the reference 
to the 'series of producers'. Namely, we take capital as a produced 
good and if we go back long enough, we shall be left with the only 
agent of production, labour. The same idea appears also in 
Sraffa(1960.Ch.6) but allow me to give it a somewhat different 
interpretation.
Consider the 2x2 system where commodity 1 is the numeraire :
(1) l=(l+r) (aii+Pa2i+aiw)
(2) P=(l+r) (412+^222+02*)
Now, applying (1) to its first argument:
aiixl=(aJi+Pa2iaii+aiaiiW) (1+r) 
and (2) to its second argument:
fa2i=(ai2a2i+fa22a2i+*2a2i*f)(l+r)
Returning them to the main equation (1) we shall get:
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[ +(^12^21+^^22^21 
+02^21^) (l+r)+a^w] (l+r)=l
If we repeat the operation several times more we shall find that the 
expressions in the parenthesis approach zero so that the set of 
original equations will shrink to:
(3) OiW(l+r)=l
(4) a2w(l+r)»P
Solving (3) for r:
r=_l_-l
a,w
Substituting in (4):
02w (1+_2l_-1) =a2W-3_=— £ =P
a^w a^w
So the price ratio, the value, of 2 in terms of 1 is determined by 
the ratio between labour inputs in 2 and 1.
However, this is only in intellectual exercise. For this to be true 
we must assume that wages are the same throughout. Indeed, Mill is 
very clear to distinguish between cost of production reflecting 
labour as a quantity and labour as a cost (including wages). "[I]t 
would seem that the value of the product cannot be determined solely 
by the quantity of labour, but by the quantity together with the 
remuneration"(p.459).
But surely it is labour, according to Mill, that is the real agent 
of production. What is it, then, that causes prices (as cost of 
production) not to reflect the logical conclusion of the above
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system? Let me for a moment return to the general form and write 
cost of production with wages as the numeraire:
£=q=(l+r) (qA+a) 
w
We can now rewrite it as :
q [ S I - A ] - a  w h e r e  5= .
^ (1+r)
Recall that the information supplied by technology suggests that:
a(I+A)=A
or:
a=A(J+A)"i
Hence,
q(fI-A)=A(I+A)-i
q=A(I+A)-i(^I-A)-i
And if we ignore the tail:
q=A(I+Ayi(6I+A)
Now it is well established that prices are proportional to labour 
values only when the capital to labour ratio in all industries is the 
same. However, this is not the only case. Also when r-0, prices will 
be proportional to labour inputs. If r-0, 6-1 then:
q=A
Which means that when profits are introduced, cost of production do 
not reflect any more the technological relations between 
commodities. But this is not to say that Mill disapproved of 
rewarding abstinence. It is not profits as such which distort the 
system, it is the uniform rate of profit. This, is entirely the
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result of competition ( which is a particular form of the social 
institution of exchange).
In fact, according to Mill, the only aspect of the rate of profit 
which will equal in all industries is the 'interest rate'. Other 
aspects, like risk, may come in a form of direct costs. However, in 
the system that we have used here, r represents the cost of risk as 
much as the interest rate (there is no other conceivable argument 
which can represent risk). Therefore, I would like to argue that in 
a system like the above it could be possible to have cost of 
production reflecting the labour inputs ratio.
So what we have so far is that 'cost of production' according to 
Mill, should reflect labour inputs but it is the arrangements of 
society that may cause them to deviate from their objective values. 
In other words, the only thing we can say about the 'cost of 
production' that they do not necessarily reflect the objective 
difficulty of attainment. Nevertheless, they do explain the 
deviation from them. What we shall have to do now is to investigate 
the moral implications of all that.
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5. The Moral Significance of Mill's economic system
It was my reading of the 'Principles' that first aroused my 
suspicions regarding the utilitarian nature of Mill's moral theory. 
His discussion of distribution seems to be dominated by ethical 
principles which do not appear to be in complete accordance with the 
method of 'classical utilitarianism'. In fact, the mere use of 
'principles', or rules, already suggests a departure from the 
mainstream thinking of this school.
Allow me just to repeat here what I mean by 'classical 
utilitarianism'. There are fundamentally two major aspects to it. 
One, the exclusiveness of 'happiness' (which must be sensually 
interpreted as all these theories are to be considered under the 
'classical empiricism' heading). The other, its teleological nature 
as far as the theory of justice is concerned. Namely, principles of 
justice should be constructed in such a way that they will never 
overrule the principle of utility. That is, as the moral value of 
actions depend on their consequences, a principle, or rule, can only 
be applied to actions the result of which are known in advance and 
at a high degree of certainty.
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In section 4 I have tried to show that Mill does not fall in this 
category because of his extended concept of 'happiness' . An extension 
that allows for a much wider conception of the moral good and for 
some other things to have moral value (like education) which are not 
be associated with any direct, or even indirect, utility. 
Nevertheless, his theory of justice is definitely teleological in 
the utilitarian tradition. The whole of his theory of justice (and 
duty) is completely dominated by his effort to show that rules as 
such are not contradictory to utilitarianism. That they can all be 
explained in terms of their contribution to the moral good. And that 
people follow duty from utilitarian reasons.
How successful Mill was in advocating his theory of justice and being 
consistent with 'classical utilitarianism' is a matter for a separate 
investigation. However, in the light of his methodological attack on 
Bentham and its immediate result- the extension of the concept of 
happiness- there is little to argue in favour of Mill's association 
with classical utilitarianism save, perhaps, his complex relationship 
with his father.
The best example, in my view, to the tension between Mill's theory 
and utilitarian principles can be found in his theory of economic 
justice. In Mill's discussion of distribution he seems to lay down 
principles of justice which appear to be more rationalist than 
empiricist in nature. For instance, I will show that in his 
discussion of both, private and communal, ownership of property the 
fundamental principles are based on some idea of a person's 
sovereignty on his self. That he has some kind of a right on his own
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faculties. This, in turn, requires that communal ownership will be 
based on a voluntary transfer of this right to some agreed 
authority; while in the case of private property it is the 
foundation of the proposition that people have rights to the 'fruits 
of their labour'.
While there might be a utilitarian explanation for the last 
proposition, it is still difficult to explain the theory of right 
behind it, in terms of a utilitarian theory. Indeed, it is not 
surprising at all that Walras, the rationalist, holds an astonishing 
similar theory of right. In turn, it will be interesting to examine 
the difference between the manifestation of the similar moral 
principle in classical and neo-classical models. At present, however, 
I would like to concentrate on examining the precise meaning of this 
principle in Mill's moral theory as well as on its manifestation in 
his economic theory.
a. I n i t i a l  D i s t r i b u t i o n  a n d  t h e  I d e a l  o f  P r i v a t e  P r o p e r t y ,
There is little doubt that Mill was quite unhappy with the social 
circumstances of his times. Nevertheless, even though he contemplated 
the 'communal' alternatives, he was willing to make allowances to the 
system of private property. Mainly on the grounds that it emerged 
from what Mill considered to be an initially wrong principle. A 
principle that can be historically explain but is not itself an
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inherent feature of this kind of social institution.
This principle is the principle of 'first occupancy'. The reason that 
Mill gives for its becoming a principle of justice is that the 
judicial systems in the rude states of society were concerned with 
peace rather than with justice. As acquisition of property through 
violence was the main cause of disorder, it was necessary to 
establish 'first occupancy' as a principle of justice. Also, bearing 
in mind the nature of acquiring any sort of wealth in those days (by 
collection rather than production) it may also appear as a plausible 
principle.
Thus, argues Mill, the actual institution of private property stems 
from an initial distribution which is based on a principle of 
acquisition which is unacceptable. The morally upsetting state of 
private property, therefore, is not necessarily because of its 
inherent qualities, rather because of some historical distortions.
In order to consider the institutions of property properly. Mill 
suggests to think of a hypothetical situation where colonists occupy 
an uninhabited country; bringing nothing with them but what belonged 
to them in common. "[HJaving a clear field for the adoption of the 
institutions and polity which they judged most expedient; [they are] 
required, therefore, to choose whether they would conduct the work 
of production on the principle of individual property, or on some 
system of common ownership and collective agency(Principles,
p.201).
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He then goes on and suggests a list of conditions that should 
accompany the establishment of private property in such a 
hypothetical situation. "Every full grown man or woman, we must 
suppose, would be secured in the unfettered use and disposal of his 
or her bodily and mental faculties ; and the instruments of 
production, the land and tools, would be divided fairly among them, 
so that all might start, in respect to outward appliances, on equal 
term."(p.202).
The ideal of private property, therefore, is based on two principles; 
an initial distribution that will start all on equal terms and, the 
freedom to exploits one's faculties (i.e., the freedom of 
occupation).
The alternative, according to Mill, is to hold the instruments of 
production collectively. Hence, the direction of labour (the actual 
division of labour) as well as the distribution of produce will also 
be conducted publicly by an authority that we assume to be obeyed 
voluntarily. Thus, the two initial principles of communal systems are 
the collective ownership of means of production and, an agreed 
transfer of the freedom of occupation.
What is not very clear is what is the meaning of these conditions. 
At the beginning Mill said that in his hypothetical situation, the 
'colonists' will choose the institution they find most expedient. He 
does not, however, deal with the question which institution they will 
choose, rather he suggests what they would do had they chosen a 
particular institution. As if the above principles have nothing to
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do with a moral choice (which would have probably be reflected in 
the choice of institution), rather with the choice of its most 
efficient form. Thus, it can be said, the above conditions are not 
moral conditions but simply the principles that f o m  the 'ideal' of 
the two concepts. They constitute, as such, the proper definitions 
of private and communal ownership.
If by the equal initial distribution and the freedom of occupation 
Mill means that this is the logical meaning of private property (in 
the abstract), they cannot be interpreted as principles of justice. 
To qualify as such, these principles must be explained in terms of 
Mill's moral theory (or utilitarianism as some would argue). 
Similarly, if communal ownership is characterized by a voluntarily 
transfer of all the means of production to an agreed authority, the 
volition side of it cannot be interpreted as a moral requirement.
However, it is difficult to maintain that these principles are not 
principles of justice even though they are being argued with no 
relation at all to any theory of morals. In the case of communal 
ownerships the first principle sounds like a definition; that is, all 
productive forces (including a person's own abilities) are in the 
hands of a central authority. Nothing is being said on what should 
be the aims or values of that authority. Nevertheless, the second 
(or hidden) principle, that the individual's productive forces 
should be voluntarily transferred, is not entirely a value free 
principle. It pre-supposes that individuals have a right to own 
their own faculties.
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In the case of private ownership, however, the only things which fits 
the term definition is the idea that everyone is free to apply his 
faculties in any way he chooses. To argue that external means of 
production should be distributed equally, or in such a way that will 
bring all to an equal footing, can hardly be part of what defines 
'private property'. In fact, even to argue that private property 
means that we own at least our own faculties, like in the previous 
case, is not a value free statement.
Therefore, it appears that these principles are moral principles 
after all. However, bearing in mind Mill's reputation as a 
utilitarian, these principles are quite surprising. They seem to be 
argued with no relation whatsoever to their consequences in 
utilitarian terms. As a matter of fact, they seem to be like 
a-priori rules of justice. Rules that are founded on the idea of 
individual's sovereignty of themselves. Quite a 'rationalistic' 
idea.
Now, we have already discussed the difficulty of any theory of rights 
in the ' classical utilitarian' framework. We saw, however, that in 
Mill's case there is room for such a theory. Mainly as 'free-will' 
in Mill's view is not something that people are being born with. 
How much of their behaviour is following customs and imitation and 
how much is a reflection of the person's individuality is a function 
of a person's education and social circumstances. Thus, some aspects 
of the theory of right actually precede any moral argument and as 
such, his theory is only semi-teleological. True, education is a key 
to a 'higher' level of happiness and as such the right of education
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can be said to be embedded in the theory of the moral good (a 
teleological theory). However, as 'free-will' is a prerequisite for 
moral accountability, it may be argued that education is a principle 
of justice that is independent of the moral good. Providing someone 
with education and the proper social circumstances does not 
guarantee that he will be able to enhance his happiness. It merely 
provides the ability for him to become a moral being.
Nevertheless, one may still argue that all these principles are not 
moral principles on the grounds that the 'ideals' of private and 
communal ownership, are simply their most efficient forms. However, 
when we examine what efficiency may mean here, we shall find that it 
means the best method of bringing about the same moral principles. 
To see that it is enough to look at Mill's criteria for judging 
between the two kinds of social institutions. "We must also suppose 
two conditions realized, without which neither Communism nor any 
other laws or institutions could make the conditions of mankind 
other than degraded and miserable.One..is universal education; the 
other, a due limitation of the numbers of the community."(p.209). 
These two principles are later on reintroduced by Mill with slight 
difference. They become the following two; (a) guaranteed 
subsistence^, and (b) the greatest amount of liberty and 
spontaneity^.
There is little doubt that these two principles are principles of
^Guaranteed subsistence is an extension of the principle restricting the 
numbers in a community.
^And this principle is the extension of the idea of education. In Mill, 
liberty and spontaneity are closely associated with education.
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justice. The great amount of liberty and spontaneity is nothing else 
but Mill's idea of the greatest amount of happiness. Obviously, the 
first principle does not have a direct utilitarian sense but given 
Mill's belief that the second principle cannot hold unless the first 
one does, we can consider both of them as principles of justice.
b .  F i n a l  D i s t r i b u t i o n  a n d  P r o p o r t i o n a l  R e m u n e r a t i o n .
Given the two principles of a just system of property, it is clear 
that one cannot stop at the initial distribution for the definition 
of a just economic system. After all, the distribution of 
subsistence as well as the material conditions for liberty and 
spontaneity depend on the mechanism that produces the final 
distribution.
Indeed, not only initial conditions constitute Mill's ideal of 
private property, also the principle of the produce distribution is 
an essential part of it. This too, seems to be based on some sort 
of individual's sovereignty principle. "Private property... is
supposed to guarantee to individuals the fruits of their own labour 
and abstinence."(p.209). If we are willing to suppose that there is 
some correlation between efforts and 'fruits of labour' then we may 
say that this is a principle of proportional remuneration.
The fact that it is a principle of proportional remuneration and the
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importance that Mill associates to this principle of distribution 
become clear from his analysis of the actual state of private 
property. It is the violation of this principle of proportional 
remuneration that is sufficient for Mill to reject the institution 
of private property whatever else can be said in its favour. Allow 
me to quote here at some length:
"If, therefore, the choice were to be made between Communism with all 
its chances, and the present [1852] state of society with all its 
suffering and injustices; if the institution of private property 
necessarily carried with it as a consequence, that the produce of 
labour should be apportioned as we now see it, almost in an inverse 
ratio to the labour -the largest portion to those who have never 
worked at all, the next largest to whose work is nominal, and so in
a descending scale ; if this or Communism were the alternative,
all the difficulties, great or small, of Communism would be as dust 
in the balance."(Principles, p.208).
This principle, as an explicit principle, does not appear in so many 
words in Mill's own writings on morals and justice. However, I 
believe that it is a plausible interpretation of that principle 
according to which a person is entitled to the fruits of his labour. 
It is, perhaps, worth noting that in his Autobiography, Mill refers 
to this principle explicitly but not in the context of his own moral 
theory rather as an acknowledged principle of justice
(Autobiography, p.239). (see also a discussion of it in Berger(1985)
pp.166-8) .
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How much of a utilitarian principle it is questionable. Though Mill 
seems to have tried and construct this principle (the entitlement to 
the fruits of one's labour) on utilitarian grounds, it is on quite 
shaky foundations. The utilitarian aspect of this principle is the 
idea that positive remuneration serves people happiness in as much 
as punitive measures do. Thus, to return good for good is a 
principle of justice no less than the principle of punishing 
malevolence. However, doing good also depend on intentions. The 
creation of output through effort cannot be interpreted as doing 
good.
Thus, there is no reason to suppose why someone should be remunerated 
for pursuing his own happiness. Moreover, even if we could defend 
this proposition on utilitarian grounds, we would still be required 
to explain proportionality. If, however, we choose to consider the 
principle in a consequentialistic fashion then, maybe, we can make 
some utilitarian sense of it. Namely, actions are judged by their 
results, not intentions. The fact that an effort by an individual 
has generated wealth (that presumably served others as well), is 
sufficient in order to crown his action as a good deed. Thus, 
provided that we accept Mill's proposition that returning good (and 
by returning I mean proportional) is a utilitarian duty, then 
proportional remuneration may be justified in utilitarian terms.
However, as I have already said before. Mill's moral theory has 
departed far enough from classical utilitarianism for us to worry 
whether such a non-utilitarian principle can be interpreted as a 
moral principle. Surely, one can explain the principle of
438
proportional remuneration in terms of its contribution to the 
development of individuality. As individuality is a condition for 
self-fulfilment and a 'higher happiness', one must not do anything 
that will hinder its development. If a person applies his faculties 
(so carefully developed) to a particular task, and then, he would 
have been deprived of the fruits of his (past) and present efforts, 
he would most certainly be discouraged from developing his faculties 
any further.
Thus proportional remuneration is related to the conditions of 
creating morally responsible people who will then be able to achieve 
the highest degree of happiness. This means that this principle is 
not derived from the individual's sovereignty as such. We are 
entitle to proportional remuneration as a positive encouragement to 
the development of our faculties, not because we have an a-priori 
right to it. This point becomes clearer when we realize that in 
Mill's theory of communal ownership, the principle of proportional 
remuneration does not hold.
There are two reasons for that; first, in a communal system the 
responsibility for the development of people's individuality is on 
the authority. This agreed and accepted administrator is responsible 
to make sure that all members of society have the social and 
material circumstances to develop themselves. The other reason for 
that is the 'moral accountability' of the action that produces the 
output.
According to Mill, if division of labour is directed by a central
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authority then there is no moral requirement for proportional 
remuneration. If a person does a particular job because he is the 
most fit to do it, there is no reason why society should enhance 
this person whom nature has already endowed. If, on the other hand, 
this person chose to do this particular job, he must be 
proportionally remunerated because it was his own choice to do it. 
He is morally responsible for his action. If he is directed to the 
action by a central authority, he can no longer be considered 
responsible for it. It was nature who endowed him in such a way that 
he would be chosen to do that particular job. Society is not bound 
to remunerate him for it beyond what it remunerates other people who 
do their suitable jobs.
So under the institution of individual property, a just economic 
system is a system where people are remunerated in proportion to 
their effort. Thus, self-development of all individuals is 
encouraged by the system. In a communal system, presumably, the 
advancement of all members of society will constitute the spirit of 
their covenant.
Hence, the principle of proportional remuneration in Mill's case can 
be interpreted as deriving from some other reason than an a-priori 
right to own one's self. Consequently, this principle is not 
independent of its general consequences. Namely, proportional 
remuneration should not be investigated independently of whether it 
improves or harms the general well-being. We shall, therefore, have 
to examine what is really meant by this principle and how it apply 
to Mill's economic system.
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Bearing in mind that in Mill's theory of production there are 
fundamentally two agents, labour and nature, the principle of 
proportional remuneration seems to imply that all the produce belong 
to labour. However, one must distinguish between present and past 
work. Suppose at the first period of production all individuals work 
and the produce is distributed among them according to the principle 
of proportional remuneration. Now some of them consume it all and 
others save. If those who saved now choose not to work, they are 
still entitle to the remuneration of that part of past labour that 
they have now transferred to the new period. Thus, not only 
labourers own the produce but also those who by some legitimate 
mean, own some form of past labour.
Another reason why labour does not really have a claim on the whole 
of the output is that it is impossible to determine what part of the 
output is due to labour efforts and what is due to the forces of 
nature^. However as nature is not a social agent, no theory of 
entitlement is relevant here. Nevertheless, it means that though 
labour has a claim on the output it can share it with those who 
provide materials and by doing so, make a claim on behalf of natural 
forces.
^According to Mill there are only two requisites of production: labour 
and nature. It is between them that one cannot establish the relative 
contribution."It is impossible to decide that in any one thing nature does 
more than in any other. One cannot even say that labour does less. Less labour 
may be required; but if that labour which is required is absolutely 
indispensable, the result is just as much the product of labour, as of
nature It is like attempting to decide...which of the factors, five and
six, contribute most to the production of thirty"(Principles, p.26).
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6. Proportional Remuneration and The Theory of Value and 
Distribution.
We saw that Mill's theory of value could, under some conditions, be 
viewed as a 'cost of production' theory of value. We also saw in 
section 2 that such a theory of value does not really correspond to 
the modern concept of general equilibrium as complete interdependence 
does not prevail. It is, therefore, a system where given one 
distributional parameter the other one is being determined by it 
together with the system of prices. Values as such, therefore, do not 
affect distribution (unless measured in term of the numeraire); they 
are however, affected by it. To that extent, we can argue that 
different structures of relative prices reflect different 
distribution circumstances. We shall find that this feature of the 
model is very important in the analysis of how proportional 
remuneration presents itself in an economic model.
The first question that we have to ask ourselves when coming to 
assess the moral significance of such a system is what does 
proportional remuneration mean in such a framework of analysis. The
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first, more general, thing that comes to mind is that the 
distribution of output between the different classes of society 
should reflect their relative contributions to its production. 
However, this is too crude a definition as different products 
require different contributions from the various classes in their 
production process. Hence, perhaps a better definition would be 
where the purchasing power of wages in terms of the different 
commodities reflects the difference in the difficulty of attainment; 
the difference in labour inputs.
If labourers get their wages in term of the commodity they produce, 
they should be able to exchange it against another according to 
whether the effort (labour) to produce the other was greater or less 
to their own. Hence, they should be able to exchange one to one with 
a commodity with the same effort, more than one if the other 
commodity is easier to attain etc.. In other words, the price ratio 
between two commodities should reflect the ratio of direct labour 
inputs.
This, it must be noted, is not the same thing as having price ratio 
equal, or proportional, to labour values (which include indirect 
labour). If two commodities exchange one to one, it is possible that 
the direct labour in the first is lower than in the second, thus 
proportional remuneration from the labourer point of view requires 
that the price ratio will be less than 1. However, from the point of 
view of the capitalist, it means that the first commodity has more 
indirect labour than the second. Proportional remuneration, then, 
requires that the price ratio will be greater than 1 (only if we
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assume that the capitalist's contribution, in terms of labour, is the 
indirect labour). To that extent, then, one may say that the labour 
theory of value takes into consideration both capitalist and worker.
Hence, deviation from the objective measure of labour inputs, 
reflects a deviation from the principle of proportional remuneration 
in favour of one side or another of those who are competing for 
remuneration. This, we know, does happen in a system of 'cost of 
production'. We shall therefore, have to examine the particular 
circumstances in which such deviation occur and, in whose favour it 
tends.
There is one qualification which I must advance to my analysis. The 
question of whether proportional remuneration is a concept which is 
applicable to capitalist. On the one hand, one can argue that the 
different capital inputs reflect different efforts in production on 
the part of the capitalists. On the other hand, for the capitalists, 
those differential aspects of the rate of profits are supposed to 
take care on the difference in risk and effort in the different 
industries. These, one may argue, do not present themselves through 
the difference in capital invested.
In any case, by having a uniform rate of profit we seem to have 
normalized those efforts. Proportional remuneration, in such a case, 
will only be applicable to labourers and will be reflected in the 
direct labour inputs. Nevertheless, as Mill did consider capitalists' 
contribution as remunerable, and as the only possible interpretation 
for their effort seems to be through indirect labour inputs, I will
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refer in my analysis to both interpretation.
The actual deviation from the labour theory of value, as I have 
already argued, is mainly due to the introduction of a uniform rate
of profit. I also argued that most writers, including Mill, argue
that rates of profits will tend to uniformity however, they also 
give enough reasons to suppose that this will never come about. In 
fact. Mill argues quite clearly that only one aspect of what 
constitutes profits will tend to uniformity. This is the interest 
rate. Other components of profits like, the value of attendance or 
the compensation of risks, according to Mill, will never tend to 
uniformity (Principles, pp.411-12).
Nevertheless, Mill does argue that one can compile an average rate
of profit at any one time. Hence, as the whole of the 'cost of
production' framework is perceived as some sort of an average, to 
have a uniform rate of profit may be consistent with the general 
analysis. Therefore, the deviations from the labour theory of value, 
resulting from this uniform rate of profits, should not be perceived 
as an inherent feature of a system of 'cost of production'. 
Consequently, prices may be proportional to labour values even when 
the capital to labour ratio in all industries is not the same.
In any case, from the point of view of proportionality, labour values 
are some sort of an average between the capitalists' point of view 
and that of the labourers. If, however, we confine proportionality 
to direct labour inputs, then only if labour values are proportional 
to direct labour inputs will they be able to represent the idea of
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proportionality.
At a given price ratio, proportionality would mean that labourers 
will be able to exchange the goods according to the direct labour 
inputs ratio. However, as we may suppose that there is an inverse 
relationship between direct and indirect labour inputs, the price 
ratio that satisfies proportional remuneration to labourers certainly 
does not satisfy the capitalists' expectations. In that case, 
however, the principles of justice may be satisfied if the 
capitalists were to be compensated in terms of their share in the 
total output.
a. P r o p o r t i o n a l  R e m u n e r a t i o n  a n d  V a l u e s .
The system of 'cost of production' in Mill's case is a meeting point 
between the natural and the social science in economics. On the one 
hand it is a system of 'average' prices constructed under given 
social institution. On the other, we have the technological labour 
values which depict the commodities technological relationships 
which are (in Mill) independent from social institutions. The 
analysis of what is economic justice will now be focused on 
comparing the system which is independent from social organizations 
(labour values) with a system which is dependent on them.
The immediate interpretation of proportional remuneration in terms 
of prices was discussed above. In short it is the following one: had 
individuals, (labourers as well as capitalists) received their 
remuneration in terms of the good they produce (or a numeraire),
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they will be able to exchange it for another according to the 
relative effort involved in the production of each commodity. On the 
other hand, there is also the question of the relative share of each 
group in the total output as a measure of remuneration. The question 
is, of course, whether these two indicators point at the same 
direction.
When the rate of profit is set at zero then we know that prices equal 
their labour values. However, labour values include past labour as 
much as direct labour. Given the property rights and the fact that 
Mill believes in the right of capitalists to be remunerated, these 
labour values will not produce an exchange rate that fits the 
labourers point of view. Namely, relative prices (and labour values) 
will not represent the relative efforts on the part of labourers 
alone (i.e. the relative direct labour inputs). The rate of exchange 
that will correspond to the labour values is the one which is going 
to be somewhere between what proportional remuneration to labour 
implies and what it implies to capitalists (capital inputs ratios). 
Of course, if the capital to labour ratios are the same everywhere 
then the exchange rate suggested by the labour theory of value will 
correspond precisely to that of both labourers and capitalists. 
Therefore, the labour theory of value is a kind of a moral
benchmark. It takes into consideration both capitalists and 
labourers as far as the proportional remuneration principle is 
concerned. When r>0 prices deviate from their labour values and as 
wages are being depressed, the actual exchange rate reflects the 
capitalists' point of view alone. Hence, the deviation of prices 
from their labour values should be seen as a violation of the
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principle of proportional remuneration.
When we consider shares in output the picture becomes a bit more 
complicated. The behaviour of total output (for a given number of 
labourers and changing wage (and profit) rates) and the shares of 
each group depends on technology. At one instance maximum output and 
highest share of labourers seem to be consistent with one another. 
It also means that prices will deviate in favour of the capitalists. 
Hence, given that the shares are working in favour of labourers, it 
might be said that the injustice generated by the price deviation is 
thus rectified. This, however, does not always hold. The idea, 
therefore, of economic justice is captured by two major components; 
the relative price and the relative share. Not always do they point 
at the same direction.
In any case, I do believe that through this extrapolation we can see 
how the concept of economic justice that is based on reward can 
generate mixed feelings about the moral value of competitive systems. 
As prices deviate from labour values it implies that there is some 
kind of initial injustice in the system which may explain many of 
Mill's critical statements about capitalist systems. On the other 
hand, as the behaviour of the share in total output may sometime 
rectify this situation, it may become a tolerable system.
Let me now be more precise on what we mean by proportional 
remuneration and its relation to values and distribution. Consider 
an economy of two sectors where only one of them (say 2) produces 
wage- good. Therefore, we have the following 'cost of production'
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equations :
(1 ) l-(l*r)[aii*PS2ai]
(2 ) f.(l+r)[ai2+PS2a2]
(1 is the numeraire hence P- P2/P1) •
We can re-write (1) and (2) as:
Fi(f,r,22) = (l+r) [an+PSja^]-1=0 
P^(P,r,S2) = (l+r) [ai2+f^2O(2]-^=0
where :
Pi(P.r,S2)=Fi[P(S2) ,r(S2> ,52]=0 
The partial derivative matrix is:
^  ^  (l^-r)Sjaj-l ai2+PSjOj
S2 now represents the wages in real terms. W- PS is the wages in term 
of the numeraire. We can see that if P rises, the same level of wages 
can buy more of the other good. Proportional remuneration here means 
that a labourer should be able to buy more or less of the other good 
according to whether the effort in producing the other good is 
greater or smaller than the effort of producing the wage-good. (By 
effort on the part of labourer I mean the direct labour).
The relationship between S2 (real wages in terms of the wage-good) and 
r are given as follows :
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6Fi
T F  -JS l  
dF^ dF^ 
~ W  ~5Fl 
5^1 5Fi 
- I F  ~FF
ÔF2 3F2
(l+r)S2o:i (l+r)?#!
(l+r)S2a2-l (l+r)Pa2 
(l+r)^2®i a^+^Szai
(l+r)S2«2-]- ai2+F^2°:2
T F  "FF 
Where the denominator is:
(3) S2Qi(l+r) [ai2+FS2a2]-[52a2(^-*-J^)~l] (aii+FS20:i) 
and the numerator:
(4) S2[ai(l+r)a2-a2ai(l+r) ] +cKi=a:i>0
Rewriting (3):
(3)' S2(l+r) [aiai2-a2-3ii] +aii+52aiP>0
We can see that it is highly unlikely that (3) will be negative. 
Also, (4) is clearly positive. Hence, S r /S S z is surely negative^
Fig.l
r
^In chapter 2 of part 3 I have questioned the nature of this relationship 
in a framework where all commoditied were also wage-goods. There we saw that 
the reason for doubts was in the sign of the numerator. Here, by virtue of (4) 
this is no more a problem and the expected relationship between real wages and 
the rate of profit can safely been established.
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At Sg max, the rate of profits is zero and values reflect their 
labour values. In our case, when r-0, we shall have :
(1) (2)
4. (1 -aii) i P-ai2
^2 = - p a -  -■ = - R T
and
This price, P, when r»0, is equal to the ratio of labour values (see, 
section 4(a) above). But the ratio of labour values includes direct 
and indirect labour. Thus, we may say that (5) is how equality to 
labour values ratios is reflected in terms of direct labour alone. 
P stands in a known relation to the direct labour ratio. The higher 
it is, the higher will the relative price be.
Clearly, labour values ratio (X 2/ X 1 where Ai-atiaii+ 0:2^21 +
+®2®22 -H%2) which equals to P when r-0, will be the same as 
the ratio of direct labour inputs only when:
(5)
p 1 . fî.flî
^11
Namely when the ratio between the capital inputs in the two 
commodities equals the ratio of direct labour inputs. (It is also 
equivalent to the famous condition given by Ricardo that prices will 
be proportional to labour values if the capital to labour ratio in 
all industries was the same: Siiz/<*2 " •
The other end in fig.l is when S2-O. Then:
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(1) (2)
r s -------- = -- -----
^11 ^12
and
(6)
«11 ^11
which, as could be expected, is completely independent of any direct 
labour consideration. At (6) the price is the equilibrium price when 
all the output remains in the hand of the capitalist. We can easily 
see that when this is the case, the price will reflect 
proportionality to effort only in terms of the capitalists' 
contribution. Namely, the price ratio at (6 ) gives the ratio of 
capital inputs between sectors 2 and 1 .
At (5), on the other hand, we had the equilibrium price when all the 
output was paid as wages. Proportional remuneration would have 
required that prices will reflect only the difficulty in attainment 
from the labourers point of view (i.e. 0 2 / 011) .  However, we can
clearly see that this is not the case unless the capital to labour 
ratio (or the relative difficulty of attainment from both classes 
point of view a^j/oj) is the same in both sectors. Namely, it is 
possible that prices will be proportional to labour values but not 
to direct labour ratios. If proportional remuneration is a principle 
applicable to labour alone, we can argue then that competition and 
the subsequent uniform rate of profits are creating injustice.
If, on the other hand, when prices reflect labour values they also 
reflect direct labour ratios the price at both ends (S2-O and r-0 )
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will be precisely the same and will reflect the general relative 
difficulty of attainment:
(5) (6)
p i ^  : p 1
^11
Hence
p(5)_ p(6)
If this is the case, actual prices too are in general proportional 
to labour values. Hence, the labour theory of value means that 
throughout, prices will reflect a given relative difficulty of 
attainment which is consistent with the labourers' point of view. 
When, however, at (5) the price does not reflect the direct labour 
inputs ratio we may, under some conditions, attribute its deviation 
to the capitalists' proportional remuneration. Indeed, the price at
(6 ) will be above the one at (5) only when the ratio of 
contributions among the capitalists is higher than that of labour 
inputs. This means that only when we do not consider labour will the 
price reflecting proportional remuneration adjust completely to the 
higher ratio of capitalists contributions. When only labour is 
considered, it will fall closer to the direct labour inputs ratio 
however, it will still remain above it. As only at (5), in such a 
case, the price ratio reflects the labour theory of value, the fact 
that prices do not fall to the level of the direct labour inputs 
ratio, means that labour theory of value is an average between the 
requirements of proportional remuneration of labourers and 
capitalists alike.
So far, however, we have only examined how prices relate to the
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principle of proportional remuneration at both ends of the 
distributional parameters. What we shall have to do now is to examine 
the general relationship between equilibrium prices and distribution.
Let us look again at (1) and (2) separately. Equilibrium in (1) means 
that :
We can thus draw the relationship between r and P which are 
consistent with equilibrium in industry 1 :
fig. 2
?
r
We can also see that as S rises, the equilibrium curve shifts 
inwards and becomes flatter.
If we follow the same line with respect to industry 2 we shall find 
that (2) can be re-written as:
(8) P=
(l+r)ai2
l-(l+r)3^%
From where we can see that r and P which are consistent with
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equilibrium in that market are directly related:
fig.3
I i_
— ^ 2 <^ 2
r
Unlike the case in fig 2, here the equilibrium curve shifts upwards 
as S is rising. General equilibrium, therefore, will be achieved 
where these two curves intersect:
fig. 4
<
o
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Now, from fig. 1 we know that the equilibrium levels of r and S2 are 
inversely related, thus, as S changes, the two equilibrium curves in 
fig 4 shift too so that new r and P now satisfy general equilibrium. 
If r-0, we know that the equilibrium price is given by (5). As r 
falls (and S2 rises) the equilibrium price will rise or fall 
according to the relative shifts of the two equilibrium curves.
b. Equilibrium P r i c e s  a n d  D i s t r i b u t i o n
Let us examine how equilibrium prices change as the distributional 
parameters change. In this framework it will be sufficient to examine 
one of them as the inverse relationship between r and S2 has already 
been established. The effects of a change in S2 on P are the 
following:
P a ^ ( l + r )
6?  ^ _ P o tz C U r )  ai2-^PS2pt2 
ô$2 S 2 0 t i ( l + r )  a^^+PS20ci
S 2 a 2 ( l - * - r ) - l  a^2^PS20i2
Or,
foi(l+r) (ai2+ES202)-Pa2(l+r) (an+PSaOti)
52»!( 1 +r) {a^ 2^ PS20i2) - [S2O12( 1 ) -1 ] {a^ ^^ PSzOti)
where the denominator as before is positive. However, as for the 
numerator the story is different:
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(9) P(aiai2-*2aii)<0
Hence, the sign of (9), depends on whether » or
• Which is precisely the same condition we had before 
for the price ratio (when r— 0 and when it equals labour values 
ratio) to be above or below the direct labour inputs ratio. Thus, 
if the proportional remuneration from the capitalists point of view 
requires a higher P (namely, ai2/&ii^2/(%i) then (9) tells us that as 
the distributional parameters move from wages to profits, the price 
will reflect proportionality according to what fits the capitalists 
group (5P/5S2<0 ).
From all that one can draw the following conclusions:
(a) Even when capitalists are excluded (r-0) and prices are 
proportional to labour values, labourers do not get the full 
proportional remuneration they can expect. Namely, the price ratio 
will not be equal to ratio of direct labour. It will be higher or 
lower according to whether the principle of proportional remuneration 
from the capitalists' point of view requires a higher or lower ratio. 
Only when prices are proportional to labour values do prices satisfy 
the principle of proportional remuneration when there are no profits 
in the system.
(b) As the rate of profits rises and the wages fall, equilibrium 
prices will preserve the principle of proportional remuneration 
according to rising importance of the group whose distributional 
parameter is rising.
(b)can now be interpreted as saying that when prices deviate from 
labour values and when r rises and S falls, the system moves from an
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initial injustice to labourers (the prices at r— 0 do not reflect 
direct labour inputs), to a greater one. If indeed, the rise in the 
rate of profits also means that total product and the share of 
profits in it have risen, then the path of equilibrium price will 
be consistent with justice in as much as the principle of 
proportionality accommodates those who have the largest share in the 
total output. It does not, however, suggests anything with respect 
to who should get what share and why.
c. P r o d u c t i o n ,  R e l a t i v e  S h a r e s  a n d  P r o p o r t i o n a l  R e m u n e r a t i o n
Let us now explore the production side of the model. We have the 
following three equations and I assume that the amount of labour is 
given:
(10) yi(i-6 )=yiaii+y2ai2
(11) y2(i-5)+yi52ai+y252«2
(12) Z'=yiai+y2*2
Equations (10) and (11) can be considered as a separated problem 
which can be written, in a matrix form, as follows:
y(l-5)=Ay
This is a similar problem to the one we had in section 2 and in 
equations (1) and (2) above. We are looking for the eigenvalue and 
eigenvector of this system. Naturally, (1-5) is the eigenvalue. As
458
the coefficient matrix here is the same as in problem (l)-(2 ), the 
eigenvalue of this system is the same as the one in (l)-(2). Thus:
Hence, the rate of 'net-surplus' ( S )  o f  the system corresponds in a 
direct way to the rate of profits. Thus, profits take upon them the 
meaning of growth in such types of models. However, it must not be 
confused for profits as the cause of growth ; simply that when there 
is no growth, there are no profits.
Equation (12) helps us to find the levels of Y and Y rather than to 
deal with ratios. Hence, we can solve the system directly to get:
We can now define total output as:
(15) rP.Yi+PYg
Let us now examine how the total output and the share of labour in 
it change, in equilibrium, when there is a change in the equilibrium 
levels of the distributional parameters. First, the effects of a 
change in Sg on Y^ and Yg:
And total product will change according to:
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2There are only two circumstances when we can be sure about the 
outcome ;
If [1 -5+(55/5S2)S2]<0 and P><X2/°'i then it follows that 3P/ôS2<0 and 
so 3TP/3S2<0 .
If [1-3+(33/3S2)S2]<0 and P<a2/«i then it follows that 3P/3S2>0 and 
so 3TP/3S2>0 .
However, clearly the sign of [1 -6+(35/3S2)S2] depends on the level of 
$2. At very low levels of S2, the absolute value of 36/382 is very 
high. Its negative sign should have made [l-6+(36/3S2)S2] negative 
but as $2 itself is very small, it become negligible altogether. As 
6 (which corresponds to the rate of profits) is at its highest equal 
to (l-a^i; because 6-r/(l+r) and r max is when it equals to (1 - 
aii)/aii (see fig. 2)) it makes [l-6+(36/3S2)S2] a positive expression 
for low 82. Thus to investigate the changes in output as a result of 
changes in distributional parameters, we shall have to look at how 
the change in output changes.
If we write the second derivative of (18) we will get:
(19)
d s l ^ ( 1-J>* “ 1
Not a very pleasant sight. Nevertheless if we assume for the sake 
of simplicity that (3^6/382^)-(3^P/382^)-0 or very small indeed, the
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sign of (19) will depend on:
Clearly if [l-5+(35/5S2)S2] is negative and (3P/9S2)<0 , the sign of
(20) [and (19)] is positive. The negative sign of (18) must change 
somewhere and the function has a minimum. In the same way the 
reverse will happen in the other case. We can therefore suppose that 
the total output functions, which depend on the technological 
coefficient (like prices and the rate of profit) will have the 
following form:
fig.5
 -|—  C
S2(r-0 )
We can easily see that the max/min occurs somewhere between 82=0 and 
r*=0 (maximum S2 which is consistent with the system having a 
solution). When S2-O, from (13) and (14) we can see the equilibrium 
values of and Y2. Thus, according to (15), TP=L(l/ai) . When r=0,
then we can calculate the equilibrium level of S2 by using (5) . This 
will be:
s:
l-aji 
 ^ (l-aii)a2+âi2ai
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By inserting it to (13) , (14) and by using the price equation (5) we 
will get;
TP - S2L[?*-fi]+LJi
Clearly, whether or not TP when r-0 is greater or smaller (or equal) 
to TP when S2-O depends on whether or not P O  02/01-
If P>02/oi then it is clear that TP(r-0)> TP(S2-0 ) . It is also clear 
that for small S2 the sign of [l-5+(3^/3S2)S2] is positive. Thus, as 
the sign of 3P/3 S2 remains the same, (19) becomes negative for very 
small 82- From (18) we can see that for very small S2, the left hand 
side will be the more dominant, thus the sign of (18) becomes 
positive too. Therefore, we get a curve of the kind depicted in 
fig.5 and denoted A.
At first, TP rises with S2 and then, when S2 is high enough the sign 
of (19) and (18) changes so that TP changed altogether. It begins 
to fall and the slope, which is now negative will begin to rise. 
Whether or not the TP function gets its minimum before Max S2 is not 
very important to us ; what matters is that in any case the value of 
TP when S2 is at its maximum is higher than when r is at its 
maximum.
In a similar way we can find curve B which depicts the conditions 
when P<a2/o!i* Obviously, the highest level of TP would be when S2-O. 
The third case is when P-02/(%i which is the case depicted by line C. 
Here we can see that the level of output is not affected by the 
distributional parameters. Recall also that this is the case when
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labour values reflect precisely the direct labour inputs ratio; 
prices, then, are always proportional to labour values and, in this 
case, they always reflect labourers' expectations with regard to 
proportional remuneration.
Naturally, looking at the distributional parameters is not sufficient 
for our purpose. We must also look at what happens to the relative 
shares. The share of labour is defined as:
W _ PS2L
IT ■ (Ti+PTa)
And the derivative with respect to S2:
dP Tc .«T / dTP
a(./TP) .
^  f p
which can now be written as :
P[l-SjL(l-S^-^Sj) — (“! ( P - ^ )) 1 )
0 S2 «1
Again, only at two instances we can get a definite result:
(a) if [1-5+(35/5S2)S2]<0 and P>(%2/(%i then (3P/3S2><0 : hence,
(3TP/aS2)<0 and [3(W/TP)/3S2]>0 .
(b) if [1 -3+(35/3S2)S2]<0 and P<Q2/ai then (3P/3S2)>0 : hence,
(3TP/3S2)>0 and [3(W/TP)/3S2]<0 .
When [1 -5+(35/3S2)S2] is positive ( at very low S2) it is likely that 
the sign of (21) in (a) and (b) will be reversed. We could have 
examined (21) in more details in order to show it but I believe that 
it can be easily deduced without it. Figure 6 depicts what happens
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to the relative shares with relation to what happens to total 
output :
fig. 6
TP1W/TP
We know very well what happens to the share of labour when S2 is 
above S (this point will be the same in A and B whenever the 
distance of P from a 2/ct i will be the same)^. This is given by (a) 
and (b), We also know that at S2- O , the share of labour will be 
zero. Given the continuous nature of (21) we can conclude that lines 
A',B' and C' represent the share of labour in output which 
corresponds to the relevant circumstances. However, the importance 
of it is not very great. We can always say that subsistence requires 
that S will be large enough to exclude the case when [1-
^The value of S which maximizes (minimizes) output is derived from 
equation (18). It is, therefore:
Ô-1)
^2 =
db
as.
[ a \ { P ------- + d P  j ___
as, ( 1 - 0
Clearly, if P-0 2 / 0 1  is the same (with different signs) the value of S will be 
the same. For particular technologies we may say without loss of generality 
that the value of S for both A and B is the same.
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5+(35/ôS2)S2 ] is positive.
Figure 7 summarizes all these results:
Fig. 7
-TP
h -
Let me first point out that lines A',B' and C in the (r,P) plane are 
our bench-mark. These are the price levels which are equal to labour 
values (measured when r-0). At C we have an additional feature; 
labour values (which include indirect labour, or capital in terms 
of labour) are equal to the ratio of direct labour inputs. As A' 
and B' deviate from C it is clear that from the point of view of 
proportional remuneration, A' and B' are some sort of an averaged 
between what the capitalists and the labourers would have expected. 
(The expectation for proportional remuneration by the capitalists 
will be satisfied at points e where prices are equal to the ratio 
of capital inputs.).
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Now, if P>(X2/°i then maximum output will be achieved when S2—S . In 
this case, the share of labour in total output will be around its 
highest that could be achieved under the given technological 
condition and the social institution of competition. As S2 is very 
low, the corresponding P (on line A) will not be so far from A' . 
Hence, prices will still be close to the average between capitalists 
and labourers expectation for proportional remuneration.
However, there is nothing in the system to guarantee that maximum 
output will be achieved. Moreover, if subsistence means having S2>S 
(which is very likely as S is very small indeed) we can be certain 
that the economy will be somewhere along the line of falling share 
of labour. Here we will see that maximum output, taken as a measure 
for the general well being, requires to have wages at their 
subsistence level (S^ in fig,7). This means that prices will now be 
closer than before to A' . Hence proportional remuneration seems to 
tend towards what labourers might consider as a fair average between 
their expectations for remuneration and those of the capitalists. 
But not only that, the share of labour in output is now lower than 
what it could be. In fact, any rise in wages will mean that the 
share of labour (in term of the numeraire) as well as output itself 
will fall. It is so because prices will fall as wages rise.
Is it an idea of economic justice according to Mill? Well, to the 
extent that proportional remuneration is a necessary condition for 
economic justice, it is not. The fact that a larger share of the 
output is now in the hands of capitalists requires that the principle 
of proportionality should follow the ratio of their difficulty of
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attainment (ai2/ a n ) . However, equilibrium price will move further 
from it the larger becomes the share of the capitalists.
On the other hand, one may argue that this is a balanced idea of 
justice. The share of profits has risen, so proportionality should 
compensate the other group rather than enhance the good fortune of 
the capitalists. Hence, the role of proportional remuneration is 
interpreted as the compensating factor for any given distribution.
In the case of P<a2/c*i (B in fig. 7), then it is clear that to 
satisfy the general well-being we should have had S2-O. However, 
given that subsistence (3%) is a viability condition, this principle 
will be satisfied in the other end, where r approaches zero. In such 
a case, the share of labour is indeed very high while the price too 
gets closer to labourers' expectations for remuneration (B'). Hence, 
the balancing role of proportional remuneration seems to disappear 
altogether. Everything here seems to be working in favour of the 
labourers. However, we must qualify this statement. Even when prices 
are proportional to labour values, those do not reflect only the 
labourers' point of view; they are some average between the two 
groups. To that extent, moving along B and raising wages, is always 
consistent with the principle of proportional remuneration.
When, however, prices are proportional to labour values and they are 
equal to direct labour inputs, we have a somewhat different story. 
A rise in wages will not change output but will raise the share of 
wages on the expense of profits. Now, if proportional remuneration 
is only related to real effort, like direct labour, then path C is 
the path of economic justice. All deviations from it, which are
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inevitable in such a system when not all industries have the same 
capital to labour ratio, expose the harming face of competition. The 
higher is the rate of profits, the greater is the deviation from the 
principle of proportional remuneration (in either path A or B) . The 
labour theory of value is, in such a case, the key to what one 
considers to be the just economic system.
However, if proportional remuneration is interpreted in such a way 
so that capitalists, in the name of past labour, have a claim on the 
efforts that were needed in the production of a commodity, then the 
labour theory of value can no longer be the key to economic justice. 
If prices are proportional to labour inputs, the capitalists lose 
their share in output as wages rise, as well as the advantages of 
exchange.
To summarize, there are two ways to interpret proportional 
remuneration. One, as reflecting the real effort of production as 
denoted by the ratio of direct labour inputs. The other, as 
reflecting efforts of past and present labour; namely, that the 
ratio of capital investments reflects the difficulty of attainment 
from the point of view of the capitalist. However, as I mentioned 
earlier, this last interpretation is not very reasonable. Mill does 
acknowledge the right for remuneration on the part of abstinence. 
However, if we follow his analysis of profits, it seems that the 
only place where proportionality may come in on the part of the 
capitalist is when he takes risks. This, however, has very little 
to do with the amount of past labour, or capital, that is required 
in the production of anything. Consequently, I believe that Mill
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meant proportionality to direct labour inputs when he discussed the 
idea of proportional remuneration. Indeed, it was only in reference 
to labour that he mentioned the subject at all.
Nevertheless, I have explored the meaning of both senses of
proportional remuneration in Mill's system. Accordingly, if we accept 
the capitalist's right for proportional remuneration, we can see that 
the concept of economic justice becomes a complex one. On the one
hand we have the inverse relationship between wages and the rate of
profits (the question of the fair share). On the other, the question 
of the advantages in trade (proportionality of prices).
We have nothing in the theory to suggest anything about what should 
be the distribution of shares between labourers and capitalists; 
however, we can say something about the moral value of different 
distributions. If technology is such that we follow path A, then a 
rise in the rate of profits also means a rise in the share of 
labourers. Thus, to compensate capitalists for their falling share, 
prices approach the proportional remuneration value from their point 
of view (P-->ai2/aii) .
If technology is such that we follow path B, then the rise in the 
rate of profits means a fall in the share of labourers in the total 
output. However, instead of compensating labour for its falling 
share, prices approach yet again the proportional remuneration value 
from the point of view of the capitalists. They have now a larger 
share and the advantages of the market to go along with it.
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If technology is such that we follow path C, then the rise in the 
rate of profits means a fall in the share of labourers in the total
output. However, as prices are proportional to labour values, they
are also proportional to direct inputs ratios and hence, labour is 
being compensated for its loss of share. However, in this case, if 
the rate of profits falls, the share of capitalists fall as well. 
Nevertheless, they are not being compensated by a price ratio which 
will reflect their presumed efforts.
If we do not accept the proposition that the capital inputs ratio 
between two goods reflect the different efforts of the capitalist, 
we will end up with only one just path; path C. Prices which are 
proportional to labour theory of value are those which are consistent 
with the principle of proportional remuneration.
As 1 said before, one of the draw-backs of such a system is that at 
least one distributional parameter (wages) is determined exogenously. 
As it affects both the other distributional parameter as well as 
prices, it seems that the whole question of economic justice depends 
on the choice of that parameter.
Indeed, on which path the economy will be is determined by
coefficients which are truly objective. But on any of these paths,
the determination of wages ($2) will also determine the degree of 
proportionality of prices. Without going into details regarding the 
wage-fund doctrine, it is clear that in Mill the two classes were 
responsible for it. The capitalists in how much they decide to return 
to the system as circulating capital; the labourers, in how much they
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decide to propagate.
The whole analysis that was carried out above assumed the question 
of setting the wages (and thus the rate of profits) as beyond the 
scope of economic justice. The question is what effects on prices 
would the assumption that the degree of capitalists' 'savings' is 
in itself a function of prices. How would that affect the setting 
of S and consequently, the proportionality of prices that would 
emerge as a result.
It is, however, not accidental that Mill neglected such consideration
r"
and left the whole analysis to be based on objective parameters. An 
introduction of subjective considerations would only be meaningful 
if it was not only related to economics. The fact that economics is 
part of a larger framework means, in Mill's case, that we cannot 
relate the determination of prices in one market to another. 
Therefore, the idea of 'cost of production' as an average is the 
only way to look at an economic system on its own. Economic justice, 
therefore, must be applied to this average.
For comparison purposes, I have introduced in the appendix to this 
chapter, a neo-classical model within which I examine the meaning of 
proportional remuneration. It will become evident that in a 
simultaneous equilibrium, the idea of proportionality does not 
prevail. In fact, equilibrium prices will change in an inverse 
relation to the ratio of proportional remunerations. If, however, 
we think of the system in a similar way to a cost of production 
system (where some variables are predetermined), we shall find that
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prices are proportional to labour inputs but that they change 
inversely to them. Naturally, this will have to do with the meaning 
of equilibrium in such a system.
Appendix: Proportional Remuneration and Subjective theory of Prices.
Consider an economy with 2 kinds of individuals, 1 & 2, and where 
there are two commodities, x & y. Individual 1 produces only X and 
his production function is: aLi. He also owns a given quantity of Y 
at the beginning of the process denoted by Y^. Individual 2 produces 
Y according to a similar production function aL2, and he too, owns 
a given quantity of x at the beginning of the process denoted by X. 
I have deliberately chosen the same productivity factor for the two 
industries so that effort will be interpreted in terms of labour 
units (hours).
Each individual has the same utility function in x,y and L. This is 
given by:
a ,y3 >0 7<0 i=l, 2
The utility maximizer individual of type 1 will have to solve the 
following problem:
M ax U(Xi,Yi,Li)=X?yfL?
S . T  ÿi=Yi+P(Xi-aLi)
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The Lagrangian will be :
L(JTi. , Li ; A ) ( Ÿi-Yi-P CXi-aL^ ) 1
And the first order conditions are as follows;
(1 ) a X f - ^ Y ( L l - X P = 0
(2) X Î 0 Y t ^ L l - X ~ O
(3) X f Y f y L r ^ ^ X P a ^ O
( i t ) 1 ^ -  r-ri-PX,+PaLi=0
Isolating X from (2) and P from (1) and substituting to get the 
following demand function:
Y ^^ P X ^ Ê
Substituting from (4) and we get I's demand for Y as:
(5) yj. |(ÿi-fPaLi)[l+|)-i
In a similar way we can calculate I's optimal effort (labour). We 
shall get:
2's problem is different in its budget constraint. Thus, 2's 
Lagrangian will be:
■L(X2,Y2,L2;X)- XtYiLl-tXlS j-yj-PATj+aLj]
And the first order conditions:
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(7) 4 ^ -  a X r ' ^ Y Î a - X P - O
•2
(9) jr|y|7L2-*tAa=0
(1 0) 1 ^. ï - Y 2 -P X 2 * a L ^ ^ 0
Following the same trail we shall find 2's demand for Y and supply 
of L
(11)
Walrasian concept of equilibrium requires the clearance of all 
markets. In our case we can learn about those conditions by examining 
the equilibrium conditions of Y. In equilibrium:
YÎ+y|.ÿ-aLj
Substituting (5) and (11) and we get the equilibrium price to be:
Ÿ 1+2 
(13) P- ]1.7
If we assumed that both individuals were similar but in their 
aversion to labour, the equilibrium price would have become:
(14) p. ÿi[l-f (1.^.2l)-'][(1.^.2Ê)(l-Jÿ)-:_Z_]
a a o a o p
Now what does 'proportional remuneration' means. In such a model 
where each individual is the producer and labourer, remuneration is 
reflected in the terms of trade. Namely, how much can he get in 
return for the products of his efforts. The numeraire in our case 
is y . Thus, as P goes up, each unit of x is worth more y's. However,
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as we can see from (13) and (14), the effort itself (which is
denoted by L as the productivity is the same) is not present in
those equations. The only effort (labour) related aspect of it is 
the aversion to work given by 7 , which, naturally, is a taste 
parameter.
From (14) we can clearly see that the greater (in absolute values) 
is I's aversion to labour, the worse are going to be his terms of
trade. 1, to remind you, produces x. The greater is his aversion
to labour the lower will P become. Which means that a unit of y will 
cost more x's (which he produces). From (6 ) we can also see the 
paradox that the more averse to labour 1 is, the more labour he will 
end up doing to maximize his utility. Thus, I think that one can 
conclude that proportional remuneration does not prevail in this 
model. The intuitive reason is that too many factors are involved. 
The decisions regarding labour and consumption are dominated by the 
same parameters- tastes- and the greater is one's dislike of labour, 
the more he has to work in order to compensate his disutility. But 
the more one works, the less favourable are his conditions in the 
market given the diminishing marginal utilities of his counterpart.
If, however, we reformulated the model as a two stage model, the 
story will be distinctly different. Suppose now that the work has 
already been done and that the two individuals appear in the market 
with what they originally had plus the direct fruits of their 
labour.
The problem for 1 becomes:
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M ax U(Xi,yi). Xfyf 
21,?1
S . T  ÿi+PaLi=yi+P-ïi 
With the following first order conditions:
aX^-^rf-XP^O
1 ^- Y i * P a L i - Y i - P X i ^ O  
From which the demand for y is being derived:
fJ. Ê l Ÿ ^ * P a L i ] l l * È ] - ^
And for 2 the Lagrangian is:
L (X j .F j;X ) .  X fy J *X (i jfa L j-F j-P F jl  
From the first order conditions we can derive the relevant demand;
y | .  i[S
Equilibrium then means:
oCŸi+aLa)
P'
)9(X2+aLi)
Now we can clearly see that prices depend on effort. Indeed, if those 
individuals were completely dependent on their labour (Yi=X2=0 ), 
then the price would have been:
In other words, remuneration would have been proportional to effort. 
Nevertheless, they would have been inversely related to it. The more 
1 works, the less favourable are his terms of trade (remuneration).
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This too, is clearly due to the property of diminishing marginal 
utility.
Of course, some injustice to the model is done here. The decisions 
about work are not brought under optimizing behaviour, they are 
simply given. To complete the picture, I should have discussed a 
form of inter-temporal optimization but due to the already 
incredible diversion, I will have to leave it out for the present.
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Conclusion
The reason I extended my analysis of the classical school beyond Adam 
Smith was that in terms of economic modelling I was not quite sure 
that he is a good representative of that school. In particular this 
is true considering my own interpretation of it. J. S. Mill, on the 
other hand, seems to be a much better representative. His partial 
equilibrium analysis of market prices and his 'cost-of-production'- 
general-equilibrium approach to natural prices appears to be much 
more in line with the various accepted interpretations of 'classical 
economics'. But this was not the only reason why I extended my 
analysis to include Mill (rather than, say, Ricardo). It was also 
Mill's standing as a Utilitarian moral theorist which attracted my 
attention.
Both his economic modelling and his utilitarianism were a source of 
worry to the status of desert within classical economics. In Adam 
Smith it was through his moral analysis of actions and the 
distinction he made between the role and motivations of the 
different classes that we were successful in using a theory of
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desert as the adhesive of his theory^. In the case of Mill it 
seems rather obvious that a utilitarian moral theory will not 
generate any kind of desert theory. His economic modelling too does 
not seem congenial to such a view. In the partial equilibrium 
setting it was his distinction between three instances of exchange^ 
which made it impossible to generalize a desert theory.
The 'cost of production' general equilibrium approach to natural 
prices poses a particular problem. First there if the question what 
is meant by 'natural prices'. If these are only long-run prices as 
some would like to seem them then it would not be meaningful to 
apply to them any ethical considerations as they might not have any 
relation to the actual state of the economy. If, however, these 
natural prices are Mill's idea of 'average' prices then it is a 
different story altogether. Although the 'average' prices may never 
prevail as such they do reflect the general actual state of the 
system. They are an equivalent idea to the gravity centre by which 
Smith described his natural price. If we do follow this latter path 
we confront the problem of interpreting proportional remuneration 
within this system given that although there seems to be a simple 
relationship between wages and the rate of profit, it is not so 
simple when we consider the share each group has in the final 
output.
1 have tried to show that one can use Mill's methodology to generate
 ^which obviously means that the theory of desert is an integral and 
important part of his theory.
^Inelastic supply, constant returns to scale and diminishing returns to 
scale: in some of them utility matters in others, cost of production.
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an explanation that will reconcile his utilitarianism with his theory 
on Liberty. In turn, this also helps to explain his adherence to a 
principle of proportional remuneration when it comes to economic 
justice. I have shown that individuality is a pre-condition to 
morality and that rewarding expressions of it is detrimental to its 
development. In that respect, the social organization of private 
property seems to be more suitable when individuals have not yet 
developed enough and therefore, proportional remuneration is a basic 
principle of such an organization. For similar reasons Mill seems to 
imply that such considerations are not necessary under a communal 
ownership as individuals must already be well developed before 
entering such a system.
Applying Mill's methodology to economics meant that we had to make 
a distinction between the social science side of economics and the 
natural science side of it. The theory of production, according to 
Mill, is in the domain of natural science and can present us with 
technological relationship between all produced commodities. Measured 
in terms of labour we can generate a labour values system which is 
not the metaphysics of prices but rather the given technological 
relationship between commodities.
Given Mill's views on deduction and the nature of the social 
sciences, we cannot really construct a general equilibrium framework 
where the activities of all individuals are inter-related. The 
reason for that is Mill's undeveloped Ethology (the theory of 
character formation) . Although society as a whole does entail such 
interrelationships, it does not prevail in the scene of economic
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analysis. Individuals' character evolve continuously in relation to 
all those things which constitute the social existence. Therefore, 
when we analyze the determinants of a market price we must do it in 
a partial equilibrium setting. What affects the behaviour of 
individuals in one market is not only what they do or what happens 
in the other markets, but also those things which are not directly 
dependent on the market. Hence, within the framework of market 
prices we cannot really establish a clear economic causal 
relationship.
But if the story ended here this would have been an uninteresting 
one. Bearing in mind that deductions in Mill are tolerated only when 
some of the premises are inferred by induction, then it is in the 
natural science side of economics that we need to anchor our 
analysis of society. One reaction to such a need could have been to 
construct an 'economic man' on the bases of 'tendencies laws'. 
However, the problem with such a view is that it shuns completely 
ethology. The 'economic man' created by such 'tendencies laws' will 
be exogenous to the economic analysis and not an evolving character 
as was clearly Mill's view. But not only that, 'tendency laws' do 
help us a bit in our deduction but this is far from sufficient to 
make deductions meaningful in terms of knowledge accumulation. For 
that, we need a firmer support from the natural sciences.
What we have from the natural science by way of interrelationship is 
only the technological labour theory of value. How, then, can w 6 \  
associated a system of markets analyzed in a partial equilibrium 
framework with a general equilibrium system that is generated by the
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natural sciences? The answer is very simply, through the 
interpretation of the natural price as the system of 'average 
prices'. As such, the 'natural price' of a commodity is an 'average' 
of the market prices depicted in the partial equilibrium framework. 
Now because production circumstances are given, it is only natural 
for all 'average' prices to converge to the 'cost of production' 
prices.
Now we have this 'cost of production' system which is a system of 
'average' prices constructed under given social institution, on the 
one hand. On the other, we have the technological labour values which 
depict the commodities technological relationships which are (in 
Mill) independent from social institutions. The analysis of what is 
economic justice will now be focused on comparing the system which 
is independent from social organizations (labour values) with a 
system which is dependent on them.
The immediate interpretation of proportional remuneration in terms
of prices is the following one: had individuals^/(labourers as well
as capitalists) received their remuneration in terms of the good 
/
they produce (or a numeraire) , they will be able to exchange it for
another according to the relative effort involved in the production 
of each commodity. On the other hand, there is also the question of 
the relative share of each group in the total output as a measure 
of remuneration. The question is, of course, whether these two
indicators point at the same direction.
When the rate of profit is set at zero then we know that prices equal
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their labour values. However, labour values include past labour as 
much as direct labour. Given the property rights and the fact that 
Mill believes in the right of capitalists to be remunerated, these 
labour values will not produce an exchange rate that fits the 
labourers point of view. Namely, relative prices (and labour values) 
will not represent the relative efforts on the part of labourers 
alone (i.e. the relative direct labour inputs). The rate of exchange 
that will correspond to the labour values is the one which is going 
to be somewhere between what proportional remuneration to labour 
implies and what it implies to capitalists (capital inputs ratios). 
Of course, if the capital to labour ratios are the same everywhere 
then the exchange rate suggested by the labour theory of value will 
correspond precisely to that of both labourers and capitalists. 
Therefore, the labour theory of value is a kind of a moral 
benchmark. It takes into consideration both capitalists and 
labourers as far as the proportional remuneration principle is 
concerned. When r>0 prices deviate from their labour values and as 
wages are being depressed, the actual exchange rate reflects the 
capitalists' point of view alone. Hence, the deviation of prices 
from their labour values should be seen as a violation of the 
principle of proportional remuneration.
t
When we consider shares in output the picture becomes a bit more 
complicated. The behaviour of total output (for a given number of 
labourers and changing wage (and profit) rates) and the shares of 
each group depends on technology. At one instance maximum output and 
highest share of labourers seem to be consistent with one another. 
It also means that prices will deviate in favour of the capitalists.
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Hence, given that the shares are working in favour of labourers, it 
might be said that the injustice generated by the price deviation is 
thus rectified. This, however, does not always hold. The idea, 
therefore, of economic justice is captured by two major components; 
the relative price and the relative share. Not always do they point
at the same direction.
In any case, I do believe that through this extrapolation we can see 
how the concept of economic justice that is based on reward can 
generate mixed feelings about the moral value of competitive systems. 
As prices deviate from labour values it implies that there is some 
kind of initial injustice in the system which may explain many of 
Mill's critical statements about capitalist systems. On the other 
hand, as the behaviour of the share in total output may sometime 
rectify this situation, it may become a tolerable system.
General Conclusion
In this work, which is part of a wider research programme, I have 
examined some of the effects that developments in economic theory 
might have had on concepts of economic justice that are associated 
with it. In particular, I have focused my attention on the concept 
of desert which seemed to have dominated human thought on economic 
justice since Aristotle and seemed to have disappeared almost 
entirely from present-day discussions of the subject.
/ I
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One possible explanation to it is the emergence of Walrasian general 
equilibrium as a dominant feature of economic theory. In it, the idea 
of simultaneity erases all traces of causality between agents' 
activities and outcome. Thus the elusiveness of responsibilities 
becomes detrimental to any theory of desert. But whether or not the 
demise of desert theories should follow from such developments in 
economic analysis also depends on what precisely is meant by general 
equilibrium (and by the concept of desert).
It matters a great deal whether the idea of general equilibrium is 
how we perceive the real world or, a 'rationalistic' tool of 
analysis. While the Walrasian notion of general equilibrium seems 
close to the latter, the 'empiricist' tradition of liberal classical 
economics implies a tendency to the former. However, in view of such 
fundamental differences in the epistemological approach, the whole 
idea of general equilibrium gets different interpretations 
altogether.
Classical economics, as represented by Adam Smith and J.S. Mill is 
a good example of models of general equilibrium (or perhaps better 
said, of interdependence) where moral responsibility cannot be 
evaded. Indeed, in the ethical analysis of those models-- conducted 
by the same people who suggested them-- the role of desert was 
prominent. Contrary to the general belief that classical economists 
advocated natural liberty for its moral goodness as much as for its 
economic efficiency, analysis by desert reveals a serious moral 
inadequacy of natural liberty. This, in turn, may explain the 
discrepancy between the received view and the fact that the works
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of classical economists are sometimes full with moral apprehensions 
about natural liberty.
Naturally, it was not only in the reconstruction of their economics 
where the room for desert was created. It was also through a 
difference in their interpretations of desert that we were able to 
argue that although interdependence is admitted, the idea of desert 
can still survive, \
Now in the appendix to the last chapter I have shown that the 
Walrasian idea of general equilibrium cannot accommodate the most 
intuitive perception of desert. Because it is a simultaneous system 
the endogenous variables which interest us (labour and prices) are 
determined by the exogenous variables. However, when we investigate 
the relationship between these endogenous variables (or when we set 
one of them to be exogenous) the relationship between them 
contradicts the most intuitive perception of desert.
One might argue that the emergence of Walrasian general equilibrium 
correspond to a more fundamental change in the subject matter of 
economics. Class distinctions became less crucial and the role of 
individuals was extended to all aspects of economic activities. 
Hence, to think of interdependence in the Walrasian way is quite 
appealing. Nevertheless, for one there is a tremendous difference 
between assuming such general interdependence and the construction 
of a simultaneous system. Also, I'm not quite convinced of how true 
a description of the world it really is. But more than that, even if 
the grounds for the Walrasian idea were the change in the subject
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matter of economic analysis it is still striking that he himself 
would adhere to a theory of desert.
But it is not only because of the structure of general equilibrium 
that we fail to apply to it an idea of desert. Some of the problem 
may lie with the rationality hypothesis. From the point of view of 
economic analysis all possible principles concerned with the internal 
composition of the range of decision making are compromisable. There 
is always an indifferent curve along which substitution is possible. 
Thus even if we resolve the issue of what precisely is meant by 
general equilibrium, we are still left with the problem of
rationality. This, to a great of extent, is a question of belief.
This work has only been a first step in my research programme. Its 
three main purposes were to show that (a) the application to
economics of ethical concepts depends on the structure of economic 
analysis; (b) that the idea of general interdependence had different 
manifestations in economic analysis which, in turn, appeared to have 
been of some importance from the moral point of view; and (c) , that 
moral apprehensions about natural liberty rather than its advocacy 
seem to be characteristic of the main classical economists.
The next step will be to investigate the meaning of the Walrasian 
notion of general equilibrium. It will require the analysis of his 
methodology, his ethics and in the end, his idea of economic justice. 
After that, the step to follow is an analysis of the question of 
relationship between the Walrasian model and the real world. In
particular, it means the analysis of the role and meaning of the
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Tâtonnement process. Once this is finished we can embark on the most 
ambitious plan of discussing the relationship between modern economic 
analysis and ethics.
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